History log of /freebsd-10.0-release/sys/sys/capability.h
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# 259065 07-Dec-2013 gjb

- Copy stable/10 (r259064) to releng/10.0 as part of the
10.0-RELEASE cycle.
- Update __FreeBSD_version [1]
- Set branch name to -RC1

[1] 10.0-CURRENT __FreeBSD_version value ended at '55', so
start releng/10.0 at '100' so the branch is started with
a value ending in zero.

Approved by: re (implicit)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

# 258324 18-Nov-2013 pjd

MFC r258148,r258149,r258150,r258152,r258153,r258154,r258181,r258182:

r258148:

Add a note that this file is compiled as part of the kernel and libc.

Requested by: kib

r258149:

Change cap_rights_merge(3) and cap_rights_remove(3) to return pointer
to the destination cap_rights_t structure.

This already matches manual page.

r258150:

Sync return value with actual implementation.

r258151:

Style.

r258152:

Precisely document capability rights here too (they are already documented
in rights(4)).

r258153:

The CAP_LINKAT, CAP_MKDIRAT, CAP_MKFIFOAT, CAP_MKNODAT, CAP_RENAMEAT,
CAP_SYMLINKAT and CAP_UNLINKAT capability rights make no sense without
the CAP_LOOKUP right, so include this rights.

r258154:

- Move CAP_EXTATTR_* and CAP_ACL_* rights to index 1 to have more room
in index 0 for the future.
- Move CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT rights to index 0 so we can include
CAP_LOOKUP right in them.
- Shuffle the bits around so there are no gaps. This is last chance to do
that as all moved rights are not used yet.

r258181:

Replace CAP_POLL_EVENT and CAP_POST_EVENT capability rights (which I had
a very hard time to fully understand) with much more intuitive rights:

CAP_EVENT - when set on descriptor, the descriptor can be monitored
with syscalls like select(2), poll(2), kevent(2).

CAP_KQUEUE_EVENT - When set on a kqueue descriptor, the kevent(2)
syscall can be called on this kqueue to with the eventlist
argument set to non-NULL value; in other words the given
kqueue descriptor can be used to monitor other descriptors.
CAP_KQUEUE_CHANGE - When set on a kqueue descriptor, the kevent(2)
syscall can be called on this kqueue to with the changelist
argument set to non-NULL value; in other words it allows to
modify events monitored with the given kqueue descriptor.

Add alias CAP_KQUEUE, which allows for both CAP_KQUEUE_EVENT and
CAP_KQUEUE_CHANGE.

Add backward compatibility define CAP_POLL_EVENT which is equal to CAP_EVENT.

r258182:

Correct right names.

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Approved by: re (kib)


# 256281 10-Oct-2013 gjb

Copy head (r256279) to stable/10 as part of the 10.0-RELEASE cycle.

Approved by: re (implicit)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation


# 255219 04-Sep-2013 pjd

Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.

The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.

The structure definition looks like this:

struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};

The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.

The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.

The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.

To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.

#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)

We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:

#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)

#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)

There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:

cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);

Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:

cap_rights_t rights;

cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);

There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:

#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);

Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:

cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);

Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.

This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation


# 248599 21-Mar-2013 pjd

Implement chflagsat(2) system call, similar to fchmodat(2), but operates on
file flags.

Reviewed by: kib, jilles
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation


# 247667 02-Mar-2013 pjd

- Implement two new system calls:

int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen);
int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen);

which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a
path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'.

- Add manual pages for the new syscalls.

- Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox.

- Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on
the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work.

- Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path
in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor.

- Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights.

- Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2).

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des


# 247602 01-Mar-2013 pjd

Merge Capsicum overhaul:

- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.

- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.

- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.

- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).

- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.

- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).

- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.

- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.

- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:

CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.

Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).

Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).

Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).

Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.

Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.

Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.

Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.

CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.

Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).

Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.

CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).

CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).

Added convinient defines:

#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE

#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)

Added defines for backward API compatibility:

#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)

Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib


# 241083 01-Oct-2012 pjd

- Enforce CAP_MKFIFO on mkfifoat(2), not on mknodat(2). Without this change
mkfifoat(2) was not restricted.
- Introduce CAP_MKNOD and enforce it on mknodat(2).

Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks


# 224987 18-Aug-2011 jonathan

Add experimental support for process descriptors

A "process descriptor" file descriptor is used to manage processes
without using the PID namespace. This is required for Capsicum's
Capability Mode, where the PID namespace is unavailable.

New system calls pdfork(2) and pdkill(2) offer the functional equivalents
of fork(2) and kill(2). pdgetpid(2) allows querying the PID of the remote
process for debugging purposes. The currently-unimplemented pdwait(2) will,
in the future, allow querying rusage/exit status. In the interim, poll(2)
may be used to check (and wait for) process termination.

When a process is referenced by a process descriptor, it does not issue
SIGCHLD to the parent, making it suitable for use in libraries---a common
scenario when using library compartmentalisation from within large
applications (such as web browsers). Some observers may note a similarity
to Mach task ports; process descriptors provide a subset of this behaviour,
but in a UNIX style.

This feature is enabled by "options PROCDESC", but as with several other
Capsicum kernel features, is not enabled by default in GENERIC 9.0.

Reviewed by: jhb, kib
Approved by: re (kib), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 224810 13-Aug-2011 jonathan

Allow Capsicum capabilities to delegate constrained
access to file system subtrees to sandboxed processes.

- Use of absolute paths and '..' are limited in capability mode.
- Use of absolute paths and '..' are limited when looking up relative
to a capability.
- When a name lookup is performed, identify what operation is to be
performed (such as CAP_MKDIR) as well as check for CAP_LOOKUP.

With these constraints, openat() and friends are now safe in capability
mode, and can then be used by code such as the capability-mode runtime
linker.

Approved by: re (bz), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 224797 12-Aug-2011 jonathan

Rename CAP_*_KEVENT to CAP_*_EVENT.

Change the names of a couple of capability rights to be less
FreeBSD-specific.

Approved by: re (kib), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 224794 12-Aug-2011 jonathan

Reorder and renumber capability rights.

This patch does three things:
- puts capability rights in a more pleasing declaration order
- changes mask values to match the new declaration order
- declare new rights which will be used soon (e.g. CAP_LOOKUP, CAP_MKDIR)

Approved by: re (kib), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 224778 11-Aug-2011 rwatson

Second-to-last commit implementing Capsicum capabilities in the FreeBSD
kernel for FreeBSD 9.0:

Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system
call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file
descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options
CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability
protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op.

Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve
information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory
map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by
narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar
purposes with file permissions.

In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability
mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there.
This will follow in a later commit.

Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become
CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they
represent.

Approved by: re (bz)
Submitted by: jonathan
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 224255 21-Jul-2011 jonathan

Declare more capability method rights.

This is a complete set of rights that can be held in a capability's
rights mask.

Approved by: re (kib), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 224066 15-Jul-2011 jonathan

Add cap_new() and cap_getrights() system calls.

Implement two previously-reserved Capsicum system calls:
- cap_new() creates a capability to wrap an existing file descriptor
- cap_getrights() queries the rights mask of a capability.

Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 224056 15-Jul-2011 jonathan

Add implementation for capabilities.

Code to actually implement Capsicum capabilities, including fileops and
kern_capwrap(), which creates a capability to wrap an existing file
descriptor.

We also modify kern_close() and closef() to handle capabilities.

Finally, remove cap_filelist from struct capability, since we don't
actually need it.

Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 223762 04-Jul-2011 jonathan

Add kernel functions to unwrap capabilities.

cap_funwrap() and cap_funwrap_mmap() unwrap capabilities, exposing the
underlying object. Attempting to unwrap a capability with an inadequate
rights mask (e.g. calling cap_funwrap(fp, CAP_WRITE | CAP_MMAP, &result)
on a capability whose rights mask is CAP_READ | CAP_MMAP) will result in
ENOTCAPABLE.

Unwrapping a non-capability is effectively a no-op.

These functions will be used by Capsicum-aware versions of _fget(), etc.

Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket)
Sponsored by: Google Inc


# 219140 01-Mar-2011 rwatson

Add Capsicum capability mode support; svn add of capability.h was missed
in a previous commit. Whoops!

Reported by: jhb
Reviewed by: anderson
Discussed with: benl, kris, pjd
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
Obtained from: Capsicum Project
MFC after: 3 months