Abstract UIO allocation and deallocation.

Introduce the allocuio() and freeuio() functions to allocate and
deallocate struct uio. This hides the actual allocator interface, so it
is easier to modify the sub-allocation layout of struct uio and the
corresponding iovec array.

Obtained from: CheriBSD
Reviewed by: kib, markj
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: CHaOS, EPSRC grant EP/V000292/1
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D43711

jail: expose children.max and children.cur via sysctl

Submitted by: Igor Ostapenko <igor.ostapenko_pm.me>
Differential Revision: <https://reviews.freebsd.org/D43565>

jail: add security.jail.mlock_allowed

when the parameter allow.mlock was added a way for jails to check
if the parameter was set or now has not been added, this change
covers it.

MFC After: 3 days
Reviewed by: jamie@
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D43314

jail: Ignore errors from copyout() while copying the error string

Reviewed by: zlei, jamie
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D43142

jail: Don't allow jail_set(2) to resurrect dying jails.

Currently, a prison in "dying" state (removed but still holding
resources) can be brought back to alive state via "jail -d", or
the JAIL_DYING flag to jail_set(2). This seemed like a good idea
at the time.

Its main use was to improve support for specifying the jid when
creating a jail, which also seemed like a good idea at the time.
But resurrecting a jail that was partway through thr process of
shutting down is trouble waiting to happen.

This patch deprecates that flag, leaving it as a no-op for creating
jails (but still useful for looking at dying jails). It sill allows
creating a new jail with the same jid as a dying one, but will renumber
the old one in that case. That's imperfect, but allows for current
behavior.

Reviewed by: bz
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28150

cr_canseejailproc(): New privilege, no direct check for UID 0

Use priv_check_cred() with a new privilege (PRIV_SEEJAILPROC) instead of
explicitly testing for UID 0 (the former has been the rule for almost 20
years).

As a consequence, cr_canseejailproc() now abides by the
'security.bsd.suser_enabled' sysctl and MAC policies.

Update the MAC policies Biba and LOMAC, and prison_priv_check() so that
they don't deny this privilege. This preserves the existing behavior
(the 'root' user is not restricted, even when jailed, unless
'security.bsd.suser_enabled' is not 0) and is consistent with what is
done for the related policies/privileges (PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS,
PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS).

Reviewed by: emaste (earlier version), mhorne
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Kumacom SAS
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D40626

jail: Add the ability to access system-level filesystem extended attributes

Prior to this commit privileged accounts in a jail could not access to the
filesystem extended attributes in the system namespace. To control access to
the system namespace in a per-jail basis add a new configuration parameter
allow.extattr which is off by default.

Reported by: zirias
Tested by: zirias
Obtained from: HardenedBSD
Reviewed by: kevans, jamie
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D41643
MFC after: 1 week
Relnotes: yes

sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: one-line .c pattern

Remove /^[\s*]*__FBSDID\("\$FreeBSD\$"\);?\s*\n/

spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD

The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch
up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of BSD-2-Clause.

Discussed with: pfg
MFC After: 3 days
Sponsored by: Netflix

netlink: allow netlink sockets in non-vnet jails.

This change allow to open Netlink sockets in the non-vnet jails, even for
unpriviledged processes.
The security model largely follows the existing one. To be more specific:
* by default, every `NETLINK_ROUTE` command is **NOT** allowed in non-VNET
jail UNLESS `RTNL_F_ALLOW_NONVNET_JAIL` flag is specified in the command
handler.
* All notifications are **disabled** for non-vnet jails (requests to
subscribe for the notifications are ignored). This will change to be more
fine-grained model once the first netlink provider requiring this gets
committed.
* Listing interfaces (RTM_GETLINK) is **allowed** w/o limits (**including**
interfaces w/o any addresses attached to the jail). The value of this is
questionable, but it follows the existing approach.
* Listing ARP/NDP neighbours is **forbidden**. This is a **change** from the
current approach - currently we list static ARP/ND entries belonging to the
addresses attached to the jail.
* Listing interface addresses is **allowed**, but the addresses are filtered
to match only ones attached to the jail.
* Listing routes is **allowed**, but the routes are filtered to provide only
host routes matching the addresses attached to the jail.
* By default, every `NETLINK_GENERIC` command is **allowed** in non-VNET jail
(as sub-families may be unrelated to network at all).
It is the goal of the family author to implement the restriction if
necessary.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D39206
MFC after: 1 month

jail: convert several functions from int to bool

these functions exclusively return (0) and (1), so convert them to bool

We also convert some networking related jail functions from int to bool
some of which were returning an error that was never used.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D29659
Reviewed by: imp, jamie (earlier version)
Pull Request: https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/pull/663

kern_jail.c: Remove #ifdefs for VNET_NFSD

The consensus was that VNET_NFSD was not needed.
This patch removes it from kern_jail.c.

With this patch, support for the "allow.nfsd"
jail parameter is enabled in the kernel for
kernels built with "options VIMAGE".

Reviewed by: markj
MFC after: 3 months
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38808

jail: Improve readability

No functional change intended.

Reviewed by: melifaro
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37890

jail: Use flexible array member within struct prison_ip

Current implementation utilize off-by-one struct prison_ip to access the
IPv[46] addresses. It is error prone and hence comes the regression fix
21ad3e27fabc and ddbf879d79d4. Use flexible array member so that compiler
will catch such errors and it will also be easier to review.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed by: melifaro, glebius
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37874

vfs_export: Add mnt_exjail to control exports done in prisons

If there are multiple instances of mountd(8) (in different
prisons), there will be confusion if they manipulate the
exports of the same file system. This patch adds mnt_exjail
to "struct mount" so that the credentials (and, therefore,
the prison) that did the exports for that file system can
be recorded. If another prison has already exported the
file system, vfs_export() will fail with an error.
If mnt_exjail == NULL, the file system has not been exported.
mnt_exjail is checked by the NFS server, so that exports done
from within a different prison will not be used.

The patch also implements vfs_exjail_destroy(), which is
called from prison_cleanup() to release all the mnt_exjail
credential references, so that the prison can be removed.
Mainly to avoid doing a scan of the mountlist for the case
where there were no exports done from within the prison,
a count of how many file systems have been exported from
within the prison is kept in pr_exportcnt.

Reviewed by: markj
Discussed with: jamie
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38371
MFC after: 3 months

jail: Fix redoing ip restricting

`prison_ip_restrict()` is called in loop FOREACH_PRISON_DESCENDANT_LOCKED.
While under low memory, it is still possible that in subsequent rounds
`prison_ip_restrict()` succeed and `redo_ip[46]` flip over from true to
false, thus leave some prisons's IPv[46] addresses unrestricted.

Reviewed by: jamie
Fixes: 8bce8d28abe6 jail: Avoid multipurpose return value of function prison_ip_restrict()
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38697

jail: Use atomic(9) instead of CK atomics

There's no reason to use one over the other here, let's prefer the
interface that's used elsewhere in the kernel.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed by: mjg
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38360

Revert "vfs_export: Add checks for correct prison when updating exports"

This reverts commit 7926a01ed7ae7cefd81ef4cc2142c35b84d81913.

A new patch in D38371 is being considered for doing this.

vfs_export: Add checks for correct prison when updating exports

mountd(8) basically does the following:
getmntinfo()
for each mount
delete_exports
using nmount(2) to do the creation/deletion of individual exports.

For prison0 (and for other prisons if enforce_statfs == 0) getmntinfo()
returns all mount points, including ones being used within other prisons.
This can cause confusion if the same file system is specified in the
exports(5) file for multiple prisons.

This patch adds a perminent identifier to each prison
and marks which prison did the exports in a field of
the mount structure called mnt_exjail. This field can
then be compared to the perminent identifier for the
prison that the thread's credentials is in.
Also required was a new function called prison_isalive_permid()
which returns if the prison is alive, so that the check can be
ignored for prisons that have been removed.

This prepares the system to allow mountd(8) to run in multiple
prisons, including prison0.

Future commits will complete the modifications to allow mountd(8)
to run in vnet prisons. Until then, these changes should not affect
semantics.

Reviewed by: markj
MFC after: 3 months
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38144

prison_check_nfsd: Add check for enforce_statfs != 0

Since mountd(8) will not be able to do exports
when running in a vnet prison if enforce_statfs is
set to 0, add a check for this to prison_check_nfsd().

Reviewed by: jamie, markj
MFC after: 2 months
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38189

jail: Avoid multipurpose return value of function prison_ip_restrict()

Currently function prison_ip_restrict() returns true if the replacement
buffer was used, or no buffer provided and allocation fails and should
redo. The logic is confusing and cause possibly infinite loop from
eb8dcdeac22d .

Reviewed by: jamie, glebius
Approved by: kp (mentor)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37918

jail: Fix regression panic from eb8dcdeac22d

And possibly infinite loop calling prison_ip_restrict() in
kern_jail_set() [2].

[1] It is possible that prisons do not have any IPv4 or IPv6 addresses.
[2] If prison_ip_restrict() is not provided with prison_ip, when it
allocates prison_ip successfully, then it should return false to
indicate not redo prison_ip_restrict() later.

Reviewed by: glebius
Approved by: kp (mentor)
Fixes: eb8dcdeac22d jail: network epoch protection for IP address lists
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37906

jail: Correctly access IPv[46] addresses of prison_ip

* Fix wrong IPv[46] addresses inherited from parent jail
* Properly restrict the child jail's IPv[46] addresses

Reviewed by: melifaro, glebius
Approved by: kp (mentor)
Fixes: eb8dcdeac22d jail: network epoch protection for IP address lists
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37871
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37872

jail: Fix output of IPv[46] addresses of DDB `show prison`

Reviewed by: melifaro, jamie
Approved by: kp (mentor)
Fixes: eb8dcdeac22d jail: network epoch protection for IP address lists
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37732

kern_jail.c: Allow mountd/nfsd to optionally run in a jail

This patch adds "allow.nfsd" to the jail code based on a
new kernel build option VNET_NFSD. This will not work
until future patches fix nmount(2) to allow mountd to
run in a vnet prison and the NFS server code is patched
so that global variables are in a vnet.

The jail(8) man page will be patched in a future commit.

Reviewed by: jamie
MFC after: 4 months
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37637

Import the WireGuard driver from zx2c4.com.

This commit brings back the driver from FreeBSD commit
f187d6dfbf633665ba6740fe22742aec60ce02a2 plus subsequent fixes from
upstream.

Relative to upstream this commit includes a few other small fixes such
as additional INET and INET6 #ifdef's, #include cleanups, and updates
for recent API changes in main.

Reviewed by: pauamma, gbe, kevans, emaste
Obtained from: git@git.zx2c4.com:wireguard-freebsd @ 3cc22b2
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36909

if_me: Use dedicated network privilege

Separate if_me privileges from if_gif.

Reviewed by: kp
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36691

kern_jail: Fix a typo in a source code comment

- s/paramter/parameter/

MFC after: 3 days

jail: add process linkage

It allows iteration over processes belonging to given jail instead of
having to walk the entire allproc list.

Note the iteration can miss processes which remains bug-compatible
with previous code.

Reviewed by: jamie (previous version), markj (previous version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D34522

kern: Correct some typos in source code comments

- s/occured/occurred/
- s/the the/the/

MFC after: 3 days

jail: Remove a prison's shared memory when it dies

Add shm_remove_prison(), that removes all POSIX shared memory segments
belonging to a prison. Call it from prison_cleanup() so a prison
won't be stuck in a dying state due to the resources still held.

PR: 257555
Reported by: grembo

jail: add prison_cleanup() to release resources held by a dying jail

Currently, when a jail starts dying, either by losing its last user
reference or by being explicitly killed,
osd_jail_call(...PR_METHOD_REMOVE...) is called. Encapsulate this
into a function prison_cleanup() that can then do other cleanup.

ovpn: Introduce OpenVPN DCO support

OpenVPN Data Channel Offload (DCO) moves OpenVPN data plane processing
(i.e. tunneling and cryptography) into the kernel, rather than using tap
devices.
This avoids significant copying and context switching overhead between
kernel and user space and improves OpenVPN throughput.

In my test setup throughput improved from around 660Mbit/s to around
2Gbit/s.

Sponsored by: Rubicon Communications, LLC ("Netgate")
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D34340

jail: Remove a double word in a source code comment

- s/a a/a/

MFC after: 3 days

vfs: NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF) -> NDFREE_PNBUF(&nd)

jail: network epoch protection for IP address lists

Now struct prison has two pointers (IPv4 and IPv6) of struct
prison_ip type. Each points into epoch context, address count
and variable size array of addresses. These structures are
freed with network epoch deferred free and are not edited in
place, instead a new structure is allocated and set.

While here, the change also generalizes a lot (but not enough)
of IPv4 and IPv6 processing. E.g. address family agnostic helpers
for kern_jail_set() are provided, that reduce v4-v6 copy-paste.

The fast-path prison_check_ip[46]_locked() is also generalized
into prison_ip_check() that can be executed with network epoch
protection only.

Reviewed by: jamie
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D33339

Fix buffer overread in preloaded hostuuid parsing

Commit b6be9566d236 stopped prison0_init writing outside of the
preloaded hostuuid's bounds. However, the preloaded data will not
(normally) have a NUL in it, and so validate_uuid will walk off the end
of the buffer in its call to sscanf. Previously if there was any
whitespace in the string we'd at least know there's a NUL one past the
end due to the off-by-one error, but now no such byte is guaranteed.

Fix this by copying to a temporary buffer and explicitly adding a NUL.

Whilst here, change the strlcpy call to use a far less suspicious
argument for dstsize; in practice it's fine, but it's an unusual pattern
and not necessary.

Found by: CHERI
Reviewed by: emaste, kevans, jhb
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D33616

vfs: remove the unused thread argument from NDINIT*

See b4a58fbf640409a1 ("vfs: remove cn_thread")

Bump __FreeBSD_version to 1400043.

jail(8): Fix a few common typos in source code comments

- s/phyiscal/physical/

MFC after: 3 days

jail(9): Fix a typo in a comment

- s/erorr/error/

MFC after: 3 days

kern: ether_gen_addr: randomize on default hostuuid, too

Currently, this will still hash the default (all zero) hostuuid and
potentially arrive at a MAC address that has a high chance of collision
if another interface of the same name appears in the same broadcast
domain on another host without a hostuuid, e.g., some virtual machine
setups.

Instead of using the default hostuuid, just treat it as a failure and
generate a random LA unicast MAC address.

Reviewed by: bz, gbe, imp, kbowling, kp
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D29788

Fix buffer overflow in preloaded hostuuid cleaning

When a module of type "hostuuid" is provided by the loader,
prison0_init strips any trailing whitespace and ASCII control
characters by (a) adjusting the buffer length, and (b) zeroing out
the characters in question, before storing it as the system's
hostuuid.

The buffer length adjustment was correct, but the zeroing overwrote
one byte higher in memory than intended -- in the typical case,
zeroing one byte past the end of the hostuuid buffer. Due to the
layout of buffers passed by the boot loader to the kernel, this will
be the first byte of a subsequent buffer.

This was *probably* harmless; prison0_init runs after preloaded kernel
modules have been linked and after the preloaded /boot/entropy cache
has been processed, so in both cases having the first byte overwritten
will not cause problems. We cannot however rule out the possibility
that other objects which are preloaded by the loader could suffer from
having the first byte overwritten.

Since the zeroing does not in fact serve any purpose, remove it and
trim trailing whitespace and ASCII control characters by adjusting
the buffer length alone.

Fixes: c3188289 Preload hostuuid for early-boot use
Reviewed by: kevans, markj
MFC after: 3 days

Fix 'hostuuid: preload data malformed' warning

If the preloaded hostuuid value is invalid and verbose booting is
enabled, a warning is printed. This printf had two bugs:

1. It was missing a trailing \n character.
2. The malformed UUID is printed with %s even though it is not known
to be NUL-terminated.

This commit adds the missing \n and uses %.*s with the (already known)
length of the preloaded UUID to ensure that we don't read past the end
of the buffer.

Reported by: kevans
Fixes: c3188289 Preload hostuuid for early-boot use
MFC after: 3 days

base: remove if_wg(4) and associated utilities, manpage

After length decisions, we've decided that the if_wg(4) driver and
related work is not yet ready to live in the tree. This driver has
larger security implications than many, and thus will be held to
more scrutiny than other drivers.

Please also see the related message sent to the freebsd-hackers@
and freebsd-arch@ lists by Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org> on
2021/03/16, with the subject line "Removing WireGuard Support From Base"
for additional context.

if_wg: import latest fixup work from the wireguard-freebsd project

This is the culmination of about a week of work from three developers to
fix a number of functional and security issues. This patch consists of
work done by the following folks:

- Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
- Matt Dunwoodie <ncon@noconroy.net>
- Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org>

Notable changes include:
- Packets are now correctly staged for processing once the handshake has
completed, resulting in less packet loss in the interim.
- Various race conditions have been resolved, particularly w.r.t. socket
and packet lifetime (panics)
- Various tests have been added to assure correct functionality and
tooling conformance
- Many security issues have been addressed
- if_wg now maintains jail-friendly semantics: sockets are created in
the interface's home vnet so that it can act as the sole network
connection for a jail
- if_wg no longer fails to remove peer allowed-ips of 0.0.0.0/0
- if_wg now exports via ioctl a format that is future proof and
complete. It is additionally supported by the upstream
wireguard-tools (which we plan to merge in to base soon)
- if_wg now conforms to the WireGuard protocol and is more closely
aligned with security auditing guidelines

Note that the driver has been rebased away from using iflib. iflib
poses a number of challenges for a cloned device trying to operate in a
vnet that are non-trivial to solve and adds complexity to the
implementation for little gain.

The crypto implementation that was previously added to the tree was a
super complex integration of what previously appeared in an old out of
tree Linux module, which has been reduced to crypto.c containing simple
boring reference implementations. This is part of a near-to-mid term
goal to work with FreeBSD kernel crypto folks and take advantage of or
improve accelerated crypto already offered elsewhere.

There's additional test suite effort underway out-of-tree taking
advantage of the aforementioned jail-friendly semantics to test a number
of real-world topologies, based on netns.sh.

Also note that this is still a work in progress; work going further will
be much smaller in nature.

MFC after: 1 month (maybe)

jail: Add safety around prison_deref() flags.

do_jail_attach() now only uses the PD_XXX flags that refer to lock
status, so make sure that something else like PD_KILL doesn't slip
through.

Add a KASSERT() in prison_deref() to catch any further PD_KILL misuse.

jail: Fix locking on an early jail_set error.

I had locked allprison_lock without immediately setting PD_LIST_LOCKED.

jail: re-commit 811e27fa3c44 with fixes

Make sure PD_KILL isn't passed to do_jail_attach, where it might end
up trying to kill the caller's prison (even prison0).

Fix the child jail loop in prison_deref_kill, which was doing the
post-order part during the pre-order part. That's not a system-
killer, but make jails not always die correctly.

jail: back out 811e27fa3c44 until it doesn't break Jenkins

Reported by: arichardson

jail: Don't allow jails under dying parents

If a jail is created with jail_set(...JAIL_DYING), and it has a parent
currently in a dying state, that will bring the parent jail back to
life. Restrict that to require that the parent itself be explicitly
brought back first, and not implicitly created along with the new
child jail.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28515

jail: Fix a LOR introduced in 1158508a8086

jail: Add PD_KILL to remove a prison in prison_deref().

Add the PD_KILL flag that instructs prison_deref() to take steps
to actively kill a prison and its descendents, namely marking it
PRISON_STATE_DYING, clearing its PR_PERSIST flag, and killing any
attached processes.

This replaces a similar loop in sys_jail_remove(), bringing the
operation under the same single hold on allprison_lock that it already
has. It is also used to clean up failed jail (re-)creations in
kern_jail_set(), which didn't generally take all the proper steps.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28473

jail: Add pr_state to struct prison

Rather that using references (pr_ref and pr_uref) to deduce the state
of a prison, keep track of its state explicitly. A prison is either
"invalid" (pr_ref == 0), "alive" (pr_uref > 0) or "dying"
(pr_uref == 0).

State transitions are generally tied to the reference counts, but with
some flexibility: a new prison is "invalid" even though it now starts
with a reference, and jail_remove(2) sets the state to "dying" before
the user reference count drops to zero (which was prviously
accomplished via the PR_REMOVE flag).

pr_state is protected by both the prison mutex and allprison_lock, so
it has the same availablity guarantees as the reference counts do.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D27876

jail: fix build after the previous commit

Noted by: Michael Butler <imb protected-networks.net>

jail: Change the locking around pr_ref and pr_uref

Require both the prison mutex and allprison_lock when pr_ref or
pr_uref go to/from zero. Adding a non-first or removing a non-last
reference remain lock-free. This means that a shared hold on
allprison_lock is sufficient for prison_isalive() to be useful, which
removes a number of cases of lock/check/unlock on the prison mutex.

Expand the locking in kern_jail_set() to keep allprison_lock held
exclusive until the new prison is valid, thus making invalid prisons
invisible to any thread holding allprison_lock (except of course the
one creating or destroying the prison). This renders prison_isvalid()
nearly redundant, now used only in asserts.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28419
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28458

jail: Improve locking when removing prisons

Change the flow of prison_deref() so it doesn't let go of allprison_lock
until it's completely done using it (except for a possible drop as part
of an upgrade on its first try).

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28458
MFC after: 3 days

jail: Change both root and working directories in jail_attach(2)

jail_attach(2) performs an internal chroot operation, leaving it up to
the calling process to assure the working directory is inside the jail.

Add a matching internal chdir operation to the jail's root. Also
ignore kern.chroot_allow_open_directories, and always disallow the
operation if there are any directory descriptors open.

Reported by: mjg
Approved by: markj, kib
MFC after: 3 days

jail: Handle a possible race between jail_remove(2) and fork(2)

jail_remove(2) includes a loop that sends SIGKILL to all processes
in a jail, but skips processes in PRS_NEW state. Thus it is possible
the a process in mid-fork(2) during jail removal can survive the jail
being removed.

Add a prison flag PR_REMOVE, which is checked before the new process
returns. If the jail is being removed, the process will then exit.
Also check this flag in jail_attach(2) which has a similar issue.

Reported by: trasz
Approved by: kib
MFC after: 3 days

jail: Handle a parent jail when a child is added to it

It's possible when adding a jail that its dying parent comes back to
life. Only allow that to happen when JAIL_DYING is specified. And if
it does happen, call PR_METHOD_CREATE on it.

jail: fix dangling reference bug from 6754ae2572eb

The change to use refcounts for pr_uref was mishandled in
prison_proc_free, so killing a jail's last process could add
an extra reference, leaving it an unkillable zombie.

jail: A jail could be removed without calling OSD methods

Fix a long-standing bug where setting nopersist on a process-less jail
would remove it without calling the the OSD PR_METHOD_REMOVE methods.

jail: Use refcount(9) for prison references.

Use refcount(9) for both pr_ref and pr_uref in struct prison. This
allows prisons to held and freed without requiring the prison mutex.
An exception to this is that dropping the last reference will still
lock the prison, to keep the guarantee that a locked prison remains
valid and alive (provided it was at the time it was locked).

Among other things, this honors the promise made in a comment in
crcopy(9), that it will not block, which hasn't been true for two
decades.

jail: Clean up some function placement and improve comments.

Move prison_hold, prison_hold_locked ,prison_proc_hold, and
prison_proc_free to a more intuitive part of the file (together with
with prison_free and prison_free_locked), and add or improve comments
to these and others, to better describe what's going in the prison
reference cycle.

No functional changes.

jail: Fix a stray mutex from 76ad42abf9d4.

jail: Add prison_isvalid() and prison_isalive()

prison_isvalid() checks if a prison record can be used at all, i.e.
pr_ref > 0. This filters out prisons that aren't fully created, and
those that are either in the process of being dismantled, or will be
at the next opportunity. While the check for pr_ref > 0 is simple
enough to make without a convenience function, this prepares the way
for other measures of prison validity.

prison_isalive() checks not only validity as far as the useablity of
the prison structure, but also whether the prison is visible to user
space. It replaces a test for pr_uref > 0, which is currently only
used within kern_jail.c, and not often there.

Both of these functions also assert that either the prison mutex or
allprison_lock is held, since it's generally the case that unlocked
prisons aren't guaranteed to remain useable for any length of time.
This isn't entirely true, for example a thread can assume its own
prison is good, but most exceptions will exist inside of kern_jail.c.

jail: Simplify handling of prison_deref()

Track the the current lock/reference state in a single variable,
rather than deducing the proper prison_deref() flags from a
combination of equations and hard-coded values.

jail: revert the attachment part of b4e87a632955

The change to kern_jail_set that was supposed to "also properly clean
up when attachment fails" didn't fix a memory leak but actually caused
a double free. Back that part out, and leave the part that manages
allprison_lock state.

jail: Clean up allprison_lock handing in kern_jail_set

Keep explicit track of the allprison_lock state during the final part
of kern_jail_set, instead of deducing it from the JAIL_ATTACH flag.

Also properly clean up when the attachment fails, fixing a long-
standing (though minor) memory leak.

jail: add a missing lock around an osd_jail_call().

allprison_lock should be at least held shared when jail OSD methods
are called. Add a shared lock around one such call where that wasn't
the case.

In another such call, change an exclusive lock grab to be shared in
what is likely the more common case.

jail: Consistently handle the pr_allow bitmask

Return a boolean (i.e. 0 or 1) from prison_allow, instead of the flag
value itself, which is what sysctl expects.

Add prison_set_allow(), which can set or clear a permission bit, and
propagates cleared bits down to child jails.

Use prison_allow() and prison_set_allow() in the various jail.allow.*
sysctls, and others that depend on thoe permissions.

Add locking around checking both pr_allow and pr_enforce_statfs in
prison_priv_check().

jail: Fix lock-free access to dynamic pr.allow flags

Use atomic access and a memory barrier to ensure that the flag parameter
in pr_flag_allow is indeed set after the rest of the structure is valid.

Simplify adding flag bits with pr_allow_all, a dynamic version of
PR_ALLOW_ALL_STATIC.

jail: Fix an O(n^2) loop when adding jails

When a jail is added using the default (system-chosen) JID, and
non-default-JID jails already exist, a loop through the allprison
list could restart and result in unnecessary O(n^2) behaviour.
There should never be more than two list passes required.

Also clean up inefficient (though still O(n)) allprison list traversal
when finding jails by ID, or when adding jails in the common case of
all default JIDs.

jail: introduce per jail suser_enabled setting

The suser_enable sysctl allows to remove a privileged rights from uid 0.
This change introduce per jail setting which allow to make root a
normal user.

Reviewed by: jamie
Previous version reviewed by: kevans, emaste, markj, me_igalic.co
Discussed with: pjd
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D27128

Fix style nits.

kern: clean up empty lines in .c and .h files

vfs: respect PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP in vaccess_smr

Reported by: novel

[net80211] Add new privileges; restrict what can be done in a jail.

Split the MANAGE privilege into MANAGE, SETMAC and CREATE_VAP.

+ VAP_MANAGE is everything but setting the MAC and creating a VAP.
+ VAP_SETMAC is setting the MAC address of the VAP.
Typically you wouldn't want the jail to be able to modify this.
+ CREATE_VAP is to create a new VAP. Again, you don't want to be doing
this in a jail, but this DOES stop being able to run some corner
cases like Dynamic WDS (DWDS) AP in a jail/vnet. We can figure this
bit out later.

This allows me to run wpa_supplicant in a jail after transferring
a STA VAP into it. I unfortunately can't currently set the wlan
debugging inside the jail; that would be super useful!

Reviewed by: bz
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25630

vfs: add restrictions to read(2) of a directory [2/2]

This commit adds the priv(9) that waters down the sysctl to make it only
allow read(2) of a dirfd by the system root. Jailed root is not allowed, but
jail policy and superuser policy will abstain from allowing/denying it so
that a MAC module can fully control the policy.

Such a MAC module has been written, and can be found at:
https://people.freebsd.org/~kevans/mac_read_dir-0.1.0.tar.gz

It is expected that the MAC module won't be needed by many, as most only
need to do such diagnostics that require this behavior as system root
anyways. Interested parties are welcome to grab the MAC module above and
create a port or locally integrate it, and with enough support it could see
introduction to base. As noted in mac_read_dir.c, it is released under the
BSD 2 clause license and allows the restrictions to be lifted for only
jailed root or for all unprivileged users.

PR: 246412
Reviewed by: mckusick, kib, emaste, jilles, cy, phk, imp (all previous)
Reviewed by: rgrimes (latest version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24596

ethersubr: Make the mac address generation more robust

If we create two (vnet) jails and create a bridge interface in each we end up
with the same mac address on both bridge interfaces.
These very often conflicts, resulting in same mac address in both jails.

Mitigate this problem by including the jail name in the mac address.

Reviewed by: kevans, melifaro
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24383

Preload hostuuid for early-boot use

prison0's hostuuid will get set by the hostid rc script, either after
generating it and saving it to /etc/hostid or by simply reading /etc/hostid.

Some things (e.g. arbitrary MAC address generation) may use the hostuuid as
a factor in early boot, so providing a way to read /etc/hostid (if it's
available) and using it before userland starts up is desirable. The code is
written such that the preload doesn't *have* to be /etc/hostid, thus not
assuming that there will be newline at the end of the buffer or even the
exact shape of the newline. White trailing whitespace/non-printables
trimmed, the result will be validated as a valid uuid before it's used for
early boot purposes.

The preload can be turned off with hostuuid_load="NO" in /boot/loader.conf,
just as other preloads; it's worth noting that this is a 37-byte file, the
overhead is believed to be generally minimal.

It doesn't seem necessary at this time to be concerned with kern.hostid.

One does wonder if we should consider validating hostuuids coming in
via jail_set(2); some bits seem to care about uuid form and we bother
validating format of smbios-provided uuid and in-fact whatever uuid comes
from /etc/hostid.

Reviewed by: karels, delphij, jamie
MFC after: 1 week (don't preload by default, probably)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24288

kern_jail: missing \0 termination check on osrelease parameter

If a user spplies a non-\0 terminated osrelease parameter reading it back
may disclose kernel memory.
This is a problem in case of nested jails (children.max > 0, which is not
the default). Otherwise root outside the jail has access to kernel memory
by other means and root inside a jail cannot create a child jail.

Add the proper \0 check at the end of a supplied osrelease parameter and
make sure any copies of the field will be \0-terminated.

Submitted by: Hans Christian Woithe (chwoithe yahoo.com)
MFC after: 3 days

Mark more nodes as CTLFLAG_MPSAFE or CTLFLAG_NEEDGIANT (17 of many)

r357614 added CTLFLAG_NEEDGIANT to make it easier to find nodes that are
still not MPSAFE (or already are but aren’t properly marked).
Use it in preparation for a general review of all nodes.

This is non-functional change that adds annotations to SYSCTL_NODE and
SYSCTL_PROC nodes using one of the soon-to-be-required flags.

Mark all obvious cases as MPSAFE. All entries that haven't been marked
as MPSAFE before are by default marked as NEEDGIANT

Approved by: kib (mentor, blanket)
Commented by: kib, gallatin, melifaro
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23718

Partially decompose priv_check by adding priv_check_cred_vfs_generation

During buildkernel there are very frequent calls to priv_check and they
all are for PRIV_VFS_GENERATION (coming from stat/fstat).

This results in branching on several potential privileges checking if
perhaps that's the one which has to be evaluated.

Instead of the kitchen-sink approach provide a way to have commonly used
privs directly evaluated.

Inline jailed().

It is constantly called from priv_check.

vfs: remove now useless ENODEV handling from vn_fullpath consumers

Noted by: ngie

Remove duplicated empty lines from kern/*.c

No functional changes.

vfs: drop the mostly unused flags argument from VOP_UNLOCK

Filesystems which want to use it in limited capacity can employ the
VOP_UNLOCK_FLAGS macro.

Reviewed by: kib (previous version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21427

Split gigantic rtsock route_output() into smaller functions.

Amount of changes to the original code has been intentionally minimised
to ease diffing.
The changes are mostly mechanical, with the following exceptions:

* lltable handler is now called directly based of RTF_LLINFO flag presense.
* "report" logic for updating rtm in RTM_GET/RTM_DELETE has been simplified,
fixing several potential use-after-free cases in rt_addrinfo.
* llable asserts has been replaced with error-returning, preventing kernel
crashes when lltable gw af family is invalid (root required).

MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22864

Replace hand-rolled unrefs if > 1 with refcount_release_if_not_last

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

In hardened systems, where the security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug sysctl
node is set, allow setting security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug per-jail.
In part, this is needed to create jails in which the Address Sanitizer
(ASAN) fully works as ASAN utilizes libkvm to inspect the virtual address
space. Instead of having to allow unprivileged process debugging for the
entire system, allow setting it on a per-jail basis.

The sysctl node is still security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug and the
jail(8) param is allow.unprivileged_proc_debug. The sysctl code is now a
sysctl proc rather than a sysctl int. This allows us to determine setting
the flag for the corresponding jail (or prison0).

As part of the change, the dynamic allow.* API needed to be modified to
take into account pr_allow flags which may now be disabled in prison0.
This prevents conflicts with new pr_allow flags (like that of vmm(4)) that
are added (and removed) dynamically.

Also teach the jail creation KPI to allow differences for certain pr_allow
flags between the parent and child jail. This can happen when unprivileged
process debugging is disabled in the parent prison, but enabled in the
child.

Submitted by: Shawn Webb <lattera at gmail.com>
Obtained from: HardenedBSD (45b3625edba0f73b3e3890b1ec3d0d1e95fd47e1, deba0b5078cef0faae43cbdafed3035b16587afc, ab21eeb3b4c72f2500987c96ff603ccf3b6e7de8)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: HardenedBSD and G2, Inc
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18319

Allow set ether/vlan PCP operation from the VNET jails.

The vlan interfaces can be created from vnet jails, it seems, so it
sounds logical to allow pcp configuration as well.

Reviewed by: bz, hselasky (previous version)
Sponsored by: Mellanox Technologies
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17777

Fix typos from r339409.

Reported by: maxim
Approved by: re (gjb)

Add a new jail permission, allow.read_msgbuf. When true, jailed processes
can see the dmesg buffer (this is the current behavior). When false (the
new default), dmesg will be unavailable to jailed users, whether root or
not.

The security.bsd.unprivileged_read_msgbuf sysctl still works as before,
controlling system-wide whether non-root users can see the buffer.

PR: 211580
Submitted by: bz
Approved by: re@ (kib@)
MFC after: 3 days

Fix the test prohibiting jails from sharing IP addresses.

It's not supposed to be legal for two jails to contain the same IP address,
unless both jails contain only that one address. This is the behavior
documented in jail(8), and is there to prevent confusion when multiple
jails are listening on IADDR_ANY.

VIMAGE jails (now the default for GENERIC kernels) test this correctly,
but non-VIMAGE jails have been performing an incomplete test when nested
jails are used.

Approved by: re@ (kib@)
MFC after: 5 days

Revert r337922, except for some documention-only bits. This needs to wait
until user is changed to stop using jail(2).

Differential Revision: D14791

Put jail(2) under COMPAT_FREEBSD11. It has been the "old" way of creating
jails since FreeBSD 7.

Along with the system call, put the various security.jail.allow_foo and
security.jail.foo_allowed sysctls partly under COMPAT_FREEBSD11 (or
BURN_BRIDGES). These sysctls had two disparate uses: on the system side,
they were global permissions for jails created via jail(2) which lacked
fine-grained permission controls; inside a jail, they're read-only
descriptions of what the current jail is allowed to do. The first use
is obsolete along with jail(2), but keep them for the second-read-only use.

Differential Revision: D14791

Add allow.mlock to jail parameters
It allows locking or unlocking physical pages in memory within a jail

This allows running elasticsearch with "bootstrap.memory_lock" inside a jail

Reviewed by: jamie@
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16342

Change prison_add_vfs() to the more generic prison_add_allow(), which
can add any dynamic allow.* or allow.*.* parameter. Also keep
prison_add_vfs() as a wrapper.

Differential Revision: D16146

Silence warnings about unused variables when RACCT is defined but RCTL
is not.

Reported by: Dries Michiels <driesm.michiels@gmail.com>
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 days

Instead of using hand-rolled loops where not needed switch them
to FOREACH_PROC_IN_SYSTEM() to have a single pattern to look for.

Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: iXsystems, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15916

Try to be consistent and spell "vnet" lower case like all the
other options (and as we do on command line).

Sponsored by: iXsystems, Inc.

Improve the KASSERT to also have the prison pointer.
Helpful when debugging from ddb.

Sponsored by: iXsystems, Inc.

Make it easier for filesystems to count themselves as jail-enabled,
by doing most of the work in a new function prison_add_vfs in kern_jail.c
Now a jail-enabled filesystem need only mark itself with VFCF_JAIL, and
the rest is taken care of. This includes adding a jail parameter like
allow.mount.foofs, and a sysctl like security.jail.mount_foofs_allowed.
Both of these used to be a static list of known filesystems, with
predefined permission bits.

Reviewed by: kib
Differential Revision: D14681

call racct_proc_ucred_changed() under the proc lock

The lock is required to ensure that the switch to the new credentials
and the transfer of the process's accounting data from the old
credentials to the new ones is done atomically. Otherwise, some updates
may be applied to the new credentials and then additionally transferred
from the old credentials if the updates happen after proc_set_cred() and
before racct_proc_ucred_changed().

The problem is especially pronounced for RACCT_RSS because
- there is a strict accounting for this resource (it's reclaimable)
- it's updated asynchronously by the vm daemon
- it's updated by setting an absolute value instead of applying a delta

I had to remove a call to rctl_proc_ucred_changed() from
racct_proc_ucred_changed() and make all callers of latter call the
former as well. The reason is that rctl_proc_ucred_changed, as it is
implemented now, cannot be called while holding the proc lock, so the
lock is dropped after calling racct_proc_ucred_changed. Additionally,
I've added calls to crhold / crfree around the rctl call, because
without the proc lock there is no gurantee that the new credentials,
owned by the process, will stay stable. That does not eliminate a
possibility that the credentials passed to the rctl will get stale.
Ideally, rctl_proc_ucred_changed should be able to work under the proc
lock.

Many thanks to kib for pointing out the above problems.

PR: 222027
Discussed with: kib
No comment: trasz
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15048

Move most of the contents of opt_compat.h to opt_global.h.

opt_compat.h is mentioned in nearly 180 files. In-progress network
driver compabibility improvements may add over 100 more so this is
closer to "just about everywhere" than "only some files" per the
guidance in sys/conf/options.

Keep COMPAT_LINUX32 in opt_compat.h as it is confined to a subset of
sys/compat/linux/*.c. A fake _COMPAT_LINUX option ensure opt_compat.h
is created on all architectures.

Move COMPAT_LINUXKPI to opt_dontuse.h as it is only used to control the
set of compiled files.

Reviewed by: kib, cem, jhb, jtl
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14941

Represent boolean jail options as an array of structures containing the
flag and both the regular and "no" names, instead of two different string
arrays whose indices need to match the flag's bit position. This makes
them similar to the say "jailsys" options are represented.

Loop through either kind of option array with a structure pointer rather
then an integer index.

sys/kern: adoption of SPDX licensing ID tags.

Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.

The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.

Jails: Optionally prevent jailed root from binding to privileged ports

You may now optionally specify allow.noreserved_ports to prevent root
inside a jail from using privileged ports (less than 1024)

PR: 217728
Submitted by: Matt Miller <mattm916@pulsar.neomailbox.ch>
Reviewed by: jamie, cem, smh
Relnotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10202

Use inet_ntoa_r() instead of inet_ntoa() throughout the kernel

inet_ntoa() cannot be used safely in a multithreaded environment
because it uses a static local buffer. Instead, use inet_ntoa_r()
with a buffer on the caller's stack.

Suggested by: glebius, emaste
Reviewed by: gnn
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Dell EMC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9625

Move IPv4-specific jail functions to new file netinet/in_jail.c
_prison_check_ip4 renamed to prison_check_ip4_locked

Move IPv6-specific jail functions to new file netinet6/in6_jail.c
_prison_check_ip6 renamed to prison_check_ip6_locked

Add appropriate prototypes to sys/sys/jail.h

Adjust kern_jail.c to call prison_check_ip4_locked and
prison_check_ip6_locked accordingly.

Add netinet/in_jail.c and netinet6/in6_jail.c to the list of files that
need to be built when INET and INET6, respectively, are configured in the
kernel configuration file.

Reviewed by: jtl
Approved by: sjg (mentor)
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D6799

Fix a vnode leak when giving a child jail a too-long path when
debug.disablefullpath=1.

Re-order some jail parameter reading to prevent a vnode leak.

Clean up some logic in jail error messages, replacing a missing test and
a redundant test with a single correct test.

Make sure the OSD methods for jail set and remove can't run concurrently,
by holding allprison_lock exclusively (even if only for a moment before
downgrading) on all paths that call PR_METHOD_REMOVE. Since they may run
on a downgraded lock, it's still possible for them to run concurrently
with PR_METHOD_GET, which will need to use the prison lock.

Mark jail(2), and the sysctls that it (and only it) uses as deprecated.
jail(8) has long used jail_set(2), and those sysctl only cause confusion.

sys/kern: spelling fixes in comments.

No functional change.

Delay revmoing the last jail reference in prison_proc_free, and instead
put it off into the pr_task. This is similar to prison_free, and in fact
uses the same task even though they do something slightly different.

This resolves a LOR between the process lock and allprison_lock, which
came about in r298565.

PR: 48471

Use crcopysafe in jail_attach.

Pass the current/new jail to PR_METHOD_CHECK, which pushes the call
until after the jail is found or created. This requires unlocking the
jail for the call and re-locking it afterward, but that works because
nothing in the jail has been changed yet, and other processes won't
change the important fields as long as allprison_lock remains held.

Keep better track of name vs namelc in kern_jail_set. Name should
always be the hierarchical name (relative to the caller), and namelc
the last component.

PR: 48471
MFC after: 5 days

Add a new jail OSD method, PR_METHOD_REMOVE. It's called when a jail is
removed from the user perspective, i.e. when the last pr_uref goes away,
even though the jail mail still exist in the dying state. It will also
be called if either PR_METHOD_CREATE or PR_METHOD_SET fail.

PR: 48471
MFC after: 5 days

Remove the PR_REMOVE flag, which was meant as a temporary marker for
a jail that might be seen mid-removal. It hasn't been doing the right
thing since at least the ability to resurrect dying jails, and such
resurrection also makes it unnecessary.

kernel: use our nitems() macro when it is available through param.h.

No functional change, only trivial cases are done in this sweep,

Discussed in: freebsd-current

Fix jail name checking that disallowed anything that starts with '0'.
The intention was to just limit leading zeroes on numeric names. That
check is now improved to also catch the leading spaces and '+' that
strtoul can pass through.

PR: 204897
MFC after: 3 days

Speed up rctl operation with large rulesets, by holding the lock
during iteration instead of relocking it for each traversed rule.

Reviewed by: mjg@
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D4110

Add support to the jail framework to be able to mount linsysfs(5) and
linprocfs(5).

Differential Revision: D2846
Submitted by: Nikolai Lifanov <lifanov@mail.lifanov.com>
Reviewed by: jamie

Move chdir/chroot-related fdp manipulation to kern_descrip.c

Prefix exported functions with pwd_.

Deduplicate some code by adding a helper for setting fd_cdir.

Reviewed by: kib

Initialise pr_enforce_statfs from the "default" sysctl value and
not from the compile time constant. The sysctl value is seeded
from the compile time constant.

MFC after: 2 weeks

Add kern.racct.enable tunable and RACCT_DISABLED config option.
The point of this is to be able to add RACCT (with RACCT_DISABLED)
to GENERIC, to avoid having to rebuild the kernel to use rctl(8).

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2369
Reviewed by: kib@
MFC after: 1 month
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

Do not include if_var.h and in6_var.h into kern_jail.c. It is now possible
after r280444.

Sponsored by: Nginx, Inc.

cred: add proc_set_cred helper

The goal here is to provide one place altering process credentials.

This eases debugging and opens up posibilities to do additional work when such
an action is performed.

Format the line properly (wrap before column 80).

Export the new osreldate and osrelease jail parms in jail_get(2).

Allow the kern.osrelease and kern.osreldate sysctl values to be set in a
jail's creation parameters. This allows the kernel version to be reliably
spoofed within the jail whether examined directly with sysctl or
indirectly with the uname -r and -K options.

The values can only be set at jail creation time, to eliminate the need
for any locking when accessing the values via sysctl.

The overridden values are inherited by nested jails (unless the config for
the nested jails also overrides the values).

There is no sanity or range checking, other than disallowing an empty
release string or a zero release date, by design. The system
administrator is trusted to set sane values. Setting values that are
newer than the actual running kernel will likely cause compatibility
problems.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1948
Relnotes: yes

Add allow.mount.fdescfs jail flag.

PR: 192951
Submitted by: ruben@verweg.com
MFC after: 3 days

Remove the prison flags PR_IP4_DISABLE and PR_IP6_DISABLE, which have been
write-only for as long as they've existed.

Don't set prison's pr_ip4s or pr_ip6s to -1.

PR: 196474
MFC after: 3 days

Avoid unlocking unlocked mutex in RCTL jail code. Specific test case
is attached to PR.

PR: 193457
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

Remove AppleTalk support.

AppleTalk was a network transport protocol for Apple Macintosh devices
in 80s and then 90s. Starting with Mac OS X in 2000 the AppleTalk was
a legacy protocol and primary networking protocol is TCP/IP. The last
Mac OS X release to support AppleTalk happened in 2009. The same year
routing equipment vendors (namely Cisco) end their support.

Thus, AppleTalk won't be supported in FreeBSD 11.0-RELEASE.

Remove IPX support.

IPX was a network transport protocol in Novell's NetWare network operating
system from late 80s and then 90s. The NetWare itself switched to TCP/IP
as default transport in 1998. Later, in this century the Novell Open
Enterprise Server became successor of Novell NetWare. The last release
that claimed to still support IPX was OES 2 in 2007. Routing equipment
vendors (e.g. Cisco) discontinued support for IPX in 2011.

Thus, IPX won't be supported in FreeBSD 11.0-RELEASE.

Back out r261266 pending security buy-in.

r261266:
Add a jail parameter, allow.kmem, which lets jailed processes access
/dev/kmem and related devices (i.e. grants PRIV_IO and PRIV_KMEM_WRITE).
This in conjunction with changing the drm driver's permission check from
PRIV_DRIVER to PRIV_KMEM_WRITE will allow a jailed Xorg server.

Add a jail parameter, allow.kmem, which lets jailed processes access
/dev/kmem and related devices (i.e. grants PRIV_IO and PRIV_KMEM_WRITE).
This in conjunction with changing the drm driver's permission check from
PRIV_DRIVER to PRIV_KMEM_WRITE will allow a jailed Xorg server.

Submitted by: netchild
MFC after: 1 week

Fix copy/paste typo.

MFC after: 1 week

jail_v0.ip_number was always in host byte order. This was handled
in one of the many layers of indirection and shims through stable/7
in jail_handle_ips(). When it was cleaned up and unified through
kern_jail() for 8.x, the byte order swap was lost.

This only matters for ancient binaries that call jail(2) themselves
internally.

prison_check_ip4() can take const arguments.

The r48589 promised to remove implicit inclusion of if_var.h soon. Prepare
to this event, adding if_var.h to files that do need it. Also, include
all includes that now are included due to implicit pollution via if_var.h

Sponsored by: Netflix
Sponsored by: Nginx, Inc.

Keep PRIV_KMEM_READ permitted inside jails as it is on the outside.

Allow tmpfs be mounted inside jail.

Refine the "nojail" rc keyword, adding "nojailvnet" for files that don't
apply to most jails but do apply to vnet jails. This includes adding
a new sysctl "security.jail.vnet" to identify vnet jails.

PR: conf/149050
Submitted by: mdodd
MFC after: 3 days

prison_racct_detach can be called for not fully initialized jail, so make it check that the jail has racct before doing anything

PR: kern/174436
Reviewed by: trasz
MFC after: 3 days

Remove the support for using non-mpsafe filesystem modules.

In particular, do not lock Giant conditionally when calling into the
filesystem module, remove the VFS_LOCK_GIANT() and related
macros. Stop handling buffers belonging to non-mpsafe filesystems.

The VFS_VERSION is bumped to indicate the interface change which does
not result in the interface signatures changes.

Conducted and reviewed by: attilio
Tested by: pho

Fix use-after-free in kern_jail_set() triggered e.g. by attempts
to clear "persist" flag from empty persistent jail, like this:

jail -c persist=1
jail -n 1 -m persist=0

Submitted by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik at gmail dot com>
MFC after: 2 weeks

Don't leak locks in prison_racct_modify().

Submitted by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik at gmail dot com>
MFC after: 2 weeks

Make racct and rctl correctly handle jail renaming. Previously
they would continue using old name, the one jail was created with.

PR: bin/165207

Add procfs to jail-mountable filesystems.

Reviewed by: jamie
MFC after: 1 week

Analogous to r232059, add a parameter for the ZFS file system:

allow.mount.zfs:
allow mounting the zfs filesystem inside a jail

This way the permssions for mounting all current VFCF_JAIL filesystems
inside a jail are controlled wia allow.mount.* jail parameters.

Update sysctl descriptions.
Update jail(8) and zfs(8) manpages.

TODO: document the connection of allow.mount.* and VFCF_JAIL for kernel
developers

MFC after: 10 days

To improve control over the use of mount(8) inside a jail(8), introduce
a new jail parameter node with the following parameters:

allow.mount.devfs:
allow mounting the devfs filesystem inside a jail

allow.mount.nullfs:
allow mounting the nullfs filesystem inside a jail

Both parameters are disabled by default (equals the behavior before
devfs and nullfs in jails). Administrators have to explicitly allow
mounting devfs and nullfs for each jail. The value "-1" of the
devfs_ruleset parameter is removed in favor of the new allow setting.

Reviewed by: jamie
Suggested by: pjd
MFC after: 2 weeks

Add support for mounting devfs inside jails.

A new jail(8) option "devfs_ruleset" defines the ruleset enforcement for
mounting devfs inside jails. A value of -1 disables mounting devfs in
jails, a value of zero means no restrictions. Nested jails can only
have mounting devfs disabled or inherit parent's enforcement as jails are
not allowed to view or manipulate devfs(8) rules.

Utilizes new functions introduced in r231265.

Reviewed by: jamie
MFC after: 1 month

Use separate buffer for global path to avoid overflow of path buffer.

Reviewed by: jamie@
MFC after: 3 weeks

Fix missing in r230129:

kern_jail.c: initialize fullpath_disabled to zero
vfs_cache.c: add missing dot in comment

Reported by: kib
MFC after: 1 month

Introduce vn_path_to_global_path()

This function updates path string to vnode's full global path and checks
the size of the new path string against the pathlen argument.

In vfs_domount(), sys_unmount() and kern_jail_set() this new function
is used to update the supplied path argument to the respective global path.

Unbreaks jailed zfs(8) with enforce_statfs set to 1.

Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 1 month

Mark all SYSCTL_NODEs static that have no corresponding SYSCTL_DECLs.

The SYSCTL_NODE macro defines a list that stores all child-elements of
that node. If there's no SYSCTL_DECL macro anywhere else, there's no
reason why it shouldn't be static.

Mark MALLOC_DEFINEs static that have no corresponding MALLOC_DECLAREs.

This means that their use is restricted to a single C file.

In order to maximize the re-usability of kernel code in user space this
patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility
calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel
entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also
fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function
psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel
psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future
MFCs that change syscalls.

Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)

Delay the recursive decrement of pr_uref when jails are made invisible
but not removed; decrement it instead when the child jail actually
goes away. This avoids letting the counter go below zero in the case
where dying (pr_uref==0) jails are "resurrected", and an associated
KASSERT panic.

Submitted by: Steven Hartland
Approved by: re (bz)
MFC after: 1 week

Always disable mount and unmount for jails with enforce_statfs==2.
A working statfs(2) is required for umount(8) in jail.

Reviewed by: pjd, kib
Approved by: re (kib)
MFC after: 2 weeks

This update changes the mnt_flag field in the mount structure from
32 bits to 64 bits and eliminates the unused mnt_xflag field. The
existing mnt_flag field is completely out of bits, so this update
gives us room to expand. Note that the f_flags field in the statfs
structure is already 64 bits, so the expanded mnt_flag field can
be exported without having to make any changes in the statfs structure.

Approved by: re (bz)

Add infrastructure to allow all frames/packets received on an interface
to be assigned to a non-default FIB instance.

You may need to recompile world or ports due to the change of struct ifnet.

Submitted by: cjsp
Submitted by: Alexander V. Chernikov (melifaro ipfw.ru)
(original versions)
Reviewed by: julian
Reviewed by: Alexander V. Chernikov (melifaro ipfw.ru)
MFC after: 2 weeks
X-MFC: use spare in struct ifnet

Change the way rctl interfaces with jails by introducing prison_racct
structure, which acts as a proxy between them. This makes jail rules
persistent, i.e. they can be added before jail gets created, and they
don't disappear when the jail gets destroyed.

Add rctl. It's used by racct to take user-configurable actions based
on the set of rules it maintains and the current resource usage. It also
privides userland API to manage that ruleset.

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)

Add racct. It's an API to keep per-process, per-jail, per-loginclass
and per-loginclass resource accounting information, to be used by the new
resource limits code. It's connected to the build, but the code that
actually calls the new functions will come later.

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: kib (earlier version)

- Merge changes to the base system to support OFED. These include
a wider arg2 for sysctl, updates to vlan code, IFT_INFINIBAND,
and other miscellaneous small features.

Add two new system calls, setloginclass(2) and getloginclass(2). This makes
it possible for the kernel to track login class the process is assigned to,
which is required for RCTL. This change also make setusercontext(3) call
setloginclass(2) and makes it possible to retrieve current login class using
id(1).

Reviewed by: kib (as part of a larger patch)

Add macro to test the sv_flags of any process. Change some places to test
the flags instead of explicit comparing with address of known sysentvec
structures.

MFC after: 1 month

Mfp4 CH177924:

Add and export constants of array sizes of jail parameters as compiled into
the kernel.
This is the least intrusive way to allow kvm to read the (sparse) arrays
independent of the options the kernel was compiled with.

Reviewed by: jhb (originally)
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Sponsored by: CK Software GmbH

A new jail(8) with a configuration file, to replace the work currently done
by /etc/rc.d/jail.

Don't exit kern_jail_set without freeing options when enforce_statfs
has an illegal value.

MFC after: 3 days

Back out r210974. Any convenience of not typing "persist" is outweighed
by the possibility of unintended partially-formed jails.

Implicitly make a new jail persistent if it's set not to attach.

MFC after: 3 days

Declare ip6 as (struct in6_addr *) instead of (struct in_addr *). This is
a harmless bug since we never actually use ip6 as anything other than an
opaque pointer.

Found with: Coverty Prevent(tm)
CID: 4319
MFC after: 1 month

MFC r205014,205015:

Provide groundwork for 32-bit binary compatibility on non-x86 platforms,
for upcoming 64-bit PowerPC and MIPS support. This renames the COMPAT_IA32
option to COMPAT_FREEBSD32, removes some IA32-specific code from MI parts
of the kernel and enhances the freebsd32 compatibility code to support
big-endian platforms.

This MFC is required for MFCs of later changes to the freebsd32
compatibility from HEAD.

Requested by: kib

MFC r202123:

Change DDB show prison:
- name some columns more closely to the user space variables,
as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already.
- print pr_childmax (children.max).
- prefix hex values with 0x.

Provide groundwork for 32-bit binary compatibility on non-x86 platforms,
for upcoming 64-bit PowerPC and MIPS support. This renames the COMPAT_IA32
option to COMPAT_FREEBSD32, removes some IA32-specific code from MI parts
of the kernel and enhances the freebsd32 compatibility code to support
big-endian platforms.

Reviewed by: kib, jhb

MFC 203052:

Add interface description capability as inspired by OpenBSD. Thanks for
rwatson@, jhb@, brooks@ and others for feedback to the old implementation!

Sponsored by: iXsystems, Inc.

MFC r201145 to stable/8:
(S)LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER takes a (S)LIST_HEAD as an argument.
Fix some wrong usages.
Note: this does not affect generated binaries as this argument is not used.

PR: 137213
Submitted by: Eygene Ryabinkin (initial version)

Revised revision 199201 (add interface description capability as inspired
by OpenBSD), based on comments from many, including rwatson, jhb, brooks
and others.

Sponsored by: iXsystems, Inc.
MFC after: 1 month

MFC r202468:

Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control
whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary
jail address for unbound outgoing connections.

This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP
jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules,
application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless
otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for
years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies.

Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to
scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the
design of jails. [1]

Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part)
Pointed out by: hrs [1]

MFC r202116:
Adjust a comment to reflect reality, as we have proper source
address selection, even for IPv4, since r183571.

Pointed out by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)

Add ip4.saddrsel/ip4.nosaddrsel (and equivalent for ip6) to control
whether to use source address selection (default) or the primary
jail address for unbound outgoing connections.

This is intended to be used by people upgrading from single-IP
jails to multi-IP jails but not having to change firewall rules,
application ACLs, ... but to force their connections (unless
otherwise changed) to the primry jail IP they had been used for
years, as well as for people prefering to implement similar policies.

Note that for IPv6, if configured incorrectly, this might lead to
scope violations, which single-IPv6 jails could as well, as by the
design of jails. [1]

Reviewed by: jamie, hrs (ipv6 part)
Pointed out by: hrs [1]
MFC After: 2 weeks
Asked for by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)

Change DDB show prison:
- name some columns more closely to the user space variables,
as we do for host.* or allow.* (in the listing) already.
- print pr_childmax (children.max).
- prefix hex values with 0x.

MFC after: 3 weeks

Adjust a comment to reflect reality, as we have proper source
address selection, even for IPv4, since r183571.

Pointed out by: Jase Thew (bazerka beardz.net)
MFC after: 3 days

(S)LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER takes a (S)LIST_HEAD as an argument.
Fix some wrong usages.
Note: this does not affect generated binaries as this argument is not used.

PR: 137213
Submitted by: Eygene Ryabinkin (initial version)
MFC after: 1 month

MFC r200473:

Throughout the network stack we have a few places of
if (jailed(cred))
left. If you are running with a vnet (virtual network stack) those will
return true and defer you to classic IP-jails handling and thus things
will be "denied" or returned with an error.

Work around this problem by introducing another "jailed()" function,
jailed_without_vnet(), that also takes vnets into account, and permits
the calls, should the jail from the given cred have its own virtual
network stack.

We cannot change the classic jailed() call to do that, as it is used
outside the network stack as well.

Discussed with: julian, zec, jamie, rwatson (back in Sept)

Throughout the network stack we have a few places of
if (jailed(cred))
left. If you are running with a vnet (virtual network stack) those will
return true and defer you to classic IP-jails handling and thus things
will be "denied" or returned with an error.

Work around this problem by introducing another "jailed()" function,
jailed_without_vnet(), that also takes vnets into account, and permits
the calls, should the jail from the given cred have its own virtual
network stack.

We cannot change the classic jailed() call to do that, as it is used
outside the network stack as well.

Discussed with: julian, zec, jamie, rwatson (back in Sept)
MFC after: 5 days

Revert revision 199201 for now as it has introduced a kernel vulnerability
and requires more polishing.

Add interface description capability as inspired by OpenBSD.

MFC after: 3 months

MFC r196835:
Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if
no name is specified), and let a numeric name specify the jid for a new
jail when the jid isn't otherwise set. Still disallow other numeric
names.

Reviewed by: zec
Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)

Revert previous commit and add myself to the list of people who should
know better than to commit with a cat in the area.

Add necessary include.

Allow a jail's name to be the same as its jid (which is the default if no
name is specified), but still disallow other numeric names.

Reviewed by: zec
Approved by: bz (mentor)
MFC after: 3 days

MFC r196592:
Fix a LOR between allprison_lock and vnode locks by releasing
allprison_lock before releasing a prison's root vnode.

PR: kern/138004
Reviewed by: kib
Approved by: re (rwatson), bz (mentor)

MFC r196505:

When "jail -c vnet" request fails, the current code actually creates and
leaves behind an orphaned vnet. This change ensures that such vnets get
released.

This change affects only options VIMAGE builds.

Submitted by: jamie
Discussed with: bz
Approved by: re (rwatson), julian (mentor)

Approved by: re (rwatson)

Fix a LOR between allprison_lock and vnode locks by releasing
allprison_lock before releasing a prison's root vnode.

PR: kern/138004
Reviewed by: kib
Approved by: bz (mentor)
MFC after: 3 days

When "jail -c vnet" request fails, the current code actually creates and
leaves behind an orphaned vnet. This change ensures that such vnets get
released.

This change affects only options VIMAGE builds.

Submitted by: jamie
Discussed with: bz
Approved by: re (rwatson), julian (mentor)
MFC after: 3 days

MFC r196176:

Make it possible to change the vnet sysctl variables on jails
with their own virtual network stack. Jails only inheriting a
network stack cannot change anything that cannot be changed from
within a prison.

Reviewed by: rwatson, zec

Approved by: re (kib)

Make it possible to change the vnet sysctl variables on jails
with their own virtual network stack. Jails only inheriting a
network stack cannot change anything that cannot be changed from
within a prison.

Reviewed by: rwatson, zec
Approved by: re (kib)

MFC r196135:
Make the kernel compile without IP networking by moving
a variable under a proper #ifdef.

Approved by: re (rwatson)

Make the kernel compile without IP networking by moving
a variable under a proper #ifdef.

Approved by: re (rwatson)

Merge the remainder of kern_vimage.c and vimage.h into vnet.c and
vnet.h, we now use jails (rather than vimages) as the abstraction
for virtualization management, and what remained was specific to
virtual network stacks. Minor cleanups are done in the process,
and comments updated to reflect these changes.

Reviewed by: bz
Approved by: re (vimage blanket)

Make the "enforce_statfs" default 2 (most restrictive) in jail_set(2),
instead of whatever the parent/system has (which is generally 0). This
mirrors the old-style default used for jail(2) in conjunction with the
security.jail.enforce_statfs sysctl.

Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)

Remove a LOR, where the the sleepable allprison_lock was being obtained
in prison_equal_ip4/6 while an inp mutex was held. Locking allprison_lock
can be avoided by making a restriction on the IP addresses associated with
jails:

Don't allow the "ip4" and "ip6" parameters to be changed after a jail is
created. Setting the "ip4.addr" and "ip6.addr" parameters is allowed,
but only if the jail was already created with either ip4/6=new or
ip4/6=disable. With this restriction, the prison flags in question
(PR_IP4_USER and PR_IP6_USER) become read-only and can be checked
without locking.

This also allows the simplification of a messy code path that was needed
to handle an existing prison gaining an IP address list.

PR: kern/136899
Reported by: Dirk Meyer
Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)

Don't allow mixing the "vnet" and "ip4/6" jail parameters, since vnet
jails have their own IP stack and don't have access to the parent IP
addresses anyway. Note that a virtual network stack forms a break
between prisons with regard to the list of allowed IP addresses.

Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)

Change the default value of the "ip4" and "ip6" jail parameters to
"disable", which only allows access to the parent/physical system's
IP addresses when specifically directed. Change the default value of
"host" to "new", and don't copy the parent host values, to insulate
jails from the parent hostname et al.

Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)

Some jail parameters (in particular, "ip4" and "ip6" for IP address
restrictions) were found to be inadequately described by a boolean.
Define a new parameter type with three values (disable, new, inherit)
to handle these and future cases.

Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)
Discussed with: rwatson

Remove the interim vimage containers, struct vimage and struct procg,
and the ioctl-based interface that supported them.

Approved by: re (kib), bz (mentor)

Wrap a PR_VNET inside "#ifdef VIMAGE" since that the only place it applies.
bz wants the blame for this.

Noticed by: rwatson
Approved by: bz (mentor)

In case of prisons with their own network stack, permit
additional privileges as well as not restricting the type of
sockets a user can open.

Note: the VIMAGE/vnet fetaure of of jails is still considered
experimental and cannot guarantee that privileged users
can be kept imprisoned if enabled.

Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: bz (mentor)

Add a limit for child jails via the "children.cur" and "children.max"
parameters. This replaces the simple "allow.jails" permission.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Manage vnets via the jail system. If a jail is given the boolean
parameter "vnet" when it is created, a new vnet instance will be created
along with the jail. Networks interfaces can be moved between prisons
with an ioctl similar to the one that moves them between vimages.
For now vnets will co-exist under both jails and vimages, but soon
struct vimage will be going away.

Reviewed by: zec, julian
Approved by: bz (mentor)

Rename the host-related prison fields to be the same as the host.*
parameters they represent, and the variables they replaced, instead of
abbreviated versions of them.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Add counterparts to getcredhostname:
getcreddomainname, getcredhostuuid, getcredhostid

Suggested by: rmacklem
Approved by: bz

Fix some overflow errors: a signed allocation and an insufficiant
array size.

Reported by: pho
Tested by: pho
Approved by: bz (mentor)

Move "options MAC" from opt_mac.h to opt_global.h, as it's now in GENERIC
and used in a large number of files, but also because an increasing number
of incorrect uses of MAC calls were sneaking in due to copy-and-paste of
MAC-aware code without the associated opt_mac.h include.

Discussed with: pjd

Place hostnames and similar information fully under the prison system.
The system hostname is now stored in prison0, and the global variable
"hostname" has been removed, as has the hostname_mtx mutex. Jails may
have their own host information, or they may inherit it from the
parent/system. The proper way to read the hostname is via
getcredhostname(), which will copy either the hostname associated with
the passed cred, or the system hostname if you pass NULL. The system
hostname can still be accessed directly (and without locking) at
prison0.pr_host, but that should be avoided where possible.

The "similar information" referred to is domainname, hostid, and
hostuuid, which have also become prison parameters and had their
associated global variables removed.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Add hierarchical jails. A jail may further virtualize its environment
by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any
parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents,
but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style
dot-separated strings.

Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which
contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root
directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the
global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel.
Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which
should not cause any problems for code that properly uses
securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge().

Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and
set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for
backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system
call.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Delay an error message until the variable it uses gets initialized.

Found with: Coverity Prevent(tm)
CID: 4316
Reported by: trasz
Approved by: bz (mentor)

Introduce a new virtualization container, provisionally named vprocg, to hold
virtualized instances of hostname and domainname, as well as a new top-level
virtualization struct vimage, which holds pointers to struct vnet and struct
vprocg. Struct vprocg is likely to become replaced in the near future with
a new jail management API import.

As a consequence of this change, change struct ucred to point to a struct
vimage, instead of directly pointing to a vnet.

Merge vnet / vimage / ucred refcounting infrastructure from p4 / vimage
branch.

Permit kldload / kldunload operations to be executed only from the default
vimage context.

This change should have no functional impact on nooptions VIMAGE kernel
builds.

Reviewed by: bz
Approved by: julian (mentor)

Move the per-prison Linux MIB from a private one-off pointer to the new
OSD-based jail extensions. This allows the Linux MIB to accessed via
jail_set and jail_get, and serves as a demonstration of adding jail support
to a module.

Reviewed by: dchagin, kib
Approved by: bz (mentor)

Introduce the extensible jail framework, using the same "name=value"
interface as nmount(2). Three new system calls are added:
* jail_set, to create jails and change the parameters of existing jails.
This replaces jail(2).
* jail_get, to read the parameters of existing jails. This replaces the
security.jail.list sysctl.
* jail_remove to kill off a jail's processes and remove the jail.
Most jail parameters may now be changed after creation, and jails may be
set to exist without any attached processes. The current jail(2) system
call still exists, though it is now a stub to jail_set(2).

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Some non-functional changes: whitespace, KASSERT strings, declaration order.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Whitespace/spelling fixes in advance of upcoming functional changes.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Don't allow creating a socket with a protocol family that the current
jail doesn't support. This involves a new function prison_check_af,
like prison_check_ip[46] but that checks only the family.

With this change, most of the errors generated by jailed sockets
shouldn't ever occur, at least until jails are changeable.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Standardize the various prison_foo_ip[46] functions and prison_if to
return zero on success and an error code otherwise. The possible errors
are EADDRNOTAVAIL if an address being checked for doesn't match the
prison, and EAFNOSUPPORT if the prison doesn't have any addresses in
that address family. For most callers of these functions, use the
returned error code instead of e.g. a hard-coded EADDRNOTAVAIL or
EINVAL.

Always include a jailed() check in these functions, where a non-jailed
cred always returns success (and makes no changes). Remove the explicit
jailed() checks that preceded many of the function calls.

Approved by: bz (mentor)

Mark most often used sysctl's as MPSAFE.

After running a `make buildkernel', I noticed most of the Giant locks in
sysctl are only caused by a very small amount of sysctl's:

- sysctl.name2oid. This one is locked by SYSCTL_LOCK, just like
sysctl.oidfmt.

- kern.ident, kern.osrelease, kern.version, etc. These are just constant
strings.

- kern.arandom, used by the stack protector. It is already protected by
arc4_mtx.

I also saw the following sysctl's show up. Not as often as the ones
above, but still quite often:

- security.jail.jailed. Also mark security.jail.list as MPSAFE. They
don't need locking or already use allprison_lock.

- kern.devname, used by devname(3), ttyname(3), etc.

This seems to reduce Giant locking inside sysctl by ~75% in my primitive
test setup.

For consistency with prison_{local,remote,check}_ipN rename
prison_getipN to prison_get_ipN.

Submitted by: jamie (as part of a larger patch)
MFC after: 1 week

Back out r186615; the sanitizing of the pointers in the error case
is not needed and seems that it will not be needed either.

Pointy hat: mine, mine, mine and not pho's

Added missing second part of cleaning j->ip[46] as requested by bz

Approved by: kib (mentor)
Pointy hat: pho

Make sure that unused j->ip[46] are cleared

Reviewed by: bz
Approved by: kib (mentor)

Correctly check the number of prison states to not access anything
outside the prison_states array.
When checking if there is a name configured for the prison, check the
first character to not be '\0' instead of checking if the char array
is present, which it always is. Note, that this is different for the
*jailname in the syscall.

Found with: Coverity Prevent(tm)
CID: 4156, 4155
MFC after: 4 weeks (just that I get the mail)

Unbreak the no-networks (no INET/6) build that I broke with
the commit in r185435.

Pointyhat: no, but I could need a ski cap for the winter

MFp4:
Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch.

This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple
addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well.
Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without
an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with
restricted process view, no networking,..

SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well.

Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor
sets after creation.

Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name
in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from
within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes
or as audit-token in the future.

DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging.

Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit
systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where
possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management
utilities.

Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features.
A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been
used by various patches floating around the last years.

Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes.

Special thanks to:
- Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches
and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches.
- Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their
help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support.
- Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions,
suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages.
- John Baldwin (jhb) for his help.
- Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes
on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people
who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and
other channels.
- My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this.

Reviewed by: (see above)
MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail)
X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible

With the permissions of phk@ change the license on kern_jail.c
to a 2 clause BSD license.

Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes.

This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes:

- Delegated Administration

Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system
creation, snapshot creation, etc.

- L2ARC

Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache.
Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly
static content.

- slog

Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up
operations like fsync(2).

- vfs.zfs.super_owner

Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored
on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one.

- chflags(2)

Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work.

- ZFSBoot

Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK.

Submitted by: dfr

- Snapshot properties

- New failure modes

Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one
can select from one of three failure modes:
- panic - panic on write error
- wait - wait for disk to reappear
- continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests

- Refquota, refreservation properties

Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed
by children file systems, clones and snapshots.

- Sparse volumes

ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool.

- External attributes

Compatible with extattr(2).

- NFSv4-ACLs

Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet.

Submitted by: trasz

- Creation-time properties

- Regression tests for zpool(8) command.

Obtained from: OpenSolaris

Retire the MALLOC and FREE macros. They are an abomination unto style(9).

MFC after: 3 months

- Import the HEAD csup code which is the basis for the cvsmode work.

Step 1.5 of importing the network stack virtualization infrastructure
from the vimage project, as per plan established at devsummit 08/08:
http://wiki.freebsd.org/Image/Notes200808DevSummit

Introduce INIT_VNET_*() initializer macros, VNET_FOREACH() iterator
macros, and CURVNET_SET() context setting macros, all currently
resolving to NOPs.

Prepare for virtualization of selected SYSCTL objects by introducing a
family of SYSCTL_V_*() macros, currently resolving to their global
counterparts, i.e. SYSCTL_V_INT() == SYSCTL_INT().

Move selected #defines from sys/sys/vimage.h to newly introduced header
files specific to virtualized subsystems (sys/net/vnet.h,
sys/netinet/vinet.h etc.).

All the changes are verified to have zero functional impact at this
point in time by doing MD5 comparision between pre- and post-change
object files(*).

(*) netipsec/keysock.c did not validate depending on compile time options.

Implemented by: julian, bz, brooks, zec
Reviewed by: julian, bz, brooks, kris, rwatson, ...
Approved by: julian (mentor)
Obtained from: //depot/projects/vimage-commit2/...
X-MFC after: never
Sponsored by: NLnet Foundation, The FreeBSD Foundation

Commit step 1 of the vimage project, (network stack)
virtualization work done by Marko Zec (zec@).

This is the first in a series of commits over the course
of the next few weeks.

Mark all uses of global variables to be virtualized
with a V_ prefix.
Use macros to map them back to their global names for
now, so this is a NOP change only.

We hope to have caught at least 85-90% of what is needed
so we do not invalidate a lot of outstanding patches again.

Obtained from: //depot/projects/vimage-commit2/...
Reviewed by: brooks, des, ed, mav, julian,
jamie, kris, rwatson, zec, ...
(various people I forgot, different versions)
md5 (with a bit of help)
Sponsored by: NLnet Foundation, The FreeBSD Foundation
X-MFC after: never
V_Commit_Message_Reviewed_By: more people than the patch

MFp4 144659:
Plug a memory leak with jail services.

PR: 125257
Submitted by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik gmail.com>
MFC after: 6 days

Introduce a new lock, hostname_mtx, and use it to synchronize access
to global hostname and domainname variables. Where necessary, copy
to or from a stack-local buffer before performing copyin() or
copyout(). A few uses, such as in cd9660 and daemon_saver, remain
under-synchronized and will require further updates.

Correct a bug in which a failed copyin() of domainname would leave
domainname potentially corrupted.

MFC after: 3 weeks

Revert rev. 178124 as requested by kris@. Having jail id not being
reused too frequently is useful for script controlled environment.

Instead of rolling our own jail number allocation procedure, use
alloc_unr() to do it.

Submitted by: Ed Schouten <ed 80386 nl>
PR: kern/122270
MFC after: 1 month

Add the support for the AT_FDCWD and fd-relative name lookups to the
namei(9).

Based on the submission by rdivacky,
sponsored by Google Summer of Code 2007
Reviewed by: rwatson, rdivacky
Tested by: pho

Replace the last susers calls in netinet6/ with privilege checks.

Introduce a new privilege allowing to set certain IP header options
(hop-by-hop, routing headers).

Leave a few comments to be addressed later.

Reviewed by: rwatson (older version, before addressing his comments)

VOP_LOCK1() (and so VOP_LOCK()) and VOP_UNLOCK() are only used in
conjuction with 'thread' argument passing which is always curthread.
Remove the unuseful extra-argument and pass explicitly curthread to lower
layer functions, when necessary.

KPI results broken by this change, which should affect several ports, so
version bumping and manpage update will be further committed.

Tested by: kris, pho, Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>

vn_lock() is currently only used with the 'curthread' passed as argument.
Remove this argument and pass curthread directly to underlying
VOP_LOCK1() VFS method. This modify makes the code cleaner and in
particular remove an annoying dependence helping next lockmgr() cleanup.
KPI results, obviously, changed.

Manpage and FreeBSD_version will be updated through further commits.

As a side note, would be valuable to say that next commits will address
a similar cleanup about VFS methods, in particular vop_lock1 and
vop_unlock.

Tested by: Diego Sardina <siarodx at gmail dot com>,
Andrea Di Pasquale <whyx dot it at gmail dot com>

Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:

mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<object>_check_<method/action>

The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.

All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.

Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer

Add PRIV_VFS_STAT privilege, which will allow overriding policy limits on
the right to stat() a file, such as in mac_bsdextended.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 months

Fix jails and jail-friendly file systems handling:
- We need to allow for PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER inside a jail.
- Move security checks to vfs_suser() and deny unmounting and updating
for jailed root from different jails, etc.

OK'ed by: rwatson

Allow PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT in jail.

prison_free() can be called with a mutex held. This wasn't a problem until
I converted allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_lock sx lock. To fix this LOR,
move prison removal to prison_complete() entirely. To ensure that noone
will reference this prison before it's beeing removed from the list skip
prisons with 'pr_ref == 0' in prison_find() and assert that pr_ref has to
greater than 0 in prison_hold().

Reported by: kris
OK'ed by: rwatson

Only use prison mutex to protect the fields that need to be protected by it.

pr_list is protected by the allprison_lock.

Implement functionality I called 'jail services'.

It may be used for external modules to attach some data to jail's in-kernel
structure.

- Change allprison_mtx mutex to allprison_sx sx(9) lock.
We will need to call external functions while holding this lock, which may
want to allocate memory.
Make use of the fact that this is shared-exclusive lock and use shared
version when possible.
- Implement the following functions:
prison_service_register() - registers a service that wants to be noticed
when a jail is created and destroyed
prison_service_deregister() - deregisters service
prison_service_data_add() - adds service-specific data to the jail structure
prison_service_data_get() - takes service-specific data from the jail
structure
prison_service_data_del() - removes service-specific data from the jail
structure

Reviewed by: rwatson

Make prison_find() globally accessible.

Add security.jail.mount_allowed sysctl, which allows to mount and
unmount jail-friendly file systems from within a jail.
Precisely it grants PRIV_VFS_MOUNT, PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT and
PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER privileges for a jailed super-user.
It is turned off by default.

A jail-friendly file system is a file system which driver registers
itself with VFCF_JAIL flag via VFS_SET(9) API.
The lsvfs(1) command can be used to see which file systems are
jail-friendly ones.

There currently no jail-friendly file systems, ZFS will be the first one.
In the future we may consider marking file systems like nullfs as
jail-friendly.

Reviewed by: rwatson

Minor simplification.

White space nits.

Remove 'MPSAFE' annotations from the comments above most system calls: all
system calls now enter without Giant held, and then in some cases, acquire
Giant explicitly.

Remove a number of other MPSAFE annotations in the credential code and
tweak one or two other adjacent comments.

Rename PRIV_VFS_CLEARSUGID to PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID, which seems to better
describe the privilege.

OK'ed by: rwatson

Remove unused PRIV_IPC_EXEC. Renumbers System V IPC privilege.

Rename three quota privileges from the UFS privilege namespace to the
VFS privilege namespace: exceedquota, getquota, and setquota. Leave
UFS-specific quota configuration privileges in the UFS name space.

This renumbers VFS and UFS privileges, so requires rebuilding modules
if you are using security policies aware of privilege identifiers.
This is likely no one at this point since none of the committed MAC
policies use the privilege checks.

Limit quota privileges in jail to PRIV_UFS_GETQUOTA and
PRIV_UFS_SETQUOTA.

For now, reflect practical reality that Audit system calls aren't
allowed in Jail: return a privilege error.

Add a new priv(9) kernel interface for checking the availability of
privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:

suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)

A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.

The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.

The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.

The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.

This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.

Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>

Complete break-out of sys/sys/mac.h into sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.

This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA

Declare security and security.bsd sysctl hierarchies in sysctl.h along
with other commonly used sysctl name spaces, rather than declaring them
all over the place.

MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.

Push Giant down in jails. Pass the MPSAFE flag to NDINIT, and keep track
of whether or not Giant was picked up by the filesystem. Add VFS_LOCK_GIANT
macros around vrele as it's possible that this can call in the VOP_INACTIVE
filesystem specific code. Also while we are here, remove the Giant assertion.
from the sysctl handler, we do not actually require Giant here so we
shouldn't assert it. Doing so will just complicate things when Giant is removed
from the sysctl framework.

Actually only protect mount-point if security.jail.enforce_statfs is set to 2.
If we don't return statistics about requested file systems, system tools
may not work correctly or at all.

Approved by: re (scottl)

Rename sysctl security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to security.jail.enforce_statfs
and extend its functionality:

value policy
0 show all mount-points without any restrictions
1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the
mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and
mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown)
2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed.

Default value is 2.

Discussed with: rwatson

- Use taskqueue_thread rather than taskqueue_swi since our task is going
to vrele, which may vop lock. This is not safe in a software interrupt
context.

Drop a bogus mp_fixme(). Adding a lock would do nothing to reduce userland
races regarding changing of jail-related sysctls.

Add a new sysctl, "security.jail.chflags_allowed", which controls the
behaviour of chflags within a jail. If set to 0 (the default), then a
jailed root user is treated as an unprivileged user; if set to 1, then
a jailed root user is treated the same as an unjailed root user.

This is necessary to allow "make installworld" to work inside a jail,
since it attempts to manipulate the system immutable flag on certain
files.

Discussed with: csjp, rwatson
MFC after: 2 weeks

/* -> /*- for copyright notices, minor format tweaks as necessary

Add two missing includes and remove two uneeded.
This is quite serious fix, because even with MAC framework compiled in,
MAC entry points in those two files were simply ignored.

Fix sysctl name: security.jail.getfsstate_getfsstatroot_only ->
security.jail.getfsstatroot_only.

Approved by: rwatson

Give jail(8) the feature to allow raw sockets from within a
jail, which is less restrictive but allows for more flexible
jail usage (for those who are willing to make the sacrifice).
The default is off, but allowing raw sockets within jails can
now be accomplished by tuning security.jail.allow_raw_sockets
to 1.

Turning this on will allow you to use things like ping(8)
or traceroute(8) from within a jail.

The patch being committed is not identical to the patch
in the PR. The committed version is more friendly to
APIs which pjd is working on, so it should integrate
into his work quite nicely. This change has also been
presented and addressed on the freebsd-hackers mailing
list.

Submitted by: Christian S.J. Peron <maneo@bsdpro.com>
PR: kern/65800

Remove sysctl security.jail.list_allowed.
This functionality was a misfeature, sysctl was added and turned off by
default just to check if nobody complains.

Reviewed by: rwatson

Rework jail_attach(2) so that an already jailed process cannot hop
to another jail.

Submitted by: rwatson

Added sysctl security.jail.jailed.
It returns 1 is process is inside of jail and 0 if it is not.
Information if we are in jail or not is not a secret, there is plenty of
ways to discover it. Many people are using own hack to check this and
this will be a legal way from now on.

It will be great if our starting scripts will take advantage of this sysctl
to allow clean "boot" inside jail.

Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor)

By default, don't allow processes in a jail to list the set of
jails in the system. Previous behavior (allowed) may be restored
by setting security.jail.list_allowed=1.

Fix mismerge in last commit: check that cred->cr_prison is NULL
before dereferencing the prison pointer.

By default, when a process in jail calls getfsstat(), only return the
data for the file system on which the jail's root vnode is located.
Previous behavior (show data for all mountpoints) can be restored
by setting security.jail.getfsstatroot_only to 0. Note: this also
has the effect of hiding other mounts inside a jail, such as /dev,
/tmp, and /proc, but errs on the side of leaking less information.

Defer the vrele() on a jail's root vnode reference from prison_free()
to a new prison_complete() task run by a task queue. This removes
a requirement for grabbing Giant in crfree(). Embed the 'struct task'
in 'struct prison' so that we don't have to allocate memory from
prison_free() (which means we also defer the FREE()).

With this change, I believe grabbing Giant from crfree() can now be
removed, but need to check the uidinfo code paths.

To avoid header pollution, move the definition of 'struct task'
to _task.h, and recursively include from taskqueue.h and jail.h; much
preferably to all files including jail.h picking up a requirement to
include taskqueue.h.

Bumped into by: sam
Reviewed by: bde, tjr

Use __FBSDID().

style(9)

- The prison mutex cannot possibly protect pointers to the prison it
protects, so don't bother locking it while we assign it to a ucred's
cr_prison.
- Fully construct the new credential for a process before assigning it to
p_ucred.

o In struct prison, add an allprison linked list of prisons (protected
by allprison_mtx), a unique prison/jail identifier field, two path
fields (pr_path for reporting and pr_root vnode instance) to store
the chroot() point of each jail.
o Add jail_attach(2) to allow a process to bind to an existing jail.
o Add change_root() to perform the chroot operation on a specified
vnode.
o Generalize change_dir() to accept a vnode, and move namei() calls
to callers of change_dir().
o Add a new sysctl (security.jail.list) which is a group of
struct xprison instances that represent a snapshot of active jails.

Reviewed by: rwatson, tjr

Back out M_* changes, per decision of the TRB.

Approved by: trb

Remove M_TRYWAIT/M_WAITOK/M_WAIT. Callers should use 0.
Merge M_NOWAIT/M_DONTWAIT into a single flag M_NOWAIT.

Don't forget to destroy the mutex if an error occurs
in the jail() system call.

Submitted by: Pawel Jakub Dawidek <nick@garage.freebsd.pl>

remove syscallarg().

Suggested by: peter

Use strlcpy() instead of strncpy() to copy NUL terminated strings
for safety and consistency.

The jail syscall calls chroot, which is not mpsafe, so put back a
mtx_lock(&Giant) around that call.

Reviewed by: arr

- Alleviate jail() from having the burden of acquiring Giant by simply
removing. We can do this since we no longer need Giant to safely
execute jail().

Reviewed by: rwatson, jhb

Change callers of mtx_init() to pass in an appropriate lock type name. In
most cases NULL is passed, but in some cases such as network driver locks
(which use the MTX_NETWORK_LOCK macro) and UMA zone locks, a name is used.

Tested on: i386, alpha, sparc64

Change the suser() API to take advantage of td_ucred as well as do a
general cleanup of the API. The entire API now consists of two functions
similar to the pre-KSE API. The suser() function takes a thread pointer
as its only argument. The td_ucred member of this thread must be valid
so the only valid thread pointers are curthread and a few kernel threads
such as thread0. The suser_cred() function takes a pointer to a struct
ucred as its first argument and an integer flag as its second argument.
The flag is currently only used for the PRISON_ROOT flag.

Discussed on: smp@

Make getcredhostname() take a buffer and the buffer's size
as arguments. The correct hostname is copied into the buffer
while having the prison's lock acquired in a jailed process'
case.

Reviewed by: jhb, rwatson

Add a function which returns the correct hostname for a given
credential.

Reviewed by: phk

- Attempt to help declutter kern. sysctl by moving security out from
beneath it.

Reviewed by: rwatson

- Move _jail sysctl node underneath _kern_security in order to standardize
where our security related sysctl tuneables are located. Also, this
will help if/when we move _security node out from under _kern as to help
make _kern less cluttered.

Approved by: rwatson
Review by: rwatson

o Introduce pr_mtx into struct prison, providing protection for the
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.

Reviewed by: jhb

o Move suser() calls in kern/ to using suser_xxx() with an explicit
credential selection, rather than reference via a thread or process
pointer. This is part of a gradual migration to suser() accepting
a struct ucred instead of a struct proc, simplifying the reference
and locking semantics of suser().

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

- Catch up to the new ucred API.
- Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling
a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin
were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing
ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc
lock.

o Initialize per-jail securelevel from global securelevel as part of
jail creation.

Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

KSE Milestone 2
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.

Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)

Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org

X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha

Pushdown Giant for acct(), kqueue(), kevent(), execve(), fork(),
vfork(), rfork(), jail().

Anton kindly pointed out (and fixed) a bug in the Jail handling of the
bind() call on IPv4 sockets:

Currently, if one tries to bind a socket using INADDR_LOOPBACK inside a
jail, it will fail because prison_ip() does not take this possibility
into account. On the other hand, when one tries to connect(), for
example, to localhost, prison_remote_ip() will silently convert
INADDR_LOOPBACK to the jail's IP address. Therefore, it is desirable to
make bind() to do this implicit conversion as well.

Apart from this, the patch also replaces 0x7f000001 in
prison_remote_ip() to a more correct INADDR_LOOPBACK.

This is a 4.4-RELEASE "during the freeze, thanks" MFC candidate.

Submitted by: Anton Berezin <tobez@FreeBSD.org>
Discussed with at some point: phk
MFC after: 3 days

o Move per-process jail pointer (p->pr_prison) to inside of the subject
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.

Notes:

o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.

Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project

Convert more malloc+bzero to malloc+M_ZERO.

Submitted by: josh@zipperup.org
Submitted by: Robert Drehmel <robd@gmx.net>

o Deny access to System V IPC from within jail by default, as in the
current implementation, jail neither virtualizes the Sys V IPC namespace,
nor provides inter-jail protections on IPC objects.
o Support for System V IPC can be enabled by setting jail.sysvipc_allowed=1
using sysctl.
o This is not the "real fix" which involves virtualizing the System V
IPC namespace, but prevents processes within jail from influencing those
outside of jail when not approved by the administrator.

Reported by: Paulo Fragoso <paulo@nlink.com.br>

o Modify jail to limit creation of sockets to UNIX domain sockets,
TCP/IP (v4) sockets, and routing sockets. Previously, interaction
with IPv6 was not well-defined, and might be inappropriate for some
environments. Similarly, sysctl MIB entries providing interface
information also give out only addresses from those protocol domains.

For the time being, this functionality is enabled by default, and
toggleable using the sysctl variable jail.socket_unixiproute_only.
In the future, protocol domains will be able to determine whether or
not they are ``jail aware''.

o Further limitations on process use of getpriority() and setpriority()
by jailed processes. Addresses problem described in kern/17878.

Reviewed by: phk, jmg

Yet-another-update: rename ``kern.prison'' to a new sysctl root entry,
``jail'', and move the set_hostname_allowed sysctl there, as well as
fixing a bug in the sysctl that resulted in jails being over-limited
(preventing them from reading as well as writing the hostname). Also,
correct some formatting issues, courtesy bde :-).

Reviewed by: phk
Approved by: jkh

Add a version number field to the jail(2) argument so that future changes
can be handled intelligently.

$Id$ -> $FreeBSD$

Add beer-ware license and $Id$

Noticed by: dillon

Make BOOTP to work again.

Submitted by: dillon
Reviewed by: phk

This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.

This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.

For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".

Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.

Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.

It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.

A few notes:

I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.

The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.

mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.

/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.

Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.

There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.

Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)

If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!

Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.

Have fun...

Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/