1/* 2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10#include <stdio.h> 11#include <limits.h> 12#include <errno.h> 13#include "../ssl_local.h" 14#include <openssl/evp.h> 15#include <openssl/buffer.h> 16#include <openssl/rand.h> 17#include "record_local.h" 18#include "../packet_local.h" 19 20#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ 21 !( defined(AESNI_ASM) && ( \ 22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ 23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ 24 ) 25# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 26# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 27#endif 28 29void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) 30{ 31 rl->s = s; 32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); 33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 34} 35 36void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 37{ 38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 39 40 /* 41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not 42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is 43 * that right? 44 */ 45 46 rl->packet = NULL; 47 rl->packet_length = 0; 48 rl->wnum = 0; 49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); 50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 51 rl->wpend_tot = 0; 52 rl->wpend_type = 0; 53 rl->wpend_ret = 0; 54 rl->wpend_buf = NULL; 55 56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); 57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 58 rl->numrpipes = 0; 59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 60 61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); 62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); 63 64 if (rl->d) 65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); 66} 67 68void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 69{ 70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) 71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); 72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0) 73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 75} 76 77/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ 78int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 79{ 80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; 81} 82 83/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ 84int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 85{ 86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); 87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; 88 89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) 90 curr_rec++; 91 92 return curr_rec < num_recs; 93} 94 95int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 96{ 97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0) 98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; 99} 100 101void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 102{ 103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); 104} 105 106void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 107{ 108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); 109} 110 111size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) 112{ 113 size_t i, num = 0; 114 115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) 116 return 0; 117 118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { 119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) 120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 121 return 0; 122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); 123 } 124 125 return num; 126} 127 128void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) 129{ 130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; 131} 132 133void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) 134{ 135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); 136} 137 138const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) 139{ 140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 142 return "read header"; 143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 144 return "read body"; 145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 146 return "read done"; 147 default: 148 return "unknown"; 149 } 150} 151 152const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) 153{ 154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 156 return "RH"; 157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 158 return "RB"; 159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 160 return "RD"; 161 default: 162 return "unknown"; 163 } 164} 165 166/* 167 * Return values are as per SSL_read() 168 */ 169int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold, 170 size_t *readbytes) 171{ 172 /* 173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If 176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus 177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if 179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were 180 */ 181 size_t len, left, align = 0; 182 unsigned char *pkt; 183 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 184 185 if (n == 0) 186 return 0; 187 188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 189 if (rb->buf == NULL) 190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 191 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 192 return -1; 193 } 194 195 left = rb->left; 196#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 197 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 198 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 199#endif 200 201 if (!extend) { 202 /* start with empty packet ... */ 203 if (left == 0) 204 rb->offset = align; 205 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 206 /* 207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload 208 * alignment... 209 */ 210 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 211 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 212 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { 213 /* 214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field 215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about 216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no 217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer 218 * overrun can be triggered. 219 */ 220 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); 221 rb->offset = align; 222 } 223 } 224 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 225 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; 226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 227 } 228 229 len = s->rlayer.packet_length; 230 pkt = rb->buf + align; 231 /* 232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already 233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end 234 */ 235 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { 236 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); 237 s->rlayer.packet = pkt; 238 rb->offset = len + align; 239 } 240 241 /* 242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 244 * the buffer). 245 */ 246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 247 if (left == 0 && extend) 248 return 0; 249 if (left > 0 && n > left) 250 n = left; 251 } 252 253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 254 if (left >= n) { 255 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 256 rb->left = left - n; 257 rb->offset += n; 258 *readbytes = n; 259 return 1; 260 } 261 262 /* else we need to read more data */ 263 264 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { 265 /* does not happen */ 266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 268 return -1; 269 } 270 271 /* 272 * Ktls always reads full records. 273 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS. 274 */ 275 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead 276 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 277 /* ignore max parameter */ 278 max = n; 279 } else { 280 if (max < n) 281 max = n; 282 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) 283 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 284 } 285 286 while (left < n) { 287 size_t bioread = 0; 288 int ret; 289 290 /* 291 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and 292 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if 293 * possible) 294 */ 295 296 clear_sys_error(); 297 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 298 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 299 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 300 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); 301 if (ret >= 0) 302 bioread = ret; 303 } else { 304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 305 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 306 ret = -1; 307 } 308 309 if (ret <= 0) { 310 rb->left = left; 311 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 312 if (len + left == 0) 313 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 314 return ret; 315 } 316 left += bioread; 317 /* 318 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 319 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 320 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 321 */ 322 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 323 if (n > left) 324 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 325 } 326 } 327 328 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 329 rb->offset += n; 330 rb->left = left - n; 331 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 332 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 333 *readbytes = n; 334 return 1; 335} 336 337/* 338 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 339 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 340 */ 341int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, 342 size_t *written) 343{ 344 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 345 size_t tot; 346 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; 347#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 348 size_t nw; 349#endif 350 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 351 int i; 352 size_t tmpwrit; 353 354 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 355 tot = s->rlayer.wnum; 356 /* 357 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 358 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for 359 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 360 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 361 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 362 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 363 * report the error in a way the user will notice 364 */ 365 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) 366 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { 367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 368 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 369 return -1; 370 } 371 372 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING 373 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { 374 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 375 return -1; 376 } 377 378 s->rlayer.wnum = 0; 379 380 /* 381 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we 382 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first. 383 */ 384 if (wb->left == 0 && s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) 385 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 386 387 /* 388 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in 389 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those 390 * messages yet. 391 */ 392 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) 393 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { 394 i = s->handshake_func(s); 395 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 396 if (i < 0) 397 return i; 398 if (i == 0) { 399 return -1; 400 } 401 } 402 403 /* 404 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 405 * will happen with non blocking IO 406 */ 407 if (wb->left != 0) { 408 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 409 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, 410 &tmpwrit); 411 if (i <= 0) { 412 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 413 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 414 return i; 415 } 416 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ 417 } 418#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 419 /* 420 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* 421 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate 422 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the 423 * compromise is considered worthy. 424 */ 425 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 426 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) && 427 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && 428 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 429 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0) && 430 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & 431 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { 432 unsigned char aad[13]; 433 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; 434 size_t packlen; 435 int packleni; 436 437 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ 438 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) 439 max_send_fragment -= 512; 440 441 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ 442 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 443 444 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 445 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, 446 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); 447 448 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 449 packlen *= 8; 450 else 451 packlen *= 4; 452 453 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { 454 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 455 return -1; 456 } 457 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 458 /* free jumbo buffer */ 459 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 460 *written = tot; 461 return 1; 462 } 463 464 n = (len - tot); 465 for (;;) { 466 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { 467 /* free jumbo buffer */ 468 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 469 break; 470 } 471 472 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 473 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 474 if (i <= 0) { 475 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 476 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 477 return i; 478 } 479 } 480 481 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 482 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); 483 else 484 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); 485 486 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); 487 aad[8] = type; 488 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 489 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 490 aad[11] = 0; 491 aad[12] = 0; 492 mb_param.out = NULL; 493 mb_param.inp = aad; 494 mb_param.len = nw; 495 496 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 497 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, 498 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); 499 packlen = (size_t)packleni; 500 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ 501 /* free jumbo buffer */ 502 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 503 break; 504 } 505 506 mb_param.out = wb->buf; 507 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; 508 mb_param.len = nw; 509 510 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 511 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, 512 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) 513 return -1; 514 515 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; 516 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { 517 int j = 6; 518 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; 519 } 520 521 wb->offset = 0; 522 wb->left = packlen; 523 524 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; 525 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; 526 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 527 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; 528 529 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); 530 if (i <= 0) { 531 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 532 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { 533 /* free jumbo buffer */ 534 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 535 } 536 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 537 return i; 538 } 539 if (tmpwrit == n) { 540 /* free jumbo buffer */ 541 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 542 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 543 return 1; 544 } 545 n -= tmpwrit; 546 tot += tmpwrit; 547 } 548 } else 549#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ 550 if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 551 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 552 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 553 554 *written = tot; 555 return 1; 556 } 557 558 n = (len - tot); 559 560 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 561 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); 562 /* 563 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to 564 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined 565 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using 566 * explicit IVs 567 */ 568 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; 569 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { 570 /* 571 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we 572 * shouldn't get here 573 */ 574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 575 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 576 return -1; 577 } 578 if (maxpipes == 0 579 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL 580 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) 581 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) 582 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) 583 maxpipes = 1; 584 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0 585 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { 586 /* 587 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send 588 * fragments so we shouldn't get here 589 */ 590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 592 return -1; 593 } 594 595 for (;;) { 596 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; 597 size_t numpipes, j; 598 599 if (n == 0) 600 numpipes = 1; 601 else 602 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; 603 if (numpipes > maxpipes) 604 numpipes = maxpipes; 605 606 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) { 607 /* 608 * We have enough data to completely fill all available 609 * pipelines 610 */ 611 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 612 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment; 613 } 614 } else { 615 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ 616 tmppipelen = n / numpipes; 617 remain = n % numpipes; 618 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 619 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; 620 if (j < remain) 621 pipelens[j]++; 622 } 623 } 624 625 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, 626 &tmpwrit); 627 if (i <= 0) { 628 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 629 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 630 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 631 return i; 632 } 633 634 if (tmpwrit == n || 635 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 636 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 637 /* 638 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 639 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 640 */ 641 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 642 643 if (tmpwrit == n 644 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 645 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 646 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 647 648 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 649 return 1; 650 } 651 652 n -= tmpwrit; 653 tot += tmpwrit; 654 } 655} 656 657int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 658 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, 659 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) 660{ 661 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 662 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 663 WPACKET *thispkt; 664 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; 665 unsigned char *recordstart; 666 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 667 size_t prefix_len = 0; 668 int eivlen = 0; 669 size_t align = 0; 670 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 671 SSL_SESSION *sess; 672 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; 673 size_t j; 674 675 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) 676 totlen += pipelens[j]; 677 /* 678 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 679 * will happen with non blocking IO 680 */ 681 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 682 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 683 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 684 } 685 686 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 687 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 688 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 689 if (i <= 0) { 690 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 691 return i; 692 } 693 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 694 } 695 696 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { 697 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { 698 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 699 return -1; 700 } 701 } 702 703 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 704 return 0; 705 706 sess = s->session; 707 708 if ((sess == NULL) || 709 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { 710 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 711 mac_size = 0; 712 } else { 713 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */ 714 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 715 if (mac_size < 0) { 716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 717 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 718 goto err; 719 } 720 } 721 722 /* 723 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 724 */ 725 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { 726 /* 727 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 728 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 729 */ 730 731 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 732 /* 733 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 734 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 735 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 736 * payload) 737 */ 738 size_t tmppipelen = 0; 739 int ret; 740 741 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); 742 if (ret <= 0) { 743 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 744 goto err; 745 } 746 747 if (prefix_len > 748 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { 749 /* insufficient space */ 750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 752 goto err; 753 } 754 } 755 756 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 757 } 758 759 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 760 /* 761 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to 762 * discard the const qualifier. 763 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when 764 * switching to ktls. 765 */ 766 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf); 767 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0); 768 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1); 769 goto wpacket_init_complete; 770 } 771 772 if (create_empty_fragment) { 773 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 774#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 775 /* 776 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be 777 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real 778 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. 779 */ 780 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 781 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 782#endif 783 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 784 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 785 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 786 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { 787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 788 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 789 goto err; 790 } 791 wpinited = 1; 792 } else if (prefix_len) { 793 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 794 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], 795 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 796 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 797 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) 798 + prefix_len, NULL)) { 799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 801 goto err; 802 } 803 wpinited = 1; 804 } else { 805 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 806 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 807 808 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; 809#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 810 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 811 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 812#endif 813 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 814 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 815 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 816 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { 817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 818 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 819 goto err; 820 } 821 wpinited++; 822 } 823 } 824 825 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 826 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { 827 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 828 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 829 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */ 830 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 831 if (eivlen <= 1) 832 eivlen = 0; 833 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 834 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 835 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 836 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { 837 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 838 } 839 } 840 841 wpacket_init_complete: 842 843 totlen = 0; 844 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ 845 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); 846 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 847 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION 848 : s->version; 849 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; 850 size_t maxcomplen; 851 unsigned int rectype; 852 853 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 854 thiswr = &wr[j]; 855 856 /* 857 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the 858 * record type 859 */ 860 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 861 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 862 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 863 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) 864 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; 865 else 866 rectype = type; 867 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); 868 869 /* 870 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes 871 * and record version number > TLS 1.0 872 */ 873 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO 874 && !s->renegotiate 875 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION 876 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 877 version = TLS1_VERSION; 878 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); 879 880 maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; 881 if (s->compress != NULL) 882 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; 883 884 /* 885 * When using offload kernel will write the header. 886 * Otherwise write the header now 887 */ 888 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 889 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) 890 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) 891 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) 892 || (eivlen > 0 893 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) 894 || (maxcomplen > 0 895 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, 896 &compressdata)))) { 897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 898 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 899 goto err; 900 } 901 902 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 903 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); 904 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); 905 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); 906 totlen += pipelens[j]; 907 908 /* 909 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into 910 * thiswr->data 911 */ 912 913 /* first we compress */ 914 if (s->compress != NULL) { 915 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) 916 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { 917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 918 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 919 goto err; 920 } 921 } else { 922 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 923 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]); 924 } else { 925 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { 926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 927 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 928 goto err; 929 } 930 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); 931 } 932 } 933 934 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 935 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) 936 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 937 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 938 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 939 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; 940 941 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { 942 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 943 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 944 goto err; 945 } 946 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); 947 948 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ 949 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 950 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 951 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { 952 size_t padding = 0; 953 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; 954 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { 955 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); 956 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { 957 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; 958 size_t remainder; 959 960 /* optimize for power of 2 */ 961 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) 962 remainder = rlen & mask; 963 else 964 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; 965 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ 966 if (remainder == 0) 967 padding = 0; 968 else 969 padding = s->block_padding - remainder; 970 } 971 if (padding > 0) { 972 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ 973 if (padding > max_padding) 974 padding = max_padding; 975 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { 976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 978 goto err; 979 } 980 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); 981 } 982 } 983 } 984 985 /* 986 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from 987 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points 988 * in the wb->buf 989 */ 990 991 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 992 unsigned char *mac; 993 994 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 995 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 998 goto err; 999 } 1000 } 1001 1002 /* 1003 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. 1004 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using 1005 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case. 1006 */ 1007 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1008 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, 1009 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, 1010 NULL) 1011 /* 1012 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this 1013 * sub-packet 1014 */ 1015 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { 1016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1017 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1018 goto err; 1019 } 1020 1021 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ 1022 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; 1023 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); 1024 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); 1025 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); 1026 } 1027 } 1028 1029 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { 1030 /* 1031 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to 1032 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. 1033 */ 1034 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1035 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1038 } 1039 goto err; 1040 } 1041 } else { 1042 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { 1043 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1044 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1047 } 1048 goto err; 1049 } 1050 } 1051 } 1052 1053 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 1054 size_t origlen; 1055 1056 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 1057 thiswr = &wr[j]; 1058 1059 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) 1060 goto mac_done; 1061 1062 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ 1063 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) 1064 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ 1065 || origlen > thiswr->length 1066 || (thiswr->length > origlen 1067 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, 1068 thiswr->length - origlen, 1069 NULL))) { 1070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1072 goto err; 1073 } 1074 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1075 unsigned char *mac; 1076 1077 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1078 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1080 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1081 goto err; 1082 } 1083 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); 1084 } 1085 1086 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) 1087 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { 1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1090 goto err; 1091 } 1092 1093 if (s->msg_callback) { 1094 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len 1095 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1096 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, 1097 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 1098 s->msg_callback_arg); 1099 1100 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { 1101 unsigned char ctype = type; 1102 1103 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, 1104 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1105 } 1106 } 1107 1108 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { 1109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1111 goto err; 1112 } 1113 1114 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */ 1115 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 1116 1117 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1118 /* 1119 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1120 * out anything here 1121 */ 1122 if (j > 0) { 1123 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ 1124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1126 goto err; 1127 } 1128 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 1129 return 1; 1130 } 1131 1132 mac_done: 1133 /* 1134 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which 1135 * is thiswr->length long 1136 */ 1137 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for 1138 * debugging */ 1139 1140 /* now let's set up wb */ 1141 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], 1142 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); 1143 } 1144 1145 /* 1146 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1147 * retries later 1148 */ 1149 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; 1150 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; 1151 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 1152 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; 1153 1154 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1155 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 1156 err: 1157 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) 1158 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); 1159 return -1; 1160} 1161 1162/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this 1163 * 1164 * Return values are as per SSL_write() 1165 */ 1166int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, 1167 size_t *written) 1168{ 1169 int i; 1170 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; 1171 size_t currbuf = 0; 1172 size_t tmpwrit = 0; 1173 1174 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) 1175 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) 1176 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) 1177 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { 1178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1179 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 1180 return -1; 1181 } 1182 1183 for (;;) { 1184 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ 1185 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 1186 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { 1187 currbuf++; 1188 continue; 1189 } 1190 clear_sys_error(); 1191 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 1192 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 1193 1194 /* 1195 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages, 1196 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO 1197 */ 1198 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 1199 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1200 if (i <= 0) 1201 return i; 1202 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type); 1203 } 1204 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ 1205 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) 1206 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) 1207 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), 1208 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); 1209 if (i >= 0) 1210 tmpwrit = i; 1211 } else { 1212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1213 SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 1214 i = -1; 1215 } 1216 1217 /* 1218 * When an empty fragment is sent on a connection using KTLS, 1219 * it is sent as a write of zero bytes. If this zero byte 1220 * write succeeds, i will be 0 rather than a non-zero value. 1221 * Treat i == 0 as success rather than an error for zero byte 1222 * writes to permit this case. 1223 */ 1224 if (i >= 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { 1225 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1226 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1227 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) 1228 continue; 1229 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1230 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; 1231 return 1; 1232 } else if (i <= 0) { 1233 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1234 /* 1235 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 1236 * using a datagram service 1237 */ 1238 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1239 } 1240 return i; 1241 } 1242 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1243 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1244 } 1245} 1246 1247/*- 1248 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 1249 * 'type' is one of the following: 1250 * 1251 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 1252 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 1253 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 1254 * 1255 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 1256 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 1257 * 1258 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 1259 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec 1260 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| 1261 * argument is non NULL. 1262 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 1263 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 1264 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 1265 * Change cipher spec protocol 1266 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 1267 * Alert protocol 1268 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 1269 * Handshake protocol 1270 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 1271 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 1272 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 1273 * Application data protocol 1274 * none of our business 1275 */ 1276int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, 1277 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) 1278{ 1279 int i, j, ret; 1280 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes; 1281 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 1282 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; 1283 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 1284 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); 1285 1286 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 1287 1288 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { 1289 /* Not initialized yet */ 1290 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 1291 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1292 return -1; 1293 } 1294 } 1295 1296 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 1297 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 1298 && (type != 1299 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 1300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1301 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1302 return -1; 1303 } 1304 1305 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1306 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1307 { 1308 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1309 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1310 unsigned int k; 1311 1312 /* peek == 0 */ 1313 n = 0; 1314 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1315 *dst++ = *src++; 1316 len--; 1317 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; 1318 n++; 1319 } 1320 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1321 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1322 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1323 1324 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1325 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1326 1327 *readbytes = n; 1328 return 1; 1329 } 1330 1331 /* 1332 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 1333 */ 1334 1335 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1336 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1337 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1338 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1339 if (i < 0) 1340 return i; 1341 if (i == 0) 1342 return -1; 1343 } 1344 start: 1345 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1346 1347 /*- 1348 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] 1349 * rr[i].type - is the type of record 1350 * rr[i].data, - data 1351 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1352 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. 1353 */ 1354 rr = s->rlayer.rrec; 1355 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1356 1357 do { 1358 /* get new records if necessary */ 1359 if (num_recs == 0) { 1360 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 1361 if (ret <= 0) { 1362 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1363 return ret; 1364 } 1365 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1366 if (num_recs == 0) { 1367 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1369 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1370 return -1; 1371 } 1372 } 1373 /* Skip over any records we have already read */ 1374 for (curr_rec = 0; 1375 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); 1376 curr_rec++) ; 1377 if (curr_rec == num_recs) { 1378 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); 1379 num_recs = 0; 1380 curr_rec = 0; 1381 } 1382 } while (num_recs == 0); 1383 rr = &rr[curr_rec]; 1384 1385 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 1386 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1387 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1389 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); 1390 return -1; 1391 } 1392 1393 /* 1394 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty 1395 * record that isn't an alert. 1396 */ 1397 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT 1398 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) 1399 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; 1400 1401 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1402 1403 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1404 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1405 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 1406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1407 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1408 return -1; 1409 } 1410 1411 /* 1412 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 1413 * 'peek' mode) 1414 */ 1415 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 1416 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1417 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1418 return 0; 1419 } 1420 1421 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) 1422 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1423 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL 1424 && !is_tls13)) { 1425 /* 1426 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 1427 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or 1428 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1429 */ 1430 /* 1431 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 1432 * doing a handshake for the first time 1433 */ 1434 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1435 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1437 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1438 return -1; 1439 } 1440 1441 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1442 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1443 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { 1444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1445 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1446 return -1; 1447 } 1448 1449 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1450 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); 1451 1452 if (len == 0) { 1453 /* 1454 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to 1455 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause 1456 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. 1457 */ 1458 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1459 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1460 return 0; 1461 } 1462 1463 totalbytes = 0; 1464 do { 1465 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1466 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); 1467 else 1468 n = len - totalbytes; 1469 1470 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1471 buf += n; 1472 if (peek) { 1473 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ 1474 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1475 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1476 } else { 1477 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1478 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1479 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { 1480 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1481 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); 1482 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1483 } 1484 } 1485 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 1486 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { 1487 curr_rec++; 1488 rr++; 1489 } 1490 totalbytes += n; 1491 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs 1492 && totalbytes < len); 1493 if (totalbytes == 0) { 1494 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ 1495 goto start; 1496 } 1497 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs 1498 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1499 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) 1500 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1501 *readbytes = totalbytes; 1502 return 1; 1503 } 1504 1505 /* 1506 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 1507 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we 1508 * were actually expecting a CCS). 1509 */ 1510 1511 /* 1512 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record 1513 */ 1514 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { 1515 /* 1516 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 1517 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an 1518 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to 1519 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong 1520 */ 1521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1523 return -1; 1524 } 1525 1526 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION 1527 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 1528 /* 1529 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version 1530 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with 1531 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything 1532 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. 1533 */ 1534 s->version = rr->rec_version; 1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1536 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1537 return -1; 1538 } 1539 1540 /*- 1541 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1542 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1543 */ 1544 1545 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 1546 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; 1547 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) 1548 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); 1549 PACKET alert; 1550 1551 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1552 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) 1553 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) 1554 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { 1555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1556 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); 1557 return -1; 1558 } 1559 1560 if (s->msg_callback) 1561 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, 1562 s->msg_callback_arg); 1563 1564 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1565 cb = s->info_callback; 1566 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1567 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1568 1569 if (cb != NULL) { 1570 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1571 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1572 } 1573 1574 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING 1575 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { 1576 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1577 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1578 1579 s->rlayer.alert_count++; 1580 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { 1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1582 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); 1583 return -1; 1584 } 1585 } 1586 1587 /* 1588 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 1589 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. 1590 */ 1591 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { 1592 goto start; 1593 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1594 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { 1595 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1596 return 0; 1597 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { 1598 char tmp[16]; 1599 1600 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1601 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1603 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1604 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1605 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1606 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1607 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1608 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1609 return 0; 1610 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1611 /* 1612 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1613 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1614 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it 1615 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1616 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1617 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1618 */ 1619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1620 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1621 return -1; 1622 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1623 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ 1624 goto start; 1625 } 1626 1627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1628 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1629 return -1; 1630 } 1631 1632 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 1633 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1634 BIO *rbio; 1635 1636 /* 1637 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are 1638 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other 1639 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them 1640 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already 1641 * sent close_notify. 1642 */ 1643 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1644 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1645 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1646 1647 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) 1648 goto start; 1649 1650 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1651 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1652 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 1653 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 1654 return -1; 1655 } 1656 } else { 1657 /* 1658 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have 1659 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have 1660 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled 1661 * above. 1662 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify 1663 */ 1664 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1665 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1667 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1668 return -1; 1669 } 1670 } 1671 1672 /* 1673 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we 1674 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the 1675 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data 1676 * that we're just going to discard. 1677 */ 1678 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1679 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); 1680 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1681 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; 1682 1683 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1684 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) 1685 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ 1686 1687 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1688 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, 1689 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n); 1690 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1691 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1692 *dest_len += n; 1693 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1694 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1695 1696 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1697 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1698 } 1699 1700 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1702 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1703 return -1; 1704 } 1705 1706 /* 1707 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or 1708 * protocol violation) 1709 */ 1710 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) 1711 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { 1712 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); 1713 1714 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ 1715 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 1716 1717 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1718 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1719 if (i < 0) 1720 return i; 1721 if (i == 0) { 1722 return -1; 1723 } 1724 1725 /* 1726 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a 1727 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read 1728 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. 1729 */ 1730 if (ined) 1731 return -1; 1732 1733 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1734 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { 1735 /* no read-ahead left? */ 1736 BIO *bio; 1737 /* 1738 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1739 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1740 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1741 * problems in the blocking world 1742 */ 1743 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1744 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1745 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1746 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1747 return -1; 1748 } 1749 } 1750 goto start; 1751 } 1752 1753 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { 1754 default: 1755 /* 1756 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but 1757 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the 1758 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where 1759 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised 1760 * record types, using up resources processing them. 1761 */ 1762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1763 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1764 return -1; 1765 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1766 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1767 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1768 /* 1769 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1770 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but 1771 * that should not happen when type != rr->type 1772 */ 1773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1775 return -1; 1776 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1777 /* 1778 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1779 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1780 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1781 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1782 * started), we will indulge it. 1783 */ 1784 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { 1785 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1786 return -1; 1787 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { 1788 /* 1789 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, 1790 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server 1791 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a 1792 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be 1793 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null 1794 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next 1795 * record. 1796 */ 1797 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, 1798 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { 1799 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1800 return -1; 1801 } 1802 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1803 goto start; 1804 } else { 1805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1806 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1807 return -1; 1808 } 1809 } 1810} 1811 1812void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) 1813{ 1814 int i; 1815 1816 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { 1817 ++seq[i]; 1818 if (seq[i] != 0) 1819 break; 1820 } 1821} 1822 1823/* 1824 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible 1825 * format and false otherwise. 1826 */ 1827int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1828{ 1829 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); 1830} 1831 1832/* 1833 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec 1834 */ 1835size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1836{ 1837 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); 1838} 1839