s3_srvr.c revision 279264
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165#include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177 { 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return(NULL); 182 } 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, 187 ssl3_get_server_method) 188#endif 189 190#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 191static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 192 { 193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 194 195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 196 197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) 199 { 200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) 201 { 202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 203 we do so if There is no srp login name */ 204 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 206 } 207 else 208 { 209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); 210 } 211 } 212 return ret; 213 } 214#endif 215 216int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 217 { 218 BUF_MEM *buf; 219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 221 int ret= -1; 222 int new_state,state,skip=0; 223 224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 225 ERR_clear_error(); 226 clear_sys_error(); 227 228 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 229 cb=s->info_callback; 230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 232 233 /* init things to blank */ 234 s->in_handshake++; 235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 236 237 if (s->cert == NULL) 238 { 239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 240 return(-1); 241 } 242 243#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we 245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because 246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. 247 */ 248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 249 { 250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 251 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 252 } 253#endif 254 255 for (;;) 256 { 257 state=s->state; 258 259 switch (s->state) 260 { 261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 262 s->renegotiate=1; 263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 264 265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 266 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 269 270 s->server=1; 271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 272 273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 274 { 275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 276 return -1; 277 } 278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 279 280 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 281 { 282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 283 { 284 ret= -1; 285 goto end; 286 } 287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 288 { 289 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 290 ret= -1; 291 goto end; 292 } 293 s->init_buf=buf; 294 } 295 296 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 297 { 298 ret= -1; 299 goto end; 300 } 301 302 s->init_num=0; 303 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 304 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 305 /* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */ 306 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 307 308 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 309 { 310 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 311 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 312 */ 313 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 314 315 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 316 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 317 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 318 } 319 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 320 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 321 { 322 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 323 * client that doesn't support secure 324 * renegotiation. 325 */ 326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 328 ret = -1; 329 goto end; 330 } 331 else 332 { 333 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 334 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 336 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 337 } 338 break; 339 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 342 343 s->shutdown=0; 344 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 345 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 346 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 347 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 348 s->init_num=0; 349 350 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 351 break; 352 353 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 354 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 355 break; 356 357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 360 361 s->shutdown=0; 362 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) 363 { 364 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 365 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 366 } 367#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 368 { 369 int al; 370 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) 371 { 372 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ 373 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 374 goto end; 375 } 376 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) 377 { 378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 379 /* This is not really an error but the only means to 380 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ 381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 384 ret= -1; 385 goto end; 386 } 387 } 388#endif 389 390 s->renegotiate = 2; 391 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 392 s->init_num=0; 393 break; 394 395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 397 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 398 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 399#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 400 if (s->hit) 401 { 402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 403 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 404 else 405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 406 } 407#else 408 if (s->hit) 409 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 410#endif 411 else 412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 413 s->init_num=0; 414 break; 415 416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 420 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP)) 421 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 422 { 423 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 424 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 425#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 427 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 428 else 429 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 430 } 431 else 432 { 433 skip = 1; 434 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 435 } 436#else 437 } 438 else 439 skip=1; 440 441 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 442#endif 443 s->init_num=0; 444 break; 445 446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 449 450 /* 451 * clear this, it may get reset by 452 * send_server_key_exchange 453 */ 454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 455 456 457 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 458 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 459 * 460 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints 461 * 462 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 463 * message only if the cipher suite is either 464 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 465 * server certificate contains the server's 466 * public key for key exchange. 467 */ 468 if (0 469 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity 470 * hint if provided */ 471#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 472 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 473#endif 474#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 475 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 476 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 477#endif 478 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) 479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 480 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 481 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 482 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 483 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 484 ) 485 ) 486 ) 487 ) 488 { 489 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 490 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 491 } 492 else 493 skip=1; 494 495 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 496 s->init_num=0; 497 break; 498 499 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 500 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 501 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 502 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 503 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 504 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 505 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 506 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 507 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 508 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 509 * and in RFC 2246): */ 510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 511 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 512 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 513 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 514 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 515 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 516 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 517 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 518 /* With normal PSK Certificates and 519 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ 520 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 521 { 522 /* no cert request */ 523 skip=1; 524 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 526 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 527 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 528 return -1; 529 } 530 else 531 { 532 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 533 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 534 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 535#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 536 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 537#else 538 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 539 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 540#endif 541 s->init_num=0; 542 } 543 break; 544 545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 547 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 548 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 549 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 551 s->init_num=0; 552 break; 553 554 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 555 556 /* This code originally checked to see if 557 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 558 * and then flushed. This caused problems 559 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 560 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 561 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 562 * still exist. So instead we just flush 563 * unconditionally. 564 */ 565 566 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 567 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 568 { 569 ret= -1; 570 goto end; 571 } 572 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 573 574 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 575 break; 576 577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 579 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 580 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 581 if (ret <= 0) 582 goto end; 583 if (ret == 2) 584 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 585 else { 586 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 587 { 588 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 589 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 590 } 591 s->init_num=0; 592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 593 } 594 break; 595 596 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 598 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 599 if (ret <= 0) 600 goto end; 601 if (ret == 2) 602 { 603 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 604 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 605 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 606 * message is not sent. 607 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 608 * the client uses its key from the certificate 609 * for key exchange. 610 */ 611#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 613#else 614 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 615 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 616 else 617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 618#endif 619 s->init_num = 0; 620 } 621 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 622 { 623 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 624 s->init_num=0; 625 if (!s->session->peer) 626 break; 627 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer 628 * at this point and digest cached records. 629 */ 630 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) 631 { 632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 633 return -1; 634 } 635 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 636 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 637 return -1; 638 } 639 else 640 { 641 int offset=0; 642 int dgst_num; 643 644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 645 s->init_num=0; 646 647 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 648 * a client cert, it can be verified 649 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify 650 * should be generalized. But it is next step 651 */ 652 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 653 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 654 return -1; 655 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) 656 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 657 { 658 int dgst_size; 659 660 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 661 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 662 if (dgst_size < 0) 663 { 664 ret = -1; 665 goto end; 666 } 667 offset+=dgst_size; 668 } 669 } 670 break; 671 672 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 674 /* 675 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be 676 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need 677 * to set this here because we don't know if we're 678 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. 679 */ 680 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 681 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 682 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 683 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 684 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 685 686#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 688#else 689 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 690 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 691 else 692 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 693#endif 694 s->init_num=0; 695 break; 696 697#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 698 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 699 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 700 /* 701 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN. 702 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through 703 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was 704 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 705 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 706 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 707 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 708 * the client's Finished message is read. 709 */ 710 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 711 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 712 713 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 714 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 715 s->init_num = 0; 716 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 717 break; 718#endif 719 720 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 721 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 722 /* 723 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN. 724 * In a full handshake, we end up here through 725 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was 726 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 727 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 728 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 729 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 730 * the client's Finished message is read. 731 */ 732 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 733 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 734 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 735 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 736 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 737 if (s->hit) 738 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 739#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 740 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 742#endif 743 else 744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 745 s->init_num=0; 746 break; 747 748#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 750 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 751 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 752 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 754 s->init_num=0; 755 break; 756 757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 759 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 760 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 761 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 762 s->init_num=0; 763 break; 764 765#endif 766 767 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 769 770 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 772 { ret= -1; goto end; } 773 774 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 775 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 776 777 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 778 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 779 s->init_num=0; 780 781 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 782 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 783 { 784 ret= -1; 785 goto end; 786 } 787 788 break; 789 790 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 791 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 792 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 793 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 794 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 795 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 796 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 797 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 798 if (s->hit) 799 { 800#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 802#else 803 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 804 { 805 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 806 } 807 else 808 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 809#endif 810 } 811 else 812 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 813 s->init_num=0; 814 break; 815 816 case SSL_ST_OK: 817 /* clean a few things up */ 818 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 819 820 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 821 s->init_buf=NULL; 822 823 /* remove buffering on output */ 824 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 825 826 s->init_num=0; 827 828 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 829 { 830 s->renegotiate=0; 831 s->new_session=0; 832 833 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 834 835 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 836 /* s->server=1; */ 837 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 838 839 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 840 } 841 842 ret = 1; 843 goto end; 844 /* break; */ 845 846 default: 847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 848 ret= -1; 849 goto end; 850 /* break; */ 851 } 852 853 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 854 { 855 if (s->debug) 856 { 857 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 858 goto end; 859 } 860 861 862 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 863 { 864 new_state=s->state; 865 s->state=state; 866 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 867 s->state=new_state; 868 } 869 } 870 skip=0; 871 } 872end: 873 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 874 875 s->in_handshake--; 876 if (cb != NULL) 877 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 878 return(ret); 879 } 880 881int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 882 { 883 unsigned char *p; 884 885 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 886 { 887 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 888 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 889 *(p++)=0; 890 *(p++)=0; 891 *(p++)=0; 892 893 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 894 /* number of bytes to write */ 895 s->init_num=4; 896 s->init_off=0; 897 } 898 899 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 900 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 901 } 902 903int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 904 { 905 int ok; 906 long n; 907 908 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 909 * so permit appropriate message length */ 910 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 911 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 912 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 913 -1, 914 s->max_cert_list, 915 &ok); 916 if (!ok) return((int)n); 917 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 918 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 919 { 920 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 921 * negotiation. */ 922 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) 923 { 924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 925 return -1; 926 } 927 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 928 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ 929#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 930 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 931 { 932 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 933 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 934 } 935#endif 936#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 937 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 938 { 939 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 940 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 941 } 942#endif 943 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 944 return 2; 945 } 946 return 1; 947} 948 949int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 950 { 951 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 952 unsigned int cookie_len; 953 long n; 954 unsigned long id; 955 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 956 SSL_CIPHER *c; 957#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 958 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 959#endif 960 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 961 962 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 963 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 964 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 965 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 966 * TLSv1. 967 */ 968 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A 969 ) 970 { 971 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 972 } 973 s->first_packet=1; 974 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 975 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 976 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 977 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 978 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 979 &ok); 980 981 if (!ok) return((int)n); 982 s->first_packet=0; 983 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 984 985 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 986 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 987 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 988 p+=2; 989 990 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 991 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 992 { 993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 994 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 995 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) 996 { 997 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 998 s->version = s->client_version; 999 } 1000 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1001 goto f_err; 1002 } 1003 1004 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 1005 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 1006 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 1007 */ 1008 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 1009 { 1010 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 1011 1012 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1013 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 1014 1015 if (cookie_length == 0) 1016 return 1; 1017 } 1018 1019 /* load the client random */ 1020 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1021 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1022 1023 /* get the session-id */ 1024 j= *(p++); 1025 1026 s->hit=0; 1027 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. 1028 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests 1029 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1030 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security 1031 * won't even compile against older library versions). 1032 * 1033 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request 1034 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, 1035 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1036 * setting will be ignored. 1037 */ 1038 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 1039 { 1040 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1041 goto err; 1042 } 1043 else 1044 { 1045 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1046 /* 1047 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1048 * version. 1049 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1050 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1051 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1052 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1053 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1054 */ 1055 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) 1056 { /* previous session */ 1057 s->hit=1; 1058 } 1059 else if (i == -1) 1060 goto err; 1061 else /* i == 0 */ 1062 { 1063 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1064 goto err; 1065 } 1066 } 1067 1068 p+=j; 1069 1070 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1071 { 1072 /* cookie stuff */ 1073 cookie_len = *(p++); 1074 1075 /* 1076 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1077 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1078 * does not cause an overflow. 1079 */ 1080 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 1081 { 1082 /* too much data */ 1083 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1085 goto f_err; 1086 } 1087 1088 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1089 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 1090 cookie_len > 0) 1091 { 1092 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1093 1094 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 1095 { 1096 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1097 cookie_len) == 0) 1098 { 1099 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1101 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1102 goto f_err; 1103 } 1104 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1105 } 1106 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1107 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 1108 { 1109 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1111 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1112 goto f_err; 1113 } 1114 1115 ret = 2; 1116 } 1117 1118 p += cookie_len; 1119 } 1120 1121 n2s(p,i); 1122 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 1123 { 1124 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 1125 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1127 goto f_err; 1128 } 1129 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 1130 { 1131 /* not enough data */ 1132 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1134 goto f_err; 1135 } 1136 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 1137 == NULL)) 1138 { 1139 goto err; 1140 } 1141 p+=i; 1142 1143 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1144 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 1145 { 1146 j=0; 1147 id=s->session->cipher->id; 1148 1149#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1150 fprintf(stderr,"client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1151#endif 1152 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 1153 { 1154 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 1155#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1156 fprintf(stderr,"client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1157 i,sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), 1158 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1159#endif 1160 if (c->id == id) 1161 { 1162 j=1; 1163 break; 1164 } 1165 } 1166/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade 1167 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. 1168 */ 1169#if 0 1170 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 1171 { 1172 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 1173 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 1174 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 1175 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 1176 * enabled, though. */ 1177 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1178 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 1179 { 1180 s->session->cipher = c; 1181 j = 1; 1182 } 1183 } 1184#endif 1185 if (j == 0) 1186 { 1187 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 1188 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 1189 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1191 goto f_err; 1192 } 1193 } 1194 1195 /* compression */ 1196 i= *(p++); 1197 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 1198 { 1199 /* not enough data */ 1200 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1202 goto f_err; 1203 } 1204 q=p; 1205 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 1206 { 1207 if (p[j] == 0) break; 1208 } 1209 1210 p+=i; 1211 if (j >= i) 1212 { 1213 /* no compress */ 1214 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1216 goto f_err; 1217 } 1218 1219#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1220 /* TLS extensions*/ 1221 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1222 { 1223 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1224 { 1225 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1227 goto f_err; 1228 } 1229 } 1230 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1232 goto err; 1233 } 1234 1235 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1236 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1237 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1238 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ 1239 { 1240 unsigned char *pos; 1241 pos=s->s3->server_random; 1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1243 { 1244 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1245 goto f_err; 1246 } 1247 } 1248 1249 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1250 { 1251 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; 1252 1253 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1254 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, 1255 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) 1256 { 1257 s->hit=1; 1258 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1259 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; 1260 1261 ciphers=NULL; 1262 1263 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1264 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1265 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1266 { 1267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1269 goto f_err; 1270 } 1271 1272 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; 1273 1274 if (s->cipher_list) 1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1276 1277 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1278 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1279 1280 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1281 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1282 } 1283 } 1284#endif 1285 1286 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1287 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1288 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1289 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1290#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1291 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1292 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1293 { 1294 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1295 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1296 /* Can't disable compression */ 1297 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1298 { 1299 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1301 goto f_err; 1302 } 1303 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1304 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) 1305 { 1306 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1307 if (comp_id == comp->id) 1308 { 1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1310 break; 1311 } 1312 } 1313 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1314 { 1315 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1317 goto f_err; 1318 } 1319 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1320 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) 1321 { 1322 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1323 break; 1324 } 1325 if (m >= i) 1326 { 1327 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1329 goto f_err; 1330 } 1331 } 1332 else if (s->hit) 1333 comp = NULL; 1334 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) 1335 { /* See if we have a match */ 1336 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1337 1338 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1339 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1340 { 1341 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1342 v=comp->id; 1343 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1344 { 1345 if (v == q[o]) 1346 { 1347 done=1; 1348 break; 1349 } 1350 } 1351 if (done) break; 1352 } 1353 if (done) 1354 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1355 else 1356 comp=NULL; 1357 } 1358#else 1359 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1360 * using compression. 1361 */ 1362 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1363 { 1364 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1366 goto f_err; 1367 } 1368#endif 1369 1370 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1371 * pick a cipher */ 1372 1373 if (!s->hit) 1374 { 1375#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1376 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1377#else 1378 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1379#endif 1380 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1381 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1382 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1383 if (ciphers == NULL) 1384 { 1385 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1387 goto f_err; 1388 } 1389 ciphers=NULL; 1390 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1391 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1392 1393 if (c == NULL) 1394 { 1395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1397 goto f_err; 1398 } 1399 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1400 } 1401 else 1402 { 1403 /* Session-id reuse */ 1404#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1405 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1406 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1407 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1408 1409 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1410 { 1411 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1412 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1413 { 1414 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1415 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1416 nc=c; 1417 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1418 ec=c; 1419 } 1420 if (nc != NULL) 1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1422 else if (ec != NULL) 1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1424 else 1425 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1426 } 1427 else 1428#endif 1429 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1430 } 1431 1432 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) 1433 { 1434 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1435 { 1436 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1437 goto f_err; 1438 } 1439 } 1440 1441 /* we now have the following setup. 1442 * client_random 1443 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1444 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1445 * compression - basically ignored right now 1446 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1447 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1448 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1449 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1450 */ 1451 1452 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1453 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1454 { 1455 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) 1456 { 1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1458 goto err; 1459 } 1460 } 1461 1462 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1463 if (0) 1464 { 1465f_err: 1466 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1467 } 1468err: 1469 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1470 return(ret); 1471 } 1472 1473int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1474 { 1475 unsigned char *buf; 1476 unsigned char *p,*d; 1477 int i,sl; 1478 unsigned long l; 1479 1480 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1481 { 1482 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1483#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1484 p=s->s3->server_random; 1485 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1486 return -1; 1487#endif 1488 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1489 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1490 1491 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1492 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1493 1494 /* Random stuff */ 1495 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1496 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1497 1498 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send 1499 * back in the server hello: 1500 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1501 * we send back the old session ID. 1502 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1503 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1504 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1505 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1506 * session ID. 1507 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1508 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1509 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1510 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1511 * to send back. 1512 */ 1513 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1514 && !s->hit) 1515 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1516 1517 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1518 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1519 { 1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1521 return -1; 1522 } 1523 *(p++)=sl; 1524 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1525 p+=sl; 1526 1527 /* put the cipher */ 1528 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1529 p+=i; 1530 1531 /* put the compression method */ 1532#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1533 *(p++)=0; 1534#else 1535 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1536 *(p++)=0; 1537 else 1538 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1539#endif 1540#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1541 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1542 { 1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1544 return -1; 1545 } 1546 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1547 { 1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1549 return -1; 1550 } 1551#endif 1552 /* do the header */ 1553 l=(p-d); 1554 d=buf; 1555 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1556 l2n3(l,d); 1557 1558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1559 /* number of bytes to write */ 1560 s->init_num=p-buf; 1561 s->init_off=0; 1562 } 1563 1564 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1565 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1566 } 1567 1568int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1569 { 1570 unsigned char *p; 1571 1572 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1573 { 1574 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1575 1576 /* do the header */ 1577 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1578 *(p++)=0; 1579 *(p++)=0; 1580 *(p++)=0; 1581 1582 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1583 /* number of bytes to write */ 1584 s->init_num=4; 1585 s->init_off=0; 1586 } 1587 1588 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1589 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1590 } 1591 1592int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1593 { 1594#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1595 unsigned char *q; 1596 int j,num; 1597 RSA *rsa; 1598 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1599 unsigned int u; 1600#endif 1601#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1602 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1603#endif 1604#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1605 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1606 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1607 int encodedlen = 0; 1608 int curve_id = 0; 1609 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1610#endif 1611 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1612 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1613 unsigned char *p,*d; 1614 int al,i; 1615 unsigned long type; 1616 int n; 1617 CERT *cert; 1618 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1619 int nr[4],kn; 1620 BUF_MEM *buf; 1621 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1622 1623 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1624 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1625 { 1626 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1627 cert=s->cert; 1628 1629 buf=s->init_buf; 1630 1631 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1632 n=0; 1633#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1634 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1635 { 1636 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1637 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1638 { 1639 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1640 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1641 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1642 if(rsa == NULL) 1643 { 1644 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1646 goto f_err; 1647 } 1648 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1649 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1650 } 1651 if (rsa == NULL) 1652 { 1653 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1655 goto f_err; 1656 } 1657 r[0]=rsa->n; 1658 r[1]=rsa->e; 1659 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1660 } 1661 else 1662#endif 1663#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1664 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1665 { 1666 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1667 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1668 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1669 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1670 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1671 if (dhp == NULL) 1672 { 1673 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1675 goto f_err; 1676 } 1677 1678 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1679 { 1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1681 goto err; 1682 } 1683 1684 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1685 { 1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1687 goto err; 1688 } 1689 1690 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1691 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1692 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1693 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1694 { 1695 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1696 { 1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1698 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1699 goto err; 1700 } 1701 } 1702 else 1703 { 1704 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1705 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1706 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1707 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1708 { 1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1710 goto err; 1711 } 1712 } 1713 r[0]=dh->p; 1714 r[1]=dh->g; 1715 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1716 } 1717 else 1718#endif 1719#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1720 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1721 { 1722 const EC_GROUP *group; 1723 1724 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1725 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1726 { 1727 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1728 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1729 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1730 } 1731 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1732 { 1733 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1735 goto f_err; 1736 } 1737 1738 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1739 { 1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1741 goto err; 1742 } 1743 1744 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1745 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1746 { 1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1748 goto err; 1749 } 1750 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) 1751 { 1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1753 goto err; 1754 } 1755 1756 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1757 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1758 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1759 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1760 { 1761 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1762 { 1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1764 goto err; 1765 } 1766 } 1767 1768 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1769 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1770 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1771 { 1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1773 goto err; 1774 } 1775 1776 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1777 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1778 { 1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1780 goto err; 1781 } 1782 1783 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1784 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1785 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1786 */ 1787 if ((curve_id = 1788 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1789 == 0) 1790 { 1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1792 goto err; 1793 } 1794 1795 /* Encode the public key. 1796 * First check the size of encoding and 1797 * allocate memory accordingly. 1798 */ 1799 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1800 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1801 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1802 NULL, 0, NULL); 1803 1804 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1805 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1806 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1807 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1808 { 1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1810 goto err; 1811 } 1812 1813 1814 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1815 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1816 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1817 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1818 1819 if (encodedlen == 0) 1820 { 1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1822 goto err; 1823 } 1824 1825 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1826 1827 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1828 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1829 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1830 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1831 * structure. 1832 */ 1833 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1834 1835 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1836 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1837 */ 1838 r[0]=NULL; 1839 r[1]=NULL; 1840 r[2]=NULL; 1841 r[3]=NULL; 1842 } 1843 else 1844#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1845#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1846 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1847 { 1848 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ 1849 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1850 } 1851 else 1852#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1853#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1854 if (type & SSL_kSRP) 1855 { 1856 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1857 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1858 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || 1859 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) 1860 { 1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1862 goto err; 1863 } 1864 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; 1865 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; 1866 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; 1867 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; 1868 } 1869 else 1870#endif 1871 { 1872 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1874 goto f_err; 1875 } 1876 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1877 { 1878 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1879#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1880 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1881 n+=1+nr[i]; 1882 else 1883#endif 1884 n+=2+nr[i]; 1885 } 1886 1887 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) 1888 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 1889 { 1890 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) 1891 == NULL) 1892 { 1893 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1894 goto f_err; 1895 } 1896 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1897 } 1898 else 1899 { 1900 pkey=NULL; 1901 kn=0; 1902 } 1903 1904 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1905 { 1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1907 goto err; 1908 } 1909 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1910 p= &(d[4]); 1911 1912 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1913 { 1914#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1915 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1916 { 1917 *p = nr[i]; 1918 p++; 1919 } 1920 else 1921#endif 1922 s2n(nr[i],p); 1923 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1924 p+=nr[i]; 1925 } 1926 1927#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1928 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1929 { 1930 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1931 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1932 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1933 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1934 * the actual encoded point itself 1935 */ 1936 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1937 p += 1; 1938 *p = 0; 1939 p += 1; 1940 *p = curve_id; 1941 p += 1; 1942 *p = encodedlen; 1943 p += 1; 1944 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1945 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1946 encodedlen); 1947 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1948 encodedPoint = NULL; 1949 p += encodedlen; 1950 } 1951#endif 1952 1953#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1954 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1955 { 1956 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1957 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1958 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1959 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1960 } 1961#endif 1962 1963 /* not anonymous */ 1964 if (pkey != NULL) 1965 { 1966 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1967 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1968#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1969 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1970 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 1971 { 1972 q=md_buf; 1973 j=0; 1974 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1975 { 1976 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1977 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1978 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1979 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1980 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1981 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1982 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1983 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1984 (unsigned int *)&i); 1985 q+=i; 1986 j+=i; 1987 } 1988 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1989 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1990 { 1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1992 goto err; 1993 } 1994 s2n(u,p); 1995 n+=u+2; 1996 } 1997 else 1998#endif 1999 if (md) 2000 { 2001 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature 2002 * algorithm */ 2003 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2004 { 2005 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) 2006 { 2007 /* Should never happen */ 2008 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2010 goto f_err; 2011 } 2012 p+=2; 2013 } 2014#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2015 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", 2016 EVP_MD_name(md)); 2017#endif 2018 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 2019 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2020 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2021 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 2022 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 2023 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 2024 { 2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); 2026 goto err; 2027 } 2028 s2n(i,p); 2029 n+=i+2; 2030 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2031 n+= 2; 2032 } 2033 else 2034 { 2035 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2036 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2038 goto f_err; 2039 } 2040 } 2041 2042 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2043 l2n3(n,d); 2044 2045 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2046 * it off */ 2047 s->init_num=n+4; 2048 s->init_off=0; 2049 } 2050 2051 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2052 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2053 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2054f_err: 2055 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2056err: 2057#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2058 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2059 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2060#endif 2061 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2062 return(-1); 2063 } 2064 2065int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2066 { 2067 unsigned char *p,*d; 2068 int i,j,nl,off,n; 2069 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 2070 X509_NAME *name; 2071 BUF_MEM *buf; 2072 2073 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 2074 { 2075 buf=s->init_buf; 2076 2077 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2078 2079 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2080 p++; 2081 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 2082 d[0]=n; 2083 p+=n; 2084 n++; 2085 2086 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2087 { 2088 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2089 s2n(nl, p); 2090 p += nl + 2; 2091 n += nl + 2; 2092 } 2093 2094 off=n; 2095 p+=2; 2096 n+=2; 2097 2098 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2099 nl=0; 2100 if (sk != NULL) 2101 { 2102 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 2103 { 2104 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 2105 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 2106 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 2107 { 2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2109 goto err; 2110 } 2111 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 2112 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 2113 { 2114 s2n(j,p); 2115 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2116 n+=2+j; 2117 nl+=2+j; 2118 } 2119 else 2120 { 2121 d=p; 2122 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2123 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 2124 n+=j; 2125 nl+=j; 2126 } 2127 } 2128 } 2129 /* else no CA names */ 2130 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 2131 s2n(nl,p); 2132 2133 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 2134 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2135 l2n3(n,d); 2136 2137 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2138 * it off */ 2139 2140 s->init_num=n+4; 2141 s->init_off=0; 2142#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2143 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) 2144 { 2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2146 goto err; 2147 } 2148 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2149 2150 /* do the header */ 2151 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2152 *(p++)=0; 2153 *(p++)=0; 2154 *(p++)=0; 2155 s->init_num += 4; 2156#endif 2157 2158 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2159 } 2160 2161 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2162 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2163err: 2164 return(-1); 2165 } 2166 2167int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2168 { 2169 int i,al,ok; 2170 long n; 2171 unsigned long alg_k; 2172 unsigned char *p; 2173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2174 RSA *rsa=NULL; 2175 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2176#endif 2177#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2178 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 2179 DH *dh_srvr; 2180#endif 2181#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2182 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2183#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2184 2185#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2186 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2187 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2188 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2189 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2190#endif 2191 2192 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2193 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2194 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2195 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2196 2048, /* ??? */ 2197 &ok); 2198 2199 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2200 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2201 2202 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2203 2204#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2205 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 2206 { 2207 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2208 int decrypt_len; 2209 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2210 size_t j; 2211 2212 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2213 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 2214 { 2215 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2216 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2217 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 2218 * be sent already */ 2219 if (rsa == NULL) 2220 { 2221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2223 goto f_err; 2224 2225 } 2226 } 2227 else 2228 { 2229 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2230 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 2231 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 2232 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 2233 { 2234 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2236 goto f_err; 2237 } 2238 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 2239 } 2240 2241 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2242 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2243 { 2244 n2s(p,i); 2245 if (n != i+2) 2246 { 2247 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 2248 { 2249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2251 goto f_err; 2252 } 2253 else 2254 p-=2; 2255 } 2256 else 2257 n=i; 2258 } 2259 2260 /* 2261 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2262 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2263 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2264 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2265 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2266 */ 2267 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2268 { 2269 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2271 goto f_err; 2272 } 2273 2274 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because 2275 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see 2276 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of 2277 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the 2278 * case that the decrypt fails. See 2279 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ 2280 2281 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */ 2282 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2283 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2284 goto err; 2285 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2286 ERR_clear_error(); 2287 2288 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. 2289 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ 2290 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2291 2292 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct 2293 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. 2294 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2295 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 2296 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks 2297 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other 2298 * decryption error. */ 2299 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); 2300 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); 2301 2302 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2303 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks 2304 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for 2305 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the 2306 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not 2307 * support the requested protocol version. If 2308 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 2309 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) 2310 { 2311 unsigned char workaround_good; 2312 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); 2313 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); 2314 version_good |= workaround_good; 2315 } 2316 2317 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good 2318 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ 2319 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2320 2321 /* 2322 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2323 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2324 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2325 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2326 */ 2327 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) 2328 { 2329 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2330 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2331 } 2332 2333 s->session->master_key_length= 2334 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2335 s->session->master_key, 2336 p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2337 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2338 } 2339 else 2340#endif 2341#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2342 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 2343 { 2344 n2s(p,i); 2345 if (n != i+2) 2346 { 2347 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 2348 { 2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2350 goto err; 2351 } 2352 else 2353 { 2354 p-=2; 2355 i=(int)n; 2356 } 2357 } 2358 2359 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2360 { 2361 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2363 goto f_err; 2364 } 2365 else 2366 { 2367 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 2368 { 2369 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2371 goto f_err; 2372 } 2373 else 2374 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 2375 } 2376 2377 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 2378 if (pub == NULL) 2379 { 2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2381 goto err; 2382 } 2383 2384 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 2385 2386 if (i <= 0) 2387 { 2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2389 BN_clear_free(pub); 2390 goto err; 2391 } 2392 2393 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2394 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 2395 2396 BN_clear_free(pub); 2397 pub=NULL; 2398 s->session->master_key_length= 2399 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2400 s->session->master_key,p,i); 2401 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2402 } 2403 else 2404#endif 2405#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2406 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 2407 { 2408 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2409 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2410 krb5_data authenticator; 2411 krb5_data enc_pms; 2412 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2414 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2415 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2416 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2417 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2418 int padl, outl; 2419 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2420 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2421 2422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2423 2424 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2425 2426 n2s(p,i); 2427 enc_ticket.length = i; 2428 2429 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) 2430 { 2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2433 goto err; 2434 } 2435 2436 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2437 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2438 2439 n2s(p,i); 2440 authenticator.length = i; 2441 2442 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) 2443 { 2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2445 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2446 goto err; 2447 } 2448 2449 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2450 p+=authenticator.length; 2451 2452 n2s(p,i); 2453 enc_pms.length = i; 2454 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2455 p+=enc_pms.length; 2456 2457 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2458 ** after decryption 2459 */ 2460 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2461 { 2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2463 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2464 goto err; 2465 } 2466 2467 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2468 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2469 { 2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2471 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2472 goto err; 2473 } 2474 2475 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2476 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2477 { 2478#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2479 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2480 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2481 if (kssl_err.text) 2482 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2483#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2485 kssl_err.reason); 2486 goto err; 2487 } 2488 2489 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2490 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2491 */ 2492 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2493 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2494 { 2495#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2496 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2497 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2498 if (kssl_err.text) 2499 fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2500#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2502 kssl_err.reason); 2503 goto err; 2504 } 2505 2506 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2507 { 2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2509 goto err; 2510 } 2511 2512#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2513 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2514#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2515 2516 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2517 if (enc == NULL) 2518 goto err; 2519 2520 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2521 2522 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2523 { 2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2525 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2526 goto err; 2527 } 2528 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2529 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2530 { 2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2533 goto err; 2534 } 2535 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2536 { 2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2538 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2539 goto err; 2540 } 2541 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2542 { 2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2544 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2545 goto err; 2546 } 2547 outl += padl; 2548 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2549 { 2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2551 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2552 goto err; 2553 } 2554 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2555 { 2556 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2557 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2558 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2559 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2560 * the protocol version. 2561 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2562 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2563 */ 2564 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2565 { 2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2567 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2568 goto err; 2569 } 2570 } 2571 2572 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2573 2574 s->session->master_key_length= 2575 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2576 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2577 2578 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2579 { 2580 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2581 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2582 { 2583 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2584 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2585 } 2586 } 2587 2588 2589 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2590 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2591 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2592 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2593 */ 2594 } 2595 else 2596#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2597 2598#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2599 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2600 { 2601 int ret = 1; 2602 int field_size = 0; 2603 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2604 const EC_GROUP *group; 2605 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2606 2607 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2608 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2609 { 2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2611 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2612 goto err; 2613 } 2614 2615 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2616 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2617 { 2618 /* use the certificate */ 2619 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2620 } 2621 else 2622 { 2623 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2624 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2625 */ 2626 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2627 } 2628 2629 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2630 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2631 2632 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2633 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2634 { 2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2636 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2637 goto err; 2638 } 2639 2640 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2641 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2642 { 2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2644 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2645 goto err; 2646 } 2647 2648 if (n == 0L) 2649 { 2650 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2651 2652 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 2653 { 2654 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2656 goto f_err; 2657 } 2658 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2659 == NULL) || 2660 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2661 { 2662 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2663 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2664 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2665 * never executed. When that support is 2666 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2667 * received in the certificate is 2668 * authorized for key agreement. 2669 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2670 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2671 * group. 2672 */ 2673 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2675 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2676 goto f_err; 2677 } 2678 2679 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2680 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2681 { 2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2683 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2684 goto err; 2685 } 2686 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2687 } 2688 else 2689 { 2690 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2691 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2692 */ 2693 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2694 { 2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2696 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2697 goto err; 2698 } 2699 2700 /* Get encoded point length */ 2701 i = *p; 2702 p += 1; 2703 if (n != 1 + i) 2704 { 2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2706 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2707 goto err; 2708 } 2709 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2710 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2711 { 2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2713 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2714 goto err; 2715 } 2716 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2717 * currently, so set it to the start 2718 */ 2719 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2720 } 2721 2722 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2723 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2724 if (field_size <= 0) 2725 { 2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2727 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2728 goto err; 2729 } 2730 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2731 if (i <= 0) 2732 { 2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2734 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2735 goto err; 2736 } 2737 2738 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2739 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2740 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2741 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2742 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2743 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2744 2745 /* Compute the master secret */ 2746 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2747 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2748 2749 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2750 return (ret); 2751 } 2752 else 2753#endif 2754#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2755 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) 2756 { 2757 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2758 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; 2759 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2760 int psk_err = 1; 2761 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; 2762 2763 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2764 2765 n2s(p,i); 2766 if (n != i+2) 2767 { 2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2769 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2770 goto psk_err; 2771 } 2772 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) 2773 { 2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2775 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2776 goto psk_err; 2777 } 2778 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) 2779 { 2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2781 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2782 goto psk_err; 2783 } 2784 2785 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity 2786 * string for the callback */ 2787 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2788 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); 2789 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2790 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2791 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); 2792 2793 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) 2794 { 2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2796 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2797 goto psk_err; 2798 } 2799 else if (psk_len == 0) 2800 { 2801 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ 2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2803 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2804 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2805 goto psk_err; 2806 } 2807 2808 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2809 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; 2810 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2811 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2812 s2n(psk_len, t); 2813 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2814 t+=psk_len; 2815 s2n(psk_len, t); 2816 2817 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2818 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2819 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); 2820 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) 2821 { 2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2823 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2824 goto psk_err; 2825 } 2826 2827 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2828 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2829 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2830 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2831 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2832 { 2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2834 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2835 goto psk_err; 2836 } 2837 2838 s->session->master_key_length= 2839 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2840 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2841 psk_err = 0; 2842 psk_err: 2843 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2844 if (psk_err != 0) 2845 goto f_err; 2846 } 2847 else 2848#endif 2849#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2850 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 2851 { 2852 int param_len; 2853 2854 n2s(p,i); 2855 param_len=i+2; 2856 if (param_len > n) 2857 { 2858 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2860 goto f_err; 2861 } 2862 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) 2863 { 2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2865 goto err; 2866 } 2867 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2868 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) 2869 { 2870 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2872 goto f_err; 2873 } 2874 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2875 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2876 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2877 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) 2878 { 2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2880 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2881 goto err; 2882 } 2883 2884 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) 2885 { 2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2887 goto err; 2888 } 2889 2890 p+=i; 2891 } 2892 else 2893#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2894 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 2895 { 2896 int ret = 0; 2897 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2898 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2899 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2900 size_t outlen=32, inlen; 2901 unsigned long alg_a; 2902 int Ttag, Tclass; 2903 long Tlen; 2904 2905 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2906 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2907 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2908 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2909 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2910 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2911 2912 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); 2913 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2914 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2915 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2916 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use 2917 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ 2918 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2919 if (client_pub_pkey) 2920 { 2921 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2922 ERR_clear_error(); 2923 } 2924 /* Decrypt session key */ 2925 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || 2926 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || 2927 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) 2928 { 2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2930 goto gerr; 2931 } 2932 start = p; 2933 inlen = Tlen; 2934 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 2935 2936 { 2937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2938 goto gerr; 2939 } 2940 /* Generate master secret */ 2941 s->session->master_key_length= 2942 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2943 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); 2944 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2945 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2946 ret = 2; 2947 else 2948 ret = 1; 2949 gerr: 2950 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2951 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2952 if (ret) 2953 return ret; 2954 else 2955 goto err; 2956 } 2957 else 2958 { 2959 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2961 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2962 goto f_err; 2963 } 2964 2965 return(1); 2966f_err: 2967 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2968#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2969err: 2970#endif 2971#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2972 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2973 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2974 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2975 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2976 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2977#endif 2978 return(-1); 2979 } 2980 2981int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2982 { 2983 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2984 unsigned char *p; 2985 int al,ok,ret=0; 2986 long n; 2987 int type=0,i,j; 2988 X509 *peer; 2989 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2990 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2991 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2992 2993 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2994 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2995 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2996 -1, 2997 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 2998 &ok); 2999 3000 if (!ok) return((int)n); 3001 3002 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 3003 { 3004 peer=s->session->peer; 3005 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 3006 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 3007 } 3008 else 3009 { 3010 peer=NULL; 3011 pkey=NULL; 3012 } 3013 3014 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 3015 { 3016 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 3017 if (peer != NULL) 3018 { 3019 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 3021 goto f_err; 3022 } 3023 ret=1; 3024 goto end; 3025 } 3026 3027 if (peer == NULL) 3028 { 3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 3030 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3031 goto f_err; 3032 } 3033 3034 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 3035 { 3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 3037 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3038 goto f_err; 3039 } 3040 3041 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3042 { 3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 3044 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3045 goto f_err; 3046 } 3047 3048 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 3049 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3050 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 3051 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare 3052 * signature without length field */ 3053 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3054 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) 3055 { 3056 i=64; 3057 } 3058 else 3059 { 3060 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3061 { 3062 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 3063 /* Should never happen */ 3064 if (sigalg == -1) 3065 { 3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3067 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3068 goto f_err; 3069 } 3070 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 3071 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) 3072 { 3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3074 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3075 goto f_err; 3076 } 3077 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3078 if (md == NULL) 3079 { 3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3081 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3082 goto f_err; 3083 } 3084#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3085fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3086#endif 3087 p += 2; 3088 n -= 2; 3089 } 3090 n2s(p,i); 3091 n-=2; 3092 if (i > n) 3093 { 3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3095 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3096 goto f_err; 3097 } 3098 } 3099 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3100 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 3101 { 3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3103 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3104 goto f_err; 3105 } 3106 3107 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3108 { 3109 long hdatalen = 0; 3110 void *hdata; 3111 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3112 if (hdatalen <= 0) 3113 { 3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3115 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3116 goto f_err; 3117 } 3118#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3119 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3120 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3121#endif 3122 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3123 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) 3124 { 3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3126 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3127 goto f_err; 3128 } 3129 3130 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) 3131 { 3132 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3134 goto f_err; 3135 } 3136 } 3137 else 3138#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3139 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 3140 { 3141 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3142 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3143 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3144 if (i < 0) 3145 { 3146 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3148 goto f_err; 3149 } 3150 if (i == 0) 3151 { 3152 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3154 goto f_err; 3155 } 3156 } 3157 else 3158#endif 3159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3160 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 3161 { 3162 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3163 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3164 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 3165 if (j <= 0) 3166 { 3167 /* bad signature */ 3168 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3170 goto f_err; 3171 } 3172 } 3173 else 3174#endif 3175#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3176 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 3177 { 3178 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3179 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3180 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 3181 if (j <= 0) 3182 { 3183 /* bad signature */ 3184 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3186 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3187 goto f_err; 3188 } 3189 } 3190 else 3191#endif 3192 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 3193 { unsigned char signature[64]; 3194 int idx; 3195 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); 3196 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3197 if (i!=64) { 3198 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); 3199 } 3200 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { 3201 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; 3202 } 3203 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); 3204 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3205 if (j<=0) 3206 { 3207 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3209 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3210 goto f_err; 3211 } 3212 } 3213 else 3214 { 3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3216 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3217 goto f_err; 3218 } 3219 3220 3221 ret=1; 3222 if (0) 3223 { 3224f_err: 3225 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3226 } 3227end: 3228 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 3229 { 3230 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3231 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3232 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3233 } 3234 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3235 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3236 return(ret); 3237 } 3238 3239int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3240 { 3241 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 3242 X509 *x=NULL; 3243 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 3244 const unsigned char *p,*q; 3245 unsigned char *d; 3246 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 3247 3248 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3249 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3250 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3251 -1, 3252 s->max_cert_list, 3253 &ok); 3254 3255 if (!ok) return((int)n); 3256 3257 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 3258 { 3259 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3260 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3261 { 3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3264 goto f_err; 3265 } 3266 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 3267 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 3268 { 3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3270 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3271 goto f_err; 3272 } 3273 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 3274 return(1); 3275 } 3276 3277 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 3278 { 3279 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3281 goto f_err; 3282 } 3283 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3284 3285 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 3286 { 3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3288 goto err; 3289 } 3290 3291 n2l3(p,llen); 3292 if (llen+3 != n) 3293 { 3294 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3296 goto f_err; 3297 } 3298 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 3299 { 3300 n2l3(p,l); 3301 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 3302 { 3303 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3305 goto f_err; 3306 } 3307 3308 q=p; 3309 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 3310 if (x == NULL) 3311 { 3312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3313 goto err; 3314 } 3315 if (p != (q+l)) 3316 { 3317 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3319 goto f_err; 3320 } 3321 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 3322 { 3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3324 goto err; 3325 } 3326 x=NULL; 3327 nc+=l+3; 3328 } 3329 3330 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 3331 { 3332 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3333 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 3334 { 3335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3337 goto f_err; 3338 } 3339 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3340 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3341 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3342 { 3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3344 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3345 goto f_err; 3346 } 3347 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3348 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 3349 { 3350 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3351 goto f_err; 3352 } 3353 } 3354 else 3355 { 3356 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 3357 if (i <= 0) 3358 { 3359 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3361 goto f_err; 3362 } 3363 } 3364 3365 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3366 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3367 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 3368 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3369 3370 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 3371 * when we arrive here. */ 3372 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3373 { 3374 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3375 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3376 { 3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3378 goto err; 3379 } 3380 } 3381 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3382 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3383 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 3384 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 3385 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 3386 3387 sk=NULL; 3388 3389 ret=1; 3390 if (0) 3391 { 3392f_err: 3393 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3394 } 3395err: 3396 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 3397 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 3398 return(ret); 3399 } 3400 3401int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3402 { 3403 unsigned long l; 3404 X509 *x; 3405 3406 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 3407 { 3408 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3409 if (x == NULL) 3410 { 3411 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3412 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3413 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) 3414 { 3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3416 return(0); 3417 } 3418 } 3419 3420 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 3421 if (!l) 3422 { 3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3424 return(0); 3425 } 3426 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3427 s->init_num=(int)l; 3428 s->init_off=0; 3429 } 3430 3431 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3432 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3433 } 3434 3435#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3436/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3437int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3438 { 3439 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 3440 { 3441 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 3442 const unsigned char *const_p; 3443 int len, slen_full, slen; 3444 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3445 unsigned int hlen; 3446 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3447 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3448 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3449 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3450 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3451 3452 /* get session encoding length */ 3453 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3454 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 3455 * too long 3456 */ 3457 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 3458 return -1; 3459 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3460 if (!senc) 3461 return -1; 3462 p = senc; 3463 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 3464 3465 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ 3466 const_p = senc; 3467 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3468 if (sess == NULL) 3469 { 3470 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3471 return -1; 3472 } 3473 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3474 3475 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3476 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3477 { 3478 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3479 return -1; 3480 } 3481 p = senc; 3482 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 3483 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3484 3485 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3486 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3487 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3488 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3489 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3490 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3491 */ 3492 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3493 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3494 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3495 return -1; 3496 3497 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3498 /* do the header */ 3499 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3500 /* Skip message length for now */ 3501 p += 3; 3502 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3503 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3504 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 3505 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 3506 * from parent ctx. 3507 */ 3508 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 3509 { 3510 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3511 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3512 { 3513 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3514 return -1; 3515 } 3516 } 3517 else 3518 { 3519 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 3520 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3521 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 3522 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3523 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 3524 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3525 } 3526 3527 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 3528 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), 3529 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long 3530 * as their sessions. */ 3531 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3532 3533 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3534 p += 2; 3535 /* Output key name */ 3536 macstart = p; 3537 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3538 p += 16; 3539 /* output IV */ 3540 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3541 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3542 /* Encrypt session data */ 3543 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 3544 p += len; 3545 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 3546 p += len; 3547 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3548 3549 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 3550 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 3551 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3552 3553 p += hlen; 3554 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3555 /* Total length */ 3556 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3557 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3558 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3559 p += 4; 3560 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3561 3562 /* number of bytes to write */ 3563 s->init_num= len; 3564 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3565 s->init_off=0; 3566 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3567 } 3568 3569 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3570 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3571 } 3572 3573int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3574 { 3575 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 3576 { 3577 unsigned char *p; 3578 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3579 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3580 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3581 * + (ocsp response) 3582 */ 3583 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3584 return -1; 3585 3586 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3587 3588 /* do the header */ 3589 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3590 /* message length */ 3591 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3592 /* status type */ 3593 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 3594 /* length of OCSP response */ 3595 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3596 /* actual response */ 3597 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3598 /* number of bytes to write */ 3599 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3601 s->init_off = 0; 3602 } 3603 3604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3605 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3606 } 3607 3608# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3609/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It 3610 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ 3611int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3612 { 3613 int ok; 3614 int proto_len, padding_len; 3615 long n; 3616 const unsigned char *p; 3617 3618 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3619 * extension in their ClientHello */ 3620 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 3621 { 3622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3623 return -1; 3624 } 3625 3626 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3627 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3628 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3629 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 3630 514, /* See the payload format below */ 3631 &ok); 3632 3633 if (!ok) 3634 return((int)n); 3635 3636 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received 3637 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset 3638 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ 3639 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3640 { 3641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3642 return -1; 3643 } 3644 3645 if (n < 2) 3646 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3647 3648 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3649 3650 /* The payload looks like: 3651 * uint8 proto_len; 3652 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3653 * uint8 padding_len; 3654 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3655 */ 3656 proto_len = p[0]; 3657 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) 3658 return 0; 3659 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3660 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) 3661 return 0; 3662 3663 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3664 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 3665 { 3666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3667 return 0; 3668 } 3669 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3670 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3671 3672 return 1; 3673 } 3674# endif 3675#endif 3676