s3_srvr.c revision 267103
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include <openssl/buffer.h> 158#include <openssl/rand.h> 159#include <openssl/objects.h> 160#include <openssl/evp.h> 161#include <openssl/hmac.h> 162#include <openssl/x509.h> 163#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 164#include <openssl/dh.h> 165#endif 166#include <openssl/bn.h> 167#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 168#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 169#endif 170#include <openssl/md5.h> 171 172static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 173 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 175 { 176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 177 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 178 else 179 return(NULL); 180 } 181 182#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 183static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 184 { 185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 186 187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 188 189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) 191 { 192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) 193 { 194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 195 we do so if There is no srp login name */ 196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 198 } 199 else 200 { 201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al); 202 } 203 } 204 return ret; 205 } 206#endif 207 208IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 209 ssl3_accept, 210 ssl_undefined_function, 211 ssl3_get_server_method) 212 213int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 214 { 215 BUF_MEM *buf; 216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 218 int ret= -1; 219 int new_state,state,skip=0; 220 221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 222 ERR_clear_error(); 223 clear_sys_error(); 224 225 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 226 cb=s->info_callback; 227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 229 230 /* init things to blank */ 231 s->in_handshake++; 232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) 235 { 236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 237 return(-1); 238 } 239 240#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we 242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because 243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway. 244 */ 245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 246 { 247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 249 } 250#endif 251 252 for (;;) 253 { 254 state=s->state; 255 256 switch (s->state) 257 { 258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 259 s->renegotiate=1; 260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 261 262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 266 267 s->server=1; 268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 269 270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 271 { 272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 273 return -1; 274 } 275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 276 277 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 278 { 279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 280 { 281 ret= -1; 282 goto end; 283 } 284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 285 { 286 ret= -1; 287 goto end; 288 } 289 s->init_buf=buf; 290 } 291 292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 293 { 294 ret= -1; 295 goto end; 296 } 297 298 s->init_num=0; 299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 300 301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 302 { 303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 305 */ 306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 307 308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 310 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 311 } 312 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 314 { 315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 316 * client that doesn't support secure 317 * renegotiation. 318 */ 319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 320 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 321 ret = -1; 322 goto end; 323 } 324 else 325 { 326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 328 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 329 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 330 } 331 break; 332 333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 335 336 s->shutdown=0; 337 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 338 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 339 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 341 s->init_num=0; 342 343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 344 break; 345 346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 347 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 348 break; 349 350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 353 354 s->shutdown=0; 355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) 356 { 357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 358 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 359 } 360#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 361 { 362 int al; 363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0) 364 { 365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */ 366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 367 goto end; 368 } 369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) 370 { 371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to 373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ 374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 377 ret= -1; 378 goto end; 379 } 380 } 381#endif 382 383 s->renegotiate = 2; 384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 385 s->init_num=0; 386 break; 387 388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 391 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 392#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 393 if (s->hit) 394 { 395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 397 else 398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 399 } 400#else 401 if (s->hit) 402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 403#endif 404 else 405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 406 s->init_num=0; 407 break; 408 409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) 415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) 416 { 417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 418 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 422 else 423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 424 } 425 else 426 { 427 skip = 1; 428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 429 } 430#else 431 } 432 else 433 skip=1; 434 435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 436#endif 437 s->init_num=0; 438 break; 439 440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 443 444 /* clear this, it may get reset by 445 * send_server_key_exchange */ 446 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 447#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 448 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 449#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 450 ) 451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 454 * be able to handle this) */ 455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 456 else 457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 458 459 460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 462 * 463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints 464 * 465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 466 * message only if the cipher suite is either 467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 468 * server certificate contains the server's 469 * public key for key exchange. 470 */ 471 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity 473 * hint if provided */ 474#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 476#endif 477#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 480#endif 481 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) 482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 487 ) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) 491 { 492 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 493 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 494 } 495 else 496 skip=1; 497 498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 499 s->init_num=0; 500 break; 501 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 512 * and in RFC 2246): */ 513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 518 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) 519 /* With normal PSK Certificates and 520 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ 521 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 522 { 523 /* no cert request */ 524 skip=1; 525 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 527 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 529 return -1; 530 } 531 else 532 { 533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 534 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 535 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 536#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 538#else 539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 540 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 541#endif 542 s->init_num=0; 543 } 544 break; 545 546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 548 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 549 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 550 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 552 s->init_num=0; 553 break; 554 555 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 556 557 /* This code originally checked to see if 558 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 559 * and then flushed. This caused problems 560 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 561 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 562 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 563 * still exist. So instead we just flush 564 * unconditionally. 565 */ 566 567 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 568 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 569 { 570 ret= -1; 571 goto end; 572 } 573 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 574 575 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 576 break; 577 578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 580 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 581 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 582 if (ret <= 0) 583 goto end; 584 if (ret == 2) 585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 586 else { 587 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 588 { 589 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 590 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 591 } 592 s->init_num=0; 593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 594 } 595 break; 596 597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 599 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 600 if (ret <= 0) 601 goto end; 602 if (ret == 2) 603 { 604 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 605 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 606 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 607 * message is not sent. 608 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 609 * the client uses its key from the certificate 610 * for key exchange. 611 */ 612#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 614#else 615 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 617 else 618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 619#endif 620 s->init_num = 0; 621 } 622 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 623 { 624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 625 s->init_num=0; 626 if (!s->session->peer) 627 break; 628 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer 629 * at this point and digest cached records. 630 */ 631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) 632 { 633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 634 return -1; 635 } 636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 638 return -1; 639 } 640 else 641 { 642 int offset=0; 643 int dgst_num; 644 645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 646 s->init_num=0; 647 648 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 649 * a client cert, it can be verified 650 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify 651 * should be generalized. But it is next step 652 */ 653 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 655 return -1; 656 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) 657 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 658 { 659 int dgst_size; 660 661 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 662 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 663 if (dgst_size < 0) 664 { 665 ret = -1; 666 goto end; 667 } 668 offset+=dgst_size; 669 } 670 } 671 break; 672 673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 675 676 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 677 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 678 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 679 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 680 681#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 682 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 683#else 684 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 685 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 686 else 687 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 688#endif 689 s->init_num=0; 690 break; 691 692#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 695 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 696 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 697 s->init_num = 0; 698 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 699 break; 700#endif 701 702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 704 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 705 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 706 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 707 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 708 if (s->hit) 709 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 710#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 711 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 713#endif 714 else 715 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 716 s->init_num=0; 717 break; 718 719#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 720 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 721 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 722 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 723 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 724 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 725 s->init_num=0; 726 break; 727 728 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 729 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 730 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 731 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 732 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 733 s->init_num=0; 734 break; 735 736#endif 737 738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 739 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 740 741 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 742 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 743 { ret= -1; goto end; } 744 745 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 746 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 747 748 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 749 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 750 s->init_num=0; 751 752 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 753 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 754 { 755 ret= -1; 756 goto end; 757 } 758 759 break; 760 761 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 762 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 763 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 764 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 765 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 766 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 767 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 769 if (s->hit) 770 { 771#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 772 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 773#else 774 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 775 { 776 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 777 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 778 } 779 else 780 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 781#endif 782 } 783 else 784 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 785 s->init_num=0; 786 break; 787 788 case SSL_ST_OK: 789 /* clean a few things up */ 790 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 791 792 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 793 s->init_buf=NULL; 794 795 /* remove buffering on output */ 796 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 797 798 s->init_num=0; 799 800 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 801 { 802 s->renegotiate=0; 803 s->new_session=0; 804 805 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 806 807 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 808 /* s->server=1; */ 809 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 810 811 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 812 } 813 814 ret = 1; 815 goto end; 816 /* break; */ 817 818 default: 819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 820 ret= -1; 821 goto end; 822 /* break; */ 823 } 824 825 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 826 { 827 if (s->debug) 828 { 829 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 830 goto end; 831 } 832 833 834 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 835 { 836 new_state=s->state; 837 s->state=state; 838 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 839 s->state=new_state; 840 } 841 } 842 skip=0; 843 } 844end: 845 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 846 847 s->in_handshake--; 848 if (cb != NULL) 849 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 850 return(ret); 851 } 852 853int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 854 { 855 unsigned char *p; 856 857 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 858 { 859 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 860 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 861 *(p++)=0; 862 *(p++)=0; 863 *(p++)=0; 864 865 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 866 /* number of bytes to write */ 867 s->init_num=4; 868 s->init_off=0; 869 } 870 871 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 872 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 873 } 874 875int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 876 { 877 int ok; 878 long n; 879 880 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 881 * so permit appropriate message length */ 882 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 883 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 884 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 885 -1, 886 s->max_cert_list, 887 &ok); 888 if (!ok) return((int)n); 889 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 890 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 891 { 892 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 893 * negotiation. */ 894 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) 895 { 896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 897 return -1; 898 } 899 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 900 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ 901#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 902 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 903 { 904 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 905 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 906 } 907#endif 908#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 909 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 910 { 911 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 912 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 913 } 914#endif 915 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 916 return 2; 917 } 918 return 1; 919} 920 921int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 922 { 923 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 924 unsigned int cookie_len; 925 long n; 926 unsigned long id; 927 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 928 SSL_CIPHER *c; 929#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 930 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 931#endif 932 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 933 934 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 935 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 936 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 937 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 938 * TLSv1. 939 */ 940 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A 941 ) 942 { 943 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 944 } 945 s->first_packet=1; 946 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 947 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 948 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 949 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 950 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 951 &ok); 952 953 if (!ok) return((int)n); 954 s->first_packet=0; 955 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 956 957 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 958 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 959 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 960 p+=2; 961 962 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 963 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 964 { 965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 966 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 967 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) 968 { 969 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 970 s->version = s->client_version; 971 } 972 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 973 goto f_err; 974 } 975 976 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 977 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 978 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 979 */ 980 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 981 { 982 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 983 984 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 985 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 986 987 if (cookie_length == 0) 988 return 1; 989 } 990 991 /* load the client random */ 992 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 993 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 994 995 /* get the session-id */ 996 j= *(p++); 997 998 s->hit=0; 999 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. 1000 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests 1001 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1002 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security 1003 * won't even compile against older library versions). 1004 * 1005 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request 1006 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, 1007 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1008 * setting will be ignored. 1009 */ 1010 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 1011 { 1012 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1013 goto err; 1014 } 1015 else 1016 { 1017 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1018 if (i == 1) 1019 { /* previous session */ 1020 s->hit=1; 1021 } 1022 else if (i == -1) 1023 goto err; 1024 else /* i == 0 */ 1025 { 1026 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 1027 goto err; 1028 } 1029 } 1030 1031 p+=j; 1032 1033 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1034 { 1035 /* cookie stuff */ 1036 cookie_len = *(p++); 1037 1038 /* 1039 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1040 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1041 * does not cause an overflow. 1042 */ 1043 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 1044 { 1045 /* too much data */ 1046 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1048 goto f_err; 1049 } 1050 1051 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1052 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 1053 cookie_len > 0) 1054 { 1055 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1056 1057 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 1058 { 1059 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1060 cookie_len) == 0) 1061 { 1062 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1064 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1065 goto f_err; 1066 } 1067 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1068 } 1069 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1070 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 1071 { 1072 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1074 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1075 goto f_err; 1076 } 1077 1078 ret = 2; 1079 } 1080 1081 p += cookie_len; 1082 } 1083 1084 n2s(p,i); 1085 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 1086 { 1087 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 1088 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1090 goto f_err; 1091 } 1092 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 1093 { 1094 /* not enough data */ 1095 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1097 goto f_err; 1098 } 1099 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 1100 == NULL)) 1101 { 1102 goto err; 1103 } 1104 p+=i; 1105 1106 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1107 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 1108 { 1109 j=0; 1110 id=s->session->cipher->id; 1111 1112#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1113 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 1114#endif 1115 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 1116 { 1117 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 1118#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1119 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1120 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1121#endif 1122 if (c->id == id) 1123 { 1124 j=1; 1125 break; 1126 } 1127 } 1128/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade 1129 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. 1130 */ 1131#if 0 1132 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 1133 { 1134 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 1135 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 1136 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 1137 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 1138 * enabled, though. */ 1139 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1140 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 1141 { 1142 s->session->cipher = c; 1143 j = 1; 1144 } 1145 } 1146#endif 1147 if (j == 0) 1148 { 1149 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 1150 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 1151 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1153 goto f_err; 1154 } 1155 } 1156 1157 /* compression */ 1158 i= *(p++); 1159 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 1160 { 1161 /* not enough data */ 1162 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1164 goto f_err; 1165 } 1166 q=p; 1167 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 1168 { 1169 if (p[j] == 0) break; 1170 } 1171 1172 p+=i; 1173 if (j >= i) 1174 { 1175 /* no compress */ 1176 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1178 goto f_err; 1179 } 1180 1181#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1182 /* TLS extensions*/ 1183 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1184 { 1185 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1186 { 1187 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1189 goto f_err; 1190 } 1191 } 1192 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1194 goto err; 1195 } 1196 1197 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1198 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1199 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1200 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ 1201 { 1202 unsigned char *pos; 1203 pos=s->s3->server_random; 1204 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1205 { 1206 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1207 goto f_err; 1208 } 1209 } 1210 1211 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1212 { 1213 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; 1214 1215 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1216 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, 1217 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) 1218 { 1219 s->hit=1; 1220 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1221 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; 1222 1223 ciphers=NULL; 1224 1225 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1226 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1227 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1228 { 1229 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1231 goto f_err; 1232 } 1233 1234 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; 1235 1236 if (s->cipher_list) 1237 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1238 1239 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1240 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1241 1242 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1243 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1244 } 1245 } 1246#endif 1247 1248 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1249 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1250 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1251 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1252#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1253 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1254 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1255 { 1256 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1257 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1258 /* Can't disable compression */ 1259 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1260 { 1261 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1263 goto f_err; 1264 } 1265 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1266 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) 1267 { 1268 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1269 if (comp_id == comp->id) 1270 { 1271 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1272 break; 1273 } 1274 } 1275 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1276 { 1277 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1279 goto f_err; 1280 } 1281 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1282 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) 1283 { 1284 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1285 break; 1286 } 1287 if (m >= i) 1288 { 1289 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1291 goto f_err; 1292 } 1293 } 1294 else if (s->hit) 1295 comp = NULL; 1296 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) 1297 { /* See if we have a match */ 1298 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1299 1300 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1301 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1302 { 1303 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1304 v=comp->id; 1305 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1306 { 1307 if (v == q[o]) 1308 { 1309 done=1; 1310 break; 1311 } 1312 } 1313 if (done) break; 1314 } 1315 if (done) 1316 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1317 else 1318 comp=NULL; 1319 } 1320#else 1321 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1322 * using compression. 1323 */ 1324 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1325 { 1326 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1328 goto f_err; 1329 } 1330#endif 1331 1332 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1333 * pick a cipher */ 1334 1335 if (!s->hit) 1336 { 1337#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1338 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1339#else 1340 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1341#endif 1342 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1343 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1344 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1345 if (ciphers == NULL) 1346 { 1347 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1349 goto f_err; 1350 } 1351 ciphers=NULL; 1352 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1353 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1354 1355 if (c == NULL) 1356 { 1357 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1359 goto f_err; 1360 } 1361 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1362 } 1363 else 1364 { 1365 /* Session-id reuse */ 1366#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1367 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1368 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1369 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1370 1371 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1372 { 1373 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1374 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1375 { 1376 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1377 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1378 nc=c; 1379 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1380 ec=c; 1381 } 1382 if (nc != NULL) 1383 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1384 else if (ec != NULL) 1385 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1386 else 1387 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1388 } 1389 else 1390#endif 1391 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1392 } 1393 1394 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) 1395 { 1396 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1397 { 1398 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1399 goto f_err; 1400 } 1401 } 1402 1403 /* we now have the following setup. 1404 * client_random 1405 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1406 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1407 * compression - basically ignored right now 1408 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1409 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1410 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1411 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1412 */ 1413 1414 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1415 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1416 { 1417 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) 1418 { 1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1420 goto err; 1421 } 1422 } 1423 1424 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1425 if (0) 1426 { 1427f_err: 1428 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1429 } 1430err: 1431 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1432 return(ret); 1433 } 1434 1435int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1436 { 1437 unsigned char *buf; 1438 unsigned char *p,*d; 1439 int i,sl; 1440 unsigned long l; 1441 1442 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1443 { 1444 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1445#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1446 p=s->s3->server_random; 1447 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) 1448 return -1; 1449#endif 1450 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1451 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1452 1453 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1454 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1455 1456 /* Random stuff */ 1457 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1458 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1459 1460 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send 1461 * back in the server hello: 1462 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1463 * we send back the old session ID. 1464 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1465 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1466 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1467 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1468 * session ID. 1469 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1470 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1471 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1472 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1473 * to send back. 1474 */ 1475 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1476 && !s->hit) 1477 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1478 1479 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1480 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1481 { 1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1483 return -1; 1484 } 1485 *(p++)=sl; 1486 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1487 p+=sl; 1488 1489 /* put the cipher */ 1490 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1491 p+=i; 1492 1493 /* put the compression method */ 1494#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1495 *(p++)=0; 1496#else 1497 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1498 *(p++)=0; 1499 else 1500 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1501#endif 1502#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1503 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1504 { 1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1506 return -1; 1507 } 1508 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1509 { 1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1511 return -1; 1512 } 1513#endif 1514 /* do the header */ 1515 l=(p-d); 1516 d=buf; 1517 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1518 l2n3(l,d); 1519 1520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1521 /* number of bytes to write */ 1522 s->init_num=p-buf; 1523 s->init_off=0; 1524 } 1525 1526 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1527 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1528 } 1529 1530int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1531 { 1532 unsigned char *p; 1533 1534 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1535 { 1536 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1537 1538 /* do the header */ 1539 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1540 *(p++)=0; 1541 *(p++)=0; 1542 *(p++)=0; 1543 1544 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1545 /* number of bytes to write */ 1546 s->init_num=4; 1547 s->init_off=0; 1548 } 1549 1550 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1551 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1552 } 1553 1554int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1555 { 1556#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1557 unsigned char *q; 1558 int j,num; 1559 RSA *rsa; 1560 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1561 unsigned int u; 1562#endif 1563#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1564 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1565#endif 1566#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1567 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1568 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1569 int encodedlen = 0; 1570 int curve_id = 0; 1571 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1572#endif 1573 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1574 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1575 unsigned char *p,*d; 1576 int al,i; 1577 unsigned long type; 1578 int n; 1579 CERT *cert; 1580 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1581 int nr[4],kn; 1582 BUF_MEM *buf; 1583 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1584 1585 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1586 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1587 { 1588 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1589 cert=s->cert; 1590 1591 buf=s->init_buf; 1592 1593 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1594 n=0; 1595#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1596 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1597 { 1598 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1599 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1600 { 1601 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1602 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1603 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1604 if(rsa == NULL) 1605 { 1606 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1608 goto f_err; 1609 } 1610 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1611 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1612 } 1613 if (rsa == NULL) 1614 { 1615 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1617 goto f_err; 1618 } 1619 r[0]=rsa->n; 1620 r[1]=rsa->e; 1621 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1622 } 1623 else 1624#endif 1625#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1626 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1627 { 1628 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1629 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1630 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1631 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1632 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1633 if (dhp == NULL) 1634 { 1635 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1637 goto f_err; 1638 } 1639 1640 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1641 { 1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1643 goto err; 1644 } 1645 1646 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1647 { 1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1649 goto err; 1650 } 1651 1652 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1653 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1654 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1655 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1656 { 1657 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1658 { 1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1660 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1661 goto err; 1662 } 1663 } 1664 else 1665 { 1666 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1667 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1668 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1669 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1670 { 1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1672 goto err; 1673 } 1674 } 1675 r[0]=dh->p; 1676 r[1]=dh->g; 1677 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1678 } 1679 else 1680#endif 1681#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1682 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1683 { 1684 const EC_GROUP *group; 1685 1686 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1687 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1688 { 1689 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1690 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1691 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1692 } 1693 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1694 { 1695 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1697 goto f_err; 1698 } 1699 1700 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1701 { 1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1703 goto err; 1704 } 1705 1706 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1707 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1708 { 1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1710 goto err; 1711 } 1712 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) 1713 { 1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1715 goto err; 1716 } 1717 1718 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1719 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1720 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1721 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1722 { 1723 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1724 { 1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1726 goto err; 1727 } 1728 } 1729 1730 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1731 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1732 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1733 { 1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1735 goto err; 1736 } 1737 1738 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1739 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1740 { 1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1742 goto err; 1743 } 1744 1745 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1746 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1747 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1748 */ 1749 if ((curve_id = 1750 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1751 == 0) 1752 { 1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1754 goto err; 1755 } 1756 1757 /* Encode the public key. 1758 * First check the size of encoding and 1759 * allocate memory accordingly. 1760 */ 1761 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1762 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1763 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1764 NULL, 0, NULL); 1765 1766 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1767 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1768 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1769 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1770 { 1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1772 goto err; 1773 } 1774 1775 1776 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1777 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1778 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1779 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1780 1781 if (encodedlen == 0) 1782 { 1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1784 goto err; 1785 } 1786 1787 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1788 1789 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1790 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1791 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1792 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1793 * structure. 1794 */ 1795 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1796 1797 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1798 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1799 */ 1800 r[0]=NULL; 1801 r[1]=NULL; 1802 r[2]=NULL; 1803 r[3]=NULL; 1804 } 1805 else 1806#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1807#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1808 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1809 { 1810 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ 1811 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1812 } 1813 else 1814#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1815#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1816 if (type & SSL_kSRP) 1817 { 1818 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1819 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1820 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || 1821 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) 1822 { 1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1824 goto err; 1825 } 1826 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N; 1827 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g; 1828 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s; 1829 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B; 1830 } 1831 else 1832#endif 1833 { 1834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1836 goto f_err; 1837 } 1838 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1839 { 1840 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1841#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1842 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1843 n+=1+nr[i]; 1844 else 1845#endif 1846 n+=2+nr[i]; 1847 } 1848 1849 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 1850 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 1851 { 1852 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) 1853 == NULL) 1854 { 1855 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1856 goto f_err; 1857 } 1858 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1859 } 1860 else 1861 { 1862 pkey=NULL; 1863 kn=0; 1864 } 1865 1866 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1867 { 1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1869 goto err; 1870 } 1871 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1872 p= &(d[4]); 1873 1874 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) 1875 { 1876#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1877 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1878 { 1879 *p = nr[i]; 1880 p++; 1881 } 1882 else 1883#endif 1884 s2n(nr[i],p); 1885 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1886 p+=nr[i]; 1887 } 1888 1889#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1890 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1891 { 1892 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1893 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1894 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1895 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1896 * the actual encoded point itself 1897 */ 1898 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1899 p += 1; 1900 *p = 0; 1901 p += 1; 1902 *p = curve_id; 1903 p += 1; 1904 *p = encodedlen; 1905 p += 1; 1906 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1907 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1908 encodedlen); 1909 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1910 encodedPoint = NULL; 1911 p += encodedlen; 1912 } 1913#endif 1914 1915#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1916 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1917 { 1918 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1919 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1920 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1921 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1922 } 1923#endif 1924 1925 /* not anonymous */ 1926 if (pkey != NULL) 1927 { 1928 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1929 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1930#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA 1932 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 1933 { 1934 q=md_buf; 1935 j=0; 1936 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1937 { 1938 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1939 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1940 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1941 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1942 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1943 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1944 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1945 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1946 (unsigned int *)&i); 1947 q+=i; 1948 j+=i; 1949 } 1950 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1951 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1952 { 1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1954 goto err; 1955 } 1956 s2n(u,p); 1957 n+=u+2; 1958 } 1959 else 1960#endif 1961 if (md) 1962 { 1963 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature 1964 * algorithm */ 1965 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1966 { 1967 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) 1968 { 1969 /* Should never happen */ 1970 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1972 goto f_err; 1973 } 1974 p+=2; 1975 } 1976#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1977 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", 1978 EVP_MD_name(md)); 1979#endif 1980 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); 1981 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1982 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1983 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1984 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1985 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1986 { 1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP); 1988 goto err; 1989 } 1990 s2n(i,p); 1991 n+=i+2; 1992 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 1993 n+= 2; 1994 } 1995 else 1996 { 1997 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1998 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2000 goto f_err; 2001 } 2002 } 2003 2004 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 2005 l2n3(n,d); 2006 2007 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2008 * it off */ 2009 s->init_num=n+4; 2010 s->init_off=0; 2011 } 2012 2013 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2014 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2015 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2016f_err: 2017 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2018err: 2019#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2020 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2021 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2022#endif 2023 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2024 return(-1); 2025 } 2026 2027int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2028 { 2029 unsigned char *p,*d; 2030 int i,j,nl,off,n; 2031 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 2032 X509_NAME *name; 2033 BUF_MEM *buf; 2034 2035 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 2036 { 2037 buf=s->init_buf; 2038 2039 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 2040 2041 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2042 p++; 2043 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 2044 d[0]=n; 2045 p+=n; 2046 n++; 2047 2048 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2049 { 2050 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2); 2051 s2n(nl, p); 2052 p += nl + 2; 2053 n += nl + 2; 2054 } 2055 2056 off=n; 2057 p+=2; 2058 n+=2; 2059 2060 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2061 nl=0; 2062 if (sk != NULL) 2063 { 2064 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 2065 { 2066 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 2067 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 2068 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 2069 { 2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2071 goto err; 2072 } 2073 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 2074 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 2075 { 2076 s2n(j,p); 2077 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2078 n+=2+j; 2079 nl+=2+j; 2080 } 2081 else 2082 { 2083 d=p; 2084 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 2085 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 2086 n+=j; 2087 nl+=j; 2088 } 2089 } 2090 } 2091 /* else no CA names */ 2092 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 2093 s2n(nl,p); 2094 2095 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 2096 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 2097 l2n3(n,d); 2098 2099 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 2100 * it off */ 2101 2102 s->init_num=n+4; 2103 s->init_off=0; 2104#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2105 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2106 2107 /* do the header */ 2108 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2109 *(p++)=0; 2110 *(p++)=0; 2111 *(p++)=0; 2112 s->init_num += 4; 2113#endif 2114 2115 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2116 } 2117 2118 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2119 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2120err: 2121 return(-1); 2122 } 2123 2124int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2125 { 2126 int i,al,ok; 2127 long n; 2128 unsigned long alg_k; 2129 unsigned char *p; 2130#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2131 RSA *rsa=NULL; 2132 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2133#endif 2134#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2135 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 2136 DH *dh_srvr; 2137#endif 2138#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2139 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2140#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2141 2142#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2143 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2144 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2145 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2146 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2147#endif 2148 2149 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2150 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2151 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2152 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2153 2048, /* ??? */ 2154 &ok); 2155 2156 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2157 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2158 2159 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2160 2161#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2162 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 2163 { 2164 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2165 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 2166 { 2167 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2168 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2169 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 2170 * be sent already */ 2171 if (rsa == NULL) 2172 { 2173 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2175 goto f_err; 2176 2177 } 2178 } 2179 else 2180 { 2181 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2182 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 2183 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 2184 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 2185 { 2186 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2188 goto f_err; 2189 } 2190 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 2191 } 2192 2193 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2194 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2195 { 2196 n2s(p,i); 2197 if (n != i+2) 2198 { 2199 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 2200 { 2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2202 goto err; 2203 } 2204 else 2205 p-=2; 2206 } 2207 else 2208 n=i; 2209 } 2210 2211 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2212 2213 al = -1; 2214 2215 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2216 { 2217 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2218 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 2219 } 2220 2221 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2222 { 2223 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2224 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2225 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2226 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2227 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2228 * protocol version. 2229 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 2230 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 2231 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 2232 { 2233 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2234 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 2235 2236 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2237 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 2238 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 2239 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 2240 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 2241 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 2242 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 2243 } 2244 } 2245 2246 if (al != -1) 2247 { 2248 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 2249 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 2250 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 2251 ERR_clear_error(); 2252 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2253 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 2254 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 2255 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 2256 goto err; 2257 } 2258 2259 s->session->master_key_length= 2260 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2261 s->session->master_key, 2262 p,i); 2263 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2264 } 2265 else 2266#endif 2267#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2268 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 2269 { 2270 n2s(p,i); 2271 if (n != i+2) 2272 { 2273 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 2274 { 2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2276 goto err; 2277 } 2278 else 2279 { 2280 p-=2; 2281 i=(int)n; 2282 } 2283 } 2284 2285 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2286 { 2287 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2289 goto f_err; 2290 } 2291 else 2292 { 2293 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 2294 { 2295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2297 goto f_err; 2298 } 2299 else 2300 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 2301 } 2302 2303 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 2304 if (pub == NULL) 2305 { 2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2307 goto err; 2308 } 2309 2310 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 2311 2312 if (i <= 0) 2313 { 2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2315 BN_clear_free(pub); 2316 goto err; 2317 } 2318 2319 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2320 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 2321 2322 BN_clear_free(pub); 2323 pub=NULL; 2324 s->session->master_key_length= 2325 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2326 s->session->master_key,p,i); 2327 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2328 } 2329 else 2330#endif 2331#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2332 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 2333 { 2334 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2335 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2336 krb5_data authenticator; 2337 krb5_data enc_pms; 2338 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2339 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2340 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2341 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2342 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2343 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2344 int padl, outl; 2345 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2346 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2347 2348 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2349 2350 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2351 2352 n2s(p,i); 2353 enc_ticket.length = i; 2354 2355 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) 2356 { 2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2358 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2359 goto err; 2360 } 2361 2362 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2363 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2364 2365 n2s(p,i); 2366 authenticator.length = i; 2367 2368 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) 2369 { 2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2371 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2372 goto err; 2373 } 2374 2375 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2376 p+=authenticator.length; 2377 2378 n2s(p,i); 2379 enc_pms.length = i; 2380 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2381 p+=enc_pms.length; 2382 2383 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2384 ** after decryption 2385 */ 2386 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2387 { 2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2389 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2390 goto err; 2391 } 2392 2393 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2394 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2395 { 2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2397 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2398 goto err; 2399 } 2400 2401 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2402 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2403 { 2404#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2405 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2406 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2407 if (kssl_err.text) 2408 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2409#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2411 kssl_err.reason); 2412 goto err; 2413 } 2414 2415 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2416 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2417 */ 2418 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2419 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2420 { 2421#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2422 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2423 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2424 if (kssl_err.text) 2425 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2426#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2428 kssl_err.reason); 2429 goto err; 2430 } 2431 2432 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2433 { 2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2435 goto err; 2436 } 2437 2438#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2439 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2440#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2441 2442 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2443 if (enc == NULL) 2444 goto err; 2445 2446 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2447 2448 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2449 { 2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2451 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2452 goto err; 2453 } 2454 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2455 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2456 { 2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2458 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2459 goto err; 2460 } 2461 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2462 { 2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2464 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2465 goto err; 2466 } 2467 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2468 { 2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2470 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2471 goto err; 2472 } 2473 outl += padl; 2474 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2475 { 2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2477 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2478 goto err; 2479 } 2480 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2481 { 2482 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2483 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2484 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2485 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2486 * the protocol version. 2487 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2488 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2489 */ 2490 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2491 { 2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2493 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2494 goto err; 2495 } 2496 } 2497 2498 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2499 2500 s->session->master_key_length= 2501 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2502 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2503 2504 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2505 { 2506 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2507 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2508 { 2509 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2510 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2511 } 2512 } 2513 2514 2515 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2516 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2517 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2518 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2519 */ 2520 } 2521 else 2522#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2523 2524#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2525 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2526 { 2527 int ret = 1; 2528 int field_size = 0; 2529 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2530 const EC_GROUP *group; 2531 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2532 2533 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2534 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2535 { 2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2537 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2538 goto err; 2539 } 2540 2541 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2542 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2543 { 2544 /* use the certificate */ 2545 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2546 } 2547 else 2548 { 2549 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2550 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2551 */ 2552 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2553 } 2554 2555 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2556 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2557 2558 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2559 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2560 { 2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2562 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2563 goto err; 2564 } 2565 2566 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2567 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2568 { 2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2570 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2571 goto err; 2572 } 2573 2574 if (n == 0L) 2575 { 2576 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2577 2578 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 2579 { 2580 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2582 goto f_err; 2583 } 2584 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2585 == NULL) || 2586 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2587 { 2588 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2589 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2590 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2591 * never executed. When that support is 2592 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2593 * received in the certificate is 2594 * authorized for key agreement. 2595 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2596 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2597 * group. 2598 */ 2599 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2601 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2602 goto f_err; 2603 } 2604 2605 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2606 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2607 { 2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2609 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2610 goto err; 2611 } 2612 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2613 } 2614 else 2615 { 2616 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2617 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2618 */ 2619 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2620 { 2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2622 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2623 goto err; 2624 } 2625 2626 /* Get encoded point length */ 2627 i = *p; 2628 p += 1; 2629 if (n != 1 + i) 2630 { 2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2632 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2633 goto err; 2634 } 2635 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2636 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2637 { 2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2639 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2640 goto err; 2641 } 2642 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2643 * currently, so set it to the start 2644 */ 2645 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2646 } 2647 2648 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2649 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2650 if (field_size <= 0) 2651 { 2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2653 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2654 goto err; 2655 } 2656 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2657 if (i <= 0) 2658 { 2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2660 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2661 goto err; 2662 } 2663 2664 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2665 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2666 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2667 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2668 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2669 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2670 2671 /* Compute the master secret */ 2672 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2673 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2674 2675 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2676 return (ret); 2677 } 2678 else 2679#endif 2680#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2681 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) 2682 { 2683 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2684 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; 2685 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2686 int psk_err = 1; 2687 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; 2688 2689 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2690 2691 n2s(p,i); 2692 if (n != i+2) 2693 { 2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2695 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2696 goto psk_err; 2697 } 2698 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) 2699 { 2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2701 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2702 goto psk_err; 2703 } 2704 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) 2705 { 2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2707 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2708 goto psk_err; 2709 } 2710 2711 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity 2712 * string for the callback */ 2713 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2714 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); 2715 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2716 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2717 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); 2718 2719 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) 2720 { 2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2723 goto psk_err; 2724 } 2725 else if (psk_len == 0) 2726 { 2727 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ 2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2729 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2730 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2731 goto psk_err; 2732 } 2733 2734 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2735 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; 2736 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2737 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2738 s2n(psk_len, t); 2739 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2740 t+=psk_len; 2741 s2n(psk_len, t); 2742 2743 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2744 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2745 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); 2746 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) 2747 { 2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2749 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2750 goto psk_err; 2751 } 2752 2753 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2754 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2755 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2756 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2757 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2758 { 2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2760 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2761 goto psk_err; 2762 } 2763 2764 s->session->master_key_length= 2765 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2766 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2767 psk_err = 0; 2768 psk_err: 2769 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2770 if (psk_err != 0) 2771 goto f_err; 2772 } 2773 else 2774#endif 2775#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2776 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 2777 { 2778 int param_len; 2779 2780 n2s(p,i); 2781 param_len=i+2; 2782 if (param_len > n) 2783 { 2784 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2786 goto f_err; 2787 } 2788 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) 2789 { 2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2791 goto err; 2792 } 2793 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2794 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2795 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2796 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) 2797 { 2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2799 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2800 goto err; 2801 } 2802 2803 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0) 2804 { 2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2806 goto err; 2807 } 2808 2809 p+=i; 2810 } 2811 else 2812#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2813 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 2814 { 2815 int ret = 0; 2816 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2817 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2818 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2819 size_t outlen=32, inlen; 2820 unsigned long alg_a; 2821 2822 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2823 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2824 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2825 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2826 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2827 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2828 2829 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); 2830 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2831 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2832 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2833 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use 2834 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ 2835 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2836 if (client_pub_pkey) 2837 { 2838 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2839 ERR_clear_error(); 2840 } 2841 /* Decrypt session key */ 2842 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 2843 { 2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2845 goto gerr; 2846 } 2847 if (p[1] == 0x81) 2848 { 2849 start = p+3; 2850 inlen = p[2]; 2851 } 2852 else if (p[1] < 0x80) 2853 { 2854 start = p+2; 2855 inlen = p[1]; 2856 } 2857 else 2858 { 2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2860 goto gerr; 2861 } 2862 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 2863 2864 { 2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2866 goto gerr; 2867 } 2868 /* Generate master secret */ 2869 s->session->master_key_length= 2870 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2871 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); 2872 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2873 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2874 ret = 2; 2875 else 2876 ret = 1; 2877 gerr: 2878 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2879 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2880 if (ret) 2881 return ret; 2882 else 2883 goto err; 2884 } 2885 else 2886 { 2887 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2890 goto f_err; 2891 } 2892 2893 return(1); 2894f_err: 2895 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2896#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2897err: 2898#endif 2899#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2900 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2901 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2902 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2903 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2904 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2905#endif 2906 return(-1); 2907 } 2908 2909int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2910 { 2911 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2912 unsigned char *p; 2913 int al,ok,ret=0; 2914 long n; 2915 int type=0,i,j; 2916 X509 *peer; 2917 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2918 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2919 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2920 2921 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2922 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2923 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2924 -1, 2925 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */ 2926 &ok); 2927 2928 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2929 2930 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2931 { 2932 peer=s->session->peer; 2933 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2934 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2935 } 2936 else 2937 { 2938 peer=NULL; 2939 pkey=NULL; 2940 } 2941 2942 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2943 { 2944 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2945 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2946 { 2947 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2949 goto f_err; 2950 } 2951 ret=1; 2952 goto end; 2953 } 2954 2955 if (peer == NULL) 2956 { 2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2958 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2959 goto f_err; 2960 } 2961 2962 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2963 { 2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2965 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2966 goto f_err; 2967 } 2968 2969 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2970 { 2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2972 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2973 goto f_err; 2974 } 2975 2976 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2977 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2978 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2979 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare 2980 * signature without length field */ 2981 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2982 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) 2983 { 2984 i=64; 2985 } 2986 else 2987 { 2988 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 2989 { 2990 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 2991 /* Should never happen */ 2992 if (sigalg == -1) 2993 { 2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2995 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2996 goto f_err; 2997 } 2998 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 2999 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) 3000 { 3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 3002 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3003 goto f_err; 3004 } 3005 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); 3006 if (md == NULL) 3007 { 3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 3009 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3010 goto f_err; 3011 } 3012#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3013fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3014#endif 3015 p += 2; 3016 n -= 2; 3017 } 3018 n2s(p,i); 3019 n-=2; 3020 if (i > n) 3021 { 3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3023 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3024 goto f_err; 3025 } 3026 } 3027 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3028 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 3029 { 3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3031 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3032 goto f_err; 3033 } 3034 3035 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 3036 { 3037 long hdatalen = 0; 3038 void *hdata; 3039 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3040 if (hdatalen <= 0) 3041 { 3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3043 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3044 goto f_err; 3045 } 3046#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3047 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3048 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3049#endif 3050 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3051 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) 3052 { 3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3054 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3055 goto f_err; 3056 } 3057 3058 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) 3059 { 3060 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3062 goto f_err; 3063 } 3064 } 3065 else 3066#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3067 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 3068 { 3069 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3070 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3071 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3072 if (i < 0) 3073 { 3074 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3076 goto f_err; 3077 } 3078 if (i == 0) 3079 { 3080 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3082 goto f_err; 3083 } 3084 } 3085 else 3086#endif 3087#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 3089 { 3090 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3091 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3092 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 3093 if (j <= 0) 3094 { 3095 /* bad signature */ 3096 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3098 goto f_err; 3099 } 3100 } 3101 else 3102#endif 3103#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3104 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 3105 { 3106 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3107 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3108 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 3109 if (j <= 0) 3110 { 3111 /* bad signature */ 3112 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3114 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3115 goto f_err; 3116 } 3117 } 3118 else 3119#endif 3120 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 3121 { unsigned char signature[64]; 3122 int idx; 3123 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); 3124 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 3125 if (i!=64) { 3126 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); 3127 } 3128 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { 3129 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; 3130 } 3131 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); 3132 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3133 if (j<=0) 3134 { 3135 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 3137 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3138 goto f_err; 3139 } 3140 } 3141 else 3142 { 3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3144 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3145 goto f_err; 3146 } 3147 3148 3149 ret=1; 3150 if (0) 3151 { 3152f_err: 3153 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3154 } 3155end: 3156 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 3157 { 3158 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3159 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3160 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3161 } 3162 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3163 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3164 return(ret); 3165 } 3166 3167int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3168 { 3169 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 3170 X509 *x=NULL; 3171 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 3172 const unsigned char *p,*q; 3173 unsigned char *d; 3174 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 3175 3176 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3177 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3178 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3179 -1, 3180 s->max_cert_list, 3181 &ok); 3182 3183 if (!ok) return((int)n); 3184 3185 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 3186 { 3187 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3188 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3189 { 3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3191 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3192 goto f_err; 3193 } 3194 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 3195 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 3196 { 3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3198 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3199 goto f_err; 3200 } 3201 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 3202 return(1); 3203 } 3204 3205 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 3206 { 3207 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3209 goto f_err; 3210 } 3211 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3212 3213 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 3214 { 3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3216 goto err; 3217 } 3218 3219 n2l3(p,llen); 3220 if (llen+3 != n) 3221 { 3222 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3224 goto f_err; 3225 } 3226 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 3227 { 3228 n2l3(p,l); 3229 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 3230 { 3231 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3233 goto f_err; 3234 } 3235 3236 q=p; 3237 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 3238 if (x == NULL) 3239 { 3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3241 goto err; 3242 } 3243 if (p != (q+l)) 3244 { 3245 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3247 goto f_err; 3248 } 3249 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 3250 { 3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3252 goto err; 3253 } 3254 x=NULL; 3255 nc+=l+3; 3256 } 3257 3258 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 3259 { 3260 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3261 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 3262 { 3263 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3265 goto f_err; 3266 } 3267 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3268 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3269 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 3270 { 3271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3272 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3273 goto f_err; 3274 } 3275 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3276 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 3277 { 3278 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3279 goto f_err; 3280 } 3281 } 3282 else 3283 { 3284 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 3285 if (i <= 0) 3286 { 3287 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 3289 goto f_err; 3290 } 3291 } 3292 3293 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3294 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3295 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 3296 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3297 3298 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 3299 * when we arrive here. */ 3300 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3301 { 3302 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3303 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 3304 { 3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3306 goto err; 3307 } 3308 } 3309 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3310 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3311 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 3312 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 3313 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 3314 3315 sk=NULL; 3316 3317 ret=1; 3318 if (0) 3319 { 3320f_err: 3321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3322 } 3323err: 3324 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 3325 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 3326 return(ret); 3327 } 3328 3329int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3330 { 3331 unsigned long l; 3332 X509 *x; 3333 3334 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 3335 { 3336 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3337 if (x == NULL) 3338 { 3339 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3340 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3341 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) 3342 { 3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3344 return(0); 3345 } 3346 } 3347 3348 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 3349 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3350 s->init_num=(int)l; 3351 s->init_off=0; 3352 } 3353 3354 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3355 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3356 } 3357 3358#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3359/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3360int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3361 { 3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 3363 { 3364 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 3365 const unsigned char *const_p; 3366 int len, slen_full, slen; 3367 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3368 unsigned int hlen; 3369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3370 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3371 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3372 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3373 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3374 3375 /* get session encoding length */ 3376 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3377 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 3378 * too long 3379 */ 3380 if (slen_full > 0xFF00) 3381 return -1; 3382 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3383 if (!senc) 3384 return -1; 3385 p = senc; 3386 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 3387 3388 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ 3389 const_p = senc; 3390 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3391 if (sess == NULL) 3392 { 3393 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3394 return -1; 3395 } 3396 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3397 3398 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3399 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3400 { 3401 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3402 return -1; 3403 } 3404 p = senc; 3405 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); 3406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3407 3408 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3409 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3410 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3411 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3412 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3413 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3414 */ 3415 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3416 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3417 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3418 return -1; 3419 3420 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3421 /* do the header */ 3422 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3423 /* Skip message length for now */ 3424 p += 3; 3425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3426 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3427 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 3428 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 3429 * from parent ctx. 3430 */ 3431 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 3432 { 3433 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3434 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3435 { 3436 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3437 return -1; 3438 } 3439 } 3440 else 3441 { 3442 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 3443 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3444 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 3445 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3446 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 3447 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3448 } 3449 3450 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): 3451 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), 3452 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long 3453 * as their sessions. */ 3454 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3455 3456 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3457 p += 2; 3458 /* Output key name */ 3459 macstart = p; 3460 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3461 p += 16; 3462 /* output IV */ 3463 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3464 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3465 /* Encrypt session data */ 3466 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 3467 p += len; 3468 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 3469 p += len; 3470 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3471 3472 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 3473 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 3474 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3475 3476 p += hlen; 3477 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3478 /* Total length */ 3479 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3480 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3481 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3482 p += 4; 3483 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3484 3485 /* number of bytes to write */ 3486 s->init_num= len; 3487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3488 s->init_off=0; 3489 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3490 } 3491 3492 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3493 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3494 } 3495 3496int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3497 { 3498 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 3499 { 3500 unsigned char *p; 3501 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3502 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3503 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3504 * + (ocsp response) 3505 */ 3506 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3507 return -1; 3508 3509 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3510 3511 /* do the header */ 3512 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3513 /* message length */ 3514 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3515 /* status type */ 3516 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 3517 /* length of OCSP response */ 3518 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3519 /* actual response */ 3520 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3521 /* number of bytes to write */ 3522 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3524 s->init_off = 0; 3525 } 3526 3527 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3528 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3529 } 3530 3531# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3532/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It 3533 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ 3534int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3535 { 3536 int ok; 3537 int proto_len, padding_len; 3538 long n; 3539 const unsigned char *p; 3540 3541 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3542 * extension in their ClientHello */ 3543 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 3544 { 3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3546 return -1; 3547 } 3548 3549 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3550 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3551 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3552 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 3553 514, /* See the payload format below */ 3554 &ok); 3555 3556 if (!ok) 3557 return((int)n); 3558 3559 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received 3560 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset 3561 * by ssl3_get_finished). */ 3562 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 3563 { 3564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3565 return -1; 3566 } 3567 3568 if (n < 2) 3569 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3570 3571 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3572 3573 /* The payload looks like: 3574 * uint8 proto_len; 3575 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3576 * uint8 padding_len; 3577 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3578 */ 3579 proto_len = p[0]; 3580 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) 3581 return 0; 3582 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3583 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) 3584 return 0; 3585 3586 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3587 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 3588 { 3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3590 return 0; 3591 } 3592 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3593 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3594 3595 return 1; 3596 } 3597# endif 3598#endif 3599