1$NetBSD: security,v 1.1 2017/01/13 10:14:58 dholland Exp $
2
3NetBSD Security Roadmap
4=======================
5
6This roadmap discusses security-related features.
7
8The following elements, projects, and goals are considered strategic
9priorities for the project:
10
11 1. PaX aslr, mprotect, and segvguard are on by default now; this will
12    be in 8.0.
13 2. Transparent full-disk encryption (discussed in the storage roadmap)
14 3. User-switching and secure attention key (see desktop roadmap)
15
16The following elements, projects, and goals are not strategic
17priorities but are still important undertakings worth doing:
18
19 4. Security restriction framework for large/less trusted applications
20 5. Interface for location, accelerometer, and similar sensitive services
21
22
23Explanations
24============
25
26
274. Security restriction framework for large/less trusted applications
28
29Traditionally in Unix permissions go with the user logged in, and all
30programs that are run execute with the credentials and permissions of
31that user. (Except for setugid programs, which execute with additional
32permissions.)
33
34This makes sense for programs like cat(1) or grep(1) that work with
35user data in the traditional shell environment. However, it is
36unsatisfactory for large semi-trusted applications such as web
37browsers, and entirely unsuitable for 3rd-party "apps" such as found
38on phones, which routinely contain spyware.
39
40We would like to have a permissions framework that works on a
41per-application basis and allows imposing restrictions on what apps
42may do, what data apps may read, and also supports policies like
43"cannot talk on the network after reading user data".
44
45Such a framework is entirely different from traditional Unix
46permissions and requires careful thought and design. Prior art is
47mostly not very good; e.g. Android's app permissions framework is both
48not expressive enough to pose serious barriers to spyware, and too
49complicated for typical users to cope with effectively. Meanwhile,
50system-call-based restrictions like seccomp/seccomp-bpf in Linux are
51messy and complicated and hard to use effectively. OpenBSD's "pledge"
52has been widely criticized for a range of reasons. Most of these
53models also do not provide for lying to apps that demand access you
54don't want to give them.
55
56dholland was working on this with some undergrads a while back and
57there's a design that may be of some value, although the prototype
58implementation was not a success.
59
60 - As of January 2017 nobody is known to be working on this.
61 - There is currently no clear timeframe or release target.
62 - Contact dholland for further information.
63
64
655. Interface for location, accelerometer, and similar sensitive services
66
67Currently in NetBSD we have no infrastructure for the "new" hardware
68interfaces typically found in phones, like GPS location information,
69accelerometer and orientation data, and so forth.
70
71There is probably no need to invent new APIs for retrieving this data,
72but we do need a sound underlying framework with security controls in
73place, as many of these data sources provide information that is
74either sensitive or can be used to derive sensitive information.
75
76(Note also that it's been shown that location data can be derived from
77monitoring battery level so that one's also sensitive.)
78
79 - As of January 2017 nobody is known to be working on this.
80 - There is currently no clear timeframe or release target.
81 - Contact: ? (XXX)
82
83