hosts_access.c revision 51495
144743Smarkm /*
244743Smarkm  * This module implements a simple access control language that is based on
344743Smarkm  * host (or domain) names, NIS (host) netgroup names, IP addresses (or
444743Smarkm  * network numbers) and daemon process names. When a match is found the
544743Smarkm  * search is terminated, and depending on whether PROCESS_OPTIONS is defined,
644743Smarkm  * a list of options is executed or an optional shell command is executed.
744743Smarkm  *
844743Smarkm  * Host and user names are looked up on demand, provided that suitable endpoint
944743Smarkm  * information is available as sockaddr_in structures or TLI netbufs. As a
1044743Smarkm  * side effect, the pattern matching process may change the contents of
1144743Smarkm  * request structure fields.
1244743Smarkm  *
1344743Smarkm  * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3).
1444743Smarkm  *
1544743Smarkm  * Compile with -DNETGROUP if your library provides support for netgroups.
1644743Smarkm  *
1744743Smarkm  * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
1851495Ssheldonh  *
1951495Ssheldonh  * $FreeBSD: head/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.c 51495 1999-09-21 09:09:57Z sheldonh $
2044743Smarkm  */
2144743Smarkm
2244743Smarkm#ifndef lint
2344743Smarkmstatic char sccsid[] = "@(#) hosts_access.c 1.21 97/02/12 02:13:22";
2444743Smarkm#endif
2544743Smarkm
2644743Smarkm/* System libraries. */
2744743Smarkm
2844743Smarkm#include <sys/types.h>
2944743Smarkm#include <sys/param.h>
3044743Smarkm#include <netinet/in.h>
3144743Smarkm#include <arpa/inet.h>
3244743Smarkm#include <stdio.h>
3344743Smarkm#include <syslog.h>
3444743Smarkm#include <ctype.h>
3544743Smarkm#include <errno.h>
3644743Smarkm#include <setjmp.h>
3744743Smarkm#include <string.h>
3844743Smarkm
3944743Smarkmextern char *fgets();
4044743Smarkmextern int errno;
4144743Smarkm
4244743Smarkm#ifndef	INADDR_NONE
4344743Smarkm#define	INADDR_NONE	(-1)		/* XXX should be 0xffffffff */
4444743Smarkm#endif
4544743Smarkm
4644743Smarkm/* Local stuff. */
4744743Smarkm
4844743Smarkm#include "tcpd.h"
4944743Smarkm
5044743Smarkm/* Error handling. */
5144743Smarkm
5244743Smarkmextern jmp_buf tcpd_buf;
5344743Smarkm
5444743Smarkm/* Delimiters for lists of daemons or clients. */
5544743Smarkm
5644743Smarkmstatic char sep[] = ", \t\r\n";
5744743Smarkm
5844743Smarkm/* Constants to be used in assignments only, not in comparisons... */
5944743Smarkm
6044743Smarkm#define	YES		1
6144743Smarkm#define	NO		0
6244743Smarkm
6344743Smarkm /*
6444743Smarkm  * These variables are globally visible so that they can be redirected in
6544743Smarkm  * verification mode.
6644743Smarkm  */
6744743Smarkm
6844743Smarkmchar   *hosts_allow_table = HOSTS_ALLOW;
6944743Smarkmchar   *hosts_deny_table = HOSTS_DENY;
7044743Smarkmint     hosts_access_verbose = 0;
7144743Smarkm
7244743Smarkm /*
7344743Smarkm  * In a long-running process, we are not at liberty to just go away.
7444743Smarkm  */
7544743Smarkm
7644743Smarkmint     resident = (-1);		/* -1, 0: unknown; +1: yes */
7744743Smarkm
7844743Smarkm/* Forward declarations. */
7944743Smarkm
8044743Smarkmstatic int table_match();
8144743Smarkmstatic int list_match();
8244743Smarkmstatic int server_match();
8344743Smarkmstatic int client_match();
8444743Smarkmstatic int host_match();
8544743Smarkmstatic int string_match();
8644743Smarkmstatic int masked_match();
8744743Smarkm
8844743Smarkm/* Size of logical line buffer. */
8944743Smarkm
9044743Smarkm#define	BUFLEN 2048
9144743Smarkm
9244743Smarkm/* hosts_access - host access control facility */
9344743Smarkm
9444743Smarkmint     hosts_access(request)
9544743Smarkmstruct request_info *request;
9644743Smarkm{
9744743Smarkm    int     verdict;
9844743Smarkm
9944743Smarkm    /*
10044743Smarkm     * If the (daemon, client) pair is matched by an entry in the file
10144743Smarkm     * /etc/hosts.allow, access is granted. Otherwise, if the (daemon,
10244743Smarkm     * client) pair is matched by an entry in the file /etc/hosts.deny,
10344743Smarkm     * access is denied. Otherwise, access is granted. A non-existent
10444743Smarkm     * access-control file is treated as an empty file.
10544743Smarkm     *
10644743Smarkm     * After a rule has been matched, the optional language extensions may
10744743Smarkm     * decide to grant or refuse service anyway. Or, while a rule is being
10844743Smarkm     * processed, a serious error is found, and it seems better to play safe
10944743Smarkm     * and deny service. All this is done by jumping back into the
11044743Smarkm     * hosts_access() routine, bypassing the regular return from the
11144743Smarkm     * table_match() function calls below.
11244743Smarkm     */
11344743Smarkm
11444743Smarkm    if (resident <= 0)
11544743Smarkm	resident++;
11644743Smarkm    verdict = setjmp(tcpd_buf);
11744743Smarkm    if (verdict != 0)
11844743Smarkm	return (verdict == AC_PERMIT);
11944743Smarkm    if (table_match(hosts_allow_table, request))
12044743Smarkm	return (YES);
12144743Smarkm    if (table_match(hosts_deny_table, request))
12244743Smarkm	return (NO);
12344743Smarkm    return (YES);
12444743Smarkm}
12544743Smarkm
12644743Smarkm/* table_match - match table entries with (daemon, client) pair */
12744743Smarkm
12844743Smarkmstatic int table_match(table, request)
12944743Smarkmchar   *table;
13044743Smarkmstruct request_info *request;
13144743Smarkm{
13244743Smarkm    FILE   *fp;
13344743Smarkm    char    sv_list[BUFLEN];		/* becomes list of daemons */
13444743Smarkm    char   *cl_list;			/* becomes list of clients */
13544743Smarkm    char   *sh_cmd;			/* becomes optional shell command */
13644743Smarkm    int     match = NO;
13744743Smarkm    struct tcpd_context saved_context;
13844743Smarkm
13944743Smarkm    saved_context = tcpd_context;		/* stupid compilers */
14044743Smarkm
14144743Smarkm    /*
14244743Smarkm     * Between the fopen() and fclose() calls, avoid jumps that may cause
14344743Smarkm     * file descriptor leaks.
14444743Smarkm     */
14544743Smarkm
14644743Smarkm    if ((fp = fopen(table, "r")) != 0) {
14744743Smarkm	tcpd_context.file = table;
14844743Smarkm	tcpd_context.line = 0;
14944743Smarkm	while (match == NO && xgets(sv_list, sizeof(sv_list), fp) != 0) {
15044743Smarkm	    if (sv_list[strlen(sv_list) - 1] != '\n') {
15144743Smarkm		tcpd_warn("missing newline or line too long");
15244743Smarkm		continue;
15344743Smarkm	    }
15444743Smarkm	    if (sv_list[0] == '#' || sv_list[strspn(sv_list, " \t\r\n")] == 0)
15544743Smarkm		continue;
15644743Smarkm	    if ((cl_list = split_at(sv_list, ':')) == 0) {
15744743Smarkm		tcpd_warn("missing \":\" separator");
15844743Smarkm		continue;
15944743Smarkm	    }
16044743Smarkm	    sh_cmd = split_at(cl_list, ':');
16144743Smarkm	    match = list_match(sv_list, request, server_match)
16244743Smarkm		&& list_match(cl_list, request, client_match);
16344743Smarkm	}
16444743Smarkm	(void) fclose(fp);
16544743Smarkm    } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
16644743Smarkm	tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table);
16744743Smarkm    }
16844743Smarkm    if (match) {
16944743Smarkm	if (hosts_access_verbose > 1)
17044743Smarkm	    syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "matched:  %s line %d",
17144743Smarkm		   tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line);
17244743Smarkm	if (sh_cmd) {
17344743Smarkm#ifdef PROCESS_OPTIONS
17444743Smarkm	    process_options(sh_cmd, request);
17544743Smarkm#else
17644743Smarkm	    char    cmd[BUFSIZ];
17744743Smarkm	    shell_cmd(percent_x(cmd, sizeof(cmd), sh_cmd, request));
17844743Smarkm#endif
17944743Smarkm	}
18044743Smarkm    }
18144743Smarkm    tcpd_context = saved_context;
18244743Smarkm    return (match);
18344743Smarkm}
18444743Smarkm
18544743Smarkm/* list_match - match a request against a list of patterns with exceptions */
18644743Smarkm
18744743Smarkmstatic int list_match(list, request, match_fn)
18844743Smarkmchar   *list;
18944743Smarkmstruct request_info *request;
19044743Smarkmint   (*match_fn) ();
19144743Smarkm{
19244743Smarkm    char   *tok;
19344743Smarkm
19444743Smarkm    /*
19544743Smarkm     * Process tokens one at a time. We have exhausted all possible matches
19644743Smarkm     * when we reach an "EXCEPT" token or the end of the list. If we do find
19744743Smarkm     * a match, look for an "EXCEPT" list and recurse to determine whether
19844743Smarkm     * the match is affected by any exceptions.
19944743Smarkm     */
20044743Smarkm
20144743Smarkm    for (tok = strtok(list, sep); tok != 0; tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) {
20244743Smarkm	if (STR_EQ(tok, "EXCEPT"))		/* EXCEPT: give up */
20344743Smarkm	    return (NO);
20444743Smarkm	if (match_fn(tok, request)) {		/* YES: look for exceptions */
20544743Smarkm	    while ((tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) && STR_NE(tok, "EXCEPT"))
20644743Smarkm		 /* VOID */ ;
20744743Smarkm	    return (tok == 0 || list_match((char *) 0, request, match_fn) == 0);
20844743Smarkm	}
20944743Smarkm    }
21044743Smarkm    return (NO);
21144743Smarkm}
21244743Smarkm
21344743Smarkm/* server_match - match server information */
21444743Smarkm
21544743Smarkmstatic int server_match(tok, request)
21644743Smarkmchar   *tok;
21744743Smarkmstruct request_info *request;
21844743Smarkm{
21944743Smarkm    char   *host;
22044743Smarkm
22144743Smarkm    if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) {	/* plain daemon */
22244743Smarkm	return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request)));
22344743Smarkm    } else {					/* daemon@host */
22444743Smarkm	return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request))
22544743Smarkm		&& host_match(host, request->server));
22644743Smarkm    }
22744743Smarkm}
22844743Smarkm
22944743Smarkm/* client_match - match client information */
23044743Smarkm
23144743Smarkmstatic int client_match(tok, request)
23244743Smarkmchar   *tok;
23344743Smarkmstruct request_info *request;
23444743Smarkm{
23544743Smarkm    char   *host;
23644743Smarkm
23744743Smarkm    if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) {	/* plain host */
23844743Smarkm	return (host_match(tok, request->client));
23944743Smarkm    } else {					/* user@host */
24044743Smarkm	return (host_match(host, request->client)
24144743Smarkm		&& string_match(tok, eval_user(request)));
24244743Smarkm    }
24344743Smarkm}
24444743Smarkm
24551495Ssheldonh/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */
24651495Ssheldonh
24751495Ssheldonhstatic int hostfile_match(path, host)
24851495Ssheldonhchar   *path;
24951495Ssheldonhstruct hosts_info *host;
25051495Ssheldonh{
25151495Ssheldonh    char    tok[BUFSIZ];
25251495Ssheldonh    int     match = NO;
25351495Ssheldonh    FILE   *fp;
25451495Ssheldonh
25551495Ssheldonh    if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) {
25651495Ssheldonh	while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host)))
25751495Ssheldonh	     /* void */ ;
25851495Ssheldonh	fclose(fp);
25951495Ssheldonh    } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
26051495Ssheldonh	tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path);
26151495Ssheldonh    }
26251495Ssheldonh    return (match);
26351495Ssheldonh}
26451495Ssheldonh
26544743Smarkm/* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
26644743Smarkm
26744743Smarkmstatic int host_match(tok, host)
26844743Smarkmchar   *tok;
26944743Smarkmstruct host_info *host;
27044743Smarkm{
27144743Smarkm    char   *mask;
27244743Smarkm
27344743Smarkm    /*
27444743Smarkm     * This code looks a little hairy because we want to avoid unnecessary
27544743Smarkm     * hostname lookups.
27644743Smarkm     *
27744743Smarkm     * The KNOWN pattern requires that both address AND name be known; some
27844743Smarkm     * patterns are specific to host names or to host addresses; all other
27944743Smarkm     * patterns are satisfied when either the address OR the name match.
28044743Smarkm     */
28144743Smarkm
28244743Smarkm    if (tok[0] == '@') {			/* netgroup: look it up */
28344743Smarkm#ifdef  NETGROUP
28444743Smarkm	static char *mydomain = 0;
28544743Smarkm	if (mydomain == 0)
28644743Smarkm	    yp_get_default_domain(&mydomain);
28744743Smarkm	return (innetgr(tok + 1, eval_hostname(host), (char *) 0, mydomain));
28844743Smarkm#else
28944743Smarkm	tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled");	/* not tcpd_jump() */
29044743Smarkm	return (NO);
29144743Smarkm#endif
29251495Ssheldonh    } else if (tok[0] == '/') {			/* /file hack */
29351495Ssheldonh	return (hostfile_match(tok, host));
29444743Smarkm    } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) {		/* check address and name */
29544743Smarkm	char   *name = eval_hostname(host);
29644743Smarkm	return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
29744743Smarkm    } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "LOCAL")) {		/* local: no dots in name */
29844743Smarkm	char   *name = eval_hostname(host);
29944743Smarkm	return (strchr(name, '.') == 0 && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
30044743Smarkm    } else if ((mask = split_at(tok, '/')) != 0) {	/* net/mask */
30144743Smarkm	return (masked_match(tok, mask, eval_hostaddr(host)));
30244743Smarkm    } else {					/* anything else */
30344743Smarkm	return (string_match(tok, eval_hostaddr(host))
30444743Smarkm	    || (NOT_INADDR(tok) && string_match(tok, eval_hostname(host))));
30544743Smarkm    }
30644743Smarkm}
30744743Smarkm
30844743Smarkm/* string_match - match string against pattern */
30944743Smarkm
31044743Smarkmstatic int string_match(tok, string)
31144743Smarkmchar   *tok;
31244743Smarkmchar   *string;
31344743Smarkm{
31444743Smarkm    int     n;
31544743Smarkm
31644743Smarkm    if (tok[0] == '.') {			/* suffix */
31744743Smarkm	n = strlen(string) - strlen(tok);
31844743Smarkm	return (n > 0 && STR_EQ(tok, string + n));
31944743Smarkm    } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "ALL")) {		/* all: match any */
32044743Smarkm	return (YES);
32144743Smarkm    } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) {		/* not unknown */
32244743Smarkm	return (STR_NE(string, unknown));
32344743Smarkm    } else if (tok[(n = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.') {	/* prefix */
32444743Smarkm	return (STRN_EQ(tok, string, n));
32544743Smarkm    } else {					/* exact match */
32644743Smarkm	return (STR_EQ(tok, string));
32744743Smarkm    }
32844743Smarkm}
32944743Smarkm
33044743Smarkm/* masked_match - match address against netnumber/netmask */
33144743Smarkm
33244743Smarkmstatic int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
33344743Smarkmchar   *net_tok;
33444743Smarkmchar   *mask_tok;
33544743Smarkmchar   *string;
33644743Smarkm{
33744743Smarkm    unsigned long net;
33844743Smarkm    unsigned long mask;
33944743Smarkm    unsigned long addr;
34044743Smarkm
34144743Smarkm    /*
34244743Smarkm     * Disallow forms other than dotted quad: the treatment that inet_addr()
34344743Smarkm     * gives to forms with less than four components is inconsistent with the
34444743Smarkm     * access control language. John P. Rouillard <rouilj@cs.umb.edu>.
34544743Smarkm     */
34644743Smarkm
34744743Smarkm    if ((addr = dot_quad_addr(string)) == INADDR_NONE)
34844743Smarkm	return (NO);
34944743Smarkm    if ((net = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE
35044743Smarkm	|| (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) {
35144743Smarkm	tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
35244743Smarkm	return (NO);				/* not tcpd_jump() */
35344743Smarkm    }
35444743Smarkm    return ((addr & mask) == net);
35544743Smarkm}
356