s3_srvr.c revision 280304
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165# include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177{ 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182} 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187#endif 188#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190{ 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209} 210#endif 211 212int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213{ 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248#endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 return -1; 270 } 271 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 272 273 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 274 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 275 ret = -1; 276 goto end; 277 } 278 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 279 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 280 ret = -1; 281 goto end; 282 } 283 s->init_buf = buf; 284 } 285 286 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 287 ret = -1; 288 goto end; 289 } 290 291 s->init_num = 0; 292 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 293 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 294 /* 295 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 296 */ 297 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 298 299 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 300 /* 301 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 302 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 303 */ 304 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 305 ret = -1; 306 goto end; 307 } 308 309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 310 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 312 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 313 !(s->options & 314 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 315 /* 316 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 317 * support secure renegotiation. 318 */ 319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 320 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 322 ret = -1; 323 goto end; 324 } else { 325 /* 326 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 327 * HelloRequest 328 */ 329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 330 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 331 } 332 break; 333 334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 336 337 s->shutdown = 0; 338 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 339 if (ret <= 0) 340 goto end; 341 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 342 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 343 s->init_num = 0; 344 345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 346 break; 347 348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 349 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 350 break; 351 352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 355 356 s->shutdown = 0; 357 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { 358 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 359 if (ret <= 0) 360 goto end; 361 } 362#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 363 { 364 int al; 365 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 366 /* 367 * callback indicates firther work to be done 368 */ 369 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 370 goto end; 371 } 372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 374 /* 375 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 376 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 377 */ 378 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 380 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 381 ret = -1; 382 goto end; 383 } 384 } 385#endif 386 387 s->renegotiate = 2; 388 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 389 s->init_num = 0; 390 break; 391 392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 393 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 394 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 395 if (ret <= 0) 396 goto end; 397#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 398 if (s->hit) { 399 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 400 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 401 else 402 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 403 } 404#else 405 if (s->hit) 406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 407#endif 408 else 409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 410 s->init_num = 0; 411 break; 412 413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 414 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 415 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 416 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 417 if (! 418 (s->s3->tmp. 419 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 420 SSL_aSRP)) 421&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 422 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 423 if (ret <= 0) 424 goto end; 425#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 426 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 427 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 428 else 429 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 430 } else { 431 skip = 1; 432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 433 } 434#else 435 } else 436 skip = 1; 437 438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 439#endif 440 s->init_num = 0; 441 break; 442 443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 444 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 445 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 446 447 /* 448 * clear this, it may get reset by 449 * send_server_key_exchange 450 */ 451 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 452 453 /* 454 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 455 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 456 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 457 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 458 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 459 * key exchange. 460 */ 461 if (0 462 /* 463 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 464 * provided 465 */ 466#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 467 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 468#endif 469#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 470 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 471 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 472#endif 473 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH)) 474 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 476 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 477 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 478 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 479 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 480 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 481 ) 482 ) 483 ) 484 ) { 485 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 486 if (ret <= 0) 487 goto end; 488 } else 489 skip = 1; 490 491 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 492 s->init_num = 0; 493 break; 494 495 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 496 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 497 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 498 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 499 /* 500 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 501 * during re-negotiation: 502 */ 503 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 504 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 505 /* 506 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 507 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 508 * RFC 2246): 509 */ 510 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 511 /* 512 * ... except when the application insists on 513 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 514 * this for SSL 3) 515 */ 516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 517 /* 518 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 519 */ 520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 521 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 522 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 523 /* 524 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 525 * are omitted 526 */ 527 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 528 /* no cert request */ 529 skip = 1; 530 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 531 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 532 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 533 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 534 return -1; 535 } else { 536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 537 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 538 if (ret <= 0) 539 goto end; 540#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 541 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 542#else 543 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 545#endif 546 s->init_num = 0; 547 } 548 break; 549 550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 552 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 553 if (ret <= 0) 554 goto end; 555 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 557 s->init_num = 0; 558 break; 559 560 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 561 562 /* 563 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 564 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 565 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 566 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 567 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 568 * unconditionally. 569 */ 570 571 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 572 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 573 ret = -1; 574 goto end; 575 } 576 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 577 578 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 579 break; 580 581 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 583 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 584 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 585 if (ret <= 0) 586 goto end; 587 if (ret == 2) 588 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 589 else { 590 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 591 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 592 if (ret <= 0) 593 goto end; 594 } 595 s->init_num = 0; 596 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 597 } 598 break; 599 600 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 602 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 603 if (ret <= 0) 604 goto end; 605 if (ret == 2) { 606 /* 607 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 608 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 609 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 610 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 611 */ 612#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 613 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 614#else 615 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 616 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 617 else 618 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 619#endif 620 s->init_num = 0; 621 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 623 s->init_num = 0; 624 if (!s->session->peer) 625 break; 626 /* 627 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 628 * digest cached records. 629 */ 630 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 632 return -1; 633 } 634 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 635 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 636 return -1; 637 } else { 638 int offset = 0; 639 int dgst_num; 640 641 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 642 s->init_num = 0; 643 644 /* 645 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 646 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 647 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 648 * step 649 */ 650 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 652 return -1; 653 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 654 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 655 int dgst_size; 656 657 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 658 EVP_MD_CTX_type 659 (s-> 660 s3->handshake_dgst 661 [dgst_num]), 662 &(s->s3-> 663 tmp.cert_verify_md 664 [offset])); 665 dgst_size = 666 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 667 if (dgst_size < 0) { 668 ret = -1; 669 goto end; 670 } 671 offset += dgst_size; 672 } 673 } 674 break; 675 676 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 677 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 678 /* 679 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be 680 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need 681 * to set this here because we don't know if we're 682 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not. 683 */ 684 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 685 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 686 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 687 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 688 if (ret <= 0) 689 goto end; 690 691#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 692 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 693#else 694 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 695 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 696 else 697 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 698#endif 699 s->init_num = 0; 700 break; 701 702#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 704 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 705 /* 706 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN. 707 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through 708 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was 709 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 710 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 711 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 712 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 713 * the client's Finished message is read. 714 */ 715 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 716 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 717 718 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 719 if (ret <= 0) 720 goto end; 721 s->init_num = 0; 722 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 723 break; 724#endif 725 726 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 727 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 728 /* 729 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN. 730 * In a full handshake, we end up here through 731 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was 732 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 733 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 734 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 735 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 736 * the client's Finished message is read. 737 */ 738 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 739 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 740 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 741 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 742 if (ret <= 0) 743 goto end; 744 if (s->hit) 745 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 746#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 747 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 748 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 749#endif 750 else 751 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 752 s->init_num = 0; 753 break; 754 755#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 756 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 757 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 758 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 759 if (ret <= 0) 760 goto end; 761 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 762 s->init_num = 0; 763 break; 764 765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 766 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 767 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 768 if (ret <= 0) 769 goto end; 770 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 771 s->init_num = 0; 772 break; 773 774#endif 775 776 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 777 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 778 779 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 780 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 781 ret = -1; 782 goto end; 783 } 784 785 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 786 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 787 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 788 789 if (ret <= 0) 790 goto end; 791 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 792 s->init_num = 0; 793 794 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 795 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 796 { 797 ret = -1; 798 goto end; 799 } 800 801 break; 802 803 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 804 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 805 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 806 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 807 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 808 s->method-> 809 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 810 s->method-> 811 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 812 if (ret <= 0) 813 goto end; 814 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 815 if (s->hit) { 816#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 817 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 818#else 819 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 820 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 821 } else 822 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 823#endif 824 } else 825 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 826 s->init_num = 0; 827 break; 828 829 case SSL_ST_OK: 830 /* clean a few things up */ 831 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 832 833 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 834 s->init_buf = NULL; 835 836 /* remove buffering on output */ 837 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 838 839 s->init_num = 0; 840 841 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 842 * HelloRequest */ 843 s->renegotiate = 0; 844 s->new_session = 0; 845 846 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 847 848 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 849 /* s->server=1; */ 850 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 851 852 if (cb != NULL) 853 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 854 } 855 856 ret = 1; 857 goto end; 858 /* break; */ 859 860 default: 861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 862 ret = -1; 863 goto end; 864 /* break; */ 865 } 866 867 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 868 if (s->debug) { 869 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 870 goto end; 871 } 872 873 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 874 new_state = s->state; 875 s->state = state; 876 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 877 s->state = new_state; 878 } 879 } 880 skip = 0; 881 } 882 end: 883 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 884 885 s->in_handshake--; 886 if (cb != NULL) 887 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 888 return (ret); 889} 890 891int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 892{ 893 unsigned char *p; 894 895 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 896 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 897 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 898 *(p++) = 0; 899 *(p++) = 0; 900 *(p++) = 0; 901 902 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 903 /* number of bytes to write */ 904 s->init_num = 4; 905 s->init_off = 0; 906 } 907 908 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 909 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 910} 911 912int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 913{ 914 int ok; 915 long n; 916 917 /* 918 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 919 * so permit appropriate message length 920 */ 921 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 922 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 923 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 924 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 925 if (!ok) 926 return ((int)n); 927 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 928 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { 929 /* 930 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 931 * negotiation. 932 */ 933 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { 934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, 935 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 936 return -1; 937 } 938 /* 939 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 940 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 941 */ 942#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 943 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 944 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 945 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 946 } 947#endif 948#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 949 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 950 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 951 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 952 } 953#endif 954 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 955 return 2; 956 } 957 return 1; 958} 959 960int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 961{ 962 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1; 963 unsigned int cookie_len; 964 long n; 965 unsigned long id; 966 unsigned char *p, *d, *q; 967 SSL_CIPHER *c; 968#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 969 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 970#endif 971 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 972 973 /* 974 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 975 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 976 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 977 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 978 */ 979 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 980 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 981 } 982 s->first_packet = 1; 983 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 984 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 985 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 986 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 987 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 988 989 if (!ok) 990 return ((int)n); 991 s->first_packet = 0; 992 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 993 994 /* 995 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 996 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 997 */ 998 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 999 p += 2; 1000 1001 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 1002 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { 1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1004 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 1005 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 1006 /* 1007 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 1008 * number 1009 */ 1010 s->version = s->client_version; 1011 } 1012 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1013 goto f_err; 1014 } 1015 1016 /* 1017 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 1018 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 1019 * cookie length... 1020 */ 1021 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 1022 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 1023 1024 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1025 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 1026 1027 if (cookie_length == 0) 1028 return 1; 1029 } 1030 1031 /* load the client random */ 1032 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1033 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1034 1035 /* get the session-id */ 1036 j = *(p++); 1037 1038 s->hit = 0; 1039 /* 1040 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1041 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1042 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1043 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1044 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1045 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1046 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1047 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1048 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1049 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1050 */ 1051 if ((s->new_session 1052 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1053 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1054 goto err; 1055 } else { 1056 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1057 /* 1058 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1059 * version. 1060 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1061 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1062 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1063 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1064 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1065 */ 1066 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1067 * session */ 1068 s->hit = 1; 1069 } else if (i == -1) 1070 goto err; 1071 else { /* i == 0 */ 1072 1073 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1074 goto err; 1075 } 1076 } 1077 1078 p += j; 1079 1080 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 1081 /* cookie stuff */ 1082 cookie_len = *(p++); 1083 1084 /* 1085 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1086 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1087 * does not cause an overflow. 1088 */ 1089 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1090 /* too much data */ 1091 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1093 goto f_err; 1094 } 1095 1096 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1097 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1098 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1099 1100 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1101 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1102 cookie_len) == 0) { 1103 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1105 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1106 goto f_err; 1107 } 1108 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1109 } 1110 /* default verification */ 1111 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1112 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1113 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1115 goto f_err; 1116 } 1117 1118 ret = 2; 1119 } 1120 1121 p += cookie_len; 1122 } 1123 1124 n2s(p, i); 1125 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { 1126 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 1127 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1129 goto f_err; 1130 } 1131 if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) { 1132 /* not enough data */ 1133 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1135 goto f_err; 1136 } 1137 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) 1138 == NULL)) { 1139 goto err; 1140 } 1141 p += i; 1142 1143 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1144 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) { 1145 j = 0; 1146 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1147 1148#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1149 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1150 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1151#endif 1152 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1153 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1154#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1155 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1156 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1157#endif 1158 if (c->id == id) { 1159 j = 1; 1160 break; 1161 } 1162 } 1163 /* 1164 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1165 * CVE-2010-4180. 1166 */ 1167#if 0 1168 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1169 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1170 /* 1171 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1172 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1173 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1174 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1175 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1176 */ 1177 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1178 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1179 s->session->cipher = c; 1180 j = 1; 1181 } 1182 } 1183#endif 1184 if (j == 0) { 1185 /* 1186 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1187 * to reuse it 1188 */ 1189 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1191 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1192 goto f_err; 1193 } 1194 } 1195 1196 /* compression */ 1197 i = *(p++); 1198 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { 1199 /* not enough data */ 1200 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1202 goto f_err; 1203 } 1204 q = p; 1205 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1206 if (p[j] == 0) 1207 break; 1208 } 1209 1210 p += i; 1211 if (j >= i) { 1212 /* no compress */ 1213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1215 goto f_err; 1216 } 1217#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1218 /* TLS extensions */ 1219 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1220 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { 1221 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1223 goto f_err; 1224 } 1225 } 1226 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1228 goto err; 1229 } 1230 1231 /* 1232 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1233 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1234 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1235 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1236 */ 1237 { 1238 unsigned char *pos; 1239 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1240 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1242 goto f_err; 1243 } 1244 } 1245 1246 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1247 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1248 1249 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1250 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1251 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1252 &pref_cipher, 1253 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1254 s->hit = 1; 1255 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1256 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1257 1258 ciphers = NULL; 1259 1260 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1261 pref_cipher = 1262 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1263 s-> 1264 session->ciphers, 1265 SSL_get_ciphers 1266 (s)); 1267 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1268 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1270 goto f_err; 1271 } 1272 1273 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1274 1275 if (s->cipher_list) 1276 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1277 1278 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1279 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1280 1281 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1282 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1283 } 1284 } 1285#endif 1286 1287 /* 1288 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1289 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1290 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1291 */ 1292 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1293#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1294 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1295 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1296 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1297 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1298 /* Can't disable compression */ 1299 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1300 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1302 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1303 goto f_err; 1304 } 1305 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1306 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1307 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1308 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1310 break; 1311 } 1312 } 1313 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1314 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1316 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1317 goto f_err; 1318 } 1319 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1320 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1321 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1322 break; 1323 } 1324 if (m >= i) { 1325 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1327 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1328 goto f_err; 1329 } 1330 } else if (s->hit) 1331 comp = NULL; 1332 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1333 /* See if we have a match */ 1334 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1335 1336 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1337 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1338 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1339 v = comp->id; 1340 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1341 if (v == q[o]) { 1342 done = 1; 1343 break; 1344 } 1345 } 1346 if (done) 1347 break; 1348 } 1349 if (done) 1350 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1351 else 1352 comp = NULL; 1353 } 1354#else 1355 /* 1356 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1357 * using compression. 1358 */ 1359 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1360 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1362 goto f_err; 1363 } 1364#endif 1365 1366 /* 1367 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1368 */ 1369 1370 if (!s->hit) { 1371#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1372 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1373#else 1374 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1375#endif 1376 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1377 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1378 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1379 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1380 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1382 goto f_err; 1383 } 1384 ciphers = NULL; 1385 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1386 1387 if (c == NULL) { 1388 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1390 goto f_err; 1391 } 1392 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1393 } else { 1394 /* Session-id reuse */ 1395#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1396 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1397 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1398 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1399 1400 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1401 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1403 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1404 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1405 nc = c; 1406 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1407 ec = c; 1408 } 1409 if (nc != NULL) 1410 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1411 else if (ec != NULL) 1412 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1413 else 1414 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1415 } else 1416#endif 1417 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1418 } 1419 1420 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION 1421 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1422 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 1423 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1424 goto f_err; 1425 } 1426 } 1427 1428 /*- 1429 * we now have the following setup. 1430 * client_random 1431 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1432 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1433 * compression - basically ignored right now 1434 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1435 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1436 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1437 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1438 */ 1439 1440 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1441 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1442 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1444 goto err; 1445 } 1446 } 1447 1448 if (ret < 0) 1449 ret = 1; 1450 if (0) { 1451 f_err: 1452 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1453 } 1454 err: 1455 if (ciphers != NULL) 1456 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1457 return (ret); 1458} 1459 1460int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1461{ 1462 unsigned char *buf; 1463 unsigned char *p, *d; 1464 int i, sl; 1465 unsigned long l; 1466 1467 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1468 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1469#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1470 p = s->s3->server_random; 1471 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1472 return -1; 1473#endif 1474 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1475 d = p = &(buf[4]); 1476 1477 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1478 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1479 1480 /* Random stuff */ 1481 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1482 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1483 1484 /*- 1485 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1486 * back in the server hello: 1487 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1488 * we send back the old session ID. 1489 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1490 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1491 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1492 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1493 * session ID. 1494 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1495 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1496 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1497 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1498 * to send back. 1499 */ 1500 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1501 && !s->hit) 1502 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1503 1504 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1505 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1507 return -1; 1508 } 1509 *(p++) = sl; 1510 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1511 p += sl; 1512 1513 /* put the cipher */ 1514 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1515 p += i; 1516 1517 /* put the compression method */ 1518#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1519 *(p++) = 0; 1520#else 1521 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1522 *(p++) = 0; 1523 else 1524 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1525#endif 1526#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1527 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1529 return -1; 1530 } 1531 if ((p = 1532 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, 1533 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == 1534 NULL) { 1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1536 return -1; 1537 } 1538#endif 1539 /* do the header */ 1540 l = (p - d); 1541 d = buf; 1542 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1543 l2n3(l, d); 1544 1545 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1546 /* number of bytes to write */ 1547 s->init_num = p - buf; 1548 s->init_off = 0; 1549 } 1550 1551 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1552 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1553} 1554 1555int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1556{ 1557 unsigned char *p; 1558 1559 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1560 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1561 1562 /* do the header */ 1563 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1564 *(p++) = 0; 1565 *(p++) = 0; 1566 *(p++) = 0; 1567 1568 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1569 /* number of bytes to write */ 1570 s->init_num = 4; 1571 s->init_off = 0; 1572 } 1573 1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1575 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1576} 1577 1578int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1579{ 1580#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1581 unsigned char *q; 1582 int j, num; 1583 RSA *rsa; 1584 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1585 unsigned int u; 1586#endif 1587#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1588 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1589#endif 1590#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1591 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1592 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1593 int encodedlen = 0; 1594 int curve_id = 0; 1595 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1596#endif 1597 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1598 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1599 unsigned char *p, *d; 1600 int al, i; 1601 unsigned long type; 1602 int n; 1603 CERT *cert; 1604 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1605 int nr[4], kn; 1606 BUF_MEM *buf; 1607 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1608 1609 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1611 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1612 cert = s->cert; 1613 1614 buf = s->init_buf; 1615 1616 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1617 n = 0; 1618#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1619 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1620 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1621 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1622 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1623 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1624 tmp.new_cipher), 1625 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1626 tmp.new_cipher)); 1627 if (rsa == NULL) { 1628 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1630 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1631 goto f_err; 1632 } 1633 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1634 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1635 } 1636 if (rsa == NULL) { 1637 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1639 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1640 goto f_err; 1641 } 1642 r[0] = rsa->n; 1643 r[1] = rsa->e; 1644 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1645 } else 1646#endif 1647#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1648 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1649 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1650 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1651 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1652 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1653 tmp.new_cipher), 1654 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1655 tmp.new_cipher)); 1656 if (dhp == NULL) { 1657 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1659 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1660 goto f_err; 1661 } 1662 1663 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1665 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1666 goto err; 1667 } 1668 1669 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1671 goto err; 1672 } 1673 1674 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1675 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1676 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1677 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { 1678 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1680 goto err; 1681 } 1682 } else { 1683 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1684 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1685 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { 1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1687 goto err; 1688 } 1689 } 1690 r[0] = dh->p; 1691 r[1] = dh->g; 1692 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1693 } else 1694#endif 1695#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1696 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1697 const EC_GROUP *group; 1698 1699 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1700 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1701 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1702 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1703 tmp.new_cipher), 1704 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1705 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1706 } 1707 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1708 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1710 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1711 goto f_err; 1712 } 1713 1714 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1716 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1717 goto err; 1718 } 1719 1720 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1721 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1723 goto err; 1724 } 1725 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1727 goto err; 1728 } 1729 1730 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1731 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1732 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1733 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1734 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1736 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1737 goto err; 1738 } 1739 } 1740 1741 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1742 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1743 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1745 goto err; 1746 } 1747 1748 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1749 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1751 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1752 goto err; 1753 } 1754 1755 /* 1756 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1757 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1758 * non-zero. 1759 */ 1760 if ((curve_id = 1761 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1762 == 0) { 1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1764 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1765 goto err; 1766 } 1767 1768 /* 1769 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1770 * allocate memory accordingly. 1771 */ 1772 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1773 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1774 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1775 NULL, 0, NULL); 1776 1777 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1778 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1779 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1780 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1782 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1783 goto err; 1784 } 1785 1786 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1787 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1788 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1789 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1790 1791 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1793 goto err; 1794 } 1795 1796 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1797 bn_ctx = NULL; 1798 1799 /* 1800 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1801 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1802 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1803 * structure. 1804 */ 1805 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1806 1807 /* 1808 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1809 * can set these to NULLs 1810 */ 1811 r[0] = NULL; 1812 r[1] = NULL; 1813 r[2] = NULL; 1814 r[3] = NULL; 1815 } else 1816#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1817#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1818 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1819 /* 1820 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1821 */ 1822 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1823 } else 1824#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1825#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1826 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1827 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1828 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1829 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1831 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1832 goto err; 1833 } 1834 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1835 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1836 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1837 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1838 } else 1839#endif 1840 { 1841 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1843 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1844 goto f_err; 1845 } 1846 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1847 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1848#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1849 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1850 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1851 else 1852#endif 1853 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1854 } 1855 1856 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1857 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1858 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1859 == NULL) { 1860 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1861 goto f_err; 1862 } 1863 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1864 } else { 1865 pkey = NULL; 1866 kn = 0; 1867 } 1868 1869 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) { 1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1871 goto err; 1872 } 1873 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1874 p = &(d[4]); 1875 1876 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1877#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1878 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1879 *p = nr[i]; 1880 p++; 1881 } else 1882#endif 1883 s2n(nr[i], p); 1884 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1885 p += nr[i]; 1886 } 1887 1888#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1889 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1890 /* 1891 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1892 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1893 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1894 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1895 */ 1896 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1897 p += 1; 1898 *p = 0; 1899 p += 1; 1900 *p = curve_id; 1901 p += 1; 1902 *p = encodedlen; 1903 p += 1; 1904 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1905 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1906 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1907 encodedPoint = NULL; 1908 p += encodedlen; 1909 } 1910#endif 1911 1912#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1913 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1914 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1915 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1916 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1917 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1918 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1919 } 1920#endif 1921 1922 /* not anonymous */ 1923 if (pkey != NULL) { 1924 /* 1925 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1926 * points to the space at the end. 1927 */ 1928#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1929 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1930 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1931 q = md_buf; 1932 j = 0; 1933 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1934 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1935 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1936 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) 1937 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1938 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1939 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1940 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1941 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); 1943 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); 1944 q += i; 1945 j += i; 1946 } 1947 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1948 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 1949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 1950 goto err; 1951 } 1952 s2n(u, p); 1953 n += u + 2; 1954 } else 1955#endif 1956 if (md) { 1957 /* 1958 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm 1959 */ 1960 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1961 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 1962 /* Should never happen */ 1963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1966 goto f_err; 1967 } 1968 p += 2; 1969 } 1970#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1971 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 1972#endif 1973 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1974 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1975 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1976 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1977 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1978 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n); 1979 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 1980 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { 1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 1982 goto err; 1983 } 1984 s2n(i, p); 1985 n += i + 2; 1986 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1987 n += 2; 1988 } else { 1989 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1990 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1992 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1993 goto f_err; 1994 } 1995 } 1996 1997 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1998 l2n3(n, d); 1999 2000 /* 2001 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2002 */ 2003 s->init_num = n + 4; 2004 s->init_off = 0; 2005 } 2006 2007 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2008 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2009 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2010 f_err: 2011 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2012 err: 2013#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2014 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2015 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2016 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2017#endif 2018 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2019 return (-1); 2020} 2021 2022int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2023{ 2024 unsigned char *p, *d; 2025 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2026 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2027 X509_NAME *name; 2028 BUF_MEM *buf; 2029 2030 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2031 buf = s->init_buf; 2032 2033 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2034 2035 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2036 p++; 2037 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2038 d[0] = n; 2039 p += n; 2040 n++; 2041 2042 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2043 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2044 s2n(nl, p); 2045 p += nl + 2; 2046 n += nl + 2; 2047 } 2048 2049 off = n; 2050 p += 2; 2051 n += 2; 2052 2053 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2054 nl = 0; 2055 if (sk != NULL) { 2056 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2057 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2058 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2059 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) { 2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2061 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2062 goto err; 2063 } 2064 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]); 2065 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2066 s2n(j, p); 2067 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2068 n += 2 + j; 2069 nl += 2 + j; 2070 } else { 2071 d = p; 2072 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2073 j -= 2; 2074 s2n(j, d); 2075 j += 2; 2076 n += j; 2077 nl += j; 2078 } 2079 } 2080 } 2081 /* else no CA names */ 2082 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]); 2083 s2n(nl, p); 2084 2085 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; 2086 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2087 l2n3(n, d); 2088 2089 /* 2090 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off 2091 */ 2092 2093 s->init_num = n + 4; 2094 s->init_off = 0; 2095#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2096 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2098 goto err; 2099 } 2100 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2101 2102 /* do the header */ 2103 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2104 *(p++) = 0; 2105 *(p++) = 0; 2106 *(p++) = 0; 2107 s->init_num += 4; 2108#endif 2109 2110 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2111 } 2112 2113 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2114 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2115 err: 2116 return (-1); 2117} 2118 2119int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2120{ 2121 int i, al, ok; 2122 long n; 2123 unsigned long alg_k; 2124 unsigned char *p; 2125#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2126 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2127 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2128#endif 2129#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2130 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2131 DH *dh_srvr; 2132#endif 2133#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2134 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2135#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2136 2137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2138 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2139 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2140 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2141 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2142#endif 2143 2144 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2145 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2146 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2147 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2148 2149 if (!ok) 2150 return ((int)n); 2151 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2152 2153 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2154 2155#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2156 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2157 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2158 int decrypt_len; 2159 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2160 size_t j; 2161 2162 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2163 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2164 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2165 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2166 /* 2167 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2168 */ 2169 if (rsa == NULL) { 2170 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2172 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2173 goto f_err; 2174 2175 } 2176 } else { 2177 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2178 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2179 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2180 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2182 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2183 goto f_err; 2184 } 2185 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2186 } 2187 2188 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2189 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2190 n2s(p, i); 2191 if (n != i + 2) { 2192 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2193 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2195 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2196 goto f_err; 2197 } else 2198 p -= 2; 2199 } else 2200 n = i; 2201 } 2202 2203 /* 2204 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2205 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2206 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2207 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2208 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2209 */ 2210 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2211 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2213 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2214 goto f_err; 2215 } 2216 2217 /* 2218 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2219 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2220 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2221 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2222 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2223 */ 2224 2225 /* 2226 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. 2227 */ 2228 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2229 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2230 goto err; 2231 decrypt_len = 2232 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2233 ERR_clear_error(); 2234 2235 /* 2236 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will 2237 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. 2238 */ 2239 decrypt_good = 2240 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2241 2242 /* 2243 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2244 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2245 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2246 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2247 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2248 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2249 */ 2250 version_good = 2251 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2252 version_good &= 2253 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2254 2255 /* 2256 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2257 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2258 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2259 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2260 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2261 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2262 * clients. 2263 */ 2264 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2265 unsigned char workaround_good; 2266 workaround_good = 2267 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2268 workaround_good &= 2269 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2270 version_good |= workaround_good; 2271 } 2272 2273 /* 2274 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2275 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2276 */ 2277 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2278 2279 /* 2280 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2281 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2282 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2283 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2284 */ 2285 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2286 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2287 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2288 } 2289 2290 s->session->master_key_length = 2291 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2292 s-> 2293 session->master_key, 2294 p, 2295 sizeof 2296 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2297 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2298 } else 2299#endif 2300#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2301 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2302 n2s(p, i); 2303 if (n != i + 2) { 2304 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2306 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2307 goto err; 2308 } else { 2309 p -= 2; 2310 i = (int)n; 2311 } 2312 } 2313 2314 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2315 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2317 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2318 goto f_err; 2319 } else { 2320 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2321 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2323 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2324 goto f_err; 2325 } else 2326 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2327 } 2328 2329 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2330 if (pub == NULL) { 2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2332 goto err; 2333 } 2334 2335 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2336 2337 if (i <= 0) { 2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2339 BN_clear_free(pub); 2340 goto err; 2341 } 2342 2343 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2344 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2345 2346 BN_clear_free(pub); 2347 pub = NULL; 2348 s->session->master_key_length = 2349 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2350 s-> 2351 session->master_key, 2352 p, i); 2353 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2354 } else 2355#endif 2356#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2357 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2358 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2359 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2360 krb5_data authenticator; 2361 krb5_data enc_pms; 2362 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2364 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2365 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2366 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2367 int padl, outl; 2368 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2369 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2370 2371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2372 2373 if (!kssl_ctx) 2374 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2375 2376 n2s(p, i); 2377 enc_ticket.length = i; 2378 2379 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2381 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2382 goto err; 2383 } 2384 2385 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2386 p += enc_ticket.length; 2387 2388 n2s(p, i); 2389 authenticator.length = i; 2390 2391 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2393 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2394 goto err; 2395 } 2396 2397 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2398 p += authenticator.length; 2399 2400 n2s(p, i); 2401 enc_pms.length = i; 2402 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2403 p += enc_pms.length; 2404 2405 /* 2406 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2407 */ 2408 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2410 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2411 goto err; 2412 } 2413 2414 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2415 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2417 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2418 goto err; 2419 } 2420 2421 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2422 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2423# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2424 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2425 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2426 if (kssl_err.text) 2427 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2428# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2430 goto err; 2431 } 2432 2433 /* 2434 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2435 * return authtime == 0. 2436 */ 2437 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2438 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2439# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2440 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2441 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2442 if (kssl_err.text) 2443 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2444# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2446 goto err; 2447 } 2448 2449 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2451 goto err; 2452 } 2453# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2454 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2455# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2456 2457 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2458 if (enc == NULL) 2459 goto err; 2460 2461 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2462 2463 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2465 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2466 goto err; 2467 } 2468 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2469 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2470 { 2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2472 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2473 goto err; 2474 } 2475 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2477 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2478 goto err; 2479 } 2480 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2482 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2483 goto err; 2484 } 2485 outl += padl; 2486 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2488 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2489 goto err; 2490 } 2491 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2492 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2493 /* 2494 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2495 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2496 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2497 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2498 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2499 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2500 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2501 * cipher) 2502 */ 2503 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2505 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2506 goto err; 2507 } 2508 } 2509 2510 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2511 2512 s->session->master_key_length = 2513 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2514 s-> 2515 session->master_key, 2516 pms, outl); 2517 2518 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2519 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2520 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2521 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2522 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2523 len); 2524 } 2525 } 2526 2527 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2528 * but it caused problems for apache. 2529 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2530 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2531 */ 2532 } else 2533#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2534 2535#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2536 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2537 int ret = 1; 2538 int field_size = 0; 2539 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2540 const EC_GROUP *group; 2541 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2542 2543 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2544 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2546 goto err; 2547 } 2548 2549 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2550 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2551 /* use the certificate */ 2552 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2553 } else { 2554 /* 2555 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2556 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2557 */ 2558 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2559 } 2560 2561 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2562 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2563 2564 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2565 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2567 goto err; 2568 } 2569 2570 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2571 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2573 goto err; 2574 } 2575 2576 if (n == 0L) { 2577 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2578 2579 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2580 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2582 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2583 goto f_err; 2584 } 2585 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2586 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2587 /* 2588 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2589 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2590 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2591 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2592 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2593 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2594 */ 2595 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2597 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2598 goto f_err; 2599 } 2600 2601 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2602 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2603 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2605 goto err; 2606 } 2607 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2608 } else { 2609 /* 2610 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2611 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2612 */ 2613 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2615 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2616 goto err; 2617 } 2618 2619 /* Get encoded point length */ 2620 i = *p; 2621 p += 1; 2622 if (n != 1 + i) { 2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2624 goto err; 2625 } 2626 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2628 goto err; 2629 } 2630 /* 2631 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2632 * to the start 2633 */ 2634 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2635 } 2636 2637 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2638 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2639 if (field_size <= 0) { 2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2641 goto err; 2642 } 2643 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2644 NULL); 2645 if (i <= 0) { 2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2647 goto err; 2648 } 2649 2650 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2651 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2652 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2653 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2654 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2655 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2656 2657 /* Compute the master secret */ 2658 s->session->master_key_length = 2659 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2660 s-> 2661 session->master_key, 2662 p, i); 2663 2664 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2665 return (ret); 2666 } else 2667#endif 2668#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2669 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2670 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2671 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2672 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2673 int psk_err = 1; 2674 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2675 2676 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2677 2678 n2s(p, i); 2679 if (n != i + 2) { 2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2681 goto psk_err; 2682 } 2683 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2685 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2686 goto psk_err; 2687 } 2688 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2690 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2691 goto psk_err; 2692 } 2693 2694 /* 2695 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2696 */ 2697 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2698 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2699 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2700 psk_or_pre_ms, 2701 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2702 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2703 2704 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2706 goto psk_err; 2707 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2708 /* 2709 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2710 */ 2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2712 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2713 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2714 goto psk_err; 2715 } 2716 2717 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2718 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2719 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2720 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2721 s2n(psk_len, t); 2722 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2723 t += psk_len; 2724 s2n(psk_len, t); 2725 2726 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2727 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2728 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); 2729 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2731 goto psk_err; 2732 } 2733 2734 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2735 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2736 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2737 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2738 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2740 goto psk_err; 2741 } 2742 2743 s->session->master_key_length = 2744 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2745 s-> 2746 session->master_key, 2747 psk_or_pre_ms, 2748 pre_ms_len); 2749 psk_err = 0; 2750 psk_err: 2751 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2752 if (psk_err != 0) 2753 goto f_err; 2754 } else 2755#endif 2756#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2757 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2758 int param_len; 2759 2760 n2s(p, i); 2761 param_len = i + 2; 2762 if (param_len > n) { 2763 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2765 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2766 goto f_err; 2767 } 2768 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2770 goto err; 2771 } 2772 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2773 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2774 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2776 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2777 goto f_err; 2778 } 2779 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2780 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2781 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2782 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2784 goto err; 2785 } 2786 2787 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2788 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2789 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2791 goto err; 2792 } 2793 2794 p += i; 2795 } else 2796#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2797 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2798 int ret = 0; 2799 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2800 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2801 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2802 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2803 unsigned long alg_a; 2804 int Ttag, Tclass; 2805 long Tlen; 2806 2807 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2808 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2809 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2810 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2811 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2812 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2813 2814 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2815 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2816 /* 2817 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2818 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2819 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2820 * client certificate for authorization only. 2821 */ 2822 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2823 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2824 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2825 ERR_clear_error(); 2826 } 2827 /* Decrypt session key */ 2828 if (ASN1_get_object 2829 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2830 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2831 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2833 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2834 goto gerr; 2835 } 2836 start = p; 2837 inlen = Tlen; 2838 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2839 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2841 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2842 goto gerr; 2843 } 2844 /* Generate master secret */ 2845 s->session->master_key_length = 2846 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2847 s-> 2848 session->master_key, 2849 premaster_secret, 32); 2850 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2851 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2852 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2853 ret = 2; 2854 else 2855 ret = 1; 2856 gerr: 2857 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2858 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2859 if (ret) 2860 return ret; 2861 else 2862 goto err; 2863 } else { 2864 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2866 goto f_err; 2867 } 2868 2869 return (1); 2870 f_err: 2871 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2872#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2873 err: 2874#endif 2875#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2876 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2877 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2878 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2879 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2880 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2881#endif 2882 return (-1); 2883} 2884 2885int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2886{ 2887 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2888 unsigned char *p; 2889 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2890 long n; 2891 int type = 0, i, j; 2892 X509 *peer; 2893 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2894 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2895 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2896 2897 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2898 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2899 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2900 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2901 2902 if (!ok) 2903 return ((int)n); 2904 2905 if (s->session->peer != NULL) { 2906 peer = s->session->peer; 2907 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2908 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2909 } else { 2910 peer = NULL; 2911 pkey = NULL; 2912 } 2913 2914 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { 2915 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 2916 if (peer != NULL) { 2917 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2919 goto f_err; 2920 } 2921 ret = 1; 2922 goto end; 2923 } 2924 2925 if (peer == NULL) { 2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2927 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2928 goto f_err; 2929 } 2930 2931 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2933 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2934 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2935 goto f_err; 2936 } 2937 2938 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2940 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2941 goto f_err; 2942 } 2943 2944 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2945 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2946 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2947 /* 2948 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 2949 * length field 2950 */ 2951 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2952 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 2953 i = 64; 2954 } else { 2955 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2956 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 2957 /* Should never happen */ 2958 if (sigalg == -1) { 2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2960 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2961 goto f_err; 2962 } 2963 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 2964 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { 2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2966 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 2967 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2968 goto f_err; 2969 } 2970 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 2971 if (md == NULL) { 2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 2973 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2974 goto f_err; 2975 } 2976#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 2977 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 2978#endif 2979 p += 2; 2980 n -= 2; 2981 } 2982 n2s(p, i); 2983 n -= 2; 2984 if (i > n) { 2985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2986 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2987 goto f_err; 2988 } 2989 } 2990 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2991 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2993 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2994 goto f_err; 2995 } 2996 2997 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2998 long hdatalen = 0; 2999 void *hdata; 3000 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3001 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3004 goto f_err; 3005 } 3006#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3007 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3008 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3009#endif 3010 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3011 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3013 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3014 goto f_err; 3015 } 3016 3017 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3018 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3020 goto f_err; 3021 } 3022 } else 3023#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3024 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3025 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3026 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3027 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3028 if (i < 0) { 3029 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3031 goto f_err; 3032 } 3033 if (i == 0) { 3034 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3036 goto f_err; 3037 } 3038 } else 3039#endif 3040#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3041 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3042 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3043 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3044 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3045 if (j <= 0) { 3046 /* bad signature */ 3047 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3049 goto f_err; 3050 } 3051 } else 3052#endif 3053#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3054 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3055 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3056 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3057 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3058 if (j <= 0) { 3059 /* bad signature */ 3060 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3062 goto f_err; 3063 } 3064 } else 3065#endif 3066 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3067 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3068 unsigned char signature[64]; 3069 int idx; 3070 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3071 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3072 if (i != 64) { 3073 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3074 } 3075 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3076 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3077 } 3078 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3079 32); 3080 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3081 if (j <= 0) { 3082 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3084 goto f_err; 3085 } 3086 } else { 3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3088 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3089 goto f_err; 3090 } 3091 3092 ret = 1; 3093 if (0) { 3094 f_err: 3095 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3096 } 3097 end: 3098 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3099 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3100 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3101 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3102 } 3103 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3104 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3105 return (ret); 3106} 3107 3108int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3109{ 3110 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3111 X509 *x = NULL; 3112 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3113 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3114 unsigned char *d; 3115 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3116 3117 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3118 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3119 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3120 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3121 3122 if (!ok) 3123 return ((int)n); 3124 3125 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3126 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3127 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3129 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3130 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3131 goto f_err; 3132 } 3133 /* 3134 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3135 */ 3136 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3138 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3139 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3140 goto f_err; 3141 } 3142 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3143 return (1); 3144 } 3145 3146 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3147 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3149 goto f_err; 3150 } 3151 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3152 3153 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3155 goto err; 3156 } 3157 3158 n2l3(p, llen); 3159 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3162 goto f_err; 3163 } 3164 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3165 n2l3(p, l); 3166 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3169 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3170 goto f_err; 3171 } 3172 3173 q = p; 3174 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3175 if (x == NULL) { 3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3177 goto err; 3178 } 3179 if (p != (q + l)) { 3180 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3182 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3183 goto f_err; 3184 } 3185 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3187 goto err; 3188 } 3189 x = NULL; 3190 nc += l + 3; 3191 } 3192 3193 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3194 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3195 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3196 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3198 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3199 goto f_err; 3200 } 3201 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3202 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3203 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3205 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3206 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3207 goto f_err; 3208 } 3209 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3210 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3211 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3212 goto f_err; 3213 } 3214 } else { 3215 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3216 if (i <= 0) { 3217 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3219 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3220 goto f_err; 3221 } 3222 } 3223 3224 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3225 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3226 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3227 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3228 3229 /* 3230 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3231 * arrive here. 3232 */ 3233 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3234 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3235 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3237 goto err; 3238 } 3239 } 3240 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3241 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3242 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3243 /* 3244 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3245 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3246 */ 3247 3248 sk = NULL; 3249 3250 ret = 1; 3251 if (0) { 3252 f_err: 3253 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3254 } 3255 err: 3256 if (x != NULL) 3257 X509_free(x); 3258 if (sk != NULL) 3259 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3260 return (ret); 3261} 3262 3263int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3264{ 3265 unsigned long l; 3266 X509 *x; 3267 3268 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3269 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3270 if (x == NULL) { 3271 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3272 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3273 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3276 return (0); 3277 } 3278 } 3279 3280 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x); 3281 if (!l) { 3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3283 return (0); 3284 } 3285 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3286 s->init_num = (int)l; 3287 s->init_off = 0; 3288 } 3289 3290 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3291 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3292} 3293 3294#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3295/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3296int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3297{ 3298 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3300 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3301 3302 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3303 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3304 const unsigned char *const_p; 3305 int len, slen_full, slen; 3306 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3307 unsigned int hlen; 3308 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3309 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3310 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3311 3312 /* get session encoding length */ 3313 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3314 /* 3315 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3316 * long 3317 */ 3318 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) 3319 return -1; 3320 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3321 if (!senc) 3322 return -1; 3323 3324 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3325 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3326 3327 p = senc; 3328 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3329 goto err; 3330 3331 /* 3332 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3333 */ 3334 const_p = senc; 3335 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3336 if (sess == NULL) 3337 goto err; 3338 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3339 3340 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3341 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3342 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3343 goto err; 3344 } 3345 p = senc; 3346 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3347 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3348 goto err; 3349 } 3350 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3351 3352 /*- 3353 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3354 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3355 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3356 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3357 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3358 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3359 */ 3360 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3361 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3362 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3363 goto err; 3364 3365 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3366 /* do the header */ 3367 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3368 /* Skip message length for now */ 3369 p += 3; 3370 /* 3371 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3372 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3373 */ 3374 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3375 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3376 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3377 goto err; 3378 } else { 3379 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3380 goto err; 3381 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3382 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3383 goto err; 3384 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3385 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3386 goto err; 3387 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3388 } 3389 3390 /* 3391 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3392 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3393 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3394 */ 3395 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3396 3397 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3398 p += 2; 3399 /* Output key name */ 3400 macstart = p; 3401 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3402 p += 16; 3403 /* output IV */ 3404 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3405 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3406 /* Encrypt session data */ 3407 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3408 goto err; 3409 p += len; 3410 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3411 goto err; 3412 p += len; 3413 3414 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3415 goto err; 3416 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3417 goto err; 3418 3419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3420 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3421 3422 p += hlen; 3423 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3424 /* Total length */ 3425 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3426 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3427 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3428 p += 4; 3429 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3430 3431 /* number of bytes to write */ 3432 s->init_num = len; 3433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3434 s->init_off = 0; 3435 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3436 } 3437 3438 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3439 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3440 err: 3441 if (senc) 3442 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3443 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3444 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3445 return -1; 3446} 3447 3448int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3449{ 3450 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3451 unsigned char *p; 3452 /*- 3453 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3454 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3455 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3456 * + (ocsp response) 3457 */ 3458 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3459 return -1; 3460 3461 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3462 3463 /* do the header */ 3464 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3465 /* message length */ 3466 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3467 /* status type */ 3468 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3469 /* length of OCSP response */ 3470 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3471 /* actual response */ 3472 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3473 /* number of bytes to write */ 3474 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3475 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3476 s->init_off = 0; 3477 } 3478 3479 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3480 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3481} 3482 3483# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3484/* 3485 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3486 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3487 */ 3488int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3489{ 3490 int ok; 3491 int proto_len, padding_len; 3492 long n; 3493 const unsigned char *p; 3494 3495 /* 3496 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3497 * extension in their ClientHello 3498 */ 3499 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3501 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3502 return -1; 3503 } 3504 3505 /* See the payload format below */ 3506 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3507 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3508 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3509 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3510 3511 if (!ok) 3512 return ((int)n); 3513 3514 /* 3515 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3516 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3517 * ssl3_get_finished). 3518 */ 3519 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3521 return -1; 3522 } 3523 3524 if (n < 2) 3525 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3526 3527 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3528 3529 /*- 3530 * The payload looks like: 3531 * uint8 proto_len; 3532 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3533 * uint8 padding_len; 3534 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3535 */ 3536 proto_len = p[0]; 3537 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) 3538 return 0; 3539 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3540 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) 3541 return 0; 3542 3543 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3544 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3546 return 0; 3547 } 3548 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3549 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3550 3551 return 1; 3552} 3553# endif 3554#endif 3555