capsicum: SIGTRAP is delivered also on ECAPMODE error.

Approved by: oshogbo (mentor)

ktrace: Record detailed ECAPMODE violations

When a Capsicum violation occurs in the kernel, ktrace will now record
detailed information pertaining to the violation.

For example:
- When a namei lookup violation occurs, ktrace will record the path.
- When a signal violation occurs, ktrace will record the signal number.
- When a sendto(2) violation occurs, ktrace will record the recipient
sockaddr.

For all violations, the syscall and ABI is recorded.

kdump is also modified to display this new information to the user.

Reviewed by: oshogbo, markj
Approved by: markj (mentor)
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D40676

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: one-line .c pattern

Remove /^[\s*]*__FBSDID\("\$FreeBSD\$"\);?\s*\n/

spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD

The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch
up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of BSD-2-Clause.

Discussed with: pfg
MFC After: 3 days
Sponsored by: Netflix

fd: rename fget*_locked to fget*_noref

This gets rid of the error prone naming where fget_unlocked returns with
a ref held, while fget_locked requires a lock but provides nothing in
terms of making sure the file lives past unlock.

No functional changes.

Enter a write sequence when updating rights.

The Capsicum system calls modify file descriptor table entries. To
ensure that readers observe a consistent snapshot of descriptor writes,
the system calls need to signal to unlocked readers that an update is
pending.

Note that ioctl rights are always checked with the descriptor table lock
held, so it is not strictly necessary to signal unlocked readers.
However, we probably want to enable lockless ioctl checks eventually, so
use seqc_write_begin() in kern_cap_ioctls_limit() too.

Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24119

capsicum: use new helpers

u_char -> vm_prot_t in a couple of places, NFC

The latter is a typedef of the former; the typedef exists and these bits are
representing vmprot values, so use the correct type.

Submitted by: sigsys@gmail.com
MFC after: 3 days

capsicum: faster cap_rights_contains

Instead of doing a 2 iteration loop (determined at runeimt), take advantage
of the fact that the size is already known.

While here provdie cap_check_inline so that fget_unlocked does not have to
do a function call.

Verified with the capsicum suite /usr/tests.

Let kern.trap_enotcap be set as a tunable.

This is handy for testing programs that are run by rc.

MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

capsicum: provide cap_rights_fde_inline

Reading caps is in the hot path (on each successful fd lookup), but
completely unnecessarily requires a function call.

Approved by: re (gjb)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

capsicum: propagate const correctness

Change trap_enotcap to bool and annotate with __read_frequently

It is read on each return to user space.

Fix broken assertion in r329520.

Reported by: pho@ lwhsu@

Use the fdeget_locked function instead of the fget_locked in the
sys_capability.

Reviewed by: pjd@ (earlier version)
Discussed with: mjg@

sys/kern: adoption of SPDX licensing ID tags.

Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.

The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.

capsicum: perform copyout without the fildesc lock held in sys_cap_ioctls_get

Reviewed by: pjd

Add PROC_TRAPCAP procctl(2) controls and global sysctl kern.trap_enocap.

Both can be used to cause processes in capability mode to receive
SIGTRAP when ENOTCAPABLE or ECAPMODE errors are returned from
syscalls.

Idea by: emaste
Reviewed by: oshogbo (previous version), emaste
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D7965

Eliminate unnecessary loop in _cap_check()

Calling cap_rights_contains() several times with the same inputs is not
going to produce a different output. The variable being iterated, i, is
never used inside the for loop.

The loop is actually done in cap_rights_contains()

Submitted by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@freqlabs.com>
Reviewed by: oshogbo, ed
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D7369

Introduce kern_cap_rights_limit().

The existing sys_cap_rights_limit() expects that a cap_rights_t object
lives in userspace. It is therefore hard to call into it from
kernelspace.

Move the interesting bits of sys_cap_rights_limit() into
kern_cap_rights_limit(), so that we can call into it from the CloudABI
compatibility layer.

Obtained from: https://github.com/NuxiNL/freebsd
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3314

cred: add proc_set_cred helper

The goal here is to provide one place altering process credentials.

This eases debugging and opens up posibilities to do additional work when such
an action is performed.

Use crcopysafe(9) to make a copy of a process' credential struct. crcopy(9)
may perform a blocking memory allocation, which is unsafe when holding a
mutex.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1443
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division

Prepare fget_unlocked for reading fd table only once.

Some capsicum functions accept fdp + fd and lookup fde based on that.
Add variants which accept fde.

Reviewed by: pjd
MFC after: 1 week

Update kernel inclusions of capability.h to use capsicum.h instead; some
further refinement is required as some device drivers intended to be
portable over FreeBSD versions rely on __FreeBSD_version to decide whether
to include capability.h.

MFC after: 3 weeks

This looks like a typo that breaks the build. Yell at me if this isn't the
intended declaration.

Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.

The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.

The structure definition looks like this:

struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};

The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.

The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.

The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.

To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.

#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)

We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:

#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)

#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)

There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:

cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);

Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:

cap_rights_t rights;

cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);

There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:

#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:

cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);

Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.

This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

Implement 32bit versions of the cap_ioctls_limit(2) and cap_ioctls_get(2)
system calls as unsigned longs have different size on i386 and amd64.

Reported by: jilles
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

Use proper malloc type for ioctls white-list.

Reported by: pho
Tested by: pho

Merge Capsicum overhaul:

- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.

- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.

- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.

- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).

- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.

- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).

- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.

- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.

- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:

CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.

Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).

Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).

Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).

Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.

Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.

Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.

Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.

CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.

Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).

Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.

CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).

CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).

Added convinient defines:

#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE

#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)

Added defines for backward API compatibility:

#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib

Remove redundant parenthesis.

Style: move opt_*.h includes in the proper place.

MFC after: 1 month

Allways call fdrop().

Revisit the capability failure trace points. The initial implementation
only logged instances where an operation on a file descriptor required
capabilities which the file descriptor did not have. By adding a type enum
to struct ktr_cap_fail, we can catch other types of capability failures as
well, such as disallowed system calls or attempts to wrap a file descriptor
with more capabilities than it had to begin with.

Add a new trace point, KTRFAC_CAPFAIL, which traces capability check
failures. It is included in the default set for ktrace(1) and kdump(1).

In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this
patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility
calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel
entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also
fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function
psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel
psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future
MFCs that change syscalls.

Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)

Add the fo_chown and fo_chmod methods to struct fileops and use them
to implement fchown(2) and fchmod(2) support for several file types
that previously lacked it. Add MAC entries for chown/chmod done on
posix shared memory and (old) in-kernel posix semaphores.

Based on the submission by: glebius
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)

Update use of the FEATURE() macro in sys_capability.c to reflect the move
to two different kernel options for capability mode vs. capabilities.

Approved by: re (bz)

Now that capability support has been committed, update and expand the
comment at the type of sys_capability.c to describe its new contents.

Approved by: re (xxx)

Allow Capsicum capabilities to delegate constrained
access to file system subtrees to sandboxed processes.

- Use of absolute paths and '..' are limited in capability mode.
- Use of absolute paths and '..' are limited when looking up relative
to a capability.
- When a name lookup is performed, identify what operation is to be
performed (such as CAP_MKDIR) as well as check for CAP_LOOKUP.

With these constraints, openat() and friends are now safe in capability
mode, and can then be used by code such as the capability-mode runtime
linker.

Approved by: re (bz), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc

Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD
kernel for FreeBSD 9.0:

Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system
call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file
descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options
CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability
protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op.

Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve
information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory
map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by
narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar
purposes with file permissions.

In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability
mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there.
This will follow in a later commit.

Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become
CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they
represent.

Approved by: re (bz)
Submitted by: jonathan
Sponsored by: Google Inc

Turn on AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS() for cap_new(2).

Now that the code is in place to audit capability method rights, start
using it to audit the 'rights' argument to cap_new(2).

Approved by: re (kib), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc

Add cap_new() and cap_getrights() system calls.

Implement two previously-reserved Capsicum system calls:
- cap_new() creates a capability to wrap an existing file descriptor
- cap_getrights() queries the rights mask of a capability.

Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc

Add implementation for capabilities.

Code to actually implement Capsicum capabilities, including fileops and
kern_capwrap(), which creates a capability to wrap an existing file
descriptor.

We also modify kern_close() and closef() to handle capabilities.

Finally, remove cap_filelist from struct capability, since we don't
actually need it.

Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc

Add kernel functions to unwrap capabilities.

cap_funwrap() and cap_funwrap_mmap() unwrap capabilities, exposing the
underlying object. Attempting to unwrap a capability with an inadequate
rights mask (e.g. calling cap_funwrap(fp, CAP_WRITE | CAP_MMAP, &result)
on a capability whose rights mask is CAP_READ | CAP_MMAP) will result in
ENOTCAPABLE.

Unwrapping a non-capability is effectively a no-op.

These functions will be used by Capsicum-aware versions of _fget(), etc.

Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc

We may split today's CAPABILITIES into CAPABILITY_MODE (which has
to do with global namespaces) and CAPABILITIES (which has to do with
constraining file descriptors). Just in case, and because it's a better
name anyway, let's move CAPABILITIES out of the way.

Also, change opt_capabilities.h to opt_capsicum.h; for now, this will
only hold CAPABILITY_MODE, but it will probably also hold the new
CAPABILITIES (implying constrained file descriptors) in the future.

Approved by: rwatson
Sponsored by: Google UK Ltd

Remove redundant Capsicum sysctl.

Since we're now declaring FEATURE(security_capabilities), there's no need for an explicit SYSCTL_NODE.

Approved by: rwatson

- Add a FEATURE for capsicum (security_capabilities).
- Rename mac FEATURE to security_mac.

Discussed with: rwatson

Add initial support for Capsicum's Capability Mode to the FreeBSD kernel,
compiled conditionally on options CAPABILITIES:

Add a new credential flag, CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE, which indicates that a
subject (typically a process) is in capability mode.

Add two new system calls, cap_enter(2) and cap_getmode(2), which allow
setting and querying (but never clearing) the flag.

Export the capability mode flag via process information sysctls.

Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
Reviewed by: anderson
Discussed with: benl, kris, pjd
Obtained from: Capsicum Project
MFC after: 3 months