1/*
2 * validator/val_nsec.c - validator NSEC denial of existance functions.
3 *
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * This software is open source.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 *
12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 *
15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18 *
19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21 * specific prior written permission.
22 *
23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
25 * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
26 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
27 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
28 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
29 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
30 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
31 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
32 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
33 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
34 */
35
36/**
37 * \file
38 *
39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
40 * The functions help with NSEC checking, the different NSEC proofs
41 * for denial of existance, and proofs for presence of types.
42 */
43#include "config.h"
44#include <ldns/packet.h>
45#include "validator/val_nsec.h"
46#include "validator/val_utils.h"
47#include "util/data/msgreply.h"
48#include "util/data/dname.h"
49#include "util/net_help.h"
50#include "util/module.h"
51#include "services/cache/rrset.h"
52
53/** get ttl of rrset */
54static uint32_t
55rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k)
56{
57	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;
58	return d->ttl;
59}
60
61int
62nsecbitmap_has_type_rdata(uint8_t* bitmap, size_t len, uint16_t type)
63{
64	/* Check type present in NSEC typemap with bitmap arg */
65	/* bitmasks for determining type-lowerbits presence */
66	uint8_t masks[8] = {0x80, 0x40, 0x20, 0x10, 0x08, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01};
67	uint8_t type_window = type>>8;
68	uint8_t type_low = type&0xff;
69	uint8_t win, winlen;
70	/* read each of the type bitmap windows and see if the searched
71	 * type is amongst it */
72	while(len > 0) {
73		if(len < 3) /* bad window, at least window# winlen bitmap */
74			return 0;
75		win = *bitmap++;
76		winlen = *bitmap++;
77		len -= 2;
78		if(len < winlen || winlen < 1 || winlen > 32)
79			return 0;	/* bad window length */
80		if(win == type_window) {
81			/* search window bitmap for the correct byte */
82			/* mybyte is 0 if we need the first byte */
83			size_t mybyte = type_low>>3;
84			if(winlen <= mybyte)
85				return 0; /* window too short */
86			return (int)(bitmap[mybyte] & masks[type_low&0x7]);
87		} else {
88			/* not the window we are looking for */
89			bitmap += winlen;
90			len -= winlen;
91		}
92	}
93	/* end of bitmap reached, no type found */
94	return 0;
95}
96
97int
98nsec_has_type(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint16_t type)
99{
100	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)nsec->
101		entry.data;
102	size_t len;
103	if(!d || d->count == 0 || d->rr_len[0] < 2+1)
104		return 0;
105	len = dname_valid(d->rr_data[0]+2, d->rr_len[0]-2);
106	if(!len)
107		return 0;
108	return nsecbitmap_has_type_rdata(d->rr_data[0]+2+len,
109		d->rr_len[0]-2-len, type);
110}
111
112/**
113 * Get next owner name from nsec record
114 * @param nsec: the nsec RRset.
115 *	If there are multiple RRs, then this will only return one of them.
116 * @param nm: the next name is returned.
117 * @param ln: length of nm is returned.
118 * @return false on a bad NSEC RR (too short, malformed dname).
119 */
120static int
121nsec_get_next(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t** nm, size_t* ln)
122{
123	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)nsec->
124		entry.data;
125	if(!d || d->count == 0 || d->rr_len[0] < 2+1) {
126		*nm = 0;
127		*ln = 0;
128		return 0;
129	}
130	*nm = d->rr_data[0]+2;
131	*ln = dname_valid(*nm, d->rr_len[0]-2);
132	if(!*ln) {
133		*nm = 0;
134		*ln = 0;
135		return 0;
136	}
137	return 1;
138}
139
140/**
141 * For an NSEC that matches the DS queried for, check absence of DS type.
142 *
143 * @param nsec: NSEC for proof, must be trusted.
144 * @param qinfo: what is queried for.
145 * @return if secure the nsec proves that no DS is present, or
146 *	insecure if it proves it is not a delegation point.
147 *	or bogus if something was wrong.
148 */
149static enum sec_status
150val_nsec_proves_no_ds(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec,
151	struct query_info* qinfo)
152{
153	log_assert(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS);
154	log_assert(ntohs(nsec->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC);
155
156	if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) && qinfo->qname_len != 1) {
157		/* SOA present means that this is the NSEC from the child,
158		 * not the parent (so it is the wrong one). */
159		return sec_status_bogus;
160	}
161	if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) {
162		/* DS present means that there should have been a positive
163		 * response to the DS query, so there is something wrong. */
164		return sec_status_bogus;
165	}
166
167	if(!nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)) {
168		/* If there is no NS at this point at all, then this
169		 * doesn't prove anything one way or the other. */
170		return sec_status_insecure;
171	}
172	/* Otherwise, this proves no DS. */
173	return sec_status_secure;
174}
175
176/** check security status from cache or verify rrset, returns true if secure */
177static int
178nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
179	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
180	char** reason)
181{
182	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
183		nsec->entry.data;
184	if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
185		return 1;
186	rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now);
187	if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
188		return 1;
189	d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason);
190	if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
191		rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now);
192		return 1;
193	}
194	return 0;
195}
196
197enum sec_status
198val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
199	struct query_info* qinfo, struct reply_info* rep,
200	struct key_entry_key* kkey, uint32_t* proof_ttl, char** reason)
201{
202	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec = reply_find_rrset_section_ns(
203		rep, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC,
204		qinfo->qclass);
205	enum sec_status sec;
206	size_t i;
207	uint8_t* wc = NULL, *ce = NULL;
208	int valid_nsec = 0;
209	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* wc_nsec = NULL;
210
211	/* If we have a NSEC at the same name, it must prove one
212	 * of two things
213	 * --
214	 * 1) this is a delegation point and there is no DS
215	 * 2) this is not a delegation point */
216	if(nsec) {
217		if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason)) {
218			verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC RRset for the "
219				"referral did not verify.");
220			return sec_status_bogus;
221		}
222		sec = val_nsec_proves_no_ds(nsec, qinfo);
223		if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
224			/* something was wrong. */
225			*reason = "NSEC does not prove absence of DS";
226			return sec;
227		} else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
228			/* this wasn't a delegation point. */
229			return sec;
230		} else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
231			/* this proved no DS. */
232			*proof_ttl = ub_packed_rrset_ttl(nsec);
233			return sec;
234		}
235		/* if unchecked, fall through to next proof */
236	}
237
238	/* Otherwise, there is no NSEC at qname. This could be an ENT.
239	 * (ENT=empty non terminal). If not, this is broken. */
240
241	/* verify NSEC rrsets in auth section */
242	for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets;
243		i++) {
244		if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type != htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
245			continue;
246		if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, rep->rrsets[i], kkey, reason)) {
247			verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC for empty non-terminal "
248				"did not verify.");
249			return sec_status_bogus;
250		}
251		if(nsec_proves_nodata(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo, &wc)) {
252			verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC for empty non-terminal "
253				"proved no DS.");
254			*proof_ttl = rrset_get_ttl(rep->rrsets[i]);
255			if(wc && dname_is_wild(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname))
256				wc_nsec = rep->rrsets[i];
257			valid_nsec = 1;
258		}
259		if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo->qname)) {
260			ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qinfo->qname,
261				rep->rrsets[i]);
262		}
263	}
264	if(wc && !ce)
265		valid_nsec = 0;
266	else if(wc && ce) {
267		/* ce and wc must match */
268		if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0)
269			valid_nsec = 0;
270		else if(!wc_nsec)
271			valid_nsec = 0;
272	}
273	if(valid_nsec) {
274		if(wc) {
275			/* check if this is a delegation */
276			*reason = "NSEC for wildcard does not prove absence of DS";
277			return val_nsec_proves_no_ds(wc_nsec, qinfo);
278		}
279		/* valid nsec proves empty nonterminal */
280		return sec_status_insecure;
281	}
282
283	/* NSEC proof did not conlusively point to DS or no DS */
284	return sec_status_unchecked;
285}
286
287int nsec_proves_nodata(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec,
288	struct query_info* qinfo, uint8_t** wc)
289{
290	log_assert(wc);
291	if(query_dname_compare(nsec->rk.dname, qinfo->qname) != 0) {
292		uint8_t* nm;
293		size_t ln;
294
295		/* empty-non-terminal checking.
296		 * Done before wildcard, because this is an exact match,
297		 * and would prevent a wildcard from matching. */
298
299		/* If the nsec is proving that qname is an ENT, the nsec owner
300		 * will be less than qname, and the next name will be a child
301		 * domain of the qname. */
302		if(!nsec_get_next(nsec, &nm, &ln))
303			return 0; /* bad nsec */
304		if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(nm, qinfo->qname) &&
305			dname_canonical_compare(nsec->rk.dname,
306				qinfo->qname) < 0) {
307			return 1; /* proves ENT */
308		}
309
310		/* wildcard checking. */
311
312		/* If this is a wildcard NSEC, make sure that a) it was
313		 * possible to have generated qname from the wildcard and
314		 * b) the type map does not contain qtype. Note that this
315		 * does NOT prove that this wildcard was the applicable
316		 * wildcard. */
317		if(dname_is_wild(nsec->rk.dname)) {
318			/* the purported closest encloser. */
319			uint8_t* ce = nsec->rk.dname;
320			size_t ce_len = nsec->rk.dname_len;
321			dname_remove_label(&ce, &ce_len);
322
323			/* The qname must be a strict subdomain of the
324			 * closest encloser, for the wildcard to apply
325			 */
326			if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, ce)) {
327				/* here we have a matching NSEC for the qname,
328				 * perform matching NSEC checks */
329				if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) {
330				   /* should have gotten the wildcard CNAME */
331					return 0;
332				}
333				if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
334				   !nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
335				   /* wrong parentside (wildcard) NSEC used */
336					return 0;
337				}
338				if(nsec_has_type(nsec, qinfo->qtype)) {
339					return 0;
340				}
341				*wc = ce;
342				return 1;
343			}
344		}
345
346		/* Otherwise, this NSEC does not prove ENT and is not a
347		 * wildcard, so it does not prove NODATA. */
348		return 0;
349	}
350
351	/* If the qtype exists, then we should have gotten it. */
352	if(nsec_has_type(nsec, qinfo->qtype)) {
353		return 0;
354	}
355
356	/* if the name is a CNAME node, then we should have gotten the CNAME*/
357	if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) {
358		return 0;
359	}
360
361	/* If an NS set exists at this name, and NOT a SOA (so this is a
362	 * zone cut, not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a
363	 * referral (or we just got the wrong NSEC).
364	 * The reverse of this check is used when qtype is DS, since that
365	 * must use the NSEC from above the zone cut. */
366	if(qinfo->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
367		nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
368		!nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
369		return 0;
370	} else if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
371		nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) &&
372		!dname_is_root(qinfo->qname)) {
373		return 0;
374	}
375
376	return 1;
377}
378
379int
380val_nsec_proves_name_error(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t* qname)
381{
382	uint8_t* owner = nsec->rk.dname;
383	uint8_t* next;
384	size_t nlen;
385	if(!nsec_get_next(nsec, &next, &nlen))
386		return 0;
387
388	/* If NSEC owner == qname, then this NSEC proves that qname exists. */
389	if(query_dname_compare(qname, owner) == 0) {
390		return 0;
391	}
392
393	/* If NSEC is a parent of qname, we need to check the type map
394	 * If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then
395	 * this NSEC is being misused. */
396	if(dname_subdomain_c(qname, owner) &&
397		(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) ||
398		(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
399			&& !nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA))
400		)) {
401		return 0;
402	}
403
404	if(query_dname_compare(owner, next) == 0) {
405		/* this nsec is the only nsec */
406		/* zone.name NSEC zone.name, disproves everything else */
407		/* but only for subdomains of that zone */
408		if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(qname, next))
409			return 1;
410	}
411	else if(dname_canonical_compare(owner, next) > 0) {
412		/* this is the last nsec, ....(bigger) NSEC zonename(smaller) */
413		/* the names after the last (owner) name do not exist
414		 * there are no names before the zone name in the zone
415		 * but the qname must be a subdomain of the zone name(next). */
416		if(dname_canonical_compare(owner, qname) < 0 &&
417			dname_strict_subdomain_c(qname, next))
418			return 1;
419	} else {
420		/* regular NSEC, (smaller) NSEC (larger) */
421		if(dname_canonical_compare(owner, qname) < 0 &&
422		   dname_canonical_compare(qname, next) < 0) {
423			return 1;
424		}
425	}
426	return 0;
427}
428
429int val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec,
430	struct query_info* qinfo)
431{
432	if(nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
433		!nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) &&
434		!nsec_has_type(nsec, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
435		/* see if nsec signals an insecure delegation */
436		if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) {
437			/* if type is DS and qname is equal to nsec, then it
438			 * is an exact match nsec, result not insecure */
439			if(dname_strict_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname,
440				nsec->rk.dname))
441				return 1;
442		} else {
443			if(dname_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, nsec->rk.dname))
444				return 1;
445		}
446	}
447	return 0;
448}
449
450uint8_t*
451nsec_closest_encloser(uint8_t* qname, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec)
452{
453	uint8_t* next;
454	size_t nlen;
455	uint8_t* common1, *common2;
456	if(!nsec_get_next(nsec, &next, &nlen))
457		return NULL;
458	/* longest common with owner or next name */
459	common1 = dname_get_shared_topdomain(nsec->rk.dname, qname);
460	common2 = dname_get_shared_topdomain(next, qname);
461	if(dname_count_labels(common1) > dname_count_labels(common2))
462		return common1;
463	return common2;
464}
465
466int val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec,
467	struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t* wc)
468{
469	uint8_t* ce;
470	/*  1) prove that qname doesn't exist and
471	 *  2) that the correct wildcard was used
472	 *  nsec has been verified already. */
473	if(!val_nsec_proves_name_error(nsec, qinf->qname))
474		return 0;
475	/* check wildcard name */
476	ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qinf->qname, nsec);
477	if(!ce)
478		return 0;
479	if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) {
480		return 0;
481	}
482	return 1;
483}
484
485int
486val_nsec_proves_no_wc(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t* qname,
487	size_t qnamelen)
488{
489	/* Determine if a NSEC record proves the non-existence of a
490	 * wildcard that could have produced qname. */
491	int labs;
492	int i;
493	uint8_t* ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qname, nsec);
494	uint8_t* strip;
495	size_t striplen;
496	uint8_t buf[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+3];
497	if(!ce)
498		return 0;
499	/* we can subtract the closest encloser count - since that is the
500	 * largest shared topdomain with owner and next NSEC name,
501	 * because the NSEC is no proof for names shorter than the owner
502	 * and next names. */
503	labs = dname_count_labels(qname) - dname_count_labels(ce);
504
505	for(i=labs; i>0; i--) {
506		/* i is number of labels to strip off qname, prepend * wild */
507		strip = qname;
508		striplen = qnamelen;
509		dname_remove_labels(&strip, &striplen, i);
510		if(striplen > LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN-2)
511			continue; /* too long to prepend wildcard */
512		buf[0] = 1;
513		buf[1] = (uint8_t)'*';
514		memmove(buf+2, strip, striplen);
515		if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(nsec, buf)) {
516			return 1;
517		}
518	}
519	return 0;
520}
521
522/**
523 * Find shared topdomain that exists
524 */
525static void
526dlv_topdomain(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, uint8_t* qname,
527	uint8_t** nm, size_t* nm_len)
528{
529	/* make sure reply is part of nm */
530	/* take shared topdomain with left of NSEC. */
531
532	/* because, if empty nonterminal, then right is subdomain of qname.
533	 * and any shared topdomain would be empty nonterminals.
534	 *
535	 * If nxdomain, then the right is bigger, and could have an
536	 * interesting shared topdomain, but if it does have one, it is
537	 * an empty nonterminal. An empty nonterminal shared with the left
538	 * one. */
539	int n;
540	uint8_t* common = dname_get_shared_topdomain(qname, nsec->rk.dname);
541	n = dname_count_labels(*nm) - dname_count_labels(common);
542	dname_remove_labels(nm, nm_len, n);
543}
544
545int val_nsec_check_dlv(struct query_info* qinfo,
546        struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t** nm, size_t* nm_len)
547{
548	uint8_t* next;
549	size_t i, nlen;
550	int c;
551	/* we should now have a NOERROR/NODATA or NXDOMAIN message */
552	if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0) {
553		return 0;
554	}
555	/* is this NOERROR ? */
556	if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
557		/* it can be a plain NSEC match - go up one more level. */
558		/* or its an empty nonterminal - go up to nonempty level */
559		for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
560			if(htons(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type)!=LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC ||
561				!nsec_get_next(rep->rrsets[i], &next, &nlen))
562				continue;
563			c = dname_canonical_compare(
564				rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, qinfo->qname);
565			if(c == 0) {
566				/* plain match */
567				if(nsec_has_type(rep->rrsets[i],
568					LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV))
569					return 0;
570				dname_remove_label(nm, nm_len);
571				return 1;
572			} else if(c < 0 &&
573				dname_strict_subdomain_c(next, qinfo->qname)) {
574				/* ENT */
575				dlv_topdomain(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo->qname,
576					nm, nm_len);
577				return 1;
578			}
579		}
580		return 0;
581	}
582
583	/* is this NXDOMAIN ? */
584	if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) {
585		/* find the qname denial NSEC record. It can tell us
586		 * a closest encloser name; or that we not need bother */
587		for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
588			if(htons(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC)
589				continue;
590			if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(rep->rrsets[i],
591				qinfo->qname)) {
592				log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "topdomain on",
593					rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
594					ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type), 0);
595				dlv_topdomain(rep->rrsets[i], qinfo->qname,
596					nm, nm_len);
597				return 1;
598			}
599		}
600		return 0;
601	}
602	return 0;
603}
604