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272461 |
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02-Oct-2014 |
gjb |
Copy stable/10@r272459 to releng/10.1 as part of the 10.1-RELEASE process.
Approved by: re (implicit) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation |
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256281 |
|
10-Oct-2013 |
gjb |
Copy head (r256279) to stable/10 as part of the 10.0-RELEASE cycle.
Approved by: re (implicit) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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255219 |
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04-Sep-2013 |
pjd |
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285 rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights { uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2]; };
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to 0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0. The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL) #define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...); void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...); void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...); bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights); void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src); void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src); bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(), cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \ __cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL) void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls, but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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247667 |
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02-Mar-2013 |
pjd |
- Implement two new system calls:
int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen); int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen);
which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'.
- Add manual pages for the new syscalls.
- Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox.
- Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work.
- Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor.
- Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights.
- Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2).
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
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247602 |
|
01-Mar-2013 |
pjd |
Merge Capsicum overhaul:
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT. - Allow for linkat(2). - Allow for symlinkat(2). CAP_CREATE new behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT: - Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit. - Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT: - Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object. - Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT: - Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR): - Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object. - Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and PROT_WRITE. CAP_MMAP new behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ). Added CAP_MMAP_W: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_X: - Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RW: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_RX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_WX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RWX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT. Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT. Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour: - Allow pread(2). - Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_READ new behaviour: - Allow read(2), readv(2). - Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour: - Allow pwrite(2). - Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_WRITE new behaviour: - Allow write(2), writev(2). - Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL) #define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W) #define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_RECV CAP_READ #define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \ (CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \ CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN) #define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \ (CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \ CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \ CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X #define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT #define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT #define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT #define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de> Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
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243726 |
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30-Nov-2012 |
pjd |
IFp4 @208451:
Fix path handling for *at() syscalls.
Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs.
Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation.
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
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241896 |
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22-Oct-2012 |
kib |
Remove the support for using non-mpsafe filesystem modules.
In particular, do not lock Giant conditionally when calling into the filesystem module, remove the VFS_LOCK_GIANT() and related macros. Stop handling buffers belonging to non-mpsafe filesystems.
The VFS_VERSION is bumped to indicate the interface change which does not result in the interface signatures changes.
Conducted and reviewed by: attilio Tested by: pho
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224778 |
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11-Aug-2011 |
rwatson |
Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD kernel for FreeBSD 9.0:
Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op.
Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar purposes with file permissions.
In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there. This will follow in a later commit.
Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they represent.
Approved by: re (bz) Submitted by: jonathan Sponsored by: Google Inc
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224181 |
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18-Jul-2011 |
jonathan |
Provide ability to audit cap_rights_t arguments.
We wish to be able to audit capability rights arguments; this code provides the necessary infrastructure.
This commit does not, of itself, turn on such auditing for any system call; that should follow shortly.
Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket) Sponsored by: Google Inc
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202143 |
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12-Jan-2010 |
brooks |
Replace the static NGROUPS=NGROUPS_MAX+1=1024 with a dynamic kern.ngroups+1. kern.ngroups can range from NGROUPS_MAX=1023 to INT_MAX-1. Given that the Windows group limit is 1024, this range should be sufficient for most applications.
MFC after: 1 month
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195939 |
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29-Jul-2009 |
rwatson |
Eliminate ARG_UPATH[12] arguments to AUDIT_ARG_UPATH() and instead provide specific macros, AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() to capture path information for audit records. This allows us to move the definitions of ARG_* out of the public audit header file, as they are an implementation detail of our current kernel-internal audit record, which may change.
Approved by: re (kensmith) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
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195926 |
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28-Jul-2009 |
rwatson |
Rework vnode argument auditing to follow the same structure, in order to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a system call.
Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
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195925 |
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28-Jul-2009 |
rwatson |
Audit file descriptors passed to fooat(2) system calls, which are used instead of the root/current working directory as the starting point for lookups. Up to two such descriptors can be audited. Add audit record BSM encoding for fooat(2).
Note: due to an error in the OpenBSM 1.1p1 configuration file, a further change is required to that file in order to fix openat(2) auditing.
Approved by: re (kib) Reviewed by: rdivacky (fooat(2) portions) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
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195177 |
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29-Jun-2009 |
sson |
Dynamically allocate the gidset field in audit record.
This fixes a problem created by the recent change that allows a large number of groups per user. The gidset field in struct kaudit_record is now dynamically allocated to the size needed rather than statically (using NGROUPS).
Approved by: re@ (kensmith, rwatson), gnn (mentor)
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184948 |
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13-Nov-2008 |
rwatson |
When repeatedly accessing a thread credential, cache the credential pointer in a local thread. While this is unlikely to significantly improve performance given modern compiler behavior, it makes the code more readable and reduces diffs to the Mac OS X version of the same code (which stores things in creds in the same way, but where the cred for a thread is reached quite differently).
Discussed with: sson MFC after: 1 month Sponsored by: Apple Inc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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184661 |
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04-Nov-2008 |
jhb |
Use shared vnode locks for auditing vnode arguments as auditing only does a VOP_GETATTR() which does not require an exclusive lock.
Reviewed by: csjp, rwatson
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182371 |
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28-Aug-2008 |
attilio |
Decontextualize the couplet VOP_GETATTR / VOP_SETATTR as the passed thread was always curthread and totally unuseful.
Tested by: Giovanni Trematerra <giovanni dot trematerra at gmail dot com>
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181053 |
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31-Jul-2008 |
rwatson |
Further synchronization of copyrights, licenses, white space, etc from Apple and from the OpenBSM vendor tree.
Obtained from: Apple Inc., TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 days
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180703 |
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22-Jul-2008 |
rwatson |
Minor white space synchronization to Apple version of security audit.
Obtained from: Apple Inc. MFC after: 3 days
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180701 |
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22-Jul-2008 |
rwatson |
In preparation to sync Apple and FreeBSD versions of security audit, pick up the Apple Computer -> Apple change in their copyright and license templates.
Obtained from: Apple Inc. MFC after: 3 days
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180699 |
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22-Jul-2008 |
rwatson |
Use unsigned int when iterating over groupsets in audit_arg_groupset().
Obtained from: Apple Inc. MFC after: 3 days
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178322 |
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19-Apr-2008 |
rwatson |
When auditing state from an IPv4 or IPv6 socket, use read locks on the inpcb rather than write locks.
MFC after: 3 months
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178285 |
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17-Apr-2008 |
rwatson |
Convert pcbinfo and inpcb mutexes to rwlocks, and modify macros to explicitly select write locking for all use of the inpcb mutex. Update some pcbinfo lock assertions to assert locked rather than write-locked, although in practice almost all uses of the pcbinfo rwlock main exclusive, and all instances of inpcb lock acquisition are exclusive.
This change should introduce (ideally) little functional change. However, it lays the groundwork for significantly increased parallelism in the TCP/IP code.
MFC after: 3 months Tested by: kris (superset of committered patch)
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178186 |
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13-Apr-2008 |
rwatson |
Use __FBSDID() for $FreeBSD$ IDs in the audit code.
MFC after: 3 days
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176565 |
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25-Feb-2008 |
rwatson |
Rename several audit functions in the global kernel symbol namespace to have audit_ on the front:
- canon_path -> audit_canon_path - msgctl_to_event -> audit_msgctl_to_event - semctl_to_event -> audit_semctl_to_event
MFC after: 1 month
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175294 |
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13-Jan-2008 |
attilio |
VOP_LOCK1() (and so VOP_LOCK()) and VOP_UNLOCK() are only used in conjuction with 'thread' argument passing which is always curthread. Remove the unuseful extra-argument and pass explicitly curthread to lower layer functions, when necessary.
KPI results broken by this change, which should affect several ports, so version bumping and manpage update will be further committed.
Tested by: kris, pho, Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>
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175202 |
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09-Jan-2008 |
attilio |
vn_lock() is currently only used with the 'curthread' passed as argument. Remove this argument and pass curthread directly to underlying VOP_LOCK1() VFS method. This modify makes the code cleaner and in particular remove an annoying dependence helping next lockmgr() cleanup. KPI results, obviously, changed.
Manpage and FreeBSD_version will be updated through further commits.
As a side note, would be valuable to say that next commits will address a similar cleanup about VFS methods, in particular vop_lock1 and vop_unlock.
Tested by: Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>, Andrea Di Pasquale <whyx dot it at gmail dot com>
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171066 |
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27-Jun-2007 |
csjp |
- Add audit_arg_audinfo_addr() for auditing the arguments for setaudit_addr(2) - In audit_bsm.c, make sure all the arguments: ARG_AUID, ARG_ASID, ARG_AMASK, and ARG_TERMID{_ADDR} are valid before auditing their arguments. (This is done for both setaudit and setaudit_addr. - Audit the arguments passed to setaudit_addr(2) - AF_INET6 does not equate to AU_IPv6. Change this in au_to_in_addr_ex() so the audit token is created with the correct type. This fixes the processing of the in_addr_ex token in users pace. - Change the size of the token (as generated by the kernel) from 5*4 bytes to 4*4 bytes (the correct size of an ip6 address) - Correct regression from ucred work which resulted in getaudit() not returning E2BIG if the subject had an ip6 termid - Correct slight regression in getaudit(2) which resulted in the size of a pointer being passed instead of the size of the structure. (This resulted in invalid auditinfo data being returned via getaudit(2))
Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re@ (kensmith) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
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170585 |
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11-Jun-2007 |
rwatson |
Clean up, and sometimes remove, a number of audit-related implementation comments.
Obtained from: TrutstedBSD Project
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170407 |
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07-Jun-2007 |
rwatson |
Move per-process audit state from a pointer in the proc structure to embedded storage in struct ucred. This allows audit state to be cached with the thread, avoiding locking operations with each system call, and makes it available in asynchronous execution contexts, such as deep in the network stack or VFS.
Reviewed by: csjp Approved by: re (kensmith) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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170196 |
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01-Jun-2007 |
rwatson |
Clean up audit comments--formatting, spelling, etc.
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168688 |
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13-Apr-2007 |
csjp |
Fix the handling of IPv6 addresses for subject and process BSM audit tokens. Currently, we do not support the set{get}audit_addr(2) system calls which allows processes like sshd to set extended or ip6 information for subject tokens.
The approach that was taken was to change the process audit state slightly to use an extended terminal ID in the kernel. This allows us to store both IPv4 IPv6 addresses. In the case that an IPv4 address is in use, we convert the terminal ID from an struct auditinfo_addr to a struct auditinfo.
If getaudit(2) is called when the subject is bound to an ip6 address, we return E2BIG.
- Change the internal audit record to store an extended terminal ID - Introduce ARG_TERMID_ADDR - Change the kaudit <-> BSM conversion process so that we are using the appropriate subject token. If the address associated with the subject is IPv4, we use the standard subject32 token. If the subject has an IPv6 address associated with them, we use an extended subject32 token. - Fix a couple of endian issues where we do a couple of byte swaps when we shouldn't be. IP addresses are already in the correct byte order, so reading the ip6 address 4 bytes at a time and swapping them results in in-correct address data. It should be noted that the same issue was found in the openbsm library and it has been changed there too on the vendor branch - Change A_GETPINFO to use the appropriate structures - Implement A_GETPINFO_ADDR which basically does what A_GETPINFO does, but can also handle ip6 addresses - Adjust get{set}audit(2) syscalls to convert the data auditinfo <-> auditinfo_addr - Fully implement set{get}audit_addr(2)
NOTE: This adds the ability for processes to correctly set extended subject information. The appropriate userspace utilities still need to be updated.
MFC after: 1 month Reviewed by: rwatson Obtained from: TrustedBSD
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166845 |
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20-Feb-2007 |
rwatson |
Update auditing of socket information for the inpcb new world order: so_pcb will always be non-NULL, and lock the inpcb while non-atomically accessing address data.
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165845 |
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06-Jan-2007 |
rwatson |
When returning early from audit_arg_file() due to so->so_pcb being NULL (due to an early reset or the like), remember to unlock the socket lock. This will not occur in 7-CURRENT, but could in theory occur in 6-STABLE.
MFC after: 1 week
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165621 |
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29-Dec-2006 |
rwatson |
Add a witness sleep warning to canon_path(), which invokes vput() and hence may perform an unbounded sleep. Remove an XXX comment suggesting that one be added.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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164011 |
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05-Nov-2006 |
csjp |
Change the type of ar_arg_sockaddr from struct sockaddr to struct sockaddr_storage. This structure is defined in RFC 2553 and is a more semantically correct structure for holding IP and IP6 sockaddr information. struct sockaddr is not big enough to hold all the required information for IP6, resulting in truncated addresses et al when auditing IP6 sockaddr information.
We also need to assume that the sa->sa_len has been validated before the call to audit_arg_sockaddr() is made, otherwise it could result in a buffer overflow. This is being done to accommodate auditing of network related arguments (like connect, bind et al) that will be added soon.
Discussed with: rwatson Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 2 weeks
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161813 |
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01-Sep-2006 |
wsalamon |
Audit the argv and env vectors passed in on exec: Add the argument auditing functions for argv and env. Add kernel-specific versions of the tokenizer functions for the arg and env represented as a char array. Implement the AUDIT_ARGV and AUDIT_ARGE audit policy commands to enable/disable argv/env auditing. Call the argument auditing from the exec system calls.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
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160086 |
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03-Jul-2006 |
rwatson |
Correct a number of problems that were previously commented on:
- Correct audit_arg_socketaddr() argument name from so to sa. - Assert arguments are non-NULL to many argument capture functions rather than testing them. This may trip some bugs. - Assert the process lock is held when auditing process information. - Test currecord in several more places. - Test validity of more arguments with kasserts, such as flag values when auditing vnode information.
Perforce change: 98825 Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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159277 |
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05-Jun-2006 |
rwatson |
When generating the process token, need to check whether the process was sucessfully audited. Otherwise, generate the PID token. This change covers the pid < 0 cases, and pid lookup failure cases.
Submitted by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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156889 |
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19-Mar-2006 |
rwatson |
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch:
Mega-style patch.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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155270 |
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03-Feb-2006 |
rwatson |
Fix INVARIANTS build on amd64; (unsigned unsigned long) != u_int64_t.
Submitted by: mlaier
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155192 |
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01-Feb-2006 |
rwatson |
Import kernel audit framework:
- Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events.
Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
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