History log of /freebsd-10-stable/sys/sys/sockbuf.h
Revision Date Author Comments
# 279930 12-Mar-2015 sjg

MFC r278729

sbspace: size of bleft, mleft must match sockbuf fields to avoid
overflow on amd64

Submitted by: anshukla@juniper.net
Obtained from: Juniper Networks


# 274043 03-Nov-2014 hselasky

MFC r271946 and r272595:
Improve transmit sending offload, TSO, algorithm in general. This
change allows all HCAs from Mellanox Technologies to function properly
when TSO is enabled. See r271946 and r272595 for more details about
this commit.

Sponsored by: Mellanox Technologies


# 264080 03-Apr-2014 asomers

MFC r263116

Replace 4.4BSD Lite's unix domain socket backpressure hack with a cleaner
mechanism, based on the new SB_STOP sockbuf flag. The old hack dynamically
changed the sending sockbuf's high water mark whenever adding or removing
data from the receiving sockbuf. It worked for stream sockets, but it never
worked for SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets because of their atomic nature. If the
sockbuf was partially full, it might return EMSGSIZE instead of blocking.

The new solution is based on DragonFlyBSD's fix from commit
3a6117bbe0ed6a87605c1e43e12a1438d8844380 on 2008-05-27. It adds an SB_STOP
flag to sockbufs. Whenever uipc_send surpasses the socket's size limit, it
sets SB_STOP on the sending sockbuf. sbspace() will then return 0 for that
sockbuf, causing sosend_generic and friends to block. uipc_rcvd will
likewise clear SB_STOP. There are two fringe benefits: uipc_{send,rcvd} no
longer need to call chgsbsize() on every send and receive because they don't
change the sockbuf's high water mark. Also, uipc_sense no longer needs to
acquire the UIPC linkage lock, because it's simpler to compute the
st_blksizes.

There is one drawback: since sbspace() will only ever return 0 or the
maximum, sosend_generic will allow the sockbuf to exceed its nominal maximum
size by at most one packet of size less than the max. I don't think that's
a serious problem. In fact, I'm not even positive that FreeBSD guarantees a
socket will always stay within its nominal size limit.

sys/sys/sockbuf.h
Add the SB_STOP flag and adjust sbspace()

sys/sys/unpcb.h
Delete the obsolete unp_cc and unp_mbcnt fields from struct unpcb.

sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c
Adjust uipc_rcvd, uipc_send, and uipc_sense to use the SB_STOP
backpressure mechanism. Removing obsolete unpcb fields from
db_show_unpcb.

tests/sys/kern/unix_seqpacket_test.c
Clear expected failures from ATF.


# 263820 27-Mar-2014 asomers

MFC r262867

Fix PR kern/185813 "SOCK_SEQPACKET AF_UNIX sockets with asymmetrical buffers
drop packets". It was caused by a check for the space available in a
sockbuf, but it was checking the wrong sockbuf.

sys/sys/sockbuf.h
sys/kern/uipc_sockbuf.c
Add sbappendaddr_nospacecheck_locked(), which is just like
sbappendaddr_locked but doesn't validate the receiving socket's space.
Factor out common code into sbappendaddr_locked_internal(). We
shouldn't simply make sbappendaddr_locked check the space and then call
sbappendaddr_nospacecheck_locked, because that would cause the O(n)
function m_length to be called twice.

sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c
Use sbappendaddr_nospacecheck_locked for SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets,
because the receiving sockbuf's size limit is irrelevant.

tests/sys/kern/unix_seqpacket_test.c
Now that 185813 is fixed, pipe_128k_8k fails intermittently due to
185812. Make it fail every time by adding a usleep after starting the
writer thread and before starting the reader thread in test_pipe. That
gives the writer time to fill up its send buffer. Also, clear the
expected failure message due to 185813. It actually said "185812", but
that was a typo.

PR: kern/185813


# 279930 12-Mar-2015 sjg

MFC r278729

sbspace: size of bleft, mleft must match sockbuf fields to avoid
overflow on amd64

Submitted by: anshukla@juniper.net
Obtained from: Juniper Networks


# 274043 03-Nov-2014 hselasky

MFC r271946 and r272595:
Improve transmit sending offload, TSO, algorithm in general. This
change allows all HCAs from Mellanox Technologies to function properly
when TSO is enabled. See r271946 and r272595 for more details about
this commit.

Sponsored by: Mellanox Technologies


# 264080 03-Apr-2014 asomers

MFC r263116

Replace 4.4BSD Lite's unix domain socket backpressure hack with a cleaner
mechanism, based on the new SB_STOP sockbuf flag. The old hack dynamically
changed the sending sockbuf's high water mark whenever adding or removing
data from the receiving sockbuf. It worked for stream sockets, but it never
worked for SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets because of their atomic nature. If the
sockbuf was partially full, it might return EMSGSIZE instead of blocking.

The new solution is based on DragonFlyBSD's fix from commit
3a6117bbe0ed6a87605c1e43e12a1438d8844380 on 2008-05-27. It adds an SB_STOP
flag to sockbufs. Whenever uipc_send surpasses the socket's size limit, it
sets SB_STOP on the sending sockbuf. sbspace() will then return 0 for that
sockbuf, causing sosend_generic and friends to block. uipc_rcvd will
likewise clear SB_STOP. There are two fringe benefits: uipc_{send,rcvd} no
longer need to call chgsbsize() on every send and receive because they don't
change the sockbuf's high water mark. Also, uipc_sense no longer needs to
acquire the UIPC linkage lock, because it's simpler to compute the
st_blksizes.

There is one drawback: since sbspace() will only ever return 0 or the
maximum, sosend_generic will allow the sockbuf to exceed its nominal maximum
size by at most one packet of size less than the max. I don't think that's
a serious problem. In fact, I'm not even positive that FreeBSD guarantees a
socket will always stay within its nominal size limit.

sys/sys/sockbuf.h
Add the SB_STOP flag and adjust sbspace()

sys/sys/unpcb.h
Delete the obsolete unp_cc and unp_mbcnt fields from struct unpcb.

sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c
Adjust uipc_rcvd, uipc_send, and uipc_sense to use the SB_STOP
backpressure mechanism. Removing obsolete unpcb fields from
db_show_unpcb.

tests/sys/kern/unix_seqpacket_test.c
Clear expected failures from ATF.


# 263820 27-Mar-2014 asomers

MFC r262867

Fix PR kern/185813 "SOCK_SEQPACKET AF_UNIX sockets with asymmetrical buffers
drop packets". It was caused by a check for the space available in a
sockbuf, but it was checking the wrong sockbuf.

sys/sys/sockbuf.h
sys/kern/uipc_sockbuf.c
Add sbappendaddr_nospacecheck_locked(), which is just like
sbappendaddr_locked but doesn't validate the receiving socket's space.
Factor out common code into sbappendaddr_locked_internal(). We
shouldn't simply make sbappendaddr_locked check the space and then call
sbappendaddr_nospacecheck_locked, because that would cause the O(n)
function m_length to be called twice.

sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c
Use sbappendaddr_nospacecheck_locked for SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets,
because the receiving sockbuf's size limit is irrelevant.

tests/sys/kern/unix_seqpacket_test.c
Now that 185813 is fixed, pipe_128k_8k fails intermittently due to
185812. Make it fail every time by adding a usleep after starting the
writer thread and before starting the reader thread in test_pipe. That
gives the writer time to fill up its send buffer. Also, clear the
expected failure message due to 185813. It actually said "185812", but
that was a typo.

PR: kern/185813