1/*- 2 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2014-2019 Netflix Inc. 5 * 6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 8 * are met: 9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 13 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 14 * 15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 16 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 18 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 19 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 20 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 21 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 22 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 23 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 24 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 25 * SUCH DAMAGE. 26 */ 27 28#include <sys/cdefs.h> 29__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); 30 31#include "opt_inet.h" 32#include "opt_inet6.h" 33#include "opt_rss.h" 34 35#include <sys/param.h> 36#include <sys/kernel.h> 37#include <sys/domainset.h> 38#include <sys/ktls.h> 39#include <sys/lock.h> 40#include <sys/mbuf.h> 41#include <sys/mutex.h> 42#include <sys/rmlock.h> 43#include <sys/proc.h> 44#include <sys/protosw.h> 45#include <sys/refcount.h> 46#include <sys/smp.h> 47#include <sys/socket.h> 48#include <sys/socketvar.h> 49#include <sys/sysctl.h> 50#include <sys/taskqueue.h> 51#include <sys/kthread.h> 52#include <sys/uio.h> 53#include <sys/vmmeter.h> 54#if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) 55#include <machine/pcb.h> 56#endif 57#include <machine/vmparam.h> 58#include <net/if.h> 59#include <net/if_var.h> 60#ifdef RSS 61#include <net/netisr.h> 62#include <net/rss_config.h> 63#endif 64#include <net/route.h> 65#include <net/route/nhop.h> 66#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) 67#include <netinet/in.h> 68#include <netinet/in_pcb.h> 69#endif 70#include <netinet/tcp_var.h> 71#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 72#include <netinet/tcp_offload.h> 73#endif 74#include <opencrypto/xform.h> 75#include <vm/uma_dbg.h> 76#include <vm/vm.h> 77#include <vm/vm_pageout.h> 78#include <vm/vm_page.h> 79 80struct ktls_wq { 81 struct mtx mtx; 82 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) m_head; 83 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) so_head; 84 bool running; 85} __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE); 86 87struct ktls_domain_info { 88 int count; 89 int cpu[MAXCPU]; 90}; 91 92struct ktls_domain_info ktls_domains[MAXMEMDOM]; 93static struct ktls_wq *ktls_wq; 94static struct proc *ktls_proc; 95LIST_HEAD(, ktls_crypto_backend) ktls_backends; 96static struct rmlock ktls_backends_lock; 97static uma_zone_t ktls_session_zone; 98static uint16_t ktls_cpuid_lookup[MAXCPU]; 99 100SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc, OID_AUTO, tls, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 101 "Kernel TLS offload"); 102SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, stats, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 103 "Kernel TLS offload stats"); 104 105static int ktls_allow_unload; 106SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, allow_unload, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, 107 &ktls_allow_unload, 0, "Allow software crypto modules to unload"); 108 109#ifdef RSS 110static int ktls_bind_threads = 1; 111#else 112static int ktls_bind_threads; 113#endif 114SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, bind_threads, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, 115 &ktls_bind_threads, 0, 116 "Bind crypto threads to cores (1) or cores and domains (2) at boot"); 117 118static u_int ktls_maxlen = 16384; 119SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, maxlen, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 120 &ktls_maxlen, 0, "Maximum TLS record size"); 121 122static int ktls_number_threads; 123SYSCTL_INT(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, threads, CTLFLAG_RD, 124 &ktls_number_threads, 0, 125 "Number of TLS threads in thread-pool"); 126 127static bool ktls_offload_enable; 128SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 129 &ktls_offload_enable, 0, 130 "Enable support for kernel TLS offload"); 131 132static bool ktls_cbc_enable = true; 133SYSCTL_BOOL(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, cbc_enable, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 134 &ktls_cbc_enable, 1, 135 "Enable Support of AES-CBC crypto for kernel TLS"); 136 137static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_tasks_active); 138SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, tasks_active, CTLFLAG_RD, 139 &ktls_tasks_active, "Number of active tasks"); 140 141static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_tx_queued); 142SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_tx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD, 143 &ktls_cnt_tx_queued, 144 "Number of TLS records in queue to tasks for SW encryption"); 145 146static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_cnt_rx_queued); 147SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, sw_rx_inqueue, CTLFLAG_RD, 148 &ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 149 "Number of TLS sockets in queue to tasks for SW decryption"); 150 151static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_total); 152SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, offload_total, 153 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_total, 154 "Total successful TLS setups (parameters set)"); 155 156static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_enable_calls); 157SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, enable_calls, 158 CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_offload_enable_calls, 159 "Total number of TLS enable calls made"); 160 161static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_active); 162SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, active, CTLFLAG_RD, 163 &ktls_offload_active, "Total Active TLS sessions"); 164 165static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_corrupted_records); 166SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, corrupted_records, CTLFLAG_RD, 167 &ktls_offload_corrupted_records, "Total corrupted TLS records received"); 168 169static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_offload_failed_crypto); 170SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, failed_crypto, CTLFLAG_RD, 171 &ktls_offload_failed_crypto, "Total TLS crypto failures"); 172 173static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_ifnet); 174SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD, 175 &ktls_switch_to_ifnet, "TLS sessions switched from SW to ifnet"); 176 177static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_to_sw); 178SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_to_sw, CTLFLAG_RD, 179 &ktls_switch_to_sw, "TLS sessions switched from ifnet to SW"); 180 181static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_switch_failed); 182SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, switch_failed, CTLFLAG_RD, 183 &ktls_switch_failed, "TLS sessions unable to switch between SW and ifnet"); 184 185SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, sw, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 186 "Software TLS session stats"); 187SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, ifnet, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 188 "Hardware (ifnet) TLS session stats"); 189#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 190SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls, OID_AUTO, toe, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, 191 "TOE TLS session stats"); 192#endif 193 194static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_cbc); 195SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_cbc, 196 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-CBC"); 197 198static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_sw_gcm); 199SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_sw, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, &ktls_sw_gcm, 200 "Active number of software TLS sessions using AES-GCM"); 201 202static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_cbc); 203SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, 204 &ktls_ifnet_cbc, 205 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-CBC"); 206 207static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_gcm); 208SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, 209 &ktls_ifnet_gcm, 210 "Active number of ifnet TLS sessions using AES-GCM"); 211 212static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset); 213SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset, CTLFLAG_RD, 214 &ktls_ifnet_reset, "TLS sessions updated to a new ifnet send tag"); 215 216static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped); 217SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_dropped, CTLFLAG_RD, 218 &ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 219 "TLS sessions dropped after failing to update ifnet send tag"); 220 221static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed); 222SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, reset_failed, CTLFLAG_RD, 223 &ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 224 "TLS sessions that failed to allocate a new ifnet send tag"); 225 226static int ktls_ifnet_permitted; 227SYSCTL_UINT(_kern_ipc_tls_ifnet, OID_AUTO, permitted, CTLFLAG_RWTUN, 228 &ktls_ifnet_permitted, 1, 229 "Whether to permit hardware (ifnet) TLS sessions"); 230 231#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 232static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_cbc); 233SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, cbc, CTLFLAG_RD, 234 &ktls_toe_cbc, 235 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-CBC"); 236 237static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ktls_toe_gcm); 238SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_toe, OID_AUTO, gcm, CTLFLAG_RD, 239 &ktls_toe_gcm, 240 "Active number of TOE TLS sessions using AES-GCM"); 241#endif 242 243static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTLS, "ktls", "Kernel TLS"); 244 245static void ktls_cleanup(struct ktls_session *tls); 246#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) 247static void ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending); 248#endif 249static void ktls_work_thread(void *ctx); 250 251int 252ktls_crypto_backend_register(struct ktls_crypto_backend *be) 253{ 254 struct ktls_crypto_backend *curr_be, *tmp; 255 256 if (be->api_version != KTLS_API_VERSION) { 257 printf("KTLS: API version mismatch (%d vs %d) for %s\n", 258 be->api_version, KTLS_API_VERSION, 259 be->name); 260 return (EINVAL); 261 } 262 263 rm_wlock(&ktls_backends_lock); 264 printf("KTLS: Registering crypto method %s with prio %d\n", 265 be->name, be->prio); 266 if (LIST_EMPTY(&ktls_backends)) { 267 LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&ktls_backends, be, next); 268 } else { 269 LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(curr_be, &ktls_backends, next, tmp) { 270 if (curr_be->prio < be->prio) { 271 LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(curr_be, be, next); 272 break; 273 } 274 if (LIST_NEXT(curr_be, next) == NULL) { 275 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(curr_be, be, next); 276 break; 277 } 278 } 279 } 280 rm_wunlock(&ktls_backends_lock); 281 return (0); 282} 283 284int 285ktls_crypto_backend_deregister(struct ktls_crypto_backend *be) 286{ 287 struct ktls_crypto_backend *tmp; 288 289 /* 290 * Don't error if the backend isn't registered. This permits 291 * MOD_UNLOAD handlers to use this function unconditionally. 292 */ 293 rm_wlock(&ktls_backends_lock); 294 LIST_FOREACH(tmp, &ktls_backends, next) { 295 if (tmp == be) 296 break; 297 } 298 if (tmp == NULL) { 299 rm_wunlock(&ktls_backends_lock); 300 return (0); 301 } 302 303 if (!ktls_allow_unload) { 304 rm_wunlock(&ktls_backends_lock); 305 printf( 306 "KTLS: Deregistering crypto method %s is not supported\n", 307 be->name); 308 return (EBUSY); 309 } 310 311 if (be->use_count) { 312 rm_wunlock(&ktls_backends_lock); 313 return (EBUSY); 314 } 315 316 LIST_REMOVE(be, next); 317 rm_wunlock(&ktls_backends_lock); 318 return (0); 319} 320 321#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) 322static u_int 323ktls_get_cpu(struct socket *so) 324{ 325 struct inpcb *inp; 326#ifdef NUMA 327 struct ktls_domain_info *di; 328#endif 329 u_int cpuid; 330 331 inp = sotoinpcb(so); 332#ifdef RSS 333 cpuid = rss_hash2cpuid(inp->inp_flowid, inp->inp_flowtype); 334 if (cpuid != NETISR_CPUID_NONE) 335 return (cpuid); 336#endif 337 /* 338 * Just use the flowid to shard connections in a repeatable 339 * fashion. Note that some crypto backends rely on the 340 * serialization provided by having the same connection use 341 * the same queue. 342 */ 343#ifdef NUMA 344 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1 && inp->inp_numa_domain != M_NODOM) { 345 di = &ktls_domains[inp->inp_numa_domain]; 346 cpuid = di->cpu[inp->inp_flowid % di->count]; 347 } else 348#endif 349 cpuid = ktls_cpuid_lookup[inp->inp_flowid % ktls_number_threads]; 350 return (cpuid); 351} 352#endif 353 354static void 355ktls_init(void *dummy __unused) 356{ 357 struct thread *td; 358 struct pcpu *pc; 359 cpuset_t mask; 360 int count, domain, error, i; 361 362 rm_init(&ktls_backends_lock, "ktls backends"); 363 LIST_INIT(&ktls_backends); 364 365 ktls_wq = malloc(sizeof(*ktls_wq) * (mp_maxid + 1), M_KTLS, 366 M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); 367 368 ktls_session_zone = uma_zcreate("ktls_session", 369 sizeof(struct ktls_session), 370 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 371 UMA_ALIGN_CACHE, 0); 372 373 /* 374 * Initialize the workqueues to run the TLS work. We create a 375 * work queue for each CPU. 376 */ 377 CPU_FOREACH(i) { 378 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].m_head); 379 STAILQ_INIT(&ktls_wq[i].so_head); 380 mtx_init(&ktls_wq[i].mtx, "ktls work queue", NULL, MTX_DEF); 381 error = kproc_kthread_add(ktls_work_thread, &ktls_wq[i], 382 &ktls_proc, &td, 0, 0, "KTLS", "thr_%d", i); 383 if (error) 384 panic("Can't add KTLS thread %d error %d", i, error); 385 386 /* 387 * Bind threads to cores. If ktls_bind_threads is > 388 * 1, then we bind to the NUMA domain. 389 */ 390 if (ktls_bind_threads) { 391 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) { 392 pc = pcpu_find(i); 393 domain = pc->pc_domain; 394 CPU_COPY(&cpuset_domain[domain], &mask); 395 count = ktls_domains[domain].count; 396 ktls_domains[domain].cpu[count] = i; 397 ktls_domains[domain].count++; 398 } else { 399 CPU_SETOF(i, &mask); 400 } 401 error = cpuset_setthread(td->td_tid, &mask); 402 if (error) 403 panic( 404 "Unable to bind KTLS thread for CPU %d error %d", 405 i, error); 406 } 407 ktls_cpuid_lookup[ktls_number_threads] = i; 408 ktls_number_threads++; 409 } 410 411 /* 412 * If we somehow have an empty domain, fall back to choosing 413 * among all KTLS threads. 414 */ 415 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) { 416 for (i = 0; i < vm_ndomains; i++) { 417 if (ktls_domains[i].count == 0) { 418 ktls_bind_threads = 1; 419 break; 420 } 421 } 422 } 423 424 if (bootverbose) 425 printf("KTLS: Initialized %d threads\n", ktls_number_threads); 426} 427SYSINIT(ktls, SI_SUB_SMP + 1, SI_ORDER_ANY, ktls_init, NULL); 428 429#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) 430static int 431ktls_create_session(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en, 432 struct ktls_session **tlsp) 433{ 434 struct ktls_session *tls; 435 int error; 436 437 /* Only TLS 1.0 - 1.3 are supported. */ 438 if (en->tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) 439 return (EINVAL); 440 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO || 441 en->tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 442 return (EINVAL); 443 444 if (en->auth_key_len < 0 || en->auth_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE) 445 return (EINVAL); 446 if (en->cipher_key_len < 0 || en->cipher_key_len > TLS_MAX_PARAM_SIZE) 447 return (EINVAL); 448 if (en->iv_len < 0 || en->iv_len > sizeof(tls->params.iv)) 449 return (EINVAL); 450 451 /* All supported algorithms require a cipher key. */ 452 if (en->cipher_key_len == 0) 453 return (EINVAL); 454 455 /* No flags are currently supported. */ 456 if (en->flags != 0) 457 return (EINVAL); 458 459 /* Common checks for supported algorithms. */ 460 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) { 461 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 462 /* 463 * auth_algorithm isn't used, but permit GMAC values 464 * for compatibility. 465 */ 466 switch (en->auth_algorithm) { 467 case 0: 468#ifdef COMPAT_FREEBSD12 469 /* XXX: Really 13.0-current COMPAT. */ 470 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC: 471 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC: 472 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC: 473#endif 474 break; 475 default: 476 return (EINVAL); 477 } 478 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) 479 return (EINVAL); 480 if ((en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO && 481 en->iv_len != TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN) || 482 (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE && 483 en->iv_len != TLS_1_3_GCM_IV_LEN)) 484 return (EINVAL); 485 break; 486 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 487 switch (en->auth_algorithm) { 488 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: 489 /* 490 * TLS 1.0 requires an implicit IV. TLS 1.1+ 491 * all use explicit IVs. 492 */ 493 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) { 494 if (en->iv_len != TLS_CBC_IMPLICIT_IV_LEN) 495 return (EINVAL); 496 break; 497 } 498 499 /* FALLTHROUGH */ 500 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: 501 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: 502 /* Ignore any supplied IV. */ 503 en->iv_len = 0; 504 break; 505 default: 506 return (EINVAL); 507 } 508 if (en->auth_key_len == 0) 509 return (EINVAL); 510 break; 511 default: 512 return (EINVAL); 513 } 514 515 tls = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); 516 517 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1); 518 519 refcount_init(&tls->refcount, 1); 520 TASK_INIT(&tls->reset_tag_task, 0, ktls_reset_send_tag, tls); 521 522 tls->wq_index = ktls_get_cpu(so); 523 524 tls->params.cipher_algorithm = en->cipher_algorithm; 525 tls->params.auth_algorithm = en->auth_algorithm; 526 tls->params.tls_vmajor = en->tls_vmajor; 527 tls->params.tls_vminor = en->tls_vminor; 528 tls->params.flags = en->flags; 529 tls->params.max_frame_len = min(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2, ktls_maxlen); 530 531 /* Set the header and trailer lengths. */ 532 tls->params.tls_hlen = sizeof(struct tls_record_layer); 533 switch (en->cipher_algorithm) { 534 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 535 /* 536 * TLS 1.2 uses a 4 byte implicit IV with an explicit 8 byte 537 * nonce. TLS 1.3 uses a 12 byte implicit IV. 538 */ 539 if (en->tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 540 tls->params.tls_hlen += sizeof(uint64_t); 541 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN; 542 543 /* 544 * TLS 1.3 includes optional padding which we 545 * do not support, and also puts the "real" record 546 * type at the end of the encrypted data. 547 */ 548 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 549 tls->params.tls_tlen += sizeof(uint8_t); 550 551 tls->params.tls_bs = 1; 552 break; 553 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 554 switch (en->auth_algorithm) { 555 case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: 556 if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) { 557 /* Implicit IV, no nonce. */ 558 } else { 559 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN; 560 } 561 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN + 562 SHA1_HASH_LEN; 563 break; 564 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: 565 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN; 566 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN + 567 SHA2_256_HASH_LEN; 568 break; 569 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: 570 tls->params.tls_hlen += AES_BLOCK_LEN; 571 tls->params.tls_tlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN + 572 SHA2_384_HASH_LEN; 573 break; 574 default: 575 panic("invalid hmac"); 576 } 577 tls->params.tls_bs = AES_BLOCK_LEN; 578 break; 579 default: 580 panic("invalid cipher"); 581 } 582 583 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_hlen <= MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN, 584 ("TLS header length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_hlen)); 585 KASSERT(tls->params.tls_tlen <= MBUF_PEXT_TRAIL_LEN, 586 ("TLS trailer length too long: %d", tls->params.tls_tlen)); 587 588 if (en->auth_key_len != 0) { 589 tls->params.auth_key_len = en->auth_key_len; 590 tls->params.auth_key = malloc(en->auth_key_len, M_KTLS, 591 M_WAITOK); 592 error = copyin(en->auth_key, tls->params.auth_key, 593 en->auth_key_len); 594 if (error) 595 goto out; 596 } 597 598 tls->params.cipher_key_len = en->cipher_key_len; 599 tls->params.cipher_key = malloc(en->cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, M_WAITOK); 600 error = copyin(en->cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key, 601 en->cipher_key_len); 602 if (error) 603 goto out; 604 605 /* 606 * This holds the implicit portion of the nonce for GCM and 607 * the initial implicit IV for TLS 1.0. The explicit portions 608 * of the IV are generated in ktls_frame(). 609 */ 610 if (en->iv_len != 0) { 611 tls->params.iv_len = en->iv_len; 612 error = copyin(en->iv, tls->params.iv, en->iv_len); 613 if (error) 614 goto out; 615 616 /* 617 * For TLS 1.2, generate an 8-byte nonce as a counter 618 * to generate unique explicit IVs. 619 * 620 * Store this counter in the last 8 bytes of the IV 621 * array so that it is 8-byte aligned. 622 */ 623 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 && 624 en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) 625 arc4rand(tls->params.iv + 8, sizeof(uint64_t), 0); 626 } 627 628 *tlsp = tls; 629 return (0); 630 631out: 632 ktls_cleanup(tls); 633 return (error); 634} 635 636static struct ktls_session * 637ktls_clone_session(struct ktls_session *tls) 638{ 639 struct ktls_session *tls_new; 640 641 tls_new = uma_zalloc(ktls_session_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); 642 643 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, 1); 644 645 refcount_init(&tls_new->refcount, 1); 646 647 /* Copy fields from existing session. */ 648 tls_new->params = tls->params; 649 tls_new->wq_index = tls->wq_index; 650 651 /* Deep copy keys. */ 652 if (tls_new->params.auth_key != NULL) { 653 tls_new->params.auth_key = malloc(tls->params.auth_key_len, 654 M_KTLS, M_WAITOK); 655 memcpy(tls_new->params.auth_key, tls->params.auth_key, 656 tls->params.auth_key_len); 657 } 658 659 tls_new->params.cipher_key = malloc(tls->params.cipher_key_len, M_KTLS, 660 M_WAITOK); 661 memcpy(tls_new->params.cipher_key, tls->params.cipher_key, 662 tls->params.cipher_key_len); 663 664 return (tls_new); 665} 666#endif 667 668static void 669ktls_cleanup(struct ktls_session *tls) 670{ 671 672 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_active, -1); 673 switch (tls->mode) { 674 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW: 675 MPASS(tls->be != NULL); 676 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 677 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 678 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, -1); 679 break; 680 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 681 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, -1); 682 break; 683 } 684 tls->free(tls); 685 break; 686 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET: 687 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 688 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 689 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, -1); 690 break; 691 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 692 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, -1); 693 break; 694 } 695 if (tls->snd_tag != NULL) 696 m_snd_tag_rele(tls->snd_tag); 697 break; 698#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 699 case TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE: 700 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 701 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 702 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, -1); 703 break; 704 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 705 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, -1); 706 break; 707 } 708 break; 709#endif 710 } 711 if (tls->params.auth_key != NULL) { 712 zfree(tls->params.auth_key, M_KTLS); 713 tls->params.auth_key = NULL; 714 tls->params.auth_key_len = 0; 715 } 716 if (tls->params.cipher_key != NULL) { 717 zfree(tls->params.cipher_key, M_KTLS); 718 tls->params.cipher_key = NULL; 719 tls->params.cipher_key_len = 0; 720 } 721 explicit_bzero(tls->params.iv, sizeof(tls->params.iv)); 722} 723 724#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6) 725 726#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 727static int 728ktls_try_toe(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction) 729{ 730 struct inpcb *inp; 731 struct tcpcb *tp; 732 int error; 733 734 inp = so->so_pcb; 735 INP_WLOCK(inp); 736 if (inp->inp_flags2 & INP_FREED) { 737 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 738 return (ECONNRESET); 739 } 740 if (inp->inp_flags & (INP_TIMEWAIT | INP_DROPPED)) { 741 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 742 return (ECONNRESET); 743 } 744 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) { 745 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 746 return (ECONNRESET); 747 } 748 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 749 if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_TOE)) { 750 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 751 return (EOPNOTSUPP); 752 } 753 754 error = tcp_offload_alloc_tls_session(tp, tls, direction); 755 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 756 if (error == 0) { 757 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_TOE; 758 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 759 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 760 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_cbc, 1); 761 break; 762 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 763 counter_u64_add(ktls_toe_gcm, 1); 764 break; 765 } 766 } 767 return (error); 768} 769#endif 770 771/* 772 * Common code used when first enabling ifnet TLS on a connection or 773 * when allocating a new ifnet TLS session due to a routing change. 774 * This function allocates a new TLS send tag on whatever interface 775 * the connection is currently routed over. 776 */ 777static int 778ktls_alloc_snd_tag(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls, bool force, 779 struct m_snd_tag **mstp) 780{ 781 union if_snd_tag_alloc_params params; 782 struct ifnet *ifp; 783 struct nhop_object *nh; 784 struct tcpcb *tp; 785 int error; 786 787 INP_RLOCK(inp); 788 if (inp->inp_flags2 & INP_FREED) { 789 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 790 return (ECONNRESET); 791 } 792 if (inp->inp_flags & (INP_TIMEWAIT | INP_DROPPED)) { 793 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 794 return (ECONNRESET); 795 } 796 if (inp->inp_socket == NULL) { 797 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 798 return (ECONNRESET); 799 } 800 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 801 802 /* 803 * Check administrative controls on ifnet TLS to determine if 804 * ifnet TLS should be denied. 805 * 806 * - Always permit 'force' requests. 807 * - ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0: always deny. 808 */ 809 if (!force && ktls_ifnet_permitted == 0) { 810 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 811 return (ENXIO); 812 } 813 814 /* 815 * XXX: Use the cached route in the inpcb to find the 816 * interface. This should perhaps instead use 817 * rtalloc1_fib(dst, 0, 0, fibnum). Since KTLS is only 818 * enabled after a connection has completed key negotiation in 819 * userland, the cached route will be present in practice. 820 */ 821 nh = inp->inp_route.ro_nh; 822 if (nh == NULL) { 823 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 824 return (ENXIO); 825 } 826 ifp = nh->nh_ifp; 827 if_ref(ifp); 828 829 /* 830 * Allocate a TLS + ratelimit tag if the connection has an 831 * existing pacing rate. 832 */ 833 if (tp->t_pacing_rate != -1 && 834 (ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_TXTLS_RTLMT) != 0) { 835 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT; 836 params.tls_rate_limit.inp = inp; 837 params.tls_rate_limit.tls = tls; 838 params.tls_rate_limit.max_rate = tp->t_pacing_rate; 839 } else { 840 params.hdr.type = IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS; 841 params.tls.inp = inp; 842 params.tls.tls = tls; 843 } 844 params.hdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid; 845 params.hdr.flowtype = inp->inp_flowtype; 846 params.hdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain; 847 INP_RUNLOCK(inp); 848 849 if ((ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_MEXTPG) == 0) { 850 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 851 goto out; 852 } 853 if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) { 854 if ((ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_TXTLS6) == 0) { 855 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 856 goto out; 857 } 858 } else { 859 if ((ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_TXTLS4) == 0) { 860 error = EOPNOTSUPP; 861 goto out; 862 } 863 } 864 error = m_snd_tag_alloc(ifp, ¶ms, mstp); 865out: 866 if_rele(ifp); 867 return (error); 868} 869 870static int 871ktls_try_ifnet(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, bool force) 872{ 873 struct m_snd_tag *mst; 874 int error; 875 876 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(so->so_pcb, tls, force, &mst); 877 if (error == 0) { 878 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET; 879 tls->snd_tag = mst; 880 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 881 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 882 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_cbc, 1); 883 break; 884 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 885 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_gcm, 1); 886 break; 887 } 888 } 889 return (error); 890} 891 892static int 893ktls_try_sw(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction) 894{ 895 struct rm_priotracker prio; 896 struct ktls_crypto_backend *be; 897 898 /* 899 * Choose the best software crypto backend. Backends are 900 * stored in sorted priority order (larget value == most 901 * important at the head of the list), so this just stops on 902 * the first backend that claims the session by returning 903 * success. 904 */ 905 if (ktls_allow_unload) 906 rm_rlock(&ktls_backends_lock, &prio); 907 LIST_FOREACH(be, &ktls_backends, next) { 908 if (be->try(so, tls, direction) == 0) 909 break; 910 KASSERT(tls->cipher == NULL, 911 ("ktls backend leaked a cipher pointer")); 912 } 913 if (be != NULL) { 914 if (ktls_allow_unload) 915 be->use_count++; 916 tls->be = be; 917 } 918 if (ktls_allow_unload) 919 rm_runlock(&ktls_backends_lock, &prio); 920 if (be == NULL) 921 return (EOPNOTSUPP); 922 tls->mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_SW; 923 switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) { 924 case CRYPTO_AES_CBC: 925 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_cbc, 1); 926 break; 927 case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16: 928 counter_u64_add(ktls_sw_gcm, 1); 929 break; 930 } 931 return (0); 932} 933 934/* 935 * KTLS RX stores data in the socket buffer as a list of TLS records, 936 * where each record is stored as a control message containg the TLS 937 * header followed by data mbufs containing the decrypted data. This 938 * is different from KTLS TX which always uses an mb_ext_pgs mbuf for 939 * both encrypted and decrypted data. TLS records decrypted by a NIC 940 * should be queued to the socket buffer as records, but encrypted 941 * data which needs to be decrypted by software arrives as a stream of 942 * regular mbufs which need to be converted. In addition, there may 943 * already be pending encrypted data in the socket buffer when KTLS RX 944 * is enabled. 945 * 946 * To manage not-yet-decrypted data for KTLS RX, the following scheme 947 * is used: 948 * 949 * - A single chain of NOTREADY mbufs is hung off of sb_mtls. 950 * 951 * - ktls_check_rx checks this chain of mbufs reading the TLS header 952 * from the first mbuf. Once all of the data for that TLS record is 953 * queued, the socket is queued to a worker thread. 954 * 955 * - The worker thread calls ktls_decrypt to decrypt TLS records in 956 * the TLS chain. Each TLS record is detached from the TLS chain, 957 * decrypted, and inserted into the regular socket buffer chain as 958 * record starting with a control message holding the TLS header and 959 * a chain of mbufs holding the encrypted data. 960 */ 961 962static void 963sb_mark_notready(struct sockbuf *sb) 964{ 965 struct mbuf *m; 966 967 m = sb->sb_mb; 968 sb->sb_mtls = m; 969 sb->sb_mb = NULL; 970 sb->sb_mbtail = NULL; 971 sb->sb_lastrecord = NULL; 972 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) { 973 KASSERT(m->m_nextpkt == NULL, ("%s: m_nextpkt != NULL", 974 __func__)); 975 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_NOTAVAIL) == 0, ("%s: mbuf not avail", 976 __func__)); 977 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc >= m->m_len, ("%s: sb_acc < m->m_len", 978 __func__)); 979 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY; 980 sb->sb_acc -= m->m_len; 981 sb->sb_tlscc += m->m_len; 982 sb->sb_mtlstail = m; 983 } 984 KASSERT(sb->sb_acc == 0 && sb->sb_tlscc == sb->sb_ccc, 985 ("%s: acc %u tlscc %u ccc %u", __func__, sb->sb_acc, sb->sb_tlscc, 986 sb->sb_ccc)); 987} 988 989int 990ktls_enable_rx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en) 991{ 992 struct ktls_session *tls; 993 int error; 994 995 if (!ktls_offload_enable) 996 return (ENOTSUP); 997 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 998 return (EINVAL); 999 1000 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1); 1001 1002 /* 1003 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option 1004 * invokes this function. 1005 */ 1006 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP) 1007 return (EINVAL); 1008 1009 /* 1010 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit 1011 * this to support rekeying in the future. 1012 */ 1013 if (so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info != NULL) 1014 return (EALREADY); 1015 1016 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable) 1017 return (ENOTSUP); 1018 1019 /* TLS 1.3 is not yet supported. */ 1020 if (en->tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE && 1021 en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE) 1022 return (ENOTSUP); 1023 1024 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls); 1025 if (error) 1026 return (error); 1027 1028#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 1029 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_RX); 1030 if (error) 1031#endif 1032 error = ktls_try_sw(so, tls, KTLS_RX); 1033 1034 if (error) { 1035 ktls_cleanup(tls); 1036 return (error); 1037 } 1038 1039 /* Mark the socket as using TLS offload. */ 1040 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1041 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq); 1042 so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info = tls; 1043 so->so_rcv.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX; 1044 1045 /* Mark existing data as not ready until it can be decrypted. */ 1046 sb_mark_notready(&so->so_rcv); 1047 ktls_check_rx(&so->so_rcv); 1048 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1049 1050 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1); 1051 1052 return (0); 1053} 1054 1055int 1056ktls_enable_tx(struct socket *so, struct tls_enable *en) 1057{ 1058 struct ktls_session *tls; 1059 struct inpcb *inp; 1060 int error; 1061 1062 if (!ktls_offload_enable) 1063 return (ENOTSUP); 1064 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 1065 return (EINVAL); 1066 1067 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_enable_calls, 1); 1068 1069 /* 1070 * This should always be true since only the TCP socket option 1071 * invokes this function. 1072 */ 1073 if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP) 1074 return (EINVAL); 1075 1076 /* 1077 * XXX: Don't overwrite existing sessions. We should permit 1078 * this to support rekeying in the future. 1079 */ 1080 if (so->so_snd.sb_tls_info != NULL) 1081 return (EALREADY); 1082 1083 if (en->cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && !ktls_cbc_enable) 1084 return (ENOTSUP); 1085 1086 /* TLS requires ext pgs */ 1087 if (mb_use_ext_pgs == 0) 1088 return (ENXIO); 1089 1090 error = ktls_create_session(so, en, &tls); 1091 if (error) 1092 return (error); 1093 1094 /* Prefer TOE -> ifnet TLS -> software TLS. */ 1095#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD 1096 error = ktls_try_toe(so, tls, KTLS_TX); 1097 if (error) 1098#endif 1099 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls, false); 1100 if (error) 1101 error = ktls_try_sw(so, tls, KTLS_TX); 1102 1103 if (error) { 1104 ktls_cleanup(tls); 1105 return (error); 1106 } 1107 1108 error = sblock(&so->so_snd, SBL_WAIT); 1109 if (error) { 1110 ktls_cleanup(tls); 1111 return (error); 1112 } 1113 1114 /* 1115 * Write lock the INP when setting sb_tls_info so that 1116 * routines in tcp_ratelimit.c can read sb_tls_info while 1117 * holding the INP lock. 1118 */ 1119 inp = so->so_pcb; 1120 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1121 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd); 1122 so->so_snd.sb_tls_seqno = be64dec(en->rec_seq); 1123 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls; 1124 if (tls->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) 1125 so->so_snd.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_IFNET; 1126 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1127 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1128 sbunlock(&so->so_snd); 1129 1130 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_total, 1); 1131 1132 return (0); 1133} 1134 1135int 1136ktls_get_rx_mode(struct socket *so) 1137{ 1138 struct ktls_session *tls; 1139 struct inpcb *inp; 1140 int mode; 1141 1142 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 1143 return (EINVAL); 1144 inp = so->so_pcb; 1145 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1146 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1147 tls = so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info; 1148 if (tls == NULL) 1149 mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE; 1150 else 1151 mode = tls->mode; 1152 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_rcv); 1153 return (mode); 1154} 1155 1156int 1157ktls_get_tx_mode(struct socket *so) 1158{ 1159 struct ktls_session *tls; 1160 struct inpcb *inp; 1161 int mode; 1162 1163 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 1164 return (EINVAL); 1165 inp = so->so_pcb; 1166 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1167 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd); 1168 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info; 1169 if (tls == NULL) 1170 mode = TCP_TLS_MODE_NONE; 1171 else 1172 mode = tls->mode; 1173 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1174 return (mode); 1175} 1176 1177/* 1178 * Switch between SW and ifnet TLS sessions as requested. 1179 */ 1180int 1181ktls_set_tx_mode(struct socket *so, int mode) 1182{ 1183 struct ktls_session *tls, *tls_new; 1184 struct inpcb *inp; 1185 int error; 1186 1187 if (SOLISTENING(so)) 1188 return (EINVAL); 1189 switch (mode) { 1190 case TCP_TLS_MODE_SW: 1191 case TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET: 1192 break; 1193 default: 1194 return (EINVAL); 1195 } 1196 1197 inp = so->so_pcb; 1198 INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1199 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd); 1200 tls = so->so_snd.sb_tls_info; 1201 if (tls == NULL) { 1202 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1203 return (0); 1204 } 1205 1206 if (tls->mode == mode) { 1207 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1208 return (0); 1209 } 1210 1211 tls = ktls_hold(tls); 1212 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1213 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1214 1215 tls_new = ktls_clone_session(tls); 1216 1217 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) 1218 error = ktls_try_ifnet(so, tls_new, true); 1219 else 1220 error = ktls_try_sw(so, tls_new, KTLS_TX); 1221 if (error) { 1222 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1); 1223 ktls_free(tls_new); 1224 ktls_free(tls); 1225 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1226 return (error); 1227 } 1228 1229 error = sblock(&so->so_snd, SBL_WAIT); 1230 if (error) { 1231 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1); 1232 ktls_free(tls_new); 1233 ktls_free(tls); 1234 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1235 return (error); 1236 } 1237 1238 /* 1239 * If we raced with another session change, keep the existing 1240 * session. 1241 */ 1242 if (tls != so->so_snd.sb_tls_info) { 1243 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_failed, 1); 1244 sbunlock(&so->so_snd); 1245 ktls_free(tls_new); 1246 ktls_free(tls); 1247 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1248 return (EBUSY); 1249 } 1250 1251 SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd); 1252 so->so_snd.sb_tls_info = tls_new; 1253 if (tls_new->mode != TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) 1254 so->so_snd.sb_flags |= SB_TLS_IFNET; 1255 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd); 1256 sbunlock(&so->so_snd); 1257 1258 /* 1259 * Drop two references on 'tls'. The first is for the 1260 * ktls_hold() above. The second drops the reference from the 1261 * socket buffer. 1262 */ 1263 KASSERT(tls->refcount >= 2, ("too few references on old session")); 1264 ktls_free(tls); 1265 ktls_free(tls); 1266 1267 if (mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET) 1268 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_ifnet, 1); 1269 else 1270 counter_u64_add(ktls_switch_to_sw, 1); 1271 1272 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1273 return (0); 1274} 1275 1276/* 1277 * Try to allocate a new TLS send tag. This task is scheduled when 1278 * ip_output detects a route change while trying to transmit a packet 1279 * holding a TLS record. If a new tag is allocated, replace the tag 1280 * in the TLS session. Subsequent packets on the connection will use 1281 * the new tag. If a new tag cannot be allocated, drop the 1282 * connection. 1283 */ 1284static void 1285ktls_reset_send_tag(void *context, int pending) 1286{ 1287 struct epoch_tracker et; 1288 struct ktls_session *tls; 1289 struct m_snd_tag *old, *new; 1290 struct inpcb *inp; 1291 struct tcpcb *tp; 1292 int error; 1293 1294 MPASS(pending == 1); 1295 1296 tls = context; 1297 inp = tls->inp; 1298 1299 /* 1300 * Free the old tag first before allocating a new one. 1301 * ip[6]_output_send() will treat a NULL send tag the same as 1302 * an ifp mismatch and drop packets until a new tag is 1303 * allocated. 1304 * 1305 * Write-lock the INP when changing tls->snd_tag since 1306 * ip[6]_output_send() holds a read-lock when reading the 1307 * pointer. 1308 */ 1309 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1310 old = tls->snd_tag; 1311 tls->snd_tag = NULL; 1312 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1313 if (old != NULL) 1314 m_snd_tag_rele(old); 1315 1316 error = ktls_alloc_snd_tag(inp, tls, true, &new); 1317 1318 if (error == 0) { 1319 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1320 tls->snd_tag = new; 1321 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1322 tls->reset_pending = false; 1323 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1324 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp)) 1325 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1326 1327 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset, 1); 1328 1329 /* 1330 * XXX: Should we kick tcp_output explicitly now that 1331 * the send tag is fixed or just rely on timers? 1332 */ 1333 } else { 1334 NET_EPOCH_ENTER(et); 1335 INP_WLOCK(inp); 1336 if (!in_pcbrele_wlocked(inp)) { 1337 if (!(inp->inp_flags & INP_TIMEWAIT) && 1338 !(inp->inp_flags & INP_DROPPED)) { 1339 tp = intotcpcb(inp); 1340 CURVNET_SET(tp->t_vnet); 1341 tp = tcp_drop(tp, ECONNABORTED); 1342 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 1343 if (tp != NULL) 1344 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1345 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_dropped, 1); 1346 } else 1347 INP_WUNLOCK(inp); 1348 } 1349 NET_EPOCH_EXIT(et); 1350 1351 counter_u64_add(ktls_ifnet_reset_failed, 1); 1352 1353 /* 1354 * Leave reset_pending true to avoid future tasks while 1355 * the socket goes away. 1356 */ 1357 } 1358 1359 ktls_free(tls); 1360} 1361 1362int 1363ktls_output_eagain(struct inpcb *inp, struct ktls_session *tls) 1364{ 1365 1366 if (inp == NULL) 1367 return (ENOBUFS); 1368 1369 INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); 1370 1371 /* 1372 * See if we should schedule a task to update the send tag for 1373 * this session. 1374 */ 1375 mtx_pool_lock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1376 if (!tls->reset_pending) { 1377 (void) ktls_hold(tls); 1378 in_pcbref(inp); 1379 tls->inp = inp; 1380 tls->reset_pending = true; 1381 taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &tls->reset_tag_task); 1382 } 1383 mtx_pool_unlock(mtxpool_sleep, tls); 1384 return (ENOBUFS); 1385} 1386 1387#ifdef RATELIMIT 1388int 1389ktls_modify_txrtlmt(struct ktls_session *tls, uint64_t max_pacing_rate) 1390{ 1391 union if_snd_tag_modify_params params = { 1392 .rate_limit.max_rate = max_pacing_rate, 1393 .rate_limit.flags = M_NOWAIT, 1394 }; 1395 struct m_snd_tag *mst; 1396 struct ifnet *ifp; 1397 int error; 1398 1399 /* Can't get to the inp, but it should be locked. */ 1400 /* INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp); */ 1401 1402 MPASS(tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_IFNET); 1403 1404 if (tls->snd_tag == NULL) { 1405 /* 1406 * Resetting send tag, ignore this change. The 1407 * pending reset may or may not see this updated rate 1408 * in the tcpcb. If it doesn't, we will just lose 1409 * this rate change. 1410 */ 1411 return (0); 1412 } 1413 1414 MPASS(tls->snd_tag != NULL); 1415 MPASS(tls->snd_tag->type == IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS_RATE_LIMIT); 1416 1417 mst = tls->snd_tag; 1418 ifp = mst->ifp; 1419 return (ifp->if_snd_tag_modify(mst, ¶ms)); 1420} 1421#endif 1422#endif 1423 1424void 1425ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session *tls) 1426{ 1427 struct rm_priotracker prio; 1428 1429 ktls_cleanup(tls); 1430 if (tls->be != NULL && ktls_allow_unload) { 1431 rm_rlock(&ktls_backends_lock, &prio); 1432 tls->be->use_count--; 1433 rm_runlock(&ktls_backends_lock, &prio); 1434 } 1435 uma_zfree(ktls_session_zone, tls); 1436} 1437 1438void 1439ktls_seq(struct sockbuf *sb, struct mbuf *m) 1440{ 1441 1442 for (; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) { 1443 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0, 1444 ("ktls_seq: mapped mbuf %p", m)); 1445 1446 m->m_epg_seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno; 1447 sb->sb_tls_seqno++; 1448 } 1449} 1450 1451/* 1452 * Add TLS framing (headers and trailers) to a chain of mbufs. Each 1453 * mbuf in the chain must be an unmapped mbuf. The payload of the 1454 * mbuf must be populated with the payload of each TLS record. 1455 * 1456 * The record_type argument specifies the TLS record type used when 1457 * populating the TLS header. 1458 * 1459 * The enq_count argument on return is set to the number of pages of 1460 * payload data for this entire chain that need to be encrypted via SW 1461 * encryption. The returned value should be passed to ktls_enqueue 1462 * when scheduling encryption of this chain of mbufs. To handle the 1463 * special case of empty fragments for TLS 1.0 sessions, an empty 1464 * fragment counts as one page. 1465 */ 1466void 1467ktls_frame(struct mbuf *top, struct ktls_session *tls, int *enq_cnt, 1468 uint8_t record_type) 1469{ 1470 struct tls_record_layer *tlshdr; 1471 struct mbuf *m; 1472 uint64_t *noncep; 1473 uint16_t tls_len; 1474 int maxlen; 1475 1476 maxlen = tls->params.max_frame_len; 1477 *enq_cnt = 0; 1478 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) { 1479 /* 1480 * All mbufs in the chain should be TLS records whose 1481 * payload does not exceed the maximum frame length. 1482 * 1483 * Empty TLS records are permitted when using CBC. 1484 */ 1485 KASSERT(m->m_len <= maxlen && 1486 (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC ? 1487 m->m_len >= 0 : m->m_len > 0), 1488 ("ktls_frame: m %p len %d\n", m, m->m_len)); 1489 1490 /* 1491 * TLS frames require unmapped mbufs to store session 1492 * info. 1493 */ 1494 KASSERT((m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) != 0, 1495 ("ktls_frame: mapped mbuf %p (top = %p)\n", m, top)); 1496 1497 tls_len = m->m_len; 1498 1499 /* Save a reference to the session. */ 1500 m->m_epg_tls = ktls_hold(tls); 1501 1502 m->m_epg_hdrlen = tls->params.tls_hlen; 1503 m->m_epg_trllen = tls->params.tls_tlen; 1504 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC) { 1505 int bs, delta; 1506 1507 /* 1508 * AES-CBC pads messages to a multiple of the 1509 * block size. Note that the padding is 1510 * applied after the digest and the encryption 1511 * is done on the "plaintext || mac || padding". 1512 * At least one byte of padding is always 1513 * present. 1514 * 1515 * Compute the final trailer length assuming 1516 * at most one block of padding. 1517 * tls->params.sb_tls_tlen is the maximum 1518 * possible trailer length (padding + digest). 1519 * delta holds the number of excess padding 1520 * bytes if the maximum were used. Those 1521 * extra bytes are removed. 1522 */ 1523 bs = tls->params.tls_bs; 1524 delta = (tls_len + tls->params.tls_tlen) & (bs - 1); 1525 m->m_epg_trllen -= delta; 1526 } 1527 m->m_len += m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen; 1528 1529 /* Populate the TLS header. */ 1530 tlshdr = (void *)m->m_epg_hdr; 1531 tlshdr->tls_vmajor = tls->params.tls_vmajor; 1532 1533 /* 1534 * TLS 1.3 masquarades as TLS 1.2 with a record type 1535 * of TLS_RLTYPE_APP. 1536 */ 1537 if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE && 1538 tls->params.tls_vmajor == TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE) { 1539 tlshdr->tls_vminor = TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO; 1540 tlshdr->tls_type = TLS_RLTYPE_APP; 1541 /* save the real record type for later */ 1542 m->m_epg_record_type = record_type; 1543 m->m_epg_trail[0] = record_type; 1544 } else { 1545 tlshdr->tls_vminor = tls->params.tls_vminor; 1546 tlshdr->tls_type = record_type; 1547 } 1548 tlshdr->tls_length = htons(m->m_len - sizeof(*tlshdr)); 1549 1550 /* 1551 * Store nonces / explicit IVs after the end of the 1552 * TLS header. 1553 * 1554 * For GCM with TLS 1.2, an 8 byte nonce is copied 1555 * from the end of the IV. The nonce is then 1556 * incremented for use by the next record. 1557 * 1558 * For CBC, a random nonce is inserted for TLS 1.1+. 1559 */ 1560 if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 && 1561 tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) { 1562 noncep = (uint64_t *)(tls->params.iv + 8); 1563 be64enc(tlshdr + 1, *noncep); 1564 (*noncep)++; 1565 } else if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC && 1566 tls->params.tls_vminor >= TLS_MINOR_VER_ONE) 1567 arc4rand(tlshdr + 1, AES_BLOCK_LEN, 0); 1568 1569 /* 1570 * When using SW encryption, mark the mbuf not ready. 1571 * It will be marked ready via sbready() after the 1572 * record has been encrypted. 1573 * 1574 * When using ifnet TLS, unencrypted TLS records are 1575 * sent down the stack to the NIC. 1576 */ 1577 if (tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW) { 1578 m->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY; 1579 m->m_epg_nrdy = m->m_epg_npgs; 1580 if (__predict_false(tls_len == 0)) { 1581 /* TLS 1.0 empty fragment. */ 1582 *enq_cnt += 1; 1583 } else 1584 *enq_cnt += m->m_epg_npgs; 1585 } 1586 } 1587} 1588 1589void 1590ktls_check_rx(struct sockbuf *sb) 1591{ 1592 struct tls_record_layer hdr; 1593 struct ktls_wq *wq; 1594 struct socket *so; 1595 bool running; 1596 1597 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb); 1598 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX, ("%s: sockbuf %p isn't TLS RX", 1599 __func__, sb)); 1600 so = __containerof(sb, struct socket, so_rcv); 1601 1602 if (sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING) 1603 return; 1604 1605 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */ 1606 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr)) { 1607 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc != 0) 1608 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE; 1609 return; 1610 } 1611 1612 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, sizeof(hdr), (void *)&hdr); 1613 1614 /* Is the entire record queued? */ 1615 if (sb->sb_tlscc < sizeof(hdr) + ntohs(hdr.tls_length)) { 1616 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0) 1617 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE; 1618 return; 1619 } 1620 1621 sb->sb_flags |= SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING; 1622 1623 soref(so); 1624 wq = &ktls_wq[so->so_rcv.sb_tls_info->wq_index]; 1625 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 1626 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->so_head, so, so_ktls_rx_list); 1627 running = wq->running; 1628 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 1629 if (!running) 1630 wakeup(wq); 1631 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, 1); 1632} 1633 1634static struct mbuf * 1635ktls_detach_record(struct sockbuf *sb, int len) 1636{ 1637 struct mbuf *m, *n, *top; 1638 int remain; 1639 1640 SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(sb); 1641 MPASS(len <= sb->sb_tlscc); 1642 1643 /* 1644 * If TLS chain is the exact size of the record, 1645 * just grab the whole record. 1646 */ 1647 top = sb->sb_mtls; 1648 if (sb->sb_tlscc == len) { 1649 sb->sb_mtls = NULL; 1650 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL; 1651 goto out; 1652 } 1653 1654 /* 1655 * While it would be nice to use m_split() here, we need 1656 * to know exactly what m_split() allocates to update the 1657 * accounting, so do it inline instead. 1658 */ 1659 remain = len; 1660 for (m = top; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) 1661 remain -= m->m_len; 1662 1663 /* Easy case: don't have to split 'm'. */ 1664 if (remain == m->m_len) { 1665 sb->sb_mtls = m->m_next; 1666 if (sb->sb_mtls == NULL) 1667 sb->sb_mtlstail = NULL; 1668 m->m_next = NULL; 1669 goto out; 1670 } 1671 1672 /* 1673 * Need to allocate an mbuf to hold the remainder of 'm'. Try 1674 * with M_NOWAIT first. 1675 */ 1676 n = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA); 1677 if (n == NULL) { 1678 /* 1679 * Use M_WAITOK with socket buffer unlocked. If 1680 * 'sb_mtls' changes while the lock is dropped, return 1681 * NULL to force the caller to retry. 1682 */ 1683 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 1684 1685 n = m_get(M_WAITOK, MT_DATA); 1686 1687 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 1688 if (sb->sb_mtls != top) { 1689 m_free(n); 1690 return (NULL); 1691 } 1692 } 1693 n->m_flags |= M_NOTREADY; 1694 1695 /* Store remainder in 'n'. */ 1696 n->m_len = m->m_len - remain; 1697 if (m->m_flags & M_EXT) { 1698 n->m_data = m->m_data + remain; 1699 mb_dupcl(n, m); 1700 } else { 1701 bcopy(mtod(m, caddr_t) + remain, mtod(n, caddr_t), n->m_len); 1702 } 1703 1704 /* Trim 'm' and update accounting. */ 1705 m->m_len -= n->m_len; 1706 sb->sb_tlscc -= n->m_len; 1707 sb->sb_ccc -= n->m_len; 1708 1709 /* Account for 'n'. */ 1710 sballoc_ktls_rx(sb, n); 1711 1712 /* Insert 'n' into the TLS chain. */ 1713 sb->sb_mtls = n; 1714 n->m_next = m->m_next; 1715 if (sb->sb_mtlstail == m) 1716 sb->sb_mtlstail = n; 1717 1718 /* Detach the record from the TLS chain. */ 1719 m->m_next = NULL; 1720 1721out: 1722 MPASS(m_length(top, NULL) == len); 1723 for (m = top; m != NULL; m = m->m_next) 1724 sbfree_ktls_rx(sb, m); 1725 sb->sb_tlsdcc = len; 1726 sb->sb_ccc += len; 1727 SBCHECK(sb); 1728 return (top); 1729} 1730 1731static void 1732ktls_decrypt(struct socket *so) 1733{ 1734 char tls_header[MBUF_PEXT_HDR_LEN]; 1735 struct ktls_session *tls; 1736 struct sockbuf *sb; 1737 struct tls_record_layer *hdr; 1738 struct tls_get_record tgr; 1739 struct mbuf *control, *data, *m; 1740 uint64_t seqno; 1741 int error, remain, tls_len, trail_len; 1742 1743 hdr = (struct tls_record_layer *)tls_header; 1744 sb = &so->so_rcv; 1745 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 1746 KASSERT(sb->sb_flags & SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING, 1747 ("%s: socket %p not running", __func__, so)); 1748 1749 tls = sb->sb_tls_info; 1750 MPASS(tls != NULL); 1751 1752 for (;;) { 1753 /* Is there enough queued for a TLS header? */ 1754 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls->params.tls_hlen) 1755 break; 1756 1757 m_copydata(sb->sb_mtls, 0, tls->params.tls_hlen, tls_header); 1758 tls_len = sizeof(*hdr) + ntohs(hdr->tls_length); 1759 1760 if (hdr->tls_vmajor != tls->params.tls_vmajor || 1761 hdr->tls_vminor != tls->params.tls_vminor) 1762 error = EINVAL; 1763 else if (tls_len < tls->params.tls_hlen || tls_len > 1764 tls->params.tls_hlen + TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2 + 1765 tls->params.tls_tlen) 1766 error = EMSGSIZE; 1767 else 1768 error = 0; 1769 if (__predict_false(error != 0)) { 1770 /* 1771 * We have a corrupted record and are likely 1772 * out of sync. The connection isn't 1773 * recoverable at this point, so abort it. 1774 */ 1775 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 1776 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_corrupted_records, 1); 1777 1778 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 1779 so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_abort(so); 1780 so->so_error = error; 1781 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 1782 goto deref; 1783 } 1784 1785 /* Is the entire record queued? */ 1786 if (sb->sb_tlscc < tls_len) 1787 break; 1788 1789 /* 1790 * Split out the portion of the mbuf chain containing 1791 * this TLS record. 1792 */ 1793 data = ktls_detach_record(sb, tls_len); 1794 if (data == NULL) 1795 continue; 1796 MPASS(sb->sb_tlsdcc == tls_len); 1797 1798 seqno = sb->sb_tls_seqno; 1799 sb->sb_tls_seqno++; 1800 SBCHECK(sb); 1801 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(sb); 1802 1803 error = tls->sw_decrypt(tls, hdr, data, seqno, &trail_len); 1804 if (error) { 1805 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1); 1806 1807 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 1808 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) { 1809 /* 1810 * sbcut/drop/flush discarded these 1811 * mbufs. 1812 */ 1813 m_freem(data); 1814 break; 1815 } 1816 1817 /* 1818 * Drop this TLS record's data, but keep 1819 * decrypting subsequent records. 1820 */ 1821 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len; 1822 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0; 1823 1824 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 1825 so->so_error = EBADMSG; 1826 sorwakeup_locked(so); 1827 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 1828 1829 m_freem(data); 1830 1831 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 1832 continue; 1833 } 1834 1835 /* Allocate the control mbuf. */ 1836 tgr.tls_type = hdr->tls_type; 1837 tgr.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor; 1838 tgr.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor; 1839 tgr.tls_length = htobe16(tls_len - tls->params.tls_hlen - 1840 trail_len); 1841 control = sbcreatecontrol_how(&tgr, sizeof(tgr), 1842 TLS_GET_RECORD, IPPROTO_TCP, M_WAITOK); 1843 1844 SOCKBUF_LOCK(sb); 1845 if (sb->sb_tlsdcc == 0) { 1846 /* sbcut/drop/flush discarded these mbufs. */ 1847 MPASS(sb->sb_tlscc == 0); 1848 m_freem(data); 1849 m_freem(control); 1850 break; 1851 } 1852 1853 /* 1854 * Clear the 'dcc' accounting in preparation for 1855 * adding the decrypted record. 1856 */ 1857 sb->sb_ccc -= tls_len; 1858 sb->sb_tlsdcc = 0; 1859 SBCHECK(sb); 1860 1861 /* If there is no payload, drop all of the data. */ 1862 if (tgr.tls_length == htobe16(0)) { 1863 m_freem(data); 1864 data = NULL; 1865 } else { 1866 /* Trim header. */ 1867 remain = tls->params.tls_hlen; 1868 while (remain > 0) { 1869 if (data->m_len > remain) { 1870 data->m_data += remain; 1871 data->m_len -= remain; 1872 break; 1873 } 1874 remain -= data->m_len; 1875 data = m_free(data); 1876 } 1877 1878 /* Trim trailer and clear M_NOTREADY. */ 1879 remain = be16toh(tgr.tls_length); 1880 m = data; 1881 for (m = data; remain > m->m_len; m = m->m_next) { 1882 m->m_flags &= ~M_NOTREADY; 1883 remain -= m->m_len; 1884 } 1885 m->m_len = remain; 1886 m_freem(m->m_next); 1887 m->m_next = NULL; 1888 m->m_flags &= ~M_NOTREADY; 1889 1890 /* Set EOR on the final mbuf. */ 1891 m->m_flags |= M_EOR; 1892 } 1893 1894 sbappendcontrol_locked(sb, data, control, 0); 1895 } 1896 1897 sb->sb_flags &= ~SB_TLS_RX_RUNNING; 1898 1899 if ((sb->sb_state & SBS_CANTRCVMORE) != 0 && sb->sb_tlscc > 0) 1900 so->so_error = EMSGSIZE; 1901 1902 sorwakeup_locked(so); 1903 1904deref: 1905 SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(sb); 1906 1907 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 1908 SOCK_LOCK(so); 1909 sorele(so); 1910 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 1911} 1912 1913void 1914ktls_enqueue_to_free(struct mbuf *m) 1915{ 1916 struct ktls_wq *wq; 1917 bool running; 1918 1919 /* Mark it for freeing. */ 1920 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_2FREE; 1921 wq = &ktls_wq[m->m_epg_tls->wq_index]; 1922 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 1923 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq); 1924 running = wq->running; 1925 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 1926 if (!running) 1927 wakeup(wq); 1928} 1929 1930void 1931ktls_enqueue(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, int page_count) 1932{ 1933 struct ktls_wq *wq; 1934 bool running; 1935 1936 KASSERT(((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == 1937 (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)), 1938 ("ktls_enqueue: %p not unready & nomap mbuf\n", m)); 1939 KASSERT(page_count != 0, ("enqueueing TLS mbuf with zero page count")); 1940 1941 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls->mode == TCP_TLS_MODE_SW, ("!SW TLS mbuf")); 1942 1943 m->m_epg_enc_cnt = page_count; 1944 1945 /* 1946 * Save a pointer to the socket. The caller is responsible 1947 * for taking an additional reference via soref(). 1948 */ 1949 m->m_epg_so = so; 1950 1951 wq = &ktls_wq[m->m_epg_tls->wq_index]; 1952 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 1953 STAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&wq->m_head, m, m_epg_stailq); 1954 running = wq->running; 1955 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 1956 if (!running) 1957 wakeup(wq); 1958 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, 1); 1959} 1960 1961static __noinline void 1962ktls_encrypt(struct mbuf *top) 1963{ 1964 struct ktls_session *tls; 1965 struct socket *so; 1966 struct mbuf *m; 1967 vm_paddr_t parray[1 + btoc(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2)]; 1968 struct iovec src_iov[1 + btoc(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2)]; 1969 struct iovec dst_iov[1 + btoc(TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2)]; 1970 vm_page_t pg; 1971 int error, i, len, npages, off, total_pages; 1972 bool is_anon; 1973 1974 so = top->m_epg_so; 1975 tls = top->m_epg_tls; 1976 KASSERT(tls != NULL, ("tls = NULL, top = %p\n", top)); 1977 KASSERT(so != NULL, ("so = NULL, top = %p\n", top)); 1978#ifdef INVARIANTS 1979 top->m_epg_so = NULL; 1980#endif 1981 total_pages = top->m_epg_enc_cnt; 1982 npages = 0; 1983 1984 /* 1985 * Encrypt the TLS records in the chain of mbufs starting with 1986 * 'top'. 'total_pages' gives us a total count of pages and is 1987 * used to know when we have finished encrypting the TLS 1988 * records originally queued with 'top'. 1989 * 1990 * NB: These mbufs are queued in the socket buffer and 1991 * 'm_next' is traversing the mbufs in the socket buffer. The 1992 * socket buffer lock is not held while traversing this chain. 1993 * Since the mbufs are all marked M_NOTREADY their 'm_next' 1994 * pointers should be stable. However, the 'm_next' of the 1995 * last mbuf encrypted is not necessarily NULL. It can point 1996 * to other mbufs appended while 'top' was on the TLS work 1997 * queue. 1998 * 1999 * Each mbuf holds an entire TLS record. 2000 */ 2001 error = 0; 2002 for (m = top; npages != total_pages; m = m->m_next) { 2003 KASSERT(m->m_epg_tls == tls, 2004 ("different TLS sessions in a single mbuf chain: %p vs %p", 2005 tls, m->m_epg_tls)); 2006 KASSERT((m->m_flags & (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY)) == 2007 (M_EXTPG | M_NOTREADY), 2008 ("%p not unready & nomap mbuf (top = %p)\n", m, top)); 2009 KASSERT(npages + m->m_epg_npgs <= total_pages, 2010 ("page count mismatch: top %p, total_pages %d, m %p", top, 2011 total_pages, m)); 2012 2013 /* 2014 * Generate source and destination ivoecs to pass to 2015 * the SW encryption backend. For writable mbufs, the 2016 * destination iovec is a copy of the source and 2017 * encryption is done in place. For file-backed mbufs 2018 * (from sendfile), anonymous wired pages are 2019 * allocated and assigned to the destination iovec. 2020 */ 2021 is_anon = (m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_ANON) != 0; 2022 2023 off = m->m_epg_1st_off; 2024 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++, off = 0) { 2025 len = m_epg_pagelen(m, i, off); 2026 src_iov[i].iov_len = len; 2027 src_iov[i].iov_base = 2028 (char *)(void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(m->m_epg_pa[i]) + 2029 off; 2030 2031 if (is_anon) { 2032 dst_iov[i].iov_base = src_iov[i].iov_base; 2033 dst_iov[i].iov_len = src_iov[i].iov_len; 2034 continue; 2035 } 2036retry_page: 2037 pg = vm_page_alloc(NULL, 0, VM_ALLOC_NORMAL | 2038 VM_ALLOC_NOOBJ | VM_ALLOC_NODUMP | VM_ALLOC_WIRED); 2039 if (pg == NULL) { 2040 vm_wait(NULL); 2041 goto retry_page; 2042 } 2043 parray[i] = VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg); 2044 dst_iov[i].iov_base = 2045 (char *)(void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(parray[i]) + off; 2046 dst_iov[i].iov_len = len; 2047 } 2048 2049 if (__predict_false(m->m_epg_npgs == 0)) { 2050 /* TLS 1.0 empty fragment. */ 2051 npages++; 2052 } else 2053 npages += i; 2054 2055 error = (*tls->sw_encrypt)(tls, 2056 (const struct tls_record_layer *)m->m_epg_hdr, 2057 m->m_epg_trail, src_iov, dst_iov, i, m->m_epg_seqno, 2058 m->m_epg_record_type); 2059 if (error) { 2060 counter_u64_add(ktls_offload_failed_crypto, 1); 2061 break; 2062 } 2063 2064 /* 2065 * For file-backed mbufs, release the file-backed 2066 * pages and replace them in the ext_pgs array with 2067 * the anonymous wired pages allocated above. 2068 */ 2069 if (!is_anon) { 2070 /* Free the old pages. */ 2071 m->m_ext.ext_free(m); 2072 2073 /* Replace them with the new pages. */ 2074 for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++) 2075 m->m_epg_pa[i] = parray[i]; 2076 2077 /* Use the basic free routine. */ 2078 m->m_ext.ext_free = mb_free_mext_pgs; 2079 2080 /* Pages are now writable. */ 2081 m->m_epg_flags |= EPG_FLAG_ANON; 2082 } 2083 2084 /* 2085 * Drop a reference to the session now that it is no 2086 * longer needed. Existing code depends on encrypted 2087 * records having no associated session vs 2088 * yet-to-be-encrypted records having an associated 2089 * session. 2090 */ 2091 m->m_epg_tls = NULL; 2092 ktls_free(tls); 2093 } 2094 2095 CURVNET_SET(so->so_vnet); 2096 if (error == 0) { 2097 (void)(*so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_ready)(so, top, npages); 2098 } else { 2099 so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_abort(so); 2100 so->so_error = EIO; 2101 mb_free_notready(top, total_pages); 2102 } 2103 2104 SOCK_LOCK(so); 2105 sorele(so); 2106 CURVNET_RESTORE(); 2107} 2108 2109static void 2110ktls_work_thread(void *ctx) 2111{ 2112 struct ktls_wq *wq = ctx; 2113 struct mbuf *m, *n; 2114 struct socket *so, *son; 2115 STAILQ_HEAD(, mbuf) local_m_head; 2116 STAILQ_HEAD(, socket) local_so_head; 2117 2118 if (ktls_bind_threads > 1) { 2119 curthread->td_domain.dr_policy = 2120 DOMAINSET_PREF(PCPU_GET(domain)); 2121 } 2122#if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) 2123 fpu_kern_thread(0); 2124#endif 2125 for (;;) { 2126 mtx_lock(&wq->mtx); 2127 while (STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->m_head) && 2128 STAILQ_EMPTY(&wq->so_head)) { 2129 wq->running = false; 2130 mtx_sleep(wq, &wq->mtx, 0, "-", 0); 2131 wq->running = true; 2132 } 2133 2134 STAILQ_INIT(&local_m_head); 2135 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_m_head, &wq->m_head); 2136 STAILQ_INIT(&local_so_head); 2137 STAILQ_CONCAT(&local_so_head, &wq->so_head); 2138 mtx_unlock(&wq->mtx); 2139 2140 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(m, &local_m_head, m_epg_stailq, n) { 2141 if (m->m_epg_flags & EPG_FLAG_2FREE) { 2142 ktls_free(m->m_epg_tls); 2143 uma_zfree(zone_mbuf, m); 2144 } else { 2145 ktls_encrypt(m); 2146 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_tx_queued, -1); 2147 } 2148 } 2149 2150 STAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(so, &local_so_head, so_ktls_rx_list, son) { 2151 ktls_decrypt(so); 2152 counter_u64_add(ktls_cnt_rx_queued, -1); 2153 } 2154 } 2155} 2156