s3_srvr.c revision 306196
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165# include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177{ 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182} 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187#endif 188#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190{ 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209} 210#endif 211 212int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213{ 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248#endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 270 return -1; 271 } 272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 273 274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 276 ret = -1; 277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 278 goto end; 279 } 280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 281 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 282 ret = -1; 283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 s->init_buf = buf; 287 } 288 289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 290 ret = -1; 291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 295 s->init_num = 0; 296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 298 /* 299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 300 */ 301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 302 303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 304 /* 305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 307 */ 308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 309 ret = -1; 310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 311 goto end; 312 } 313 314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 318 !(s->options & 319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 320 /* 321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 322 * support secure renegotiation. 323 */ 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 327 ret = -1; 328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 329 goto end; 330 } else { 331 /* 332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 333 * HelloRequest 334 */ 335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 337 } 338 break; 339 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 342 343 s->shutdown = 0; 344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 345 if (ret <= 0) 346 goto end; 347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 349 s->init_num = 0; 350 351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 352 break; 353 354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 356 break; 357 358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 361 362 s->shutdown = 0; 363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 365 if (ret <= 0) 366 goto end; 367 } 368#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 369 { 370 int al; 371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 372 /* 373 * callback indicates firther work to be done 374 */ 375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 376 goto end; 377 } 378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 380 /* 381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 383 */ 384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 386 ret = -1; 387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 388 goto end; 389 } 390 } 391#endif 392 393 s->renegotiate = 2; 394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 395 s->init_num = 0; 396 break; 397 398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 401 if (ret <= 0) 402 goto end; 403#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 404 if (s->hit) { 405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 407 else 408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 409 } 410#else 411 if (s->hit) 412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 413#endif 414 else 415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 416 s->init_num = 0; 417 break; 418 419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 423 if (! 424 (s->s3->tmp. 425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 426 SSL_aSRP)) 427&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 429 if (ret <= 0) 430 goto end; 431#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 434 else 435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 436 } else { 437 skip = 1; 438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 439 } 440#else 441 } else 442 skip = 1; 443 444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 445#endif 446 s->init_num = 0; 447 break; 448 449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 452 453 /* 454 * clear this, it may get reset by 455 * send_server_key_exchange 456 */ 457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 458 459 /* 460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 465 * key exchange. 466 */ 467 if (0 468 /* 469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 470 * provided 471 */ 472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 474#endif 475#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 478#endif 479 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH)) 480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 487 ) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) { 491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 492 if (ret <= 0) 493 goto end; 494 } else 495 skip = 1; 496 497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 498 s->init_num = 0; 499 break; 500 501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 505 /* 506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 507 * during re-negotiation: 508 */ 509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 511 /* 512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 514 * RFC 2246): 515 */ 516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 517 /* 518 * ... except when the application insists on 519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 520 * this for SSL 3) 521 */ 522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 523 /* 524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 525 */ 526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 529 /* 530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 531 * are omitted 532 */ 533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 534 /* no cert request */ 535 skip = 1; 536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 541 return -1; 542 } 543 } 544 } else { 545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 547 if (ret <= 0) 548 goto end; 549#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 551#else 552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 554#endif 555 s->init_num = 0; 556 } 557 break; 558 559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 562 if (ret <= 0) 563 goto end; 564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 566 s->init_num = 0; 567 break; 568 569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 570 571 /* 572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 577 * unconditionally. 578 */ 579 580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 582 ret = -1; 583 goto end; 584 } 585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 586 587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 588 break; 589 590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 592 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 593 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 594 if (ret <= 0) 595 goto end; 596 if (ret == 2) 597 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 598 else { 599 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 600 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 601 if (ret <= 0) 602 goto end; 603 } 604 s->init_num = 0; 605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 606 } 607 break; 608 609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 611 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 612 if (ret <= 0) 613 goto end; 614 if (ret == 2) { 615 /* 616 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 617 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 618 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 619 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 620 */ 621#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 623#else 624 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 625 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 626 else 627 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 628#endif 629 s->init_num = 0; 630 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 631 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 632 s->init_num = 0; 633 if (!s->session->peer) 634 break; 635 /* 636 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 637 * digest cached records. 638 */ 639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 641 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 642 return -1; 643 } 644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 646 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 647 return -1; 648 } 649 } else { 650 int offset = 0; 651 int dgst_num; 652 653 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 654 s->init_num = 0; 655 656 /* 657 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 658 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 659 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 660 * step 661 */ 662 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 663 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 664 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 665 return -1; 666 } 667 } 668 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 669 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 670 int dgst_size; 671 672 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 673 EVP_MD_CTX_type 674 (s-> 675 s3->handshake_dgst 676 [dgst_num]), 677 &(s->s3-> 678 tmp.cert_verify_md 679 [offset])); 680 dgst_size = 681 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 682 if (dgst_size < 0) { 683 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 684 ret = -1; 685 goto end; 686 } 687 offset += dgst_size; 688 } 689 } 690 break; 691 692 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 694 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 695 if (ret <= 0) 696 goto end; 697 698#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 699 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 700#else 701 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 702 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 703 else 704 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 705#endif 706 s->init_num = 0; 707 break; 708 709#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 712 /* 713 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the 715 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be 716 * cautious. 717 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 718 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 719 * the client's Finished message is read. 720 */ 721 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 722 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 723 724 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 725 if (ret <= 0) 726 goto end; 727 s->init_num = 0; 728 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 729 break; 730#endif 731 732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 734 /* 735 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has 736 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 737 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 738 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 739 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 740 * the client's Finished message is read. 741 */ 742 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 743 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 744 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 745 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 746 if (ret <= 0) 747 goto end; 748 if (s->hit) 749 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 750#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 751 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 752 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 753#endif 754 else 755 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 756 s->init_num = 0; 757 break; 758 759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 760 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 762 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 763 if (ret <= 0) 764 goto end; 765 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 766 s->init_num = 0; 767 break; 768 769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 771 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 772 if (ret <= 0) 773 goto end; 774 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 775 s->init_num = 0; 776 break; 777 778#endif 779 780 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 782 783 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 784 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 785 ret = -1; 786 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 787 goto end; 788 } 789 790 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 791 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 793 794 if (ret <= 0) 795 goto end; 796 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 797 s->init_num = 0; 798 799 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 800 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 801 { 802 ret = -1; 803 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 804 goto end; 805 } 806 807 break; 808 809 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 811 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 812 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 814 s->method-> 815 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 816 s->method-> 817 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 818 if (ret <= 0) 819 goto end; 820 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 821 if (s->hit) { 822#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 824#else 825 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 826 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 827 } else 828 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 829#endif 830 } else 831 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 832 s->init_num = 0; 833 break; 834 835 case SSL_ST_OK: 836 /* clean a few things up */ 837 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 838 839 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 840 s->init_buf = NULL; 841 842 /* remove buffering on output */ 843 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 844 845 s->init_num = 0; 846 847 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 848 * HelloRequest */ 849 s->renegotiate = 0; 850 s->new_session = 0; 851 852 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 853 854 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 855 /* s->server=1; */ 856 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 857 858 if (cb != NULL) 859 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 860 } 861 862 ret = 1; 863 goto end; 864 /* break; */ 865 866 case SSL_ST_ERR: 867 default: 868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 869 ret = -1; 870 goto end; 871 /* break; */ 872 } 873 874 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 875 if (s->debug) { 876 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 877 goto end; 878 } 879 880 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 881 new_state = s->state; 882 s->state = state; 883 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 884 s->state = new_state; 885 } 886 } 887 skip = 0; 888 } 889 end: 890 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 891 892 s->in_handshake--; 893 if (cb != NULL) 894 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 895 return (ret); 896} 897 898int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 899{ 900 unsigned char *p; 901 902 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 903 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 904 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 905 *(p++) = 0; 906 *(p++) = 0; 907 *(p++) = 0; 908 909 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 910 /* number of bytes to write */ 911 s->init_num = 4; 912 s->init_off = 0; 913 } 914 915 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 916 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 917} 918 919int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 920{ 921 int ok; 922 long n; 923 924 /* 925 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 926 * so permit appropriate message length 927 */ 928 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 929 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 930 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 931 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 932 if (!ok) 933 return ((int)n); 934 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 935 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 936 /* 937 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 938 * negotiation. 939 */ 940 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { 941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, 942 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 943 return -1; 944 } 945 /* 946 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 947 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 948 */ 949#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 950 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 951 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 952 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 953 } 954#endif 955#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 956 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 957 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 958 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 959 } 960#endif 961 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 962 return 2; 963 } 964 return 1; 965} 966 967int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 968{ 969 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 970 unsigned int cookie_len; 971 long n; 972 unsigned long id; 973 unsigned char *p, *d, *q; 974 SSL_CIPHER *c; 975#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 976 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 977#endif 978 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 979 980 /* 981 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 982 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 983 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 984 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 985 */ 986 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 987 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 988 } 989 s->first_packet = 1; 990 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 991 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 993 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 994 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 995 996 if (!ok) 997 return ((int)n); 998 s->first_packet = 0; 999 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1000 1001 /* 1002 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte 1003 * for session id length 1004 */ 1005 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { 1006 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1008 goto f_err; 1009 } 1010 1011 /* 1012 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 1013 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 1014 */ 1015 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 1016 p += 2; 1017 1018 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 1019 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { 1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1021 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 1022 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 1023 /* 1024 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 1025 * number 1026 */ 1027 s->version = s->client_version; 1028 } 1029 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1030 goto f_err; 1031 } 1032 1033 /* 1034 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 1035 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 1036 * cookie length... 1037 */ 1038 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1039 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 1040 1041 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1042 1043 if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { 1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1046 goto f_err; 1047 } 1048 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 1049 1050 if (cookie_length == 0) 1051 return 1; 1052 } 1053 1054 /* load the client random */ 1055 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1056 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1057 1058 /* get the session-id */ 1059 j = *(p++); 1060 1061 if ((d + n) - p < j) { 1062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1064 goto f_err; 1065 } 1066 1067 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { 1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1070 goto f_err; 1071 } 1072 1073 s->hit = 0; 1074 /* 1075 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1076 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1077 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1078 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1079 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1080 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1081 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1082 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1083 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1084 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1085 */ 1086 if ((s->new_session 1087 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1088 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1089 goto err; 1090 } else { 1091 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1092 /* 1093 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1094 * version. 1095 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1096 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1097 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1098 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1099 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1100 */ 1101 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1102 * session */ 1103 s->hit = 1; 1104 } else if (i == -1) 1105 goto err; 1106 else { /* i == 0 */ 1107 1108 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1109 goto err; 1110 } 1111 } 1112 1113 p += j; 1114 1115 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 1116 /* cookie stuff */ 1117 if ((d + n) - p < 1) { 1118 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1120 goto f_err; 1121 } 1122 cookie_len = *(p++); 1123 1124 if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { 1125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1127 goto f_err; 1128 } 1129 1130 /* 1131 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1132 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1133 * does not cause an overflow. 1134 */ 1135 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1136 /* too much data */ 1137 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1139 goto f_err; 1140 } 1141 1142 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1143 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1144 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1145 1146 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1147 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1148 cookie_len) == 0) { 1149 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1151 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1152 goto f_err; 1153 } 1154 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1155 } 1156 /* default verification */ 1157 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1158 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1159 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1161 goto f_err; 1162 } 1163 cookie_valid = 1; 1164 } 1165 1166 p += cookie_len; 1167 } 1168 1169 if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { 1170 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1172 goto f_err; 1173 } 1174 n2s(p, i); 1175 1176 if (i == 0) { 1177 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1179 goto f_err; 1180 } 1181 1182 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ 1183 if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { 1184 /* not enough data */ 1185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1187 goto f_err; 1188 } 1189 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { 1190 goto err; 1191 } 1192 p += i; 1193 1194 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1195 if (s->hit) { 1196 j = 0; 1197 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1198 1199#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1200 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1201 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1202#endif 1203 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1204 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1205#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1206 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1207 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1208#endif 1209 if (c->id == id) { 1210 j = 1; 1211 break; 1212 } 1213 } 1214 /* 1215 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1216 * CVE-2010-4180. 1217 */ 1218#if 0 1219 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1220 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1221 /* 1222 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1223 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1224 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1225 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1226 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1227 */ 1228 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1229 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1230 s->session->cipher = c; 1231 j = 1; 1232 } 1233 } 1234#endif 1235 if (j == 0) { 1236 /* 1237 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1238 * to reuse it 1239 */ 1240 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1242 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1243 goto f_err; 1244 } 1245 } 1246 1247 /* compression */ 1248 i = *(p++); 1249 if ((d + n) - p < i) { 1250 /* not enough data */ 1251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1253 goto f_err; 1254 } 1255 q = p; 1256 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1257 if (p[j] == 0) 1258 break; 1259 } 1260 1261 p += i; 1262 if (j >= i) { 1263 /* no compress */ 1264 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1266 goto f_err; 1267 } 1268#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1269 /* TLS extensions */ 1270 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1271 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n, &al)) { 1272 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1274 goto f_err; 1275 } 1276 } 1277 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1279 goto err; 1280 } 1281 1282 /* 1283 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1284 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1285 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1286 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1287 */ 1288 { 1289 unsigned char *pos; 1290 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1291 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1292 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1293 goto f_err; 1294 } 1295 } 1296 1297 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1298 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1299 1300 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1301 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1302 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1303 &pref_cipher, 1304 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1305 s->hit = 1; 1306 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1307 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1308 1309 ciphers = NULL; 1310 1311 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1312 pref_cipher = 1313 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1314 s-> 1315 session->ciphers, 1316 SSL_get_ciphers 1317 (s)); 1318 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1319 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1321 goto f_err; 1322 } 1323 1324 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1325 1326 if (s->cipher_list) 1327 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1328 1329 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1330 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1331 1332 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1333 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1334 } 1335 } 1336#endif 1337 1338 /* 1339 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1340 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1341 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1342 */ 1343 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1344#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1345 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1346 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1347 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1348 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1349 /* Can't disable compression */ 1350 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1351 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1353 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1354 goto f_err; 1355 } 1356 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1357 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1358 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1359 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1360 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1361 break; 1362 } 1363 } 1364 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1365 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1367 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1368 goto f_err; 1369 } 1370 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1371 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1372 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1373 break; 1374 } 1375 if (m >= i) { 1376 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1378 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1379 goto f_err; 1380 } 1381 } else if (s->hit) 1382 comp = NULL; 1383 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1384 /* See if we have a match */ 1385 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1386 1387 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1388 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1389 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1390 v = comp->id; 1391 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1392 if (v == q[o]) { 1393 done = 1; 1394 break; 1395 } 1396 } 1397 if (done) 1398 break; 1399 } 1400 if (done) 1401 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1402 else 1403 comp = NULL; 1404 } 1405#else 1406 /* 1407 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1408 * using compression. 1409 */ 1410 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1411 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1413 goto f_err; 1414 } 1415#endif 1416 1417 /* 1418 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1419 */ 1420 1421 if (!s->hit) { 1422#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1423 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1424#else 1425 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1426#endif 1427 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1428 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1429 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1430 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1431 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1433 goto f_err; 1434 } 1435 ciphers = NULL; 1436 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1437 1438 if (c == NULL) { 1439 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1441 goto f_err; 1442 } 1443 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1444 } else { 1445 /* Session-id reuse */ 1446#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1447 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1448 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1449 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1450 1451 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1452 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1453 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1454 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1455 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1456 nc = c; 1457 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1458 ec = c; 1459 } 1460 if (nc != NULL) 1461 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1462 else if (ec != NULL) 1463 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1464 else 1465 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1466 } else 1467#endif 1468 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1469 } 1470 1471 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION 1472 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1473 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 1474 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1475 goto f_err; 1476 } 1477 } 1478 1479 /*- 1480 * we now have the following setup. 1481 * client_random 1482 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1483 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1484 * compression - basically ignored right now 1485 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1486 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1487 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1488 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1489 */ 1490 1491 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1492 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1493 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1495 goto err; 1496 } 1497 } 1498 1499 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1500 if (0) { 1501 f_err: 1502 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1503 err: 1504 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1505 } 1506 1507 if (ciphers != NULL) 1508 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1509 return ret; 1510} 1511 1512int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1513{ 1514 unsigned char *buf; 1515 unsigned char *p, *d; 1516 int i, sl; 1517 unsigned long l; 1518 1519 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1520 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1521#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1522 p = s->s3->server_random; 1523 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1524 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1525 return -1; 1526 } 1527#endif 1528 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1529 d = p = &(buf[4]); 1530 1531 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1532 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1533 1534 /* Random stuff */ 1535 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1536 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1537 1538 /*- 1539 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1540 * back in the server hello: 1541 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1542 * we send back the old session ID. 1543 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1544 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1545 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1546 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1547 * session ID. 1548 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1549 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1550 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1551 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1552 * to send back. 1553 */ 1554 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1555 && !s->hit) 1556 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1557 1558 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1559 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1561 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1562 return -1; 1563 } 1564 *(p++) = sl; 1565 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1566 p += sl; 1567 1568 /* put the cipher */ 1569 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1570 p += i; 1571 1572 /* put the compression method */ 1573#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1574 *(p++) = 0; 1575#else 1576 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1577 *(p++) = 0; 1578 else 1579 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1580#endif 1581#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1582 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1584 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1585 return -1; 1586 } 1587 if ((p = 1588 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, 1589 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == 1590 NULL) { 1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1592 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1593 return -1; 1594 } 1595#endif 1596 /* do the header */ 1597 l = (p - d); 1598 d = buf; 1599 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1600 l2n3(l, d); 1601 1602 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1603 /* number of bytes to write */ 1604 s->init_num = p - buf; 1605 s->init_off = 0; 1606 } 1607 1608 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1609 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1610} 1611 1612int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1613{ 1614 unsigned char *p; 1615 1616 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1617 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1618 1619 /* do the header */ 1620 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1621 *(p++) = 0; 1622 *(p++) = 0; 1623 *(p++) = 0; 1624 1625 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1626 /* number of bytes to write */ 1627 s->init_num = 4; 1628 s->init_off = 0; 1629 } 1630 1631 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1632 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1633} 1634 1635int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1636{ 1637#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1638 unsigned char *q; 1639 int j, num; 1640 RSA *rsa; 1641 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1642 unsigned int u; 1643#endif 1644#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1645 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1646#endif 1647#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1648 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1649 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1650 int encodedlen = 0; 1651 int curve_id = 0; 1652 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1653#endif 1654 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1655 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1656 unsigned char *p, *d; 1657 int al, i; 1658 unsigned long type; 1659 int n; 1660 CERT *cert; 1661 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1662 int nr[4], kn; 1663 BUF_MEM *buf; 1664 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1665 1666 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1667 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1668 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1669 cert = s->cert; 1670 1671 buf = s->init_buf; 1672 1673 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1674 n = 0; 1675#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1676 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1677 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1678 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1679 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1680 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1681 tmp.new_cipher), 1682 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1683 tmp.new_cipher)); 1684 if (rsa == NULL) { 1685 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1687 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1688 goto f_err; 1689 } 1690 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1691 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1692 } 1693 if (rsa == NULL) { 1694 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1696 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1697 goto f_err; 1698 } 1699 r[0] = rsa->n; 1700 r[1] = rsa->e; 1701 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1702 } else 1703#endif 1704#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1705 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1706 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1707 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1708 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1709 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1710 tmp.new_cipher), 1711 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1712 tmp.new_cipher)); 1713 if (dhp == NULL) { 1714 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1716 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1717 goto f_err; 1718 } 1719 1720 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1723 goto err; 1724 } 1725 1726 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1728 goto err; 1729 } 1730 1731 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1732 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1734 goto err; 1735 } 1736 r[0] = dh->p; 1737 r[1] = dh->g; 1738 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1739 } else 1740#endif 1741#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1742 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1743 const EC_GROUP *group; 1744 1745 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1746 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1747 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1748 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1749 tmp.new_cipher), 1750 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1751 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1752 } 1753 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1754 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1756 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1757 goto f_err; 1758 } 1759 1760 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1763 goto err; 1764 } 1765 1766 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1767 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1769 goto err; 1770 } 1771 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1773 goto err; 1774 } 1775 1776 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1777 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1779 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1780 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1782 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1783 goto err; 1784 } 1785 } 1786 1787 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1788 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1789 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1791 goto err; 1792 } 1793 1794 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1795 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1797 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1798 goto err; 1799 } 1800 1801 /* 1802 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1803 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1804 * non-zero. 1805 */ 1806 if ((curve_id = 1807 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1808 == 0) { 1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1810 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1811 goto err; 1812 } 1813 1814 /* 1815 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1816 * allocate memory accordingly. 1817 */ 1818 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1819 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1820 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1821 NULL, 0, NULL); 1822 1823 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1824 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1825 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1826 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1828 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1829 goto err; 1830 } 1831 1832 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1833 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1834 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1835 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1836 1837 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1839 goto err; 1840 } 1841 1842 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1843 bn_ctx = NULL; 1844 1845 /* 1846 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1847 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1848 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1849 * structure. 1850 */ 1851 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1852 1853 /* 1854 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1855 * can set these to NULLs 1856 */ 1857 r[0] = NULL; 1858 r[1] = NULL; 1859 r[2] = NULL; 1860 r[3] = NULL; 1861 } else 1862#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1863#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1864 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1865 /* 1866 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1867 */ 1868 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1869 } else 1870#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1871#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1872 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1873 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1874 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1875 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1877 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1878 goto err; 1879 } 1880 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1881 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1882 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1883 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1884 } else 1885#endif 1886 { 1887 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1890 goto f_err; 1891 } 1892 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1893 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1894#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1895 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1896 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1897 else 1898#endif 1899 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1900 } 1901 1902 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1903 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1904 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1905 == NULL) { 1906 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1907 goto f_err; 1908 } 1909 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1910 } else { 1911 pkey = NULL; 1912 kn = 0; 1913 } 1914 1915 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) { 1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1917 goto err; 1918 } 1919 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1920 p = &(d[4]); 1921 1922 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1923#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1924 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1925 *p = nr[i]; 1926 p++; 1927 } else 1928#endif 1929 s2n(nr[i], p); 1930 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1931 p += nr[i]; 1932 } 1933 1934#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1935 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1936 /* 1937 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1938 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1939 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1940 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1941 */ 1942 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1943 p += 1; 1944 *p = 0; 1945 p += 1; 1946 *p = curve_id; 1947 p += 1; 1948 *p = encodedlen; 1949 p += 1; 1950 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1951 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1952 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1953 encodedPoint = NULL; 1954 p += encodedlen; 1955 } 1956#endif 1957 1958#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1959 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1960 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1961 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1962 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1963 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1964 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1965 } 1966#endif 1967 1968 /* not anonymous */ 1969 if (pkey != NULL) { 1970 /* 1971 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1972 * points to the space at the end. 1973 */ 1974#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1976 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1977 q = md_buf; 1978 j = 0; 1979 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1980 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1981 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1982 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, 1983 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 1984 : s->ctx->sha1, 1985 NULL) <= 0 1986 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1987 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1988 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1989 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1990 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 1991 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1992 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { 1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1994 ERR_LIB_EVP); 1995 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1996 goto f_err; 1997 } 1998 q += i; 1999 j += i; 2000 } 2001 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 2002 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 2004 goto err; 2005 } 2006 s2n(u, p); 2007 n += u + 2; 2008 } else 2009#endif 2010 if (md) { 2011 /* 2012 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm 2013 */ 2014 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2015 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 2016 /* Should never happen */ 2017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2020 goto f_err; 2021 } 2022 p += 2; 2023 } 2024#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2025 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 2026#endif 2027 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 2028 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 2029 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2030 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 2031 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2032 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 2033 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 2034 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { 2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 2036 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2037 goto f_err; 2038 } 2039 s2n(i, p); 2040 n += i + 2; 2041 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2042 n += 2; 2043 } else { 2044 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2045 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2047 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2048 goto f_err; 2049 } 2050 } 2051 2052 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2053 l2n3(n, d); 2054 2055 /* 2056 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2057 */ 2058 s->init_num = n + 4; 2059 s->init_off = 0; 2060 } 2061 2062 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2063 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2064 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2065 f_err: 2066 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2067 err: 2068#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2069 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2070 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2071 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2072#endif 2073 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2074 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2075 return (-1); 2076} 2077 2078int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2079{ 2080 unsigned char *p, *d; 2081 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2082 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2083 X509_NAME *name; 2084 BUF_MEM *buf; 2085 2086 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2087 buf = s->init_buf; 2088 2089 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2090 2091 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2092 p++; 2093 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2094 d[0] = n; 2095 p += n; 2096 n++; 2097 2098 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2099 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2100 s2n(nl, p); 2101 p += nl + 2; 2102 n += nl + 2; 2103 } 2104 2105 off = n; 2106 p += 2; 2107 n += 2; 2108 2109 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2110 nl = 0; 2111 if (sk != NULL) { 2112 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2113 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2114 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2115 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) { 2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2117 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2118 goto err; 2119 } 2120 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]); 2121 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2122 s2n(j, p); 2123 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2124 n += 2 + j; 2125 nl += 2 + j; 2126 } else { 2127 d = p; 2128 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2129 j -= 2; 2130 s2n(j, d); 2131 j += 2; 2132 n += j; 2133 nl += j; 2134 } 2135 } 2136 } 2137 /* else no CA names */ 2138 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]); 2139 s2n(nl, p); 2140 2141 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; 2142 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2143 l2n3(n, d); 2144 2145 /* 2146 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2147 */ 2148 2149 s->init_num = n + 4; 2150 s->init_off = 0; 2151#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2152 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2154 goto err; 2155 } 2156 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2157 2158 /* do the header */ 2159 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2160 *(p++) = 0; 2161 *(p++) = 0; 2162 *(p++) = 0; 2163 s->init_num += 4; 2164#endif 2165 2166 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2167 } 2168 2169 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2170 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2171 err: 2172 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2173 return (-1); 2174} 2175 2176int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2177{ 2178 int i, al, ok; 2179 long n; 2180 unsigned long alg_k; 2181 unsigned char *p; 2182#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2183 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2184 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2185#endif 2186#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2187 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2188 DH *dh_srvr; 2189#endif 2190#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2191 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2192#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2193 2194#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2195 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2196 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2197 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2198 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2199#endif 2200 2201 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2203 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2204 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2205 2206 if (!ok) 2207 return ((int)n); 2208 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2209 2210 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2211 2212#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2213 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2214 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2215 int decrypt_len; 2216 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2217 size_t j; 2218 2219 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2220 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2221 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2222 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2223 /* 2224 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2225 */ 2226 if (rsa == NULL) { 2227 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2229 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2230 goto f_err; 2231 2232 } 2233 } else { 2234 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2235 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2236 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2237 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2239 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2240 goto f_err; 2241 } 2242 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2243 } 2244 2245 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2246 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2247 n2s(p, i); 2248 if (n != i + 2) { 2249 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2252 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2253 goto f_err; 2254 } else 2255 p -= 2; 2256 } else 2257 n = i; 2258 } 2259 2260 /* 2261 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2262 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2263 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2264 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2265 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2266 */ 2267 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2268 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2270 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2271 goto f_err; 2272 } 2273 2274 /* 2275 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2276 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2277 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2278 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2279 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2280 */ 2281 2282 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2283 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2284 goto err; 2285 decrypt_len = 2286 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2287 ERR_clear_error(); 2288 2289 /* 2290 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will 2291 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. 2292 */ 2293 decrypt_good = 2294 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2295 2296 /* 2297 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2298 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2299 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2300 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2301 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2302 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2303 */ 2304 version_good = 2305 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2306 version_good &= 2307 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2308 2309 /* 2310 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2311 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2312 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2313 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2314 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2315 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2316 * clients. 2317 */ 2318 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2319 unsigned char workaround_good; 2320 workaround_good = 2321 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2322 workaround_good &= 2323 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2324 version_good |= workaround_good; 2325 } 2326 2327 /* 2328 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2329 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2330 */ 2331 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2332 2333 /* 2334 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2335 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2336 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2337 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2338 */ 2339 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2340 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2341 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2342 } 2343 2344 s->session->master_key_length = 2345 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2346 s-> 2347 session->master_key, 2348 p, 2349 sizeof 2350 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2351 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2352 } else 2353#endif 2354#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2355 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2356 n2s(p, i); 2357 if (n != i + 2) { 2358 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2360 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2361 goto err; 2362 } else { 2363 p -= 2; 2364 i = (int)n; 2365 } 2366 } 2367 2368 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2369 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2371 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2372 goto f_err; 2373 } else { 2374 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2375 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2377 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2378 goto f_err; 2379 } else 2380 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2381 } 2382 2383 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2384 if (pub == NULL) { 2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2386 goto err; 2387 } 2388 2389 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2390 2391 if (i <= 0) { 2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2393 BN_clear_free(pub); 2394 goto err; 2395 } 2396 2397 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2398 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2399 2400 BN_clear_free(pub); 2401 pub = NULL; 2402 s->session->master_key_length = 2403 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2404 s-> 2405 session->master_key, 2406 p, i); 2407 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2408 } else 2409#endif 2410#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2411 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2412 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2413 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2414 krb5_data authenticator; 2415 krb5_data enc_pms; 2416 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2418 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2419 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2420 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2421 int padl, outl; 2422 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2423 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2424 int kerr = 0; 2425 2426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2427 2428 if (!kssl_ctx) 2429 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2430 2431 n2s(p, i); 2432 enc_ticket.length = i; 2433 2434 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2436 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2437 goto err; 2438 } 2439 2440 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2441 p += enc_ticket.length; 2442 2443 n2s(p, i); 2444 authenticator.length = i; 2445 2446 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2448 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2449 goto err; 2450 } 2451 2452 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2453 p += authenticator.length; 2454 2455 n2s(p, i); 2456 enc_pms.length = i; 2457 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2458 p += enc_pms.length; 2459 2460 /* 2461 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2462 */ 2463 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2465 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2466 goto err; 2467 } 2468 2469 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2470 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2472 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2473 goto err; 2474 } 2475 2476 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2477 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2478# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2479 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2480 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2481 if (kssl_err.text) 2482 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2483# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2485 goto err; 2486 } 2487 2488 /* 2489 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2490 * return authtime == 0. 2491 */ 2492 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2493 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2494# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2495 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2496 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2497 if (kssl_err.text) 2498 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2499# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2501 goto err; 2502 } 2503 2504 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2506 goto err; 2507 } 2508# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2509 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2510# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2511 2512 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2513 if (enc == NULL) 2514 goto err; 2515 2516 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2517 2518 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2520 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2521 goto err; 2522 } 2523 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2524 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2525 { 2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2527 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2528 kerr = 1; 2529 goto kclean; 2530 } 2531 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2533 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2534 kerr = 1; 2535 goto kclean; 2536 } 2537 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2539 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2540 kerr = 1; 2541 goto kclean; 2542 } 2543 outl += padl; 2544 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2546 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2547 kerr = 1; 2548 goto kclean; 2549 } 2550 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2551 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2552 /* 2553 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2554 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2555 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2556 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2557 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2558 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2559 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2560 * cipher) 2561 */ 2562 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2564 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2565 kerr = 1; 2566 goto kclean; 2567 } 2568 } 2569 2570 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2571 2572 s->session->master_key_length = 2573 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2574 s-> 2575 session->master_key, 2576 pms, outl); 2577 2578 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2579 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2580 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2581 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2582 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2583 len); 2584 } 2585 } 2586 2587 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2588 * but it caused problems for apache. 2589 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2590 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2591 */ 2592 2593 kclean: 2594 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); 2595 if (kerr) 2596 goto err; 2597 } else 2598#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2599 2600#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2601 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2602 int ret = 1; 2603 int field_size = 0; 2604 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2605 const EC_GROUP *group; 2606 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2607 2608 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2609 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2611 goto err; 2612 } 2613 2614 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2615 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2616 /* use the certificate */ 2617 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2618 } else { 2619 /* 2620 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2621 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2622 */ 2623 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2624 } 2625 2626 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2627 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2628 2629 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2630 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2632 goto err; 2633 } 2634 2635 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2636 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2638 goto err; 2639 } 2640 2641 if (n == 0L) { 2642 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2643 2644 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2645 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2647 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2648 goto f_err; 2649 } 2650 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2651 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2652 /* 2653 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2654 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2655 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2656 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2657 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2658 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2659 */ 2660 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2662 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2663 goto f_err; 2664 } 2665 2666 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2667 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2668 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2670 goto err; 2671 } 2672 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2673 } else { 2674 /* 2675 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2676 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2677 */ 2678 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2680 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2681 goto err; 2682 } 2683 2684 /* Get encoded point length */ 2685 i = *p; 2686 p += 1; 2687 if (n != 1 + i) { 2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2689 goto err; 2690 } 2691 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2693 goto err; 2694 } 2695 /* 2696 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2697 * to the start 2698 */ 2699 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2700 } 2701 2702 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2703 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2704 if (field_size <= 0) { 2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2706 goto err; 2707 } 2708 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2709 NULL); 2710 if (i <= 0) { 2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2712 goto err; 2713 } 2714 2715 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2716 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2717 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2718 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2719 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2720 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2721 2722 /* Compute the master secret */ 2723 s->session->master_key_length = 2724 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2725 s-> 2726 session->master_key, 2727 p, i); 2728 2729 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2730 return (ret); 2731 } else 2732#endif 2733#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2734 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2735 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2736 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2737 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2738 int psk_err = 1; 2739 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2740 2741 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2742 2743 n2s(p, i); 2744 if (n != i + 2) { 2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2746 goto psk_err; 2747 } 2748 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2750 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2751 goto psk_err; 2752 } 2753 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2755 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2756 goto psk_err; 2757 } 2758 2759 /* 2760 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2761 */ 2762 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2763 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2764 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2765 psk_or_pre_ms, 2766 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2767 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2768 2769 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2771 goto psk_err; 2772 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2773 /* 2774 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2775 */ 2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2777 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2778 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2779 goto psk_err; 2780 } 2781 2782 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2783 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2784 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2785 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2786 s2n(psk_len, t); 2787 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2788 t += psk_len; 2789 s2n(psk_len, t); 2790 2791 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2792 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2793 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); 2794 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2796 goto psk_err; 2797 } 2798 2799 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2800 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2801 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2802 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2803 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2805 goto psk_err; 2806 } 2807 2808 s->session->master_key_length = 2809 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2810 s-> 2811 session->master_key, 2812 psk_or_pre_ms, 2813 pre_ms_len); 2814 psk_err = 0; 2815 psk_err: 2816 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2817 if (psk_err != 0) 2818 goto f_err; 2819 } else 2820#endif 2821#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2822 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2823 int param_len; 2824 2825 n2s(p, i); 2826 param_len = i + 2; 2827 if (param_len > n) { 2828 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2830 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2831 goto f_err; 2832 } 2833 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2835 goto err; 2836 } 2837 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2838 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2839 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2841 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2842 goto f_err; 2843 } 2844 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2845 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2846 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2847 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2849 goto err; 2850 } 2851 2852 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2853 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2854 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2856 goto err; 2857 } 2858 2859 p += i; 2860 } else 2861#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2862 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2863 int ret = 0; 2864 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2865 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2866 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2867 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2868 unsigned long alg_a; 2869 int Ttag, Tclass; 2870 long Tlen; 2871 2872 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2873 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2874 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2875 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2876 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2877 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2878 2879 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2880 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 2881 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2883 goto f_err; 2884 } 2885 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2887 goto gerr; 2888 } 2889 /* 2890 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2891 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2892 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2893 * client certificate for authorization only. 2894 */ 2895 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2896 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2897 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2898 ERR_clear_error(); 2899 } 2900 /* Decrypt session key */ 2901 if (ASN1_get_object 2902 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2903 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2904 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2906 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2907 goto gerr; 2908 } 2909 start = p; 2910 inlen = Tlen; 2911 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2912 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2914 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2915 goto gerr; 2916 } 2917 /* Generate master secret */ 2918 s->session->master_key_length = 2919 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2920 s-> 2921 session->master_key, 2922 premaster_secret, 32); 2923 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); 2924 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2925 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2926 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2927 ret = 2; 2928 else 2929 ret = 1; 2930 gerr: 2931 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2933 if (ret) 2934 return ret; 2935 else 2936 goto err; 2937 } else { 2938 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2940 goto f_err; 2941 } 2942 2943 return (1); 2944 f_err: 2945 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2946#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2947 err: 2948#endif 2949#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2950 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2951 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2952 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2953 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2954 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2955#endif 2956 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2957 return (-1); 2958} 2959 2960int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2961{ 2962 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2963 unsigned char *p; 2964 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2965 long n; 2966 int type = 0, i, j; 2967 X509 *peer; 2968 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2969 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2970 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2971 2972 /* 2973 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received 2974 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non 2975 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even 2976 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static 2977 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the 2978 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. 2979 */ 2980 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 2981 ret = 1; 2982 goto end; 2983 } 2984 2985 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2986 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2987 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2988 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, 2989 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2990 2991 if (!ok) 2992 return ((int)n); 2993 2994 peer = s->session->peer; 2995 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2996 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2997 2998 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3000 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 3001 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3002 goto f_err; 3003 } 3004 3005 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 3006 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3007 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 3008 /* 3009 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 3010 * length field 3011 */ 3012 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3013 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 3014 i = 64; 3015 } else { 3016 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 3017 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 3018 /* Should never happen */ 3019 if (sigalg == -1) { 3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3021 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3022 goto f_err; 3023 } 3024 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 3025 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { 3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3027 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3028 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3029 goto f_err; 3030 } 3031 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3032 if (md == NULL) { 3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3034 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3035 goto f_err; 3036 } 3037#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3038 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3039#endif 3040 p += 2; 3041 n -= 2; 3042 } 3043 n2s(p, i); 3044 n -= 2; 3045 if (i > n) { 3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3048 goto f_err; 3049 } 3050 } 3051 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3052 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3054 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3055 goto f_err; 3056 } 3057 3058 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 3059 long hdatalen = 0; 3060 void *hdata; 3061 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3062 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3064 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3065 goto f_err; 3066 } 3067#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3068 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3069 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3070#endif 3071 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3072 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3075 goto f_err; 3076 } 3077 3078 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3079 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3081 goto f_err; 3082 } 3083 } else 3084#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3085 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3086 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3087 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3088 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3089 if (i < 0) { 3090 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3092 goto f_err; 3093 } 3094 if (i == 0) { 3095 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3097 goto f_err; 3098 } 3099 } else 3100#endif 3101#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3102 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3103 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3104 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3105 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3106 if (j <= 0) { 3107 /* bad signature */ 3108 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3110 goto f_err; 3111 } 3112 } else 3113#endif 3114#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3115 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3116 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3117 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3118 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3119 if (j <= 0) { 3120 /* bad signature */ 3121 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3123 goto f_err; 3124 } 3125 } else 3126#endif 3127 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3128 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3129 unsigned char signature[64]; 3130 int idx; 3131 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3132 if (pctx == NULL) { 3133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3135 goto f_err; 3136 } 3137 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { 3138 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3141 goto f_err; 3142 } 3143 if (i != 64) { 3144 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3145 } 3146 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3147 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3148 } 3149 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3150 32); 3151 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3152 if (j <= 0) { 3153 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3155 goto f_err; 3156 } 3157 } else { 3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3159 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3160 goto f_err; 3161 } 3162 3163 ret = 1; 3164 if (0) { 3165 f_err: 3166 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3167 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3168 } 3169 end: 3170 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3171 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3172 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3173 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3174 } 3175 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3176 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3177 return (ret); 3178} 3179 3180int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3181{ 3182 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3183 X509 *x = NULL; 3184 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3185 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3186 unsigned char *d; 3187 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3188 3189 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3190 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3191 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3192 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3193 3194 if (!ok) 3195 return ((int)n); 3196 3197 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3198 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3199 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3203 goto f_err; 3204 } 3205 /* 3206 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3207 */ 3208 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3210 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3211 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3212 goto f_err; 3213 } 3214 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3215 return (1); 3216 } 3217 3218 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3219 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3221 goto f_err; 3222 } 3223 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3224 3225 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3227 goto err; 3228 } 3229 3230 n2l3(p, llen); 3231 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3232 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3234 goto f_err; 3235 } 3236 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3237 if (nc + 3 > llen) { 3238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3240 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3241 goto f_err; 3242 } 3243 n2l3(p, l); 3244 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3245 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3247 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3248 goto f_err; 3249 } 3250 3251 q = p; 3252 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3253 if (x == NULL) { 3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3255 goto err; 3256 } 3257 if (p != (q + l)) { 3258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3260 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3261 goto f_err; 3262 } 3263 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3265 goto err; 3266 } 3267 x = NULL; 3268 nc += l + 3; 3269 } 3270 3271 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3272 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3273 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3274 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3276 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3277 goto f_err; 3278 } 3279 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3280 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3281 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3283 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3284 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3285 goto f_err; 3286 } 3287 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3288 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3289 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3290 goto f_err; 3291 } 3292 } else { 3293 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3294 if (i <= 0) { 3295 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3297 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3298 goto f_err; 3299 } 3300 } 3301 3302 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3303 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3304 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3305 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3306 3307 /* 3308 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3309 * arrive here. 3310 */ 3311 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3312 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3313 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3315 goto err; 3316 } 3317 } 3318 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3319 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3320 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3321 /* 3322 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3323 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3324 */ 3325 3326 sk = NULL; 3327 3328 ret = 1; 3329 if (0) { 3330 f_err: 3331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3332 err: 3333 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3334 } 3335 3336 if (x != NULL) 3337 X509_free(x); 3338 if (sk != NULL) 3339 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3340 return (ret); 3341} 3342 3343int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3344{ 3345 unsigned long l; 3346 X509 *x; 3347 3348 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3349 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3350 if (x == NULL) { 3351 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3352 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3353 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3355 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3356 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3357 return (0); 3358 } 3359 } 3360 3361 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x); 3362 if (!l) { 3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3364 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3365 return (0); 3366 } 3367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3368 s->init_num = (int)l; 3369 s->init_off = 0; 3370 } 3371 3372 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3373 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3374} 3375 3376#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3377/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3378int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3379{ 3380 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3381 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3382 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3383 3384 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3385 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3386 const unsigned char *const_p; 3387 int len, slen_full, slen; 3388 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3389 unsigned int hlen; 3390 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3391 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3392 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3393 3394 /* get session encoding length */ 3395 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3396 /* 3397 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3398 * long 3399 */ 3400 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3401 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3402 return -1; 3403 } 3404 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3405 if (!senc) { 3406 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3407 return -1; 3408 } 3409 3410 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3411 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3412 3413 p = senc; 3414 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3415 goto err; 3416 3417 /* 3418 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3419 */ 3420 const_p = senc; 3421 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3422 if (sess == NULL) 3423 goto err; 3424 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3425 3426 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3427 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3428 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3429 goto err; 3430 } 3431 p = senc; 3432 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3433 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3434 goto err; 3435 } 3436 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3437 3438 /*- 3439 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3440 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3441 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3442 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3443 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3444 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3445 */ 3446 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3447 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3448 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3449 goto err; 3450 3451 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3452 /* do the header */ 3453 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3454 /* Skip message length for now */ 3455 p += 3; 3456 /* 3457 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3458 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3459 */ 3460 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3461 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3462 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3463 goto err; 3464 } else { 3465 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3466 goto err; 3467 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3468 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3469 goto err; 3470 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3471 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3472 goto err; 3473 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3474 } 3475 3476 /* 3477 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3478 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3479 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3480 */ 3481 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3482 3483 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3484 p += 2; 3485 /* Output key name */ 3486 macstart = p; 3487 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3488 p += 16; 3489 /* output IV */ 3490 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3491 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3492 /* Encrypt session data */ 3493 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3494 goto err; 3495 p += len; 3496 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3497 goto err; 3498 p += len; 3499 3500 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3501 goto err; 3502 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3503 goto err; 3504 3505 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3506 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3507 3508 p += hlen; 3509 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3510 /* Total length */ 3511 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3512 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3513 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3514 p += 4; 3515 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3516 3517 /* number of bytes to write */ 3518 s->init_num = len; 3519 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3520 s->init_off = 0; 3521 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3522 } 3523 3524 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3525 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3526 err: 3527 if (senc) 3528 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3529 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3530 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3531 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3532 return -1; 3533} 3534 3535int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3536{ 3537 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3538 unsigned char *p; 3539 /*- 3540 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3541 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3542 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3543 * + (ocsp response) 3544 */ 3545 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { 3546 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3547 return -1; 3548 } 3549 3550 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3551 3552 /* do the header */ 3553 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3554 /* message length */ 3555 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3556 /* status type */ 3557 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3558 /* length of OCSP response */ 3559 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3560 /* actual response */ 3561 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3562 /* number of bytes to write */ 3563 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3564 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3565 s->init_off = 0; 3566 } 3567 3568 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3569 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3570} 3571 3572# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3573/* 3574 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3575 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3576 */ 3577int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3578{ 3579 int ok; 3580 int proto_len, padding_len; 3581 long n; 3582 const unsigned char *p; 3583 3584 /* 3585 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3586 * extension in their ClientHello 3587 */ 3588 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3590 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3591 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3592 return -1; 3593 } 3594 3595 /* See the payload format below */ 3596 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3597 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3598 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3599 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3600 3601 if (!ok) 3602 return ((int)n); 3603 3604 /* 3605 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3606 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3607 * ssl3_get_finished). 3608 */ 3609 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3611 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3612 return -1; 3613 } 3614 3615 if (n < 2) { 3616 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3617 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3618 } 3619 3620 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3621 3622 /*- 3623 * The payload looks like: 3624 * uint8 proto_len; 3625 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3626 * uint8 padding_len; 3627 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3628 */ 3629 proto_len = p[0]; 3630 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { 3631 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3632 return 0; 3633 } 3634 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3635 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { 3636 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3637 return 0; 3638 } 3639 3640 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3641 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3643 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3644 return 0; 3645 } 3646 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3647 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3648 3649 return 1; 3650} 3651# endif 3652#endif 3653