t1_lib.c revision 280304
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117#include <openssl/rand.h> 118#include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126#endif 127 128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141}; 142 143long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144{ 145 /* 146 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 147 * http, the cache would over fill 148 */ 149 return (60 * 60 * 2); 150} 151 152int tls1_new(SSL *s) 153{ 154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 155 return (0); 156 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 157 return (1); 158} 159 160void tls1_free(SSL *s) 161{ 162#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 163 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 165 } 166#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 167 ssl3_free(s); 168} 169 170void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 171{ 172 ssl3_clear(s); 173 s->version = s->method->version; 174} 175 176#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 177 178static int nid_list[] = { 179 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 180 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 181 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 182 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 183 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 184 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 185 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 186 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 187 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 188 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 189 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 190 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 191 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 192 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 193 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 194 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 195 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 196 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 197 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 198 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 199 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 200 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 201 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 202 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 203 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 204}; 205 206static int pref_list[] = { 207# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 210# endif 211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 212# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 215# endif 216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 217# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 220# endif 221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 223# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 227# endif 228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 230# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 233# endif 234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 236# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 240# endif 241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 244}; 245 246int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 247{ 248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 250 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 251 return 0; 252 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 253} 254 255int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 256{ 257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ 258 switch (nid) { 259 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 260 return 1; 261 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 262 return 2; 263 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 264 return 3; 265 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 266 return 4; 267 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 268 return 5; 269 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 270 return 6; 271 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 272 return 7; 273 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 274 return 8; 275 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 276 return 9; 277 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 278 return 10; 279 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 280 return 11; 281 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 282 return 12; 283 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 284 return 13; 285 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 286 return 14; 287 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 288 return 15; 289 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 290 return 16; 291 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 292 return 17; 293 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 294 return 18; 295 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 296 return 19; 297 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 298 return 20; 299 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 300 return 21; 301 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 302 return 22; 303 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 304 return 23; 305 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 306 return 24; 307 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 308 return 25; 309 default: 310 return 0; 311 } 312} 313#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 314 315#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 316 317/* 318 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 320 */ 321 322# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 323# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 324# else 325# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 326# endif 327 328# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 329# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 330# else 331# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 332# endif 333 334# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 335# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 336 /* */ 337# else 338# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 339# endif 340 341# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 342 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 343 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 344 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 345 346static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 347# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 349 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 350# endif 351# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 353 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 354# endif 355# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 356 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 357# endif 358}; 359 360int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 361{ 362 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 363 if (p) 364 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 365 return (int)slen; 366} 367 368unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 369 unsigned char *limit) 370{ 371 int extdatalen = 0; 372 unsigned char *orig = buf; 373 unsigned char *ret = buf; 374 375 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 376 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 377 return orig; 378 379 ret += 2; 380 381 if (ret >= limit) 382 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 383 384 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 385 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 386 unsigned long size_str; 387 long lenmax; 388 389 /*- 390 * check for enough space. 391 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 392 * 2 for servernamelist length 393 * 1 for the hostname type 394 * 2 for hostname length 395 * + hostname length 396 */ 397 398 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 399 || (size_str = 400 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 401 return NULL; 402 403 /* extension type and length */ 404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 405 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 406 407 /* length of servername list */ 408 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 409 410 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 411 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 412 s2n(size_str, ret); 413 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 414 ret += size_str; 415 } 416 417 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 418 if (s->renegotiate) { 419 int el; 420 421 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 423 return NULL; 424 } 425 426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 427 return NULL; 428 429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 430 s2n(el, ret); 431 432 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 434 return NULL; 435 } 436 437 ret += el; 438 } 439# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 442 * Client Hello message */ 443 444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 447 return NULL; 448 } 449 450 /*- 451 * check for enough space. 452 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 453 * 1 for the srp user identity 454 * + srp user identity length 455 */ 456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) 457 return NULL; 458 459 /* fill in the extension */ 460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 461 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 462 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 463 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 464 ret += login_len; 465 } 466# endif 467 468# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 469 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { 470 /* 471 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 472 */ 473 long lenmax; 474 475 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 476 return NULL; 477 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 478 return NULL; 479 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { 480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 481 return NULL; 482 } 483 484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 485 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); 486 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 487 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 488 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 489 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 490 } 491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { 492 /* 493 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 494 */ 495 long lenmax; 496 497 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) 498 return NULL; 499 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 500 return NULL; 501 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) { 502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 503 return NULL; 504 } 505 506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 507 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 508 509 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 510 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, 511 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 512 ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 513 } 514# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 515 516 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 517 int ticklen; 518 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 519 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 520 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 521 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 522 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 523 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 524 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 525 return NULL; 526 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 527 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 528 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 529 } else 530 ticklen = 0; 531 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 532 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 533 goto skip_ext; 534 /* 535 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 536 * ticket 537 */ 538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) 539 return NULL; 540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 541 s2n(ticklen, ret); 542 if (ticklen) { 543 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 544 ret += ticklen; 545 } 546 } 547 skip_ext: 548 549 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 550 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 551 return NULL; 552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 554 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 555 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 556 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 557 } 558# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 561 562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 563 return NULL; 564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 565 return NULL; 566 567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 568 s2n(col + 2, ret); 569 s2n(col, ret); 570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 571 ret += col; 572 } 573# endif 574 575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 577 int i; 578 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 579 OCSP_RESPID *id; 580 581 idlen = 0; 582 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 583 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 584 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 585 if (itmp <= 0) 586 return NULL; 587 idlen += itmp + 2; 588 } 589 590 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 591 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 592 if (extlen < 0) 593 return NULL; 594 } else 595 extlen = 0; 596 597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) 598 return NULL; 599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 600 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 601 return NULL; 602 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 603 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 604 s2n(idlen, ret); 605 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 606 /* save position of id len */ 607 unsigned char *q = ret; 608 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 609 /* skip over id len */ 610 ret += 2; 611 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 612 /* write id len */ 613 s2n(itmp, q); 614 } 615 s2n(extlen, ret); 616 if (extlen > 0) 617 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 618 } 619# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 620 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 621 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 622 return NULL; 623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 624 s2n(1, ret); 625 /*- 626 * Set mode: 627 * 1: peer may send requests 628 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 629 */ 630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 632 else 633 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 634# endif 635 636# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 637 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 638 /* 639 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 640 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 641 */ 642 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 643 return NULL; 644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 645 s2n(0, ret); 646 } 647# endif 648 649# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 650 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 651 int el; 652 653 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 654 655 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 656 return NULL; 657 658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 659 s2n(el, ret); 660 661 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 663 return NULL; 664 } 665 ret += el; 666 } 667# endif 668 /* 669 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 670 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 671 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 672 * appear last. 673 */ 674 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 675 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 676 /* 677 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 678 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 679 * does not. 680 */ 681 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 682 hlen -= 5; 683 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 684 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 685 if (hlen >= 4) 686 hlen -= 4; 687 else 688 hlen = 0; 689 690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 691 s2n(hlen, ret); 692 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 693 ret += hlen; 694 } 695 } 696 697 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 698 return orig; 699 700 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 701 return ret; 702} 703 704unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 705 unsigned char *limit) 706{ 707 int extdatalen = 0; 708 unsigned char *orig = buf; 709 unsigned char *ret = buf; 710# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 711 int next_proto_neg_seen; 712# endif 713 714 /* 715 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 716 */ 717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 718 return orig; 719 720 ret += 2; 721 if (ret >= limit) 722 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 723 724 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 725 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 727 return NULL; 728 729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 730 s2n(0, ret); 731 } 732 733 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 734 int el; 735 736 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 738 return NULL; 739 } 740 741 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 742 return NULL; 743 744 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 745 s2n(el, ret); 746 747 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 749 return NULL; 750 } 751 752 ret += el; 753 } 754# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 755 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { 756 /* 757 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 758 */ 759 long lenmax; 760 761 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) 762 return NULL; 763 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) 764 return NULL; 765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { 766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 767 return NULL; 768 } 769 770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 771 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); 772 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 773 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, 774 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 775 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 776 777 } 778 /* 779 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 780 * extension 781 */ 782# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 783 784 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 786 return NULL; 787 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 788 s2n(0, ret); 789 } 790 791 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 792 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 793 return NULL; 794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 795 s2n(0, ret); 796 } 797# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 798 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 799 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 800 801 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 802 return NULL; 803 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 804 return NULL; 805 806 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 807 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 808 s2n(sol, ret); 809 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 810 ret += sol; 811 } 812# endif 813 814# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 815 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 816 int el; 817 818 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 819 820 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 821 return NULL; 822 823 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 824 s2n(el, ret); 825 826 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 828 return NULL; 829 } 830 ret += el; 831 } 832# endif 833 834 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 835 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 836 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 837 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 838 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 839 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 840 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 841 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 842 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 843 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 844 }; 845 if (limit - ret < 36) 846 return NULL; 847 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); 848 ret += 36; 849 850 } 851# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 854 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 855 return NULL; 856 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 857 s2n(1, ret); 858 /*- 859 * Set mode: 860 * 1: peer may send requests 861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 862 */ 863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 865 else 866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 867 868 } 869# endif 870 871# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 875 const unsigned char *npa; 876 unsigned int npalen; 877 int r; 878 879 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 880 s-> 881 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 882 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) 884 return NULL; 885 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 886 s2n(npalen, ret); 887 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 888 ret += npalen; 889 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 890 } 891 } 892# endif 893 894 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 895 return orig; 896 897 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 898 return ret; 899} 900 901# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 902/*- 903 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 904 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 905 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 906 * SNI, 907 * elliptic_curves 908 * ec_point_formats 909 * 910 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 911 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 912 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 913 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 914 */ 915static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 916 const unsigned char *d, int n) 917{ 918 unsigned short type, size; 919 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 920 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 921 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 922 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 923 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 924 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 925 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 926 927 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 928 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 929 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 930 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 931 }; 932 933 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 934 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 935 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 936 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 937 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 938 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 939 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 940 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 941 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 942 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 943 }; 944 945 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) 946 return; 947 data += 2; 948 949 if (data > (d + n - 4)) 950 return; 951 n2s(data, type); 952 n2s(data, size); 953 954 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 955 return; 956 957 if (data + size > d + n) 958 return; 959 data += size; 960 961 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 962 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 963 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 964 965 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) 966 return; 967 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 968 return; 969 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 970 return; 971 } else { 972 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 973 974 if (data + len != d + n) 975 return; 976 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 977 return; 978 } 979 980 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 981} 982# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 983 984int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 985 int n, int *al) 986{ 987 unsigned short type; 988 unsigned short size; 989 unsigned short len; 990 unsigned char *data = *p; 991 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 992 int sigalg_seen = 0; 993 994 s->servername_done = 0; 995 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 996# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 997 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 998# endif 999 1000# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1001 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1002 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1003# endif 1004 1005# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1006 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 1007 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); 1008# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1009 1010# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 1012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 1013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 1014 } 1015# endif 1016 1017 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 1018 1019 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) 1020 goto ri_check; 1021 n2s(data, len); 1022 1023 if (data > (d + n - len)) 1024 goto ri_check; 1025 1026 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { 1027 n2s(data, type); 1028 n2s(data, size); 1029 1030 if (data + size > (d + n)) 1031 goto ri_check; 1032# if 0 1033 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 1034# endif 1035 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1036 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1037/*- 1038 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 1039 * 1040 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 1041 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 1042 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 1043 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 1044 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 1045 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 1046 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 1047 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 1048 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 1049 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 1050 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 1051 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 1052 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 1053 * the value of the Host: field. 1054 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1055 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 1056 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 1057 * extension. 1058 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 1059 * 1060 */ 1061 1062 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 1063 unsigned char *sdata; 1064 int servname_type; 1065 int dsize; 1066 1067 if (size < 2) { 1068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1069 return 0; 1070 } 1071 n2s(data, dsize); 1072 size -= 2; 1073 if (dsize > size) { 1074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1075 return 0; 1076 } 1077 1078 sdata = data; 1079 while (dsize > 3) { 1080 servname_type = *(sdata++); 1081 n2s(sdata, len); 1082 dsize -= 3; 1083 1084 if (len > dsize) { 1085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1086 return 0; 1087 } 1088 if (s->servername_done == 0) 1089 switch (servname_type) { 1090 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 1091 if (!s->hit) { 1092 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 1093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1094 return 0; 1095 } 1096 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 1097 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1098 return 0; 1099 } 1100 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 1101 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 1102 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1103 return 0; 1104 } 1105 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 1106 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 1107 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 1108 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 1109 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 1110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1111 return 0; 1112 } 1113 s->servername_done = 1; 1114 1115 } else 1116 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 1117 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 1118 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 1119 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 1120 1121 break; 1122 1123 default: 1124 break; 1125 } 1126 1127 dsize -= len; 1128 } 1129 if (dsize != 0) { 1130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1131 return 0; 1132 } 1133 1134 } 1135# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1136 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 1137 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) { 1138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1139 return 0; 1140 } 1141 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 1142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1143 return 0; 1144 } 1145 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 1146 return -1; 1147 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1148 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 1149 1150 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) { 1151 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1152 return 0; 1153 } 1154 } 1155# endif 1156 1157# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 1159 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1160 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1161 1162 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { 1163 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1164 return 0; 1165 } 1166 if (!s->hit) { 1167 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 1168 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1169 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1170 } 1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1172 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 1173 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 1174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1175 return 0; 1176 } 1177 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1178 ecpointformatlist_length; 1179 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 1180 ecpointformatlist_length); 1181 } 1182# if 0 1183 fprintf(stderr, 1184 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 1185 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1186 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1187 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1188 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1189 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1190# endif 1191 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 1192 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1193 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1194 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1195 1196 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1197 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 1198 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 1199 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) { 1200 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1201 return 0; 1202 } 1203 if (!s->hit) { 1204 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { 1205 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1206 return 0; 1207 } 1208 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1209 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 1210 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 1211 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1212 return 0; 1213 } 1214 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 1215 ellipticcurvelist_length; 1216 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 1217 ellipticcurvelist_length); 1218 } 1219# if 0 1220 fprintf(stderr, 1221 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 1222 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1223 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1224 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1225 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1226 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1227# endif 1228 } 1229# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1230# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1231 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1232 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1233 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1234 1235 if (size < 2) { 1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1237 return 0; 1238 } 1239 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 1241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1242 return 0; 1243 } 1244 1245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1246 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1248 } 1249 1250 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1251 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1252 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1253 else 1254 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 1255 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1257 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1258 return 0; 1259 } 1260 } 1261# endif 1262 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 1263 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1264 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 1265 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1266 { 1267 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1268 return 0; 1269 } 1270 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 1271 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1272 return 0; 1273 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1274 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 1275 int dsize; 1276 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) { 1277 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1278 return 0; 1279 } 1280 sigalg_seen = 1; 1281 n2s(data, dsize); 1282 size -= 2; 1283 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) { 1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1285 return 0; 1286 } 1287 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) { 1288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1289 return 0; 1290 } 1291 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1292 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1293 1294 if (size < 5) { 1295 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1296 return 0; 1297 } 1298 1299 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1300 size--; 1301 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1302 const unsigned char *sdata; 1303 int dsize; 1304 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1305 n2s(data, dsize); 1306 size -= 2; 1307 if (dsize > size) { 1308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1309 return 0; 1310 } 1311 while (dsize > 0) { 1312 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1313 int idsize; 1314 if (dsize < 4) { 1315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1316 return 0; 1317 } 1318 n2s(data, idsize); 1319 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1320 size -= 2 + idsize; 1321 if (dsize < 0) { 1322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1323 return 0; 1324 } 1325 sdata = data; 1326 data += idsize; 1327 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 1328 if (!id) { 1329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1330 return 0; 1331 } 1332 if (data != sdata) { 1333 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1335 return 0; 1336 } 1337 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1338 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1339 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { 1340 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1342 return 0; 1343 } 1344 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 1345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1346 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1347 return 0; 1348 } 1349 } 1350 1351 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1352 if (size < 2) { 1353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1354 return 0; 1355 } 1356 n2s(data, dsize); 1357 size -= 2; 1358 if (dsize != size) { 1359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1360 return 0; 1361 } 1362 sdata = data; 1363 if (dsize > 0) { 1364 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1365 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1366 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1367 } 1368 1369 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1370 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 1371 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) { 1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1373 return 0; 1374 } 1375 } 1376 } 1377 /* 1378 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 1379 */ 1380 else 1381 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1382 } 1383# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1384 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 1385 switch (data[0]) { 1386 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1387 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1388 break; 1389 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1390 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1392 break; 1393 default: 1394 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1395 return 0; 1396 } 1397 } 1398# endif 1399# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1401 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 1402 /*- 1403 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1404 * renegotiation. 1405 * 1406 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1407 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1408 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1409 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1410 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1411 * anything like that, but this might change). 1412 * 1413 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1414 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1415 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1416 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1417 * Finished message could have been computed.) 1418 */ 1419 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1420 } 1421# endif 1422 1423 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1424# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1425 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 1426 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 1427 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1428 return 0; 1429 } 1430# endif 1431 1432 data += size; 1433 } 1434 1435 *p = data; 1436 1437 ri_check: 1438 1439 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1440 1441 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1442 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1443 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1445 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1446 return 0; 1447 } 1448 1449 return 1; 1450} 1451 1452# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1453/* 1454 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1455 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 1456 * fill the length of the block. 1457 */ 1458static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1459{ 1460 unsigned int off = 0; 1461 1462 while (off < len) { 1463 if (d[off] == 0) 1464 return 0; 1465 off += d[off]; 1466 off++; 1467 } 1468 1469 return off == len; 1470} 1471# endif 1472 1473int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 1474 int n, int *al) 1475{ 1476 unsigned short length; 1477 unsigned short type; 1478 unsigned short size; 1479 unsigned char *data = *p; 1480 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1481 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1482 1483# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1484 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1485# endif 1486 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1487 1488# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1489 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1490 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1491# endif 1492 1493 if (data >= (d + n - 2)) 1494 goto ri_check; 1495 1496 n2s(data, length); 1497 if (data + length != d + n) { 1498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1499 return 0; 1500 } 1501 1502 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { 1503 n2s(data, type); 1504 n2s(data, size); 1505 1506 if (data + size > (d + n)) 1507 goto ri_check; 1508 1509 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1510 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1511 1512 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 1513 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 1514 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1515 return 0; 1516 } 1517 tlsext_servername = 1; 1518 } 1519# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 1521 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1522 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1523 1524 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1525 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) { 1526 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1527 return 0; 1528 } 1529 if (!s->hit) { 1530 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1531 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1532 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1533 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 1534 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 1535 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1536 return 0; 1537 } 1538 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 1539 ecpointformatlist_length; 1540 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 1541 ecpointformatlist_length); 1542 } 1543# if 0 1544 fprintf(stderr, 1545 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1546 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1547 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1548 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 1549 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 1550# endif 1551 } 1552# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1553 1554 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 1555 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1556 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 1557 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1558 { 1559 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1560 return 0; 1561 } 1562 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1563 || (size > 0)) { 1564 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1565 return 0; 1566 } 1567 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1568 } 1569# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1571 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1572 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1573 1574 if (size < 2) { 1575 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1576 return 0; 1577 } 1578 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1579 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 1580 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1581 return 0; 1582 } 1583 1584 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1585 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1586 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1587 } 1588 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1589 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1590 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1591 } else { 1592 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 1593 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1594 } 1595 1596 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1597 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1598 return 0; 1599 } 1600 } 1601# endif 1602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1603 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { 1604 /* 1605 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 1606 * request message. 1607 */ 1608 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 1609 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1610 return 0; 1611 } 1612 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1613 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1614 } 1615# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1617 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 1618 unsigned char *selected; 1619 unsigned char selected_len; 1620 1621 /* We must have requested it. */ 1622 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 1623 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1624 return 0; 1625 } 1626 /* The data must be valid */ 1627 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 1628 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1629 return 0; 1630 } 1631 if (s-> 1632 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 1633 size, 1634 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 1635 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1636 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1637 return 0; 1638 } 1639 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1640 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 1641 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1642 return 0; 1643 } 1644 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1645 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1646 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1647 } 1648# endif 1649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 1650 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1651 return 0; 1652 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1653 } 1654# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1655 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 1656 switch (data[0]) { 1657 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1658 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1659 break; 1660 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1661 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1662 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1663 break; 1664 default: 1665 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1666 return 0; 1667 } 1668 } 1669# endif 1670# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1671 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 1672 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1673 return 0; 1674 } 1675# endif 1676 1677 data += size; 1678 } 1679 1680 if (data != d + n) { 1681 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1682 return 0; 1683 } 1684 1685 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 1686 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 1687 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 1688 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1689 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 1690 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1691 return 0; 1692 } 1693 } else { 1694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1695 return 0; 1696 } 1697 } 1698 } 1699 1700 *p = data; 1701 1702 ri_check: 1703 1704 /* 1705 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 1706 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 1707 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 1708 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 1709 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 1710 * initial connect only. 1711 */ 1712 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1713 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1714 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1716 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1717 return 0; 1718 } 1719 1720 return 1; 1721} 1722 1723int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1724{ 1725# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1726 /* 1727 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 1728 * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support. 1729 */ 1730 int using_ecc = 0; 1731 int i; 1732 unsigned char *j; 1733 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1734 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1735 1736 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1737 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1738 1739 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1740 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1741 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1742 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1743 using_ecc = 1; 1744 break; 1745 } 1746 } 1747 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1748 if (using_ecc) { 1749 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1750 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1751 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { 1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1753 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1754 return -1; 1755 } 1756 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1757 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1758 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = 1759 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1760 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = 1761 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1762 1763 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */ 1764 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) 1765 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1766 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 1767 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1768 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 1769 OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 1770 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1772 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1773 return -1; 1774 } 1775 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1776 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) { 1777 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1778 s2n(id, j); 1779 } 1780 } 1781# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1782 1783# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1784 { 1785 int r = 1; 1786 1787 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 1788 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 1789 s-> 1790 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1791 if (!r) 1792 return -1; 1793 } 1794 1795 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1796 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1797 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1799 } 1800 1801 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1802 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1803 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1804 } else { 1805 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 1806 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 1807 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1808 } 1809 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1811 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1812 return -1; 1813 } 1814 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 1815 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1816 } 1817 1818 if (r == 2) 1819 /* 1820 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 1821 * server opaque PRF input 1822 */ 1823 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 1824 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1825 } 1826# endif 1827 1828 return 1; 1829} 1830 1831int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1832{ 1833# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1834 /* 1835 * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats 1836 * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note 1837 * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1838 */ 1839 1840 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1841 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1842 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1843 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1844 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1845 1846 if (using_ecc) { 1847 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 1848 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1849 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { 1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1851 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1852 return -1; 1853 } 1854 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1855 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1856 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = 1857 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1858 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = 1859 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1860 } 1861# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1862 1863 return 1; 1864} 1865 1866int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 1867{ 1868 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1869 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1870 1871# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1872 /* 1873 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 1874 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1875 */ 1876 /* 1877 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 1878 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1879 */ 1880# endif 1881 1882 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1883 ret = 1884 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 1885 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1886 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 1887 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1888 ret = 1889 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 1890 s-> 1891 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1892 1893# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1894 { 1895 /* 1896 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 1897 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 1898 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 1899 */ 1900 1901 int r = 1; 1902 1903 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 1904 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 1905 s-> 1906 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1907 if (!r) { 1908 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1909 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1910 goto err; 1911 } 1912 } 1913 1914 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1915 /* shouldn't really happen */ 1916 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1917 } 1918 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1919 1920 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1921 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1922 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 1923 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 1924 /* 1925 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 1926 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 1927 */ 1928 1929 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 1930 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1931 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 1932 } else { 1933 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 1934 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 1935 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1936 } 1937 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1938 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1939 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1940 goto err; 1941 } 1942 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 1943 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1944 } 1945 } 1946 1947 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 1948 /* 1949 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 1950 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 1951 * handshake. 1952 */ 1953 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1954 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1955 } 1956 } 1957 1958 err: 1959# endif 1960 switch (ret) { 1961 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1962 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1963 return -1; 1964 1965 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1966 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 1967 return 1; 1968 1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1970 s->servername_done = 0; 1971 default: 1972 return 1; 1973 } 1974} 1975 1976int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 1977{ 1978 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1979 int al; 1980 1981 /* 1982 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 1983 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has 1984 * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because 1985 * this may influence which certificate is sent 1986 */ 1987 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 1988 int r; 1989 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 1990 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 1991 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 1992 if (certpkey == NULL) { 1993 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1994 return 1; 1995 } 1996 /* 1997 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 1998 * et al can pick it up. 1999 */ 2000 s->cert->key = certpkey; 2001 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2002 switch (r) { 2003 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2004 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2005 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2006 break; 2007 /* status request response should be sent */ 2008 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2009 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2010 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2011 else 2012 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2013 break; 2014 /* something bad happened */ 2015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2016 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2018 goto err; 2019 } 2020 } else 2021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2022 2023 err: 2024 switch (ret) { 2025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2026 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2027 return -1; 2028 2029 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2030 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 2031 return 1; 2032 2033 default: 2034 return 1; 2035 } 2036} 2037 2038int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2039{ 2040 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2041 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2042 2043# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2044 /* 2045 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 2046 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 2047 * must contain uncompressed. 2048 */ 2049 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2050 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2051 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2052 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 2053 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2054 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 2055 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 2056 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 2057 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 2058 size_t i; 2059 unsigned char *list; 2060 int found_uncompressed = 0; 2061 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2062 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 2063 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 2064 found_uncompressed = 1; 2065 break; 2066 } 2067 } 2068 if (!found_uncompressed) { 2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2070 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 2071 return -1; 2072 } 2073 } 2074 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2075# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2076 2077 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2078 ret = 2079 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2080 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2081 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 2082 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2083 ret = 2084 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 2085 s-> 2086 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2087 2088# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2089 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 2090 /* 2091 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 2092 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 2093 * value from the server too. 2094 */ 2095 2096 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2097 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2098 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2099 } 2100 2101 /* 2102 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 2103 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 2104 */ 2105 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 2106 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 2107 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 2108 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2110 } 2111 } 2112# endif 2113 2114 /* 2115 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 2116 * callback 2117 */ 2118 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2119 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 2120 int r; 2121 /* 2122 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no 2123 * response. 2124 */ 2125 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { 2126 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2127 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2128 } 2129 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2130 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2131 if (r == 0) { 2132 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2133 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2134 } 2135 if (r < 0) { 2136 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2137 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2138 } 2139 } 2140 2141 switch (ret) { 2142 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2143 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2144 return -1; 2145 2146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 2148 return 1; 2149 2150 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2151 s->servername_done = 0; 2152 default: 2153 return 1; 2154 } 2155} 2156 2157/*- 2158 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2159 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2160 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2161 * 2162 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2163 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2164 * extension, if any. 2165 * len: the length of the session ID. 2166 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2167 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2168 * point to the resulting session. 2169 * 2170 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2171 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2172 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2173 * 2174 * Returns: 2175 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2176 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2177 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2178 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2179 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2180 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2181 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2182 * 2183 * Side effects: 2184 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2185 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2186 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2187 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2188 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2189 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2190 */ 2191int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2192 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2193{ 2194 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2195 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2196 unsigned short i; 2197 2198 *ret = NULL; 2199 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2200 2201 /* 2202 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 2203 * resumption. 2204 */ 2205 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2206 return 0; 2207 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2208 return 0; 2209 if (p >= limit) 2210 return -1; 2211 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2212 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2213 i = *(p++); 2214 p += i; 2215 if (p >= limit) 2216 return -1; 2217 } 2218 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2219 n2s(p, i); 2220 p += i; 2221 if (p >= limit) 2222 return -1; 2223 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2224 i = *(p++); 2225 p += i; 2226 if (p > limit) 2227 return -1; 2228 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2229 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2230 return 0; 2231 n2s(p, i); 2232 while ((p + 4) <= limit) { 2233 unsigned short type, size; 2234 n2s(p, type); 2235 n2s(p, size); 2236 if (p + size > limit) 2237 return 0; 2238 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2239 int r; 2240 if (size == 0) { 2241 /* 2242 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 2243 * one. 2244 */ 2245 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2246 return 1; 2247 } 2248 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 2249 /* 2250 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 2251 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 2252 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 2253 * calculate the master secret later. 2254 */ 2255 return 2; 2256 } 2257 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2258 switch (r) { 2259 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2260 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2261 return 2; 2262 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2263 return r; 2264 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2266 return 3; 2267 default: /* fatal error */ 2268 return -1; 2269 } 2270 } 2271 p += size; 2272 } 2273 return 0; 2274} 2275 2276/*- 2277 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2278 * 2279 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2280 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2281 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2282 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2283 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2284 * point to the resulting session. 2285 * 2286 * Returns: 2287 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2288 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2289 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2290 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2291 */ 2292static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 2293 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 2294 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 2295{ 2296 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2297 unsigned char *sdec; 2298 const unsigned char *p; 2299 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2300 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2301 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2302 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2303 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2304 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2305 if (eticklen < 48) 2306 return 2; 2307 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2308 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2309 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2310 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 2311 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2312 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2313 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2314 if (rv < 0) 2315 return -1; 2316 if (rv == 0) 2317 return 2; 2318 if (rv == 2) 2319 renew_ticket = 1; 2320 } else { 2321 /* Check key name matches */ 2322 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2323 return 2; 2324 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2325 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2326 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2327 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2328 } 2329 /* 2330 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 2331 * checks on ticket. 2332 */ 2333 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2334 if (mlen < 0) { 2335 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2336 return -1; 2337 } 2338 eticklen -= mlen; 2339 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2340 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2341 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2342 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2343 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 2344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2345 return 2; 2346 } 2347 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2348 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2349 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2350 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2351 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2352 if (!sdec) { 2353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2354 return -1; 2355 } 2356 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2357 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 2358 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2359 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2360 return 2; 2361 } 2362 slen += mlen; 2363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2364 p = sdec; 2365 2366 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2367 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2368 if (sess) { 2369 /* 2370 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 2371 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 2372 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 2373 * standard. 2374 */ 2375 if (sesslen) 2376 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2377 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2378 *psess = sess; 2379 if (renew_ticket) 2380 return 4; 2381 else 2382 return 3; 2383 } 2384 ERR_clear_error(); 2385 /* 2386 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 2387 */ 2388 return 2; 2389} 2390 2391/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2392 2393typedef struct { 2394 int nid; 2395 int id; 2396} tls12_lookup; 2397 2398static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2399# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2400 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2401# endif 2402# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2403 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2404# endif 2405# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2406 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2407 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2408# endif 2409# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2410 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2411 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2412# endif 2413}; 2414 2415static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2416# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2417 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2418# endif 2419# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2420 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2421# endif 2422# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2423 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2424# endif 2425}; 2426 2427static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2428{ 2429 size_t i; 2430 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 2431 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2432 return table[i].id; 2433 } 2434 return -1; 2435} 2436 2437# if 0 2438static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2439{ 2440 size_t i; 2441 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 2442 if (table[i].id == id) 2443 return table[i].nid; 2444 } 2445 return -1; 2446} 2447# endif 2448 2449int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 2450 const EVP_MD *md) 2451{ 2452 int sig_id, md_id; 2453 if (!md) 2454 return 0; 2455 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2456 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2457 if (md_id == -1) 2458 return 0; 2459 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2460 if (sig_id == -1) 2461 return 0; 2462 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2463 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2464 return 1; 2465} 2466 2467int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2468{ 2469 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2470 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2471} 2472 2473const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2474{ 2475 switch (hash_alg) { 2476# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2477 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2478 return EVP_sha1(); 2479# endif 2480# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2481 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2482 return EVP_sha224(); 2483 2484 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2485 return EVP_sha256(); 2486# endif 2487# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2488 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2489 return EVP_sha384(); 2490 2491 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2492 return EVP_sha512(); 2493# endif 2494 default: 2495 return NULL; 2496 2497 } 2498} 2499 2500/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2501 2502int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2503{ 2504 int i, idx; 2505 const EVP_MD *md; 2506 CERT *c = s->cert; 2507 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2508 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2509 return 1; 2510 /* Should never happen */ 2511 if (!c) 2512 return 0; 2513 2514 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2515 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2516 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2517 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2518 2519 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) { 2520 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1]; 2521 2522 switch (sig_alg) { 2523# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2524 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2525 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2526 break; 2527# endif 2528# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2529 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2530 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2531 break; 2532# endif 2533# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2534 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2535 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2536 break; 2537# endif 2538 default: 2539 continue; 2540 } 2541 2542 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 2543 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2544 if (md) { 2545 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2546 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2547 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2548 } 2549 } 2550 2551 } 2552 2553 /* 2554 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2555 * supported it stays as NULL. 2556 */ 2557# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2558 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2559 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2560# endif 2561# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2562 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 2563 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2564 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2565 } 2566# endif 2567# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2568 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2569 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2570# endif 2571 return 1; 2572} 2573 2574#endif 2575 2576#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2577int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2578{ 2579 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2580 unsigned short hbtype; 2581 unsigned int payload; 2582 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2583 2584 if (s->msg_callback) 2585 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2586 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2587 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2588 2589 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2590 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2591 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2592 hbtype = *p++; 2593 n2s(p, payload); 2594 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2595 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2596 pl = p; 2597 2598 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 2599 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2600 int r; 2601 2602 /* 2603 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 2604 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 2605 */ 2606 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2607 bp = buffer; 2608 2609 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2610 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2611 s2n(payload, bp); 2612 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2613 bp += payload; 2614 /* Random padding */ 2615 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); 2616 2617 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 2618 3 + payload + padding); 2619 2620 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2621 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2622 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2623 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2624 2625 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2626 2627 if (r < 0) 2628 return r; 2629 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 2630 unsigned int seq; 2631 2632 /* 2633 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 2634 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 2635 */ 2636 n2s(pl, seq); 2637 2638 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 2639 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2640 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2641 } 2642 } 2643 2644 return 0; 2645} 2646 2647int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2648{ 2649 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2650 int ret; 2651 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2652 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2653 2654 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2655 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2656 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2658 return -1; 2659 } 2660 2661 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2662 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2664 return -1; 2665 } 2666 2667 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2668 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2670 return -1; 2671 } 2672 2673 /* 2674 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 2675 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2676 */ 2677 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2678 2679 /*- 2680 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2681 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2682 * some random stuff. 2683 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2684 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2685 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2686 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2687 * - Padding 2688 */ 2689 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2690 p = buf; 2691 /* Message Type */ 2692 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2693 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2694 s2n(payload, p); 2695 /* Sequence number */ 2696 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2697 /* 16 random bytes */ 2698 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); 2699 p += 16; 2700 /* Random padding */ 2701 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); 2702 2703 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2704 if (ret >= 0) { 2705 if (s->msg_callback) 2706 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2707 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2708 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2709 2710 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2711 } 2712 2713 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2714 2715 return ret; 2716} 2717#endif 2718