xform_esp.c revision 315514
1/*	$FreeBSD: stable/11/sys/netipsec/xform_esp.c 315514 2017-03-18 22:04:20Z ae $	*/
2/*	$OpenBSD: ip_esp.c,v 1.69 2001/06/26 06:18:59 angelos Exp $ */
3/*-
4 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
5 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
6 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
7 *
8 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
9 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
10 *
11 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
12 * by Angelos D. Keromytis.
13 *
14 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
15 * and Niels Provos.
16 *
17 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis.
18 *
19 * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
20 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
21 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
22 *
23 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
24 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
25 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
26 * modification of this software.
27 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
28 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
29 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
30 * all.
31 *
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
34 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
35 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
36 * PURPOSE.
37 */
38#include "opt_inet.h"
39#include "opt_inet6.h"
40
41#include <sys/param.h>
42#include <sys/systm.h>
43#include <sys/mbuf.h>
44#include <sys/socket.h>
45#include <sys/syslog.h>
46#include <sys/kernel.h>
47#include <sys/lock.h>
48#include <sys/random.h>
49#include <sys/mutex.h>
50#include <sys/sysctl.h>
51#include <sys/mutex.h>
52#include <machine/atomic.h>
53
54#include <net/if.h>
55#include <net/vnet.h>
56
57#include <netinet/in.h>
58#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
59#include <netinet/ip.h>
60#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
61#include <netinet/ip6.h>
62
63#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
64#include <netipsec/ah.h>
65#include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
66#include <netipsec/esp.h>
67#include <netipsec/esp_var.h>
68#include <netipsec/xform.h>
69
70#ifdef INET6
71#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
72#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
73#include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
74#endif
75
76#include <netipsec/key.h>
77#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
78
79#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
80#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
81
82VNET_DEFINE(int, esp_enable) = 1;
83VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct espstat, espstat);
84VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(espstat);
85
86#ifdef VIMAGE
87VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(espstat);
88#endif /* VIMAGE */
89
90SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_esp);
91SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_esp, OID_AUTO, esp_enable,
92	CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(esp_enable), 0, "");
93SYSCTL_VNET_PCPUSTAT(_net_inet_esp, IPSECCTL_STATS, stats,
94    struct espstat, espstat,
95    "ESP statistics (struct espstat, netipsec/esp_var.h");
96
97static int esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *op);
98static int esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp);
99
100size_t
101esp_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
102{
103	size_t size;
104
105	if (sav != NULL) {
106		/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
107		IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL,
108			("SA with null xform"));
109		if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
110			size = sizeof (struct esp);
111		else
112			size = sizeof (struct newesp);
113		size += sav->tdb_encalgxform->blocksize + 9;
114		/*XXX need alg check???*/
115		if (sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL && sav->replay)
116			size += ah_hdrsiz(sav);
117	} else {
118		/*
119		 *   base header size
120		 * + max iv length for CBC mode
121		 * + max pad length
122		 * + sizeof (pad length field)
123		 * + sizeof (next header field)
124		 * + max icv supported.
125		 */
126		size = sizeof (struct newesp) + EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN + 9 + 16;
127	}
128	return size;
129}
130
131/*
132 * esp_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
133 */
134static int
135esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
136{
137	const struct enc_xform *txform;
138	struct cryptoini cria, crie;
139	int keylen;
140	int error;
141
142	txform = enc_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc);
143	if (txform == NULL) {
144		DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported encryption algorithm %d\n",
145			__func__, sav->alg_enc));
146		return EINVAL;
147	}
148	if (sav->key_enc == NULL) {
149		DPRINTF(("%s: no encoding key for %s algorithm\n",
150			 __func__, txform->name));
151		return EINVAL;
152	}
153	if ((sav->flags & (SADB_X_EXT_OLD | SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) ==
154	    SADB_X_EXT_IV4B) {
155		DPRINTF(("%s: 4-byte IV not supported with protocol\n",
156			__func__));
157		return EINVAL;
158	}
159	/* subtract off the salt, RFC4106, 8.1 and RFC3686, 5.1 */
160	keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) * 4;
161	if (txform->minkey > keylen || keylen > txform->maxkey) {
162		DPRINTF(("%s: invalid key length %u, must be in the range "
163			"[%u..%u] for algorithm %s\n", __func__,
164			keylen, txform->minkey, txform->maxkey,
165			txform->name));
166		return EINVAL;
167	}
168
169	if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav))
170		sav->ivlen = 8;	/* RFC4106 3.1 and RFC3686 3.1 */
171	else
172		sav->ivlen = txform->ivsize;
173
174	/*
175	 * Setup AH-related state.
176	 */
177	if (sav->alg_auth != 0) {
178		error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
179		if (error)
180			return error;
181	}
182
183	/* NB: override anything set in ah_init0 */
184	sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
185	sav->tdb_encalgxform = txform;
186
187	/*
188	 * Whenever AES-GCM is used for encryption, one
189	 * of the AES authentication algorithms is chosen
190	 * as well, based on the key size.
191	 */
192	if (sav->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16) {
193		switch (keylen) {
194		case AES_128_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
195			sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC;
196			sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
197			break;
198		case AES_192_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
199			sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC;
200			sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
201			break;
202		case AES_256_GMAC_KEY_LEN:
203			sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC;
204			sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
205			break;
206		default:
207			DPRINTF(("%s: invalid key length %u"
208				 "for algorithm %s\n", __func__,
209				 keylen, txform->name));
210			return EINVAL;
211		}
212		bzero(&cria, sizeof(cria));
213		cria.cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
214		cria.cri_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
215		cria.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) - SAV_ISGCM(sav) * 32;
216	}
217
218	/* Initialize crypto session. */
219	bzero(&crie, sizeof(crie));
220	crie.cri_alg = sav->tdb_encalgxform->type;
221	crie.cri_key = sav->key_enc->key_data;
222	crie.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) - SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav) * 32;
223
224	if (sav->tdb_authalgxform && sav->tdb_encalgxform) {
225		/* init both auth & enc */
226		crie.cri_next = &cria;
227		error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid,
228					  &crie, V_crypto_support);
229	} else if (sav->tdb_encalgxform) {
230		error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid,
231					  &crie, V_crypto_support);
232	} else if (sav->tdb_authalgxform) {
233		error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid,
234					  &cria, V_crypto_support);
235	} else {
236		/* XXX cannot happen? */
237		DPRINTF(("%s: no encoding OR authentication xform!\n",
238			__func__));
239		error = EINVAL;
240	}
241	return error;
242}
243
244/*
245 * Paranoia.
246 */
247static int
248esp_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
249{
250	/* NB: ah_zerorize free's the crypto session state */
251	int error = ah_zeroize(sav);
252
253	if (sav->key_enc)
254		bzero(sav->key_enc->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc));
255	sav->tdb_encalgxform = NULL;
256	sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
257	return error;
258}
259
260/*
261 * ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch.
262 */
263static int
264esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
265{
266	char buf[128];
267	const struct auth_hash *esph;
268	const struct enc_xform *espx;
269	struct xform_data *xd;
270	struct cryptodesc *crde;
271	struct cryptop *crp;
272	struct newesp *esp;
273	uint8_t *ivp;
274	uint64_t cryptoid;
275	int plen, alen, hlen;
276
277	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
278	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL, ("null encoding xform"));
279
280	/* Valid IP Packet length ? */
281	if ( (skip&3) || (m->m_pkthdr.len&3) ){
282		DPRINTF(("%s: misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u",
283				__func__, skip, m->m_pkthdr.len));
284		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
285		m_freem(m);
286		return EINVAL;
287	}
288	/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
289	IP6_EXTHDR_GET(esp, struct newesp *, m, skip, sizeof (struct newesp));
290
291	esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
292	espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
293
294	/* Determine the ESP header and auth length */
295	if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
296		hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
297	else
298		hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
299
300	alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
301
302	/*
303	 * Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm
304	 * block size.
305	 *
306	 * NB: This works for the null algorithm because the blocksize
307	 *     is 4 and all packets must be 4-byte aligned regardless
308	 *     of the algorithm.
309	 */
310	plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
311	if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) {
312		DPRINTF(("%s: payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets,"
313		    "  SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, plen, espx->blocksize,
314		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
315		    (u_long)ntohl(sav->spi)));
316		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
317		m_freem(m);
318		return EINVAL;
319	}
320
321	/*
322	 * Check sequence number.
323	 */
324	SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
325	if (esph != NULL && sav->replay != NULL && sav->replay->wsize != 0) {
326		if (ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(esp->esp_seq), sav) == 0) {
327			SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
328			DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
329			    ipsec_sa2str(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
330			ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
331			m_freem(m);
332			return (EACCES);
333		}
334	}
335	cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
336	SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
337
338	/* Update the counters */
339	ESPSTAT_ADD(esps_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen));
340
341	/* Get crypto descriptors */
342	crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1);
343	if (crp == NULL) {
344		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
345			__func__));
346		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
347		m_freem(m);
348		return ENOBUFS;
349	}
350
351	/* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */
352	xd = malloc(sizeof(*xd) + alen, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
353	if (xd == NULL) {
354		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__));
355		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
356		crypto_freereq(crp);
357		m_freem(m);
358		return ENOBUFS;
359	}
360
361	if (esph != NULL) {
362		struct cryptodesc *crda = crp->crp_desc;
363
364		IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null ah crypto descriptor"));
365
366		/* Authentication descriptor */
367		crda->crd_skip = skip;
368		if (SAV_ISGCM(sav))
369			crda->crd_len = 8;	/* RFC4106 5, SPI + SN */
370		else
371			crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
372		crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
373
374		crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
375
376		/* Copy the authenticator */
377		m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen,
378		    (caddr_t) (xd + 1));
379
380		/* Chain authentication request */
381		crde = crda->crd_next;
382	} else {
383		crde = crp->crp_desc;
384	}
385
386	/* Crypto operation descriptor */
387	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length */
388	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
389	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
390	crp->crp_callback = esp_input_cb;
391	crp->crp_sid = cryptoid;
392	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) xd;
393
394	/* These are passed as-is to the callback */
395	xd->sav = sav;
396	xd->protoff = protoff;
397	xd->skip = skip;
398	xd->cryptoid = cryptoid;
399
400	/* Decryption descriptor */
401	IPSEC_ASSERT(crde != NULL, ("null esp crypto descriptor"));
402	crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
403	crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
404	crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
405
406	if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav)) {
407		ivp = &crde->crd_iv[0];
408
409		/* GCM IV Format: RFC4106 4 */
410		/* CTR IV Format: RFC3686 4 */
411		/* Salt is last four bytes of key, RFC4106 8.1 */
412		/* Nonce is last four bytes of key, RFC3686 5.1 */
413		memcpy(ivp, sav->key_enc->key_data +
414		    _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - 4, 4);
415
416		if (SAV_ISCTR(sav)) {
417			/* Initial block counter is 1, RFC3686 4 */
418			be32enc(&ivp[sav->ivlen + 4], 1);
419		}
420
421		m_copydata(m, skip + hlen - sav->ivlen, sav->ivlen, &ivp[4]);
422		crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT;
423	}
424
425	crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
426
427	return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
428}
429
430/*
431 * ESP input callback from the crypto driver.
432 */
433static int
434esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
435{
436	char buf[128];
437	u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_HMAC_MAXHASHLEN];
438	const struct auth_hash *esph;
439	const struct enc_xform *espx;
440	struct mbuf *m;
441	struct cryptodesc *crd;
442	struct xform_data *xd;
443	struct secasvar *sav;
444	struct secasindex *saidx;
445	caddr_t ptr;
446	uint64_t cryptoid;
447	int hlen, skip, protoff, error, alen;
448
449	crd = crp->crp_desc;
450	IPSEC_ASSERT(crd != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor!"));
451
452	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
453	xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque;
454	sav = xd->sav;
455	skip = xd->skip;
456	protoff = xd->protoff;
457	cryptoid = xd->cryptoid;
458	saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
459	esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
460	espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
461
462	/* Check for crypto errors */
463	if (crp->crp_etype) {
464		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
465			/* Reset the session ID */
466			if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_sid, &cryptoid) != 0)
467				crypto_freesession(cryptoid);
468			xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
469			return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
470		}
471		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_noxform);
472		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
473		error = crp->crp_etype;
474		goto bad;
475	}
476
477	/* Shouldn't happen... */
478	if (m == NULL) {
479		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
480		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
481		error = EINVAL;
482		goto bad;
483	}
484	ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]);
485
486	/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
487	if (esph != NULL) {
488		alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
489		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
490		/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
491		m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, aalg);
492		ptr = (caddr_t) (xd + 1);
493
494		/* Verify authenticator */
495		if (timingsafe_bcmp(ptr, aalg, alen) != 0) {
496			DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for "
497			    "packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
498			    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
499			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
500			ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badauth);
501			error = EACCES;
502			goto bad;
503		}
504		m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPDGM;
505		/* Remove trailing authenticator */
506		m_adj(m, -alen);
507	}
508
509	/* Release the crypto descriptors */
510	free(xd, M_XDATA), xd = NULL;
511	crypto_freereq(crp), crp = NULL;
512
513	/*
514	 * Packet is now decrypted.
515	 */
516	m->m_flags |= M_DECRYPTED;
517
518	/*
519	 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
520	 */
521	if (sav->replay) {
522		u_int32_t seq;
523
524		m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newesp, esp_seq),
525			   sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
526		SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
527		if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
528			SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
529			DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay check for %s\n", __func__,
530			    ipsec_sa2str(sav, buf, sizeof(buf))));
531			ESPSTAT_INC(esps_replay);
532			error = EACCES;
533			goto bad;
534		}
535		SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
536	}
537
538	/* Determine the ESP header length */
539	if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
540		hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
541	else
542		hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
543
544	/* Remove the ESP header and IV from the mbuf. */
545	error = m_striphdr(m, skip, hlen);
546	if (error) {
547		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hdrops);
548		DPRINTF(("%s: bad mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
549		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
550		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
551		goto bad;
552	}
553
554	/* Save the last three bytes of decrypted data */
555	m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - 3, 3, lastthree);
556
557	/* Verify pad length */
558	if (lastthree[1] + 2 > m->m_pkthdr.len - skip) {
559		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badilen);
560		DPRINTF(("%s: invalid padding length %d for %u byte packet "
561		    "in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, lastthree[1],
562		    m->m_pkthdr.len - skip,
563		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
564		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
565		error = EINVAL;
566		goto bad;
567	}
568
569	/* Verify correct decryption by checking the last padding bytes */
570	if ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) != SADB_X_EXT_PRAND) {
571		if (lastthree[1] != lastthree[0] && lastthree[1] != 0) {
572			ESPSTAT_INC(esps_badenc);
573			DPRINTF(("%s: decryption failed for packet in "
574			    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, ipsec_address(
575			    &sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
576			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
577			error = EINVAL;
578			goto bad;
579		}
580	}
581
582	/* Trim the mbuf chain to remove trailing authenticator and padding */
583	m_adj(m, -(lastthree[1] + 2));
584
585	/* Restore the Next Protocol field */
586	m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof (u_int8_t), lastthree + 2);
587
588	switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
589#ifdef INET6
590	case AF_INET6:
591		error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
592		break;
593#endif
594#ifdef INET
595	case AF_INET:
596		error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff);
597		break;
598#endif
599	default:
600		panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__,
601		    saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx);
602	}
603	return error;
604bad:
605	if (sav != NULL)
606		key_freesav(&sav);
607	if (m != NULL)
608		m_freem(m);
609	if (xd != NULL)
610		free(xd, M_XDATA);
611	if (crp != NULL)
612		crypto_freereq(crp);
613	return error;
614}
615/*
616 * ESP output routine, called by ipsec[46]_perform_request().
617 */
618static int
619esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct secpolicy *sp, struct secasvar *sav,
620    u_int idx, int skip, int protoff)
621{
622	char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN];
623	struct cryptodesc *crde = NULL, *crda = NULL;
624	struct cryptop *crp;
625	const struct auth_hash *esph;
626	const struct enc_xform *espx;
627	struct mbuf *mo = NULL;
628	struct xform_data *xd;
629	struct secasindex *saidx;
630	unsigned char *pad;
631	uint8_t *ivp;
632	uint64_t cntr, cryptoid;
633	int hlen, rlen, padding, blks, alen, i, roff;
634	int error, maxpacketsize;
635	uint8_t prot;
636
637	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
638	esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
639	espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
640	IPSEC_ASSERT(espx != NULL, ("null encoding xform"));
641
642	if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
643		hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
644	else
645		hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
646
647	rlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - skip;	/* Raw payload length. */
648	/*
649	 * RFC4303 2.4 Requires 4 byte alignment.
650	 */
651	blks = MAX(4, espx->blocksize);		/* Cipher blocksize */
652
653	/* XXX clamp padding length a la KAME??? */
654	padding = ((blks - ((rlen + 2) % blks)) % blks) + 2;
655
656	alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
657
658	ESPSTAT_INC(esps_output);
659
660	saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
661	/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
662	switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
663#ifdef INET
664	case AF_INET:
665		maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
666		break;
667#endif /* INET */
668#ifdef INET6
669	case AF_INET6:
670		maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
671		break;
672#endif /* INET6 */
673	default:
674		DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol "
675		    "family %d, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
676		    saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst,
677			buf, sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
678		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_nopf);
679		error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
680		goto bad;
681	}
682	/*
683	DPRINTF(("%s: skip %d hlen %d rlen %d padding %d alen %d blksd %d\n",
684		__func__, skip, hlen, rlen, padding, alen, blks)); */
685	if (skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen > maxpacketsize) {
686		DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
687		    "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
688		    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
689		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
690		    skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen, maxpacketsize));
691		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_toobig);
692		error = EMSGSIZE;
693		goto bad;
694	}
695
696	/* Update the counters. */
697	ESPSTAT_ADD(esps_obytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip);
698
699	m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
700	if (m == NULL) {
701		DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
702		    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
703		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
704		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hdrops);
705		error = ENOBUFS;
706		goto bad;
707	}
708
709	/* Inject ESP header. */
710	mo = m_makespace(m, skip, hlen, &roff);
711	if (mo == NULL) {
712		DPRINTF(("%s: %u byte ESP hdr inject failed for SA %s/%08lx\n",
713		    __func__, hlen, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf,
714		    sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
715		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hdrops);	/* XXX diffs from openbsd */
716		error = ENOBUFS;
717		goto bad;
718	}
719
720	/* Initialize ESP header. */
721	bcopy((caddr_t) &sav->spi, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff,
722	    sizeof(uint32_t));
723	SECASVAR_LOCK(sav);
724	if (sav->replay) {
725		uint32_t replay;
726
727#ifdef REGRESSION
728		/* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
729		if (!V_ipsec_replay)
730#endif
731			sav->replay->count++;
732		replay = htonl(sav->replay->count);
733
734		bcopy((caddr_t) &replay, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff +
735		    sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(uint32_t));
736	}
737	cryptoid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
738	if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav))
739		cntr = sav->cntr++;
740	SECASVAR_UNLOCK(sav);
741
742	/*
743	 * Add padding -- better to do it ourselves than use the crypto engine,
744	 * although if/when we support compression, we'd have to do that.
745	 */
746	pad = (u_char *) m_pad(m, padding + alen);
747	if (pad == NULL) {
748		DPRINTF(("%s: m_pad failed for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
749		    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)),
750		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
751		m = NULL;		/* NB: free'd by m_pad */
752		error = ENOBUFS;
753		goto bad;
754	}
755
756	/*
757	 * Add padding: random, zero, or self-describing.
758	 * XXX catch unexpected setting
759	 */
760	switch (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) {
761	case SADB_X_EXT_PRAND:
762		(void) read_random(pad, padding - 2);
763		break;
764	case SADB_X_EXT_PZERO:
765		bzero(pad, padding - 2);
766		break;
767	case SADB_X_EXT_PSEQ:
768		for (i = 0; i < padding - 2; i++)
769			pad[i] = i+1;
770		break;
771	}
772
773	/* Fix padding length and Next Protocol in padding itself. */
774	pad[padding - 2] = padding - 2;
775	m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), pad + padding - 1);
776
777	/* Fix Next Protocol in IPv4/IPv6 header. */
778	prot = IPPROTO_ESP;
779	m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (u_char *) &prot);
780
781	/* Get crypto descriptors. */
782	crp = crypto_getreq(esph != NULL ? 2 : 1);
783	if (crp == NULL) {
784		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
785			__func__));
786		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
787		error = ENOBUFS;
788		goto bad;
789	}
790
791	/* IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
792	xd =  malloc(sizeof(struct xform_data), M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
793	if (xd == NULL) {
794		crypto_freereq(crp);
795		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate xform_data\n", __func__));
796		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
797		error = ENOBUFS;
798		goto bad;
799	}
800
801	crde = crp->crp_desc;
802	crda = crde->crd_next;
803
804	/* Encryption descriptor. */
805	crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen;
806	crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen);
807	crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
808	crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen;
809
810	/* Encryption operation. */
811	crde->crd_alg = espx->type;
812	if (SAV_ISCTRORGCM(sav)) {
813		ivp = &crde->crd_iv[0];
814
815		/* GCM IV Format: RFC4106 4 */
816		/* CTR IV Format: RFC3686 4 */
817		/* Salt is last four bytes of key, RFC4106 8.1 */
818		/* Nonce is last four bytes of key, RFC3686 5.1 */
819		memcpy(ivp, sav->key_enc->key_data +
820		    _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) - 4, 4);
821		be64enc(&ivp[4], cntr);
822		if (SAV_ISCTR(sav)) {
823			/* Initial block counter is 1, RFC3686 4 */
824			/* XXXAE: should we use this only for first packet? */
825			be32enc(&ivp[sav->ivlen + 4], 1);
826		}
827
828		m_copyback(m, skip + hlen - sav->ivlen, sav->ivlen, &ivp[4]);
829		crde->crd_flags |= CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT|CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
830	}
831
832	/* Callback parameters */
833	xd->sp = sp;
834	xd->sav = sav;
835	xd->idx = idx;
836	xd->cryptoid = cryptoid;
837
838	/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
839	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
840	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
841	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
842	crp->crp_callback = esp_output_cb;
843	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) xd;
844	crp->crp_sid = cryptoid;
845
846	if (esph) {
847		/* Authentication descriptor. */
848		crda->crd_alg = esph->type;
849		crda->crd_skip = skip;
850		if (SAV_ISGCM(sav))
851			crda->crd_len = 8;	/* RFC4106 5, SPI + SN */
852		else
853			crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen);
854		crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen;
855	}
856
857	return crypto_dispatch(crp);
858bad:
859	if (m)
860		m_freem(m);
861	return (error);
862}
863/*
864 * ESP output callback from the crypto driver.
865 */
866static int
867esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
868{
869	struct xform_data *xd;
870	struct secpolicy *sp;
871	struct secasvar *sav;
872	struct mbuf *m;
873	uint64_t cryptoid;
874	u_int idx;
875	int error;
876
877	xd = (struct xform_data *) crp->crp_opaque;
878	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
879	sp = xd->sp;
880	sav = xd->sav;
881	idx = xd->idx;
882	cryptoid = xd->cryptoid;
883
884	/* Check for crypto errors. */
885	if (crp->crp_etype) {
886		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
887			/* Reset the session ID */
888			if (ipsec_updateid(sav, &crp->crp_sid, &cryptoid) != 0)
889				crypto_freesession(cryptoid);
890			xd->cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
891			return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
892		}
893		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_noxform);
894		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
895		error = crp->crp_etype;
896		m_freem(m);
897		goto bad;
898	}
899
900	/* Shouldn't happen... */
901	if (m == NULL) {
902		ESPSTAT_INC(esps_crypto);
903		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
904		error = EINVAL;
905		goto bad;
906	}
907	free(xd, M_XDATA);
908	crypto_freereq(crp);
909	ESPSTAT_INC(esps_hist[sav->alg_enc]);
910	if (sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL)
911		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
912
913#ifdef REGRESSION
914	/* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
915	if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
916		static unsigned char ipseczeroes[AH_HMAC_MAXHASHLEN];
917		const struct auth_hash *esph;
918
919		/*
920		 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
921		 * the other side.
922		 */
923		esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
924		if (esph !=  NULL) {
925			int alen;
926
927			alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
928			m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen,
929			    alen, ipseczeroes);
930		}
931	}
932#endif
933
934	/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
935	error = ipsec_process_done(m, sp, sav, idx);
936	return (error);
937bad:
938	free(xd, M_XDATA);
939	crypto_freereq(crp);
940	key_freesav(&sav);
941	key_freesp(&sp);
942	return (error);
943}
944
945static struct xformsw esp_xformsw = {
946	.xf_type =	XF_ESP,
947	.xf_name =	"IPsec ESP",
948	.xf_init =	esp_init,
949	.xf_zeroize =	esp_zeroize,
950	.xf_input =	esp_input,
951	.xf_output =	esp_output,
952};
953
954SYSINIT(esp_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE,
955    xform_attach, &esp_xformsw);
956SYSUNINIT(esp_xform_uninit, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE,
957    xform_detach, &esp_xformsw);
958