s3_srvr.c revision 291721
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165# include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177{ 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182} 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187#endif 188#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190{ 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209} 210#endif 211 212int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213{ 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248#endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 270 return -1; 271 } 272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 273 274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 276 ret = -1; 277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 278 goto end; 279 } 280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 281 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 282 ret = -1; 283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 s->init_buf = buf; 287 } 288 289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 290 ret = -1; 291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 295 s->init_num = 0; 296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 298 /* 299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 300 */ 301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 302 303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 304 /* 305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 307 */ 308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 309 ret = -1; 310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 311 goto end; 312 } 313 314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 318 !(s->options & 319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 320 /* 321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 322 * support secure renegotiation. 323 */ 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 327 ret = -1; 328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 329 goto end; 330 } else { 331 /* 332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 333 * HelloRequest 334 */ 335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 337 } 338 break; 339 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 342 343 s->shutdown = 0; 344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 345 if (ret <= 0) 346 goto end; 347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 349 s->init_num = 0; 350 351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 352 break; 353 354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 356 break; 357 358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 361 362 s->shutdown = 0; 363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 365 if (ret <= 0) 366 goto end; 367 } 368#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 369 { 370 int al; 371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 372 /* 373 * callback indicates firther work to be done 374 */ 375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 376 goto end; 377 } 378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 380 /* 381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 383 */ 384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 386 ret = -1; 387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 388 goto end; 389 } 390 } 391#endif 392 393 s->renegotiate = 2; 394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 395 s->init_num = 0; 396 break; 397 398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 401 if (ret <= 0) 402 goto end; 403#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 404 if (s->hit) { 405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 407 else 408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 409 } 410#else 411 if (s->hit) 412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 413#endif 414 else 415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 416 s->init_num = 0; 417 break; 418 419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 423 if (! 424 (s->s3->tmp. 425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 426 SSL_aSRP)) 427&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 429 if (ret <= 0) 430 goto end; 431#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 434 else 435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 436 } else { 437 skip = 1; 438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 439 } 440#else 441 } else 442 skip = 1; 443 444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 445#endif 446 s->init_num = 0; 447 break; 448 449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 452 453 /* 454 * clear this, it may get reset by 455 * send_server_key_exchange 456 */ 457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 458 459 /* 460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 465 * key exchange. 466 */ 467 if (0 468 /* 469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 470 * provided 471 */ 472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 474#endif 475#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 478#endif 479 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH)) 480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 487 ) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) { 491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 492 if (ret <= 0) 493 goto end; 494 } else 495 skip = 1; 496 497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 498 s->init_num = 0; 499 break; 500 501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 505 /* 506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 507 * during re-negotiation: 508 */ 509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 511 /* 512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 514 * RFC 2246): 515 */ 516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 517 /* 518 * ... except when the application insists on 519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 520 * this for SSL 3) 521 */ 522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 523 /* 524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 525 */ 526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 529 /* 530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 531 * are omitted 532 */ 533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 534 /* no cert request */ 535 skip = 1; 536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 541 return -1; 542 } 543 } 544 } else { 545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 547 if (ret <= 0) 548 goto end; 549#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 551#else 552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 554#endif 555 s->init_num = 0; 556 } 557 break; 558 559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 562 if (ret <= 0) 563 goto end; 564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 566 s->init_num = 0; 567 break; 568 569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 570 571 /* 572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 577 * unconditionally. 578 */ 579 580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 582 ret = -1; 583 goto end; 584 } 585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 586 587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 588 break; 589 590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 592 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 593 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 594 if (ret <= 0) 595 goto end; 596 if (ret == 2) 597 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 598 else { 599 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 600 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 601 if (ret <= 0) 602 goto end; 603 } 604 s->init_num = 0; 605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 606 } 607 break; 608 609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 611 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 612 if (ret <= 0) 613 goto end; 614 if (ret == 2) { 615 /* 616 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 617 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 618 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 619 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 620 */ 621#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 623#else 624 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 625 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 626 else 627 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 628#endif 629 s->init_num = 0; 630 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 631 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 632 s->init_num = 0; 633 if (!s->session->peer) 634 break; 635 /* 636 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 637 * digest cached records. 638 */ 639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 641 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 642 return -1; 643 } 644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 646 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 647 return -1; 648 } 649 } else { 650 int offset = 0; 651 int dgst_num; 652 653 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 654 s->init_num = 0; 655 656 /* 657 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 658 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 659 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 660 * step 661 */ 662 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 663 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 664 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 665 return -1; 666 } 667 } 668 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 669 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 670 int dgst_size; 671 672 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 673 EVP_MD_CTX_type 674 (s-> 675 s3->handshake_dgst 676 [dgst_num]), 677 &(s->s3-> 678 tmp.cert_verify_md 679 [offset])); 680 dgst_size = 681 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 682 if (dgst_size < 0) { 683 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 684 ret = -1; 685 goto end; 686 } 687 offset += dgst_size; 688 } 689 } 690 break; 691 692 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 694 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 695 if (ret <= 0) 696 goto end; 697 698#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 699 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 700#else 701 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 702 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 703 else 704 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 705#endif 706 s->init_num = 0; 707 break; 708 709#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 712 /* 713 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the 715 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be 716 * cautious. 717 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 718 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 719 * the client's Finished message is read. 720 */ 721 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 722 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 723 724 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 725 if (ret <= 0) 726 goto end; 727 s->init_num = 0; 728 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 729 break; 730#endif 731 732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 734 /* 735 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has 736 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 737 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 738 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 739 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 740 * the client's Finished message is read. 741 */ 742 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 743 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 744 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 745 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 746 if (ret <= 0) 747 goto end; 748 if (s->hit) 749 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 750#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 751 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 752 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 753#endif 754 else 755 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 756 s->init_num = 0; 757 break; 758 759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 760 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 762 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 763 if (ret <= 0) 764 goto end; 765 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 766 s->init_num = 0; 767 break; 768 769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 771 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 772 if (ret <= 0) 773 goto end; 774 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 775 s->init_num = 0; 776 break; 777 778#endif 779 780 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 782 783 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 784 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 785 ret = -1; 786 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 787 goto end; 788 } 789 790 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 791 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 793 794 if (ret <= 0) 795 goto end; 796 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 797 s->init_num = 0; 798 799 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 800 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 801 { 802 ret = -1; 803 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 804 goto end; 805 } 806 807 break; 808 809 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 811 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 812 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 814 s->method-> 815 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 816 s->method-> 817 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 818 if (ret <= 0) 819 goto end; 820 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 821 if (s->hit) { 822#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 824#else 825 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 826 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 827 } else 828 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 829#endif 830 } else 831 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 832 s->init_num = 0; 833 break; 834 835 case SSL_ST_OK: 836 /* clean a few things up */ 837 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 838 839 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 840 s->init_buf = NULL; 841 842 /* remove buffering on output */ 843 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 844 845 s->init_num = 0; 846 847 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 848 * HelloRequest */ 849 s->renegotiate = 0; 850 s->new_session = 0; 851 852 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 853 854 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 855 /* s->server=1; */ 856 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 857 858 if (cb != NULL) 859 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 860 } 861 862 ret = 1; 863 goto end; 864 /* break; */ 865 866 case SSL_ST_ERR: 867 default: 868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 869 ret = -1; 870 goto end; 871 /* break; */ 872 } 873 874 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 875 if (s->debug) { 876 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 877 goto end; 878 } 879 880 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 881 new_state = s->state; 882 s->state = state; 883 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 884 s->state = new_state; 885 } 886 } 887 skip = 0; 888 } 889 end: 890 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 891 892 s->in_handshake--; 893 if (cb != NULL) 894 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 895 return (ret); 896} 897 898int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 899{ 900 unsigned char *p; 901 902 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 903 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 904 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 905 *(p++) = 0; 906 *(p++) = 0; 907 *(p++) = 0; 908 909 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 910 /* number of bytes to write */ 911 s->init_num = 4; 912 s->init_off = 0; 913 } 914 915 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 916 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 917} 918 919int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 920{ 921 int ok; 922 long n; 923 924 /* 925 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 926 * so permit appropriate message length 927 */ 928 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 929 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 930 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 931 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 932 if (!ok) 933 return ((int)n); 934 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 935 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 936 /* 937 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 938 * negotiation. 939 */ 940 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { 941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, 942 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 943 return -1; 944 } 945 /* 946 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 947 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 948 */ 949#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 950 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 951 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 952 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 953 } 954#endif 955#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 956 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 957 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 958 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 959 } 960#endif 961 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 962 return 2; 963 } 964 return 1; 965} 966 967int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 968{ 969 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 970 unsigned int cookie_len; 971 long n; 972 unsigned long id; 973 unsigned char *p, *d, *q; 974 SSL_CIPHER *c; 975#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 976 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 977#endif 978 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 979 980 /* 981 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 982 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 983 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 984 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 985 */ 986 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 987 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 988 } 989 s->first_packet = 1; 990 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 991 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 993 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 994 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 995 996 if (!ok) 997 return ((int)n); 998 s->first_packet = 0; 999 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1000 1001 /* 1002 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte 1003 * for session id length 1004 */ 1005 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { 1006 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1008 goto f_err; 1009 } 1010 1011 /* 1012 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 1013 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 1014 */ 1015 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 1016 p += 2; 1017 1018 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 1019 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { 1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1021 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 1022 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 1023 /* 1024 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 1025 * number 1026 */ 1027 s->version = s->client_version; 1028 } 1029 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1030 goto f_err; 1031 } 1032 1033 /* 1034 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 1035 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 1036 * cookie length... 1037 */ 1038 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1039 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 1040 1041 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1042 1043 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { 1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1046 goto f_err; 1047 } 1048 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 1049 1050 if (cookie_length == 0) 1051 return 1; 1052 } 1053 1054 /* load the client random */ 1055 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1056 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1057 1058 /* get the session-id */ 1059 j = *(p++); 1060 1061 if (p + j > d + n) { 1062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1064 goto f_err; 1065 } 1066 1067 s->hit = 0; 1068 /* 1069 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1070 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1071 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1072 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1073 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1074 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1075 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1076 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1077 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1078 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1079 */ 1080 if ((s->new_session 1081 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1082 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1083 goto err; 1084 } else { 1085 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1086 /* 1087 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1088 * version. 1089 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1090 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1091 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1092 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1093 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1094 */ 1095 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1096 * session */ 1097 s->hit = 1; 1098 } else if (i == -1) 1099 goto err; 1100 else { /* i == 0 */ 1101 1102 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1103 goto err; 1104 } 1105 } 1106 1107 p += j; 1108 1109 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 1110 /* cookie stuff */ 1111 if (p + 1 > d + n) { 1112 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1114 goto f_err; 1115 } 1116 cookie_len = *(p++); 1117 1118 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { 1119 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1121 goto f_err; 1122 } 1123 1124 /* 1125 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1126 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1127 * does not cause an overflow. 1128 */ 1129 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1130 /* too much data */ 1131 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1133 goto f_err; 1134 } 1135 1136 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1137 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1138 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1139 1140 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1141 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1142 cookie_len) == 0) { 1143 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1145 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1146 goto f_err; 1147 } 1148 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1149 } 1150 /* default verification */ 1151 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1152 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1153 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1155 goto f_err; 1156 } 1157 cookie_valid = 1; 1158 } 1159 1160 p += cookie_len; 1161 } 1162 1163 if (p + 2 > d + n) { 1164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1166 goto f_err; 1167 } 1168 n2s(p, i); 1169 1170 if (i == 0) { 1171 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1173 goto f_err; 1174 } 1175 1176 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ 1177 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { 1178 /* not enough data */ 1179 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1181 goto f_err; 1182 } 1183 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { 1184 goto err; 1185 } 1186 p += i; 1187 1188 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1189 if (s->hit) { 1190 j = 0; 1191 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1192 1193#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1194 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1195 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1196#endif 1197 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1198 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1199#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1200 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1201 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1202#endif 1203 if (c->id == id) { 1204 j = 1; 1205 break; 1206 } 1207 } 1208 /* 1209 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1210 * CVE-2010-4180. 1211 */ 1212#if 0 1213 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1214 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1215 /* 1216 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1217 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1218 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1219 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1220 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1221 */ 1222 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1223 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1224 s->session->cipher = c; 1225 j = 1; 1226 } 1227 } 1228#endif 1229 if (j == 0) { 1230 /* 1231 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1232 * to reuse it 1233 */ 1234 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1236 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1237 goto f_err; 1238 } 1239 } 1240 1241 /* compression */ 1242 i = *(p++); 1243 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { 1244 /* not enough data */ 1245 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1247 goto f_err; 1248 } 1249 q = p; 1250 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1251 if (p[j] == 0) 1252 break; 1253 } 1254 1255 p += i; 1256 if (j >= i) { 1257 /* no compress */ 1258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1260 goto f_err; 1261 } 1262#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1263 /* TLS extensions */ 1264 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1265 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n, &al)) { 1266 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1268 goto f_err; 1269 } 1270 } 1271 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1273 goto err; 1274 } 1275 1276 /* 1277 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1278 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1279 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1280 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1281 */ 1282 { 1283 unsigned char *pos; 1284 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1285 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1286 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1287 goto f_err; 1288 } 1289 } 1290 1291 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1292 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1293 1294 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1295 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1296 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1297 &pref_cipher, 1298 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1299 s->hit = 1; 1300 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1301 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1302 1303 ciphers = NULL; 1304 1305 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1306 pref_cipher = 1307 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1308 s-> 1309 session->ciphers, 1310 SSL_get_ciphers 1311 (s)); 1312 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1313 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1315 goto f_err; 1316 } 1317 1318 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1319 1320 if (s->cipher_list) 1321 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1322 1323 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1324 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1325 1326 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1327 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1328 } 1329 } 1330#endif 1331 1332 /* 1333 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1334 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1335 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1336 */ 1337 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1338#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1339 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1340 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1341 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1342 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1343 /* Can't disable compression */ 1344 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1345 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1347 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1348 goto f_err; 1349 } 1350 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1351 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1352 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1353 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1354 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1355 break; 1356 } 1357 } 1358 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1359 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1361 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1362 goto f_err; 1363 } 1364 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1365 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1366 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1367 break; 1368 } 1369 if (m >= i) { 1370 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1372 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1373 goto f_err; 1374 } 1375 } else if (s->hit) 1376 comp = NULL; 1377 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1378 /* See if we have a match */ 1379 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1380 1381 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1382 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1383 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1384 v = comp->id; 1385 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1386 if (v == q[o]) { 1387 done = 1; 1388 break; 1389 } 1390 } 1391 if (done) 1392 break; 1393 } 1394 if (done) 1395 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1396 else 1397 comp = NULL; 1398 } 1399#else 1400 /* 1401 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1402 * using compression. 1403 */ 1404 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1405 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1407 goto f_err; 1408 } 1409#endif 1410 1411 /* 1412 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1413 */ 1414 1415 if (!s->hit) { 1416#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1417 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1418#else 1419 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1420#endif 1421 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1422 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1423 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1424 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1425 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1427 goto f_err; 1428 } 1429 ciphers = NULL; 1430 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1431 1432 if (c == NULL) { 1433 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1435 goto f_err; 1436 } 1437 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1438 } else { 1439 /* Session-id reuse */ 1440#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1441 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1442 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1443 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1444 1445 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1446 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1447 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1448 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1449 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1450 nc = c; 1451 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1452 ec = c; 1453 } 1454 if (nc != NULL) 1455 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1456 else if (ec != NULL) 1457 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1458 else 1459 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1460 } else 1461#endif 1462 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1463 } 1464 1465 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION 1466 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1467 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 1468 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1469 goto f_err; 1470 } 1471 } 1472 1473 /*- 1474 * we now have the following setup. 1475 * client_random 1476 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1477 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1478 * compression - basically ignored right now 1479 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1480 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1481 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1482 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1483 */ 1484 1485 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1486 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1487 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1489 goto err; 1490 } 1491 } 1492 1493 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1494 if (0) { 1495 f_err: 1496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1497 err: 1498 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1499 } 1500 1501 if (ciphers != NULL) 1502 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1503 return ret; 1504} 1505 1506int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1507{ 1508 unsigned char *buf; 1509 unsigned char *p, *d; 1510 int i, sl; 1511 unsigned long l; 1512 1513 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1514 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1515#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1516 p = s->s3->server_random; 1517 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1518 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1519 return -1; 1520 } 1521#endif 1522 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1523 d = p = &(buf[4]); 1524 1525 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1526 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1527 1528 /* Random stuff */ 1529 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1530 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1531 1532 /*- 1533 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1534 * back in the server hello: 1535 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1536 * we send back the old session ID. 1537 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1538 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1539 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1540 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1541 * session ID. 1542 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1543 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1544 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1545 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1546 * to send back. 1547 */ 1548 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1549 && !s->hit) 1550 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1551 1552 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1553 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1555 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1556 return -1; 1557 } 1558 *(p++) = sl; 1559 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1560 p += sl; 1561 1562 /* put the cipher */ 1563 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1564 p += i; 1565 1566 /* put the compression method */ 1567#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1568 *(p++) = 0; 1569#else 1570 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1571 *(p++) = 0; 1572 else 1573 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1574#endif 1575#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1576 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1578 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1579 return -1; 1580 } 1581 if ((p = 1582 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, 1583 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == 1584 NULL) { 1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1586 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1587 return -1; 1588 } 1589#endif 1590 /* do the header */ 1591 l = (p - d); 1592 d = buf; 1593 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1594 l2n3(l, d); 1595 1596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1597 /* number of bytes to write */ 1598 s->init_num = p - buf; 1599 s->init_off = 0; 1600 } 1601 1602 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1603 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1604} 1605 1606int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1607{ 1608 unsigned char *p; 1609 1610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1611 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1612 1613 /* do the header */ 1614 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1615 *(p++) = 0; 1616 *(p++) = 0; 1617 *(p++) = 0; 1618 1619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1620 /* number of bytes to write */ 1621 s->init_num = 4; 1622 s->init_off = 0; 1623 } 1624 1625 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1626 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1627} 1628 1629int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1630{ 1631#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1632 unsigned char *q; 1633 int j, num; 1634 RSA *rsa; 1635 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1636 unsigned int u; 1637#endif 1638#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1639 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1640#endif 1641#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1642 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1643 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1644 int encodedlen = 0; 1645 int curve_id = 0; 1646 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1647#endif 1648 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1649 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1650 unsigned char *p, *d; 1651 int al, i; 1652 unsigned long type; 1653 int n; 1654 CERT *cert; 1655 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1656 int nr[4], kn; 1657 BUF_MEM *buf; 1658 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1659 1660 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1661 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1662 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1663 cert = s->cert; 1664 1665 buf = s->init_buf; 1666 1667 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1668 n = 0; 1669#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1670 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1671 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1672 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1673 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1674 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1675 tmp.new_cipher), 1676 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1677 tmp.new_cipher)); 1678 if (rsa == NULL) { 1679 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1681 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1682 goto f_err; 1683 } 1684 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1685 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1686 } 1687 if (rsa == NULL) { 1688 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1690 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1691 goto f_err; 1692 } 1693 r[0] = rsa->n; 1694 r[1] = rsa->e; 1695 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1696 } else 1697#endif 1698#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1699 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1700 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1701 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1702 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1703 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1704 tmp.new_cipher), 1705 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1706 tmp.new_cipher)); 1707 if (dhp == NULL) { 1708 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1710 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1711 goto f_err; 1712 } 1713 1714 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1716 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1717 goto err; 1718 } 1719 1720 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1722 goto err; 1723 } 1724 1725 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1726 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1727 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1728 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { 1729 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1731 goto err; 1732 } 1733 } else { 1734 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1735 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1736 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { 1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1738 goto err; 1739 } 1740 } 1741 r[0] = dh->p; 1742 r[1] = dh->g; 1743 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1744 } else 1745#endif 1746#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1747 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1748 const EC_GROUP *group; 1749 1750 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1751 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1752 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1753 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1754 tmp.new_cipher), 1755 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1756 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1757 } 1758 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1759 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1761 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1762 goto f_err; 1763 } 1764 1765 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1767 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1768 goto err; 1769 } 1770 1771 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1772 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1774 goto err; 1775 } 1776 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1778 goto err; 1779 } 1780 1781 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1782 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1783 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1784 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1785 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1787 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1788 goto err; 1789 } 1790 } 1791 1792 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1793 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1794 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1796 goto err; 1797 } 1798 1799 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1800 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1802 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1803 goto err; 1804 } 1805 1806 /* 1807 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1808 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1809 * non-zero. 1810 */ 1811 if ((curve_id = 1812 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1813 == 0) { 1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1815 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1816 goto err; 1817 } 1818 1819 /* 1820 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1821 * allocate memory accordingly. 1822 */ 1823 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1824 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1825 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1826 NULL, 0, NULL); 1827 1828 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1829 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1830 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1831 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1833 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1834 goto err; 1835 } 1836 1837 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1838 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1839 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1840 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1841 1842 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1844 goto err; 1845 } 1846 1847 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1848 bn_ctx = NULL; 1849 1850 /* 1851 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1852 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1853 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1854 * structure. 1855 */ 1856 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1857 1858 /* 1859 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1860 * can set these to NULLs 1861 */ 1862 r[0] = NULL; 1863 r[1] = NULL; 1864 r[2] = NULL; 1865 r[3] = NULL; 1866 } else 1867#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1868#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1869 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1870 /* 1871 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1872 */ 1873 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1874 } else 1875#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1876#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1877 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1878 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1879 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1880 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1882 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1883 goto err; 1884 } 1885 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1886 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1887 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1888 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1889 } else 1890#endif 1891 { 1892 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1894 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1895 goto f_err; 1896 } 1897 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1898 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1899#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1900 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1901 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1902 else 1903#endif 1904 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1905 } 1906 1907 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1908 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1909 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1910 == NULL) { 1911 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1912 goto f_err; 1913 } 1914 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1915 } else { 1916 pkey = NULL; 1917 kn = 0; 1918 } 1919 1920 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) { 1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1922 goto err; 1923 } 1924 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1925 p = &(d[4]); 1926 1927 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1928#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1929 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1930 *p = nr[i]; 1931 p++; 1932 } else 1933#endif 1934 s2n(nr[i], p); 1935 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1936 p += nr[i]; 1937 } 1938 1939#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1940 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1941 /* 1942 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1943 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1944 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1945 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1946 */ 1947 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1948 p += 1; 1949 *p = 0; 1950 p += 1; 1951 *p = curve_id; 1952 p += 1; 1953 *p = encodedlen; 1954 p += 1; 1955 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1956 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1957 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1958 encodedPoint = NULL; 1959 p += encodedlen; 1960 } 1961#endif 1962 1963#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1964 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1965 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1966 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1967 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1968 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1969 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1970 } 1971#endif 1972 1973 /* not anonymous */ 1974 if (pkey != NULL) { 1975 /* 1976 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1977 * points to the space at the end. 1978 */ 1979#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1980 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1981 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1982 q = md_buf; 1983 j = 0; 1984 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1985 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1986 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1987 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, 1988 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 1989 : s->ctx->sha1, 1990 NULL) <= 0 1991 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1992 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1993 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1994 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1995 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 1996 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1997 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { 1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1999 ERR_LIB_EVP); 2000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2001 goto f_err; 2002 } 2003 q += i; 2004 j += i; 2005 } 2006 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 2007 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 2009 goto err; 2010 } 2011 s2n(u, p); 2012 n += u + 2; 2013 } else 2014#endif 2015 if (md) { 2016 /* 2017 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm 2018 */ 2019 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2020 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 2021 /* Should never happen */ 2022 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2025 goto f_err; 2026 } 2027 p += 2; 2028 } 2029#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2030 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 2031#endif 2032 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 2033 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 2034 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2035 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 2036 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 2037 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0 2038 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 2039 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { 2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 2041 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2042 goto f_err; 2043 } 2044 s2n(i, p); 2045 n += i + 2; 2046 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2047 n += 2; 2048 } else { 2049 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2050 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2052 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2053 goto f_err; 2054 } 2055 } 2056 2057 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2058 l2n3(n, d); 2059 2060 /* 2061 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2062 */ 2063 s->init_num = n + 4; 2064 s->init_off = 0; 2065 } 2066 2067 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2069 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2070 f_err: 2071 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2072 err: 2073#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2074 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2075 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2076 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2077#endif 2078 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2079 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2080 return (-1); 2081} 2082 2083int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2084{ 2085 unsigned char *p, *d; 2086 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2087 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2088 X509_NAME *name; 2089 BUF_MEM *buf; 2090 2091 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2092 buf = s->init_buf; 2093 2094 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2095 2096 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2097 p++; 2098 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2099 d[0] = n; 2100 p += n; 2101 n++; 2102 2103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2104 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2105 s2n(nl, p); 2106 p += nl + 2; 2107 n += nl + 2; 2108 } 2109 2110 off = n; 2111 p += 2; 2112 n += 2; 2113 2114 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2115 nl = 0; 2116 if (sk != NULL) { 2117 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2118 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2119 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2120 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) { 2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2122 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2123 goto err; 2124 } 2125 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]); 2126 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2127 s2n(j, p); 2128 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2129 n += 2 + j; 2130 nl += 2 + j; 2131 } else { 2132 d = p; 2133 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2134 j -= 2; 2135 s2n(j, d); 2136 j += 2; 2137 n += j; 2138 nl += j; 2139 } 2140 } 2141 } 2142 /* else no CA names */ 2143 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]); 2144 s2n(nl, p); 2145 2146 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; 2147 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2148 l2n3(n, d); 2149 2150 /* 2151 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2152 */ 2153 2154 s->init_num = n + 4; 2155 s->init_off = 0; 2156#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2157 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2159 goto err; 2160 } 2161 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2162 2163 /* do the header */ 2164 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2165 *(p++) = 0; 2166 *(p++) = 0; 2167 *(p++) = 0; 2168 s->init_num += 4; 2169#endif 2170 2171 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2172 } 2173 2174 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2175 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2176 err: 2177 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2178 return (-1); 2179} 2180 2181int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2182{ 2183 int i, al, ok; 2184 long n; 2185 unsigned long alg_k; 2186 unsigned char *p; 2187#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2188 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2189 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2190#endif 2191#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2192 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2193 DH *dh_srvr; 2194#endif 2195#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2196 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2197#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2198 2199#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2200 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2201 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2202 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2203 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2204#endif 2205 2206 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2207 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2208 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2209 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2210 2211 if (!ok) 2212 return ((int)n); 2213 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2214 2215 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2216 2217#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2218 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2219 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2220 int decrypt_len; 2221 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2222 size_t j; 2223 2224 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2225 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2226 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2227 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2228 /* 2229 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2230 */ 2231 if (rsa == NULL) { 2232 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2234 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2235 goto f_err; 2236 2237 } 2238 } else { 2239 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2240 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2241 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2242 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2244 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2245 goto f_err; 2246 } 2247 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2248 } 2249 2250 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2251 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2252 n2s(p, i); 2253 if (n != i + 2) { 2254 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2255 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2257 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2258 goto f_err; 2259 } else 2260 p -= 2; 2261 } else 2262 n = i; 2263 } 2264 2265 /* 2266 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2267 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2268 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2269 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2270 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2271 */ 2272 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2273 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2275 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2276 goto f_err; 2277 } 2278 2279 /* 2280 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2281 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2282 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2283 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2284 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2285 */ 2286 2287 /* 2288 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. 2289 */ 2290 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2291 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2292 goto err; 2293 decrypt_len = 2294 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2295 ERR_clear_error(); 2296 2297 /* 2298 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will 2299 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. 2300 */ 2301 decrypt_good = 2302 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2303 2304 /* 2305 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2306 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2307 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2308 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2309 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2310 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2311 */ 2312 version_good = 2313 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2314 version_good &= 2315 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2316 2317 /* 2318 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2319 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2320 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2321 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2322 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2323 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2324 * clients. 2325 */ 2326 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2327 unsigned char workaround_good; 2328 workaround_good = 2329 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2330 workaround_good &= 2331 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2332 version_good |= workaround_good; 2333 } 2334 2335 /* 2336 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2337 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2338 */ 2339 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2340 2341 /* 2342 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2343 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2344 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2345 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2346 */ 2347 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2348 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2349 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2350 } 2351 2352 s->session->master_key_length = 2353 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2354 s-> 2355 session->master_key, 2356 p, 2357 sizeof 2358 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2359 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2360 } else 2361#endif 2362#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2363 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2364 n2s(p, i); 2365 if (n != i + 2) { 2366 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2368 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2369 goto err; 2370 } else { 2371 p -= 2; 2372 i = (int)n; 2373 } 2374 } 2375 2376 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2377 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2379 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2380 goto f_err; 2381 } else { 2382 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2383 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2385 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2386 goto f_err; 2387 } else 2388 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2389 } 2390 2391 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2392 if (pub == NULL) { 2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2394 goto err; 2395 } 2396 2397 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2398 2399 if (i <= 0) { 2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2401 BN_clear_free(pub); 2402 goto err; 2403 } 2404 2405 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2406 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2407 2408 BN_clear_free(pub); 2409 pub = NULL; 2410 s->session->master_key_length = 2411 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2412 s-> 2413 session->master_key, 2414 p, i); 2415 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2416 } else 2417#endif 2418#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2419 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2420 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2421 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2422 krb5_data authenticator; 2423 krb5_data enc_pms; 2424 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2426 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2427 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2428 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2429 int padl, outl; 2430 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2431 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2432 int kerr = 0; 2433 2434 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2435 2436 if (!kssl_ctx) 2437 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2438 2439 n2s(p, i); 2440 enc_ticket.length = i; 2441 2442 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2444 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2445 goto err; 2446 } 2447 2448 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2449 p += enc_ticket.length; 2450 2451 n2s(p, i); 2452 authenticator.length = i; 2453 2454 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2456 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2457 goto err; 2458 } 2459 2460 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2461 p += authenticator.length; 2462 2463 n2s(p, i); 2464 enc_pms.length = i; 2465 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2466 p += enc_pms.length; 2467 2468 /* 2469 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2470 */ 2471 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2473 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2474 goto err; 2475 } 2476 2477 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2478 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2480 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2481 goto err; 2482 } 2483 2484 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2485 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2486# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2487 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2488 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2489 if (kssl_err.text) 2490 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2491# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2493 goto err; 2494 } 2495 2496 /* 2497 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2498 * return authtime == 0. 2499 */ 2500 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2501 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2502# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2503 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2504 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2505 if (kssl_err.text) 2506 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2507# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2509 goto err; 2510 } 2511 2512 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2514 goto err; 2515 } 2516# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2517 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2518# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2519 2520 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2521 if (enc == NULL) 2522 goto err; 2523 2524 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2525 2526 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2529 goto err; 2530 } 2531 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2532 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2533 { 2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2536 kerr = 1; 2537 goto kclean; 2538 } 2539 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2541 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2542 kerr = 1; 2543 goto kclean; 2544 } 2545 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2547 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2548 kerr = 1; 2549 goto kclean; 2550 } 2551 outl += padl; 2552 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2554 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2555 kerr = 1; 2556 goto kclean; 2557 } 2558 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2559 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2560 /* 2561 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2562 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2563 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2564 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2565 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2566 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2567 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2568 * cipher) 2569 */ 2570 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2572 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2573 kerr = 1; 2574 goto kclean; 2575 } 2576 } 2577 2578 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2579 2580 s->session->master_key_length = 2581 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2582 s-> 2583 session->master_key, 2584 pms, outl); 2585 2586 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2587 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2588 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2589 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2590 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2591 len); 2592 } 2593 } 2594 2595 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2596 * but it caused problems for apache. 2597 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2598 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2599 */ 2600 2601 kclean: 2602 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); 2603 if (kerr) 2604 goto err; 2605 } else 2606#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2607 2608#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2609 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2610 int ret = 1; 2611 int field_size = 0; 2612 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2613 const EC_GROUP *group; 2614 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2615 2616 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2617 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2619 goto err; 2620 } 2621 2622 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2623 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2624 /* use the certificate */ 2625 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2626 } else { 2627 /* 2628 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2629 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2630 */ 2631 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2632 } 2633 2634 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2635 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2636 2637 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2638 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2640 goto err; 2641 } 2642 2643 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2644 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2646 goto err; 2647 } 2648 2649 if (n == 0L) { 2650 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2651 2652 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2653 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2655 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2656 goto f_err; 2657 } 2658 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2659 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2660 /* 2661 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2662 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2663 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2664 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2665 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2666 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2667 */ 2668 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2670 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2671 goto f_err; 2672 } 2673 2674 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2675 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2676 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2678 goto err; 2679 } 2680 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2681 } else { 2682 /* 2683 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2684 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2685 */ 2686 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2688 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2689 goto err; 2690 } 2691 2692 /* Get encoded point length */ 2693 i = *p; 2694 p += 1; 2695 if (n != 1 + i) { 2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2697 goto err; 2698 } 2699 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2701 goto err; 2702 } 2703 /* 2704 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2705 * to the start 2706 */ 2707 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2708 } 2709 2710 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2711 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2712 if (field_size <= 0) { 2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2714 goto err; 2715 } 2716 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2717 NULL); 2718 if (i <= 0) { 2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2720 goto err; 2721 } 2722 2723 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2724 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2725 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2726 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2727 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2728 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2729 2730 /* Compute the master secret */ 2731 s->session->master_key_length = 2732 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2733 s-> 2734 session->master_key, 2735 p, i); 2736 2737 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2738 return (ret); 2739 } else 2740#endif 2741#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2742 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2743 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2744 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2745 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2746 int psk_err = 1; 2747 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2748 2749 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2750 2751 n2s(p, i); 2752 if (n != i + 2) { 2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2754 goto psk_err; 2755 } 2756 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2758 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2759 goto psk_err; 2760 } 2761 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2763 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2764 goto psk_err; 2765 } 2766 2767 /* 2768 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2769 */ 2770 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2771 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2772 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2773 psk_or_pre_ms, 2774 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2775 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2776 2777 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2779 goto psk_err; 2780 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2781 /* 2782 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2783 */ 2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2785 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2786 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2787 goto psk_err; 2788 } 2789 2790 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2791 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2792 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2793 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2794 s2n(psk_len, t); 2795 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2796 t += psk_len; 2797 s2n(psk_len, t); 2798 2799 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2800 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2801 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); 2802 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2804 goto psk_err; 2805 } 2806 2807 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2808 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2809 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2810 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2811 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2813 goto psk_err; 2814 } 2815 2816 s->session->master_key_length = 2817 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2818 s-> 2819 session->master_key, 2820 psk_or_pre_ms, 2821 pre_ms_len); 2822 psk_err = 0; 2823 psk_err: 2824 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2825 if (psk_err != 0) 2826 goto f_err; 2827 } else 2828#endif 2829#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2830 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2831 int param_len; 2832 2833 n2s(p, i); 2834 param_len = i + 2; 2835 if (param_len > n) { 2836 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2838 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2839 goto f_err; 2840 } 2841 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2843 goto err; 2844 } 2845 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2846 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2847 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2849 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2850 goto f_err; 2851 } 2852 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2853 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2854 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2855 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2857 goto err; 2858 } 2859 2860 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2861 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2862 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2864 goto err; 2865 } 2866 2867 p += i; 2868 } else 2869#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2870 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2871 int ret = 0; 2872 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2873 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2874 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2875 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2876 unsigned long alg_a; 2877 int Ttag, Tclass; 2878 long Tlen; 2879 2880 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2881 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2882 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2883 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2884 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2885 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2886 2887 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2888 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 2889 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2891 goto f_err; 2892 } 2893 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2895 goto gerr; 2896 } 2897 /* 2898 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2899 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2900 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2901 * client certificate for authorization only. 2902 */ 2903 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2904 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2905 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2906 ERR_clear_error(); 2907 } 2908 /* Decrypt session key */ 2909 if (ASN1_get_object 2910 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2911 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2912 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2914 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2915 goto gerr; 2916 } 2917 start = p; 2918 inlen = Tlen; 2919 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2920 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2922 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2923 goto gerr; 2924 } 2925 /* Generate master secret */ 2926 s->session->master_key_length = 2927 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2928 s-> 2929 session->master_key, 2930 premaster_secret, 32); 2931 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); 2932 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2933 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2934 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2935 ret = 2; 2936 else 2937 ret = 1; 2938 gerr: 2939 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2940 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2941 if (ret) 2942 return ret; 2943 else 2944 goto err; 2945 } else { 2946 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2948 goto f_err; 2949 } 2950 2951 return (1); 2952 f_err: 2953 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2954#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2955 err: 2956#endif 2957#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2958 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2959 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2960 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2961 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2962 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2963#endif 2964 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2965 return (-1); 2966} 2967 2968int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2969{ 2970 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2971 unsigned char *p; 2972 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2973 long n; 2974 int type = 0, i, j; 2975 X509 *peer; 2976 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2977 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2978 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2979 2980 /* 2981 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received 2982 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non 2983 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even 2984 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static 2985 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the 2986 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. 2987 */ 2988 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 2989 ret = 1; 2990 goto end; 2991 } 2992 2993 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2994 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2995 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2996 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, 2997 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2998 2999 if (!ok) 3000 return ((int)n); 3001 3002 peer = s->session->peer; 3003 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 3004 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 3005 3006 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3008 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 3009 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3010 goto f_err; 3011 } 3012 3013 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 3014 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3015 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 3016 /* 3017 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 3018 * length field 3019 */ 3020 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3021 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 3022 i = 64; 3023 } else { 3024 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 3025 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 3026 /* Should never happen */ 3027 if (sigalg == -1) { 3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3029 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3030 goto f_err; 3031 } 3032 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 3033 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { 3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3035 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3036 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3037 goto f_err; 3038 } 3039 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3040 if (md == NULL) { 3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3042 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3043 goto f_err; 3044 } 3045#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3046 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3047#endif 3048 p += 2; 3049 n -= 2; 3050 } 3051 n2s(p, i); 3052 n -= 2; 3053 if (i > n) { 3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3055 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3056 goto f_err; 3057 } 3058 } 3059 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3060 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3063 goto f_err; 3064 } 3065 3066 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 3067 long hdatalen = 0; 3068 void *hdata; 3069 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3070 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3072 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3073 goto f_err; 3074 } 3075#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3076 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3077 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3078#endif 3079 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3080 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3082 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3083 goto f_err; 3084 } 3085 3086 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3087 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3089 goto f_err; 3090 } 3091 } else 3092#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3093 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3094 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3095 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3096 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3097 if (i < 0) { 3098 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3100 goto f_err; 3101 } 3102 if (i == 0) { 3103 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3105 goto f_err; 3106 } 3107 } else 3108#endif 3109#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3110 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3111 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3112 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3113 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3114 if (j <= 0) { 3115 /* bad signature */ 3116 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3118 goto f_err; 3119 } 3120 } else 3121#endif 3122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3123 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3124 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3125 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3126 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3127 if (j <= 0) { 3128 /* bad signature */ 3129 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3131 goto f_err; 3132 } 3133 } else 3134#endif 3135 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3136 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3137 unsigned char signature[64]; 3138 int idx; 3139 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3140 if (pctx == NULL) { 3141 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3143 goto f_err; 3144 } 3145 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { 3146 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3147 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3149 goto f_err; 3150 } 3151 if (i != 64) { 3152 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3153 } 3154 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3155 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3156 } 3157 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3158 32); 3159 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3160 if (j <= 0) { 3161 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3163 goto f_err; 3164 } 3165 } else { 3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3167 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3168 goto f_err; 3169 } 3170 3171 ret = 1; 3172 if (0) { 3173 f_err: 3174 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3175 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3176 } 3177 end: 3178 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3179 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3180 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3181 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3182 } 3183 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3184 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3185 return (ret); 3186} 3187 3188int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3189{ 3190 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3191 X509 *x = NULL; 3192 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3193 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3194 unsigned char *d; 3195 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3196 3197 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3198 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3199 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3200 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3201 3202 if (!ok) 3203 return ((int)n); 3204 3205 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3206 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3207 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3209 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3210 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3211 goto f_err; 3212 } 3213 /* 3214 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3215 */ 3216 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3218 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3219 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3220 goto f_err; 3221 } 3222 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3223 return (1); 3224 } 3225 3226 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3227 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3229 goto f_err; 3230 } 3231 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3232 3233 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3235 goto err; 3236 } 3237 3238 n2l3(p, llen); 3239 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3242 goto f_err; 3243 } 3244 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3245 n2l3(p, l); 3246 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3247 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3249 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3250 goto f_err; 3251 } 3252 3253 q = p; 3254 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3255 if (x == NULL) { 3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3257 goto err; 3258 } 3259 if (p != (q + l)) { 3260 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3262 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3263 goto f_err; 3264 } 3265 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3267 goto err; 3268 } 3269 x = NULL; 3270 nc += l + 3; 3271 } 3272 3273 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3274 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3275 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3278 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3279 goto f_err; 3280 } 3281 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3282 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3283 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3285 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3286 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3287 goto f_err; 3288 } 3289 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3290 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3291 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3292 goto f_err; 3293 } 3294 } else { 3295 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3296 if (i <= 0) { 3297 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3299 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3300 goto f_err; 3301 } 3302 } 3303 3304 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3305 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3306 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3307 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3308 3309 /* 3310 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3311 * arrive here. 3312 */ 3313 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3314 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3315 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3317 goto err; 3318 } 3319 } 3320 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3321 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3322 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3323 /* 3324 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3325 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3326 */ 3327 3328 sk = NULL; 3329 3330 ret = 1; 3331 if (0) { 3332 f_err: 3333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3334 err: 3335 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3336 } 3337 3338 if (x != NULL) 3339 X509_free(x); 3340 if (sk != NULL) 3341 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3342 return (ret); 3343} 3344 3345int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3346{ 3347 unsigned long l; 3348 X509 *x; 3349 3350 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3351 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3352 if (x == NULL) { 3353 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3354 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3355 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3358 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3359 return (0); 3360 } 3361 } 3362 3363 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x); 3364 if (!l) { 3365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3366 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3367 return (0); 3368 } 3369 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3370 s->init_num = (int)l; 3371 s->init_off = 0; 3372 } 3373 3374 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3375 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3376} 3377 3378#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3379/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3380int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3381{ 3382 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3383 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3384 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3385 3386 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3387 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3388 const unsigned char *const_p; 3389 int len, slen_full, slen; 3390 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3391 unsigned int hlen; 3392 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3393 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3394 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3395 3396 /* get session encoding length */ 3397 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3398 /* 3399 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3400 * long 3401 */ 3402 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3403 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3404 return -1; 3405 } 3406 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3407 if (!senc) { 3408 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3409 return -1; 3410 } 3411 3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3413 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3414 3415 p = senc; 3416 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3417 goto err; 3418 3419 /* 3420 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3421 */ 3422 const_p = senc; 3423 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3424 if (sess == NULL) 3425 goto err; 3426 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3427 3428 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3429 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3430 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3431 goto err; 3432 } 3433 p = senc; 3434 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3435 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3436 goto err; 3437 } 3438 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3439 3440 /*- 3441 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3442 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3443 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3444 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3445 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3446 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3447 */ 3448 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3449 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3450 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3451 goto err; 3452 3453 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3454 /* do the header */ 3455 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3456 /* Skip message length for now */ 3457 p += 3; 3458 /* 3459 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3460 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3461 */ 3462 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3463 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3464 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3465 goto err; 3466 } else { 3467 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3468 goto err; 3469 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3470 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3471 goto err; 3472 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3473 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3474 goto err; 3475 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3476 } 3477 3478 /* 3479 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3480 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3481 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3482 */ 3483 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3484 3485 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3486 p += 2; 3487 /* Output key name */ 3488 macstart = p; 3489 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3490 p += 16; 3491 /* output IV */ 3492 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3493 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3494 /* Encrypt session data */ 3495 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3496 goto err; 3497 p += len; 3498 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3499 goto err; 3500 p += len; 3501 3502 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3503 goto err; 3504 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3505 goto err; 3506 3507 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3508 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3509 3510 p += hlen; 3511 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3512 /* Total length */ 3513 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3514 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3515 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3516 p += 4; 3517 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3518 3519 /* number of bytes to write */ 3520 s->init_num = len; 3521 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3522 s->init_off = 0; 3523 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3524 } 3525 3526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3527 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3528 err: 3529 if (senc) 3530 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3531 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3532 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3533 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3534 return -1; 3535} 3536 3537int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3538{ 3539 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3540 unsigned char *p; 3541 /*- 3542 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3543 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3544 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3545 * + (ocsp response) 3546 */ 3547 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { 3548 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3549 return -1; 3550 } 3551 3552 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3553 3554 /* do the header */ 3555 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3556 /* message length */ 3557 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3558 /* status type */ 3559 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3560 /* length of OCSP response */ 3561 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3562 /* actual response */ 3563 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3564 /* number of bytes to write */ 3565 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3567 s->init_off = 0; 3568 } 3569 3570 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3571 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3572} 3573 3574# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3575/* 3576 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3577 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3578 */ 3579int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3580{ 3581 int ok; 3582 int proto_len, padding_len; 3583 long n; 3584 const unsigned char *p; 3585 3586 /* 3587 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3588 * extension in their ClientHello 3589 */ 3590 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3592 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3593 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3594 return -1; 3595 } 3596 3597 /* See the payload format below */ 3598 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3599 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3600 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3601 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3602 3603 if (!ok) 3604 return ((int)n); 3605 3606 /* 3607 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3608 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3609 * ssl3_get_finished). 3610 */ 3611 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3613 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3614 return -1; 3615 } 3616 3617 if (n < 2) { 3618 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3619 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3620 } 3621 3622 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3623 3624 /*- 3625 * The payload looks like: 3626 * uint8 proto_len; 3627 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3628 * uint8 padding_len; 3629 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3630 */ 3631 proto_len = p[0]; 3632 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { 3633 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3634 return 0; 3635 } 3636 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3637 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { 3638 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3639 return 0; 3640 } 3641 3642 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3643 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3645 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3646 return 0; 3647 } 3648 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3649 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3650 3651 return 1; 3652} 3653# endif 3654#endif 3655