Searched hist:224778 (Results 1 - 25 of 47) sorted by relevance
| /freebsd-10.1-release/tools/regression/security/cap_test/ | ||
| H A D | cap_test.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| H A D | cap_test_capabilities.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/tdfx/ | ||
| H A D | tdfx_linux.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/aac/ | ||
| H A D | aac_linux.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/amr/ | ||
| H A D | amr_linux.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/ipmi/ | ||
| H A D | ipmi_linux.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/mfi/ | ||
| H A D | mfi_linux.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/compat/freebsd32/ | ||
| H A D | freebsd32_ioctl.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/cddl/compat/opensolaris/sys/ | ||
| H A D | file.h | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/compat/svr4/ | ||
| H A D | svr4_ioctl.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| H A D | svr4_fcntl.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| H A D | svr4_filio.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| H A D | svr4_stream.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/iscsi_initiator/ | ||
| H A D | iscsi.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/hwpmc/ | ||
| H A D | hwpmc_logging.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/i386/ibcs2/ | ||
| H A D | ibcs2_fcntl.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| H A D | ibcs2_ioctl.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| H A D | ibcs2_misc.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/amd64/linux32/ | ||
| H A D | linux32_machdep.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/fs/nfsclient/ | ||
| H A D | nfs_clport.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/kern/ | ||
| H A D | uipc_sem.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| H A D | vfs_acl.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/nfsserver/ | ||
| H A D | nfs_srvkrpc.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/security/audit/ | ||
| H A D | audit_arg.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
| /freebsd-10.1-release/sys/dev/snp/ | ||
| H A D | snp.c | diff 224778 Thu Aug 11 10:35:30 MDT 2011 rwatson Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0: Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op. Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions. In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit. Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent. Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc |
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