s3_pkt.c revision 267258
1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <limits.h> 114#include <errno.h> 115#define USE_SOCKETS 116#include "ssl_locl.h" 117#include <openssl/evp.h> 118#include <openssl/buffer.h> 119#include <openssl/rand.h> 120 121static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 122 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); 123static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); 124 125int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) 126 { 127 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 128 * packet by another n bytes. 129 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified 130 * by s->packet and s->packet_length. 131 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf 132 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 133 */ 134 int i,len,left; 135 long align=0; 136 unsigned char *pkt; 137 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 138 139 if (n <= 0) return n; 140 141 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf); 142 if (rb->buf == NULL) 143 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 144 return -1; 145 146 left = rb->left; 147#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 148 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 149 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 150#endif 151 152 if (!extend) 153 { 154 /* start with empty packet ... */ 155 if (left == 0) 156 rb->offset = align; 157 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 158 { 159 /* check if next packet length is large 160 * enough to justify payload alignment... */ 161 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 162 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 163 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) 164 { 165 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted 166 * and its length field is insane, we can 167 * only be led to wrong decision about 168 * whether memmove will occur or not. 169 * Header values has no effect on memmove 170 * arguments and therefore no buffer 171 * overrun can be triggered. */ 172 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left); 173 rb->offset = align; 174 } 175 } 176 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 177 s->packet_length = 0; 178 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 179 } 180 181 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets 182 * because the read operation returns the whole packet 183 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ 184 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 185 { 186 if (left > 0 && n > left) 187 n = left; 188 } 189 190 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 191 if (left >= n) 192 { 193 s->packet_length+=n; 194 rb->left=left-n; 195 rb->offset+=n; 196 return(n); 197 } 198 199 /* else we need to read more data */ 200 201 len = s->packet_length; 202 pkt = rb->buf+align; 203 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 204 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', 205 * 'left' extra ones at the end */ 206 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */ 207 { 208 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left); 209 s->packet = pkt; 210 rb->offset = len + align; 211 } 212 213 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */ 214 { 215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 216 return -1; 217 } 218 219 if (!s->read_ahead) 220 /* ignore max parameter */ 221 max = n; 222 else 223 { 224 if (max < n) 225 max = n; 226 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) 227 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 228 } 229 230 while (left < n) 231 { 232 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf 233 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to 234 * len+max if possible) */ 235 236 clear_sys_error(); 237 if (s->rbio != NULL) 238 { 239 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 240 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left); 241 } 242 else 243 { 244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 245 i = -1; 246 } 247 248 if (i <= 0) 249 { 250 rb->left = left; 251 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 252 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 253 if (len+left == 0) 254 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 255 return(i); 256 } 257 left+=i; 258 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because 259 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed 260 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ 261 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 262 { 263 if (n > left) 264 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 265 } 266 } 267 268 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 269 rb->offset += n; 270 rb->left = left - n; 271 s->packet_length += n; 272 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 273 return(n); 274 } 275 276/* Call this to get a new input record. 277 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 278 * or non-blocking IO. 279 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 280 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 281 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 282 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 283 */ 284/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ 285static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) 286 { 287 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; 288 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; 289 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 290 SSL_SESSION *sess; 291 unsigned char *p; 292 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 293 short version; 294 unsigned mac_size, orig_len; 295 size_t extra; 296 297 rr= &(s->s3->rrec); 298 sess=s->session; 299 300 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) 301 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; 302 else 303 extra=0; 304 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) 305 { 306 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 307 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ 308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 309 return -1; 310 } 311 312again: 313 /* check if we have the header */ 314 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 315 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 316 { 317 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 318 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ 319 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 320 321 p=s->packet; 322 323 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ 324 rr->type= *(p++); 325 ssl_major= *(p++); 326 ssl_minor= *(p++); 327 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; 328 n2s(p,rr->length); 329#if 0 330fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 331#endif 332 333 /* Lets check version */ 334 if (!s->first_packet) 335 { 336 if (version != s->version) 337 { 338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 339 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) 340 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ 341 s->version = (unsigned short)version; 342 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 343 goto f_err; 344 } 345 } 346 347 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 348 { 349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 350 goto err; 351 } 352 353 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 354 { 355 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 357 goto f_err; 358 } 359 360 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 361 } 362 363 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 364 365 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) 366 { 367 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 368 i=rr->length; 369 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); 370 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ 371 /* now n == rr->length, 372 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ 373 } 374 375 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 376 377 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 378 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 379 */ 380 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 381 382 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' 383 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which 384 * need to be copied into rr->data by either 385 * the decryption or by the decompression 386 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, 387 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 388 389 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] 390 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ 391 392 /* check is not needed I believe */ 393 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) 394 { 395 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 397 goto f_err; 398 } 399 400 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 401 rr->data=rr->input; 402 403 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); 404 /* enc_err is: 405 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. 406 * 1: if the padding is valid 407 * -1: if the padding is invalid */ 408 if (enc_err == 0) 409 { 410 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; 411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); 412 goto f_err; 413 } 414 415#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 416printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); 417{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } 418printf("\n"); 419#endif 420 421 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 422 if ((sess != NULL) && 423 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && 424 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) 425 { 426 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ 427 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 428 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 429 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 430 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 431 432 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ 433 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); 434 435 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was 436 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, 437 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different 438 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. 439 */ 440 if (orig_len < mac_size || 441 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ 442 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 443 orig_len < mac_size+1)) 444 { 445 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 447 goto f_err; 448 } 449 450 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 451 { 452 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes 453 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract 454 * the MAC in constant time from within the record, 455 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. 456 * */ 457 mac = mac_tmp; 458 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); 459 rr->length -= mac_size; 460 } 461 else 462 { 463 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| 464 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's 465 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ 466 rr->length -= mac_size; 467 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 468 } 469 470 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); 471 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) 472 enc_err = -1; 473 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) 474 enc_err = -1; 475 } 476 477 if (enc_err < 0) 478 { 479 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, 480 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption 481 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, 482 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this 483 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ 484 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; 485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 486 goto f_err; 487 } 488 489 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 490 if (s->expand != NULL) 491 { 492 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) 493 { 494 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 496 goto f_err; 497 } 498 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) 499 { 500 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 502 goto f_err; 503 } 504 } 505 506 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) 507 { 508 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 510 goto f_err; 511 } 512 513 rr->off=0; 514 /* So at this point the following is true 515 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 516 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 517 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 518 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 519 * after use :-). 520 */ 521 522 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 523 s->packet_length=0; 524 525 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 526 if (rr->length == 0) goto again; 527 528#if 0 529fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length); 530#endif 531 532 return(1); 533 534f_err: 535 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 536err: 537 return(ret); 538 } 539 540int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) 541 { 542#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 543 int i; 544 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 545 546 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); 547 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, 548 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); 549 if (i < 0) 550 return(0); 551 else 552 rr->length=i; 553 rr->data=rr->comp; 554#endif 555 return(1); 556 } 557 558int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) 559 { 560#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 561 int i; 562 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 563 564 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); 565 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, 566 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, 567 wr->input,(int)wr->length); 568 if (i < 0) 569 return(0); 570 else 571 wr->length=i; 572 573 wr->input=wr->data; 574#endif 575 return(1); 576 } 577 578/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' 579 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 580 */ 581int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 582 { 583 const unsigned char *buf=buf_; 584 unsigned int n,nw; 585 int i,tot; 586 587 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 588 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); 589 tot=s->s3->wnum; 590 s->s3->wnum=0; 591 592 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) 593 { 594 i=s->handshake_func(s); 595 if (i < 0) return(i); 596 if (i == 0) 597 { 598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 599 return -1; 600 } 601 } 602 603 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write 604 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete 605 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding 606 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as 607 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large 608 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users 609 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user 610 * will notice 611 */ 612 if (len < tot) 613 { 614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 615 return(-1); 616 } 617 618 619 n=(len-tot); 620 for (;;) 621 { 622 if (n > s->max_send_fragment) 623 nw=s->max_send_fragment; 624 else 625 nw=n; 626 627 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); 628 if (i <= 0) 629 { 630 s->s3->wnum=tot; 631 return i; 632 } 633 634 if ((i == (int)n) || 635 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 636 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) 637 { 638 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 639 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ 640 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 641 642 return tot+i; 643 } 644 645 n-=i; 646 tot+=i; 647 } 648 } 649 650static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 651 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 652 { 653 unsigned char *p,*plen; 654 int i,mac_size,clear=0; 655 int prefix_len=0; 656 int eivlen; 657 long align=0; 658 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 659 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 660 SSL_SESSION *sess; 661 662 663 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written 664 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ 665 if (wb->left != 0) 666 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); 667 668 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 669 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) 670 { 671 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 672 if (i <= 0) 673 return(i); 674 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 675 } 676 677 if (wb->buf == NULL) 678 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) 679 return -1; 680 681 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 682 return 0; 683 684 wr= &(s->s3->wrec); 685 sess=s->session; 686 687 if ( (sess == NULL) || 688 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || 689 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) 690 { 691#if 1 692 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 693#else 694 clear=1; 695#endif 696 mac_size=0; 697 } 698 else 699 { 700 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 701 if (mac_size < 0) 702 goto err; 703 } 704 705 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ 706 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) 707 { 708 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites 709 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ 710 711 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 712 { 713 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; 714 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment 715 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later 716 * together with the actual payload) */ 717 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 718 if (prefix_len <= 0) 719 goto err; 720 721 if (prefix_len > 722 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) 723 { 724 /* insufficient space */ 725 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 726 goto err; 727 } 728 } 729 730 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 731 } 732 733 if (create_empty_fragment) 734 { 735#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 736 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, 737 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so 738 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can 739 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */ 740 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 741 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 742#endif 743 p = wb->buf + align; 744 wb->offset = align; 745 } 746 else if (prefix_len) 747 { 748 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len; 749 } 750 else 751 { 752#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 753 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 754 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1); 755#endif 756 p = wb->buf + align; 757 wb->offset = align; 758 } 759 760 /* write the header */ 761 762 *(p++)=type&0xff; 763 wr->type=type; 764 765 *(p++)=(s->version>>8); 766 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 767 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0 768 */ 769 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B 770 && !s->renegotiate 771 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION) 772 *(p++) = 0x1; 773 else 774 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 775 776 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ 777 plen=p; 778 p+=2; 779 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */ 780 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) 781 { 782 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 783 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 784 { 785 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 786 if (eivlen <= 1) 787 eivlen = 0; 788 } 789 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 790 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 791 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 792 else 793 eivlen = 0; 794 } 795 else 796 eivlen = 0; 797 798 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 799 wr->data=p + eivlen; 800 wr->length=(int)len; 801 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; 802 803 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into 804 * wr->data */ 805 806 /* first we compress */ 807 if (s->compress != NULL) 808 { 809 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) 810 { 811 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 812 goto err; 813 } 814 } 815 else 816 { 817 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); 818 wr->input=wr->data; 819 } 820 821 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input 822 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. 823 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ 824 825 if (mac_size != 0) 826 { 827 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0) 828 goto err; 829 wr->length+=mac_size; 830 } 831 832 wr->input=p; 833 wr->data=p; 834 835 if (eivlen) 836 { 837 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) 838 goto err; */ 839 wr->length += eivlen; 840 } 841 842 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ 843 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); 844 845 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 846 s2n(wr->length,plen); 847 848 /* we should now have 849 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 850 * wr->length long */ 851 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 852 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 853 854 if (create_empty_fragment) 855 { 856 /* we are in a recursive call; 857 * just return the length, don't write out anything here 858 */ 859 return wr->length; 860 } 861 862 /* now let's set up wb */ 863 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 864 865 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ 866 s->s3->wpend_tot=len; 867 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; 868 s->s3->wpend_type=type; 869 s->s3->wpend_ret=len; 870 871 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 872 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); 873err: 874 return -1; 875 } 876 877/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ 878int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 879 unsigned int len) 880 { 881 int i; 882 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf); 883 884/* XXXX */ 885 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) 886 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && 887 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) 888 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) 889 { 890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 891 return(-1); 892 } 893 894 for (;;) 895 { 896 clear_sys_error(); 897 if (s->wbio != NULL) 898 { 899 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 900 i=BIO_write(s->wbio, 901 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), 902 (unsigned int)wb->left); 903 } 904 else 905 { 906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 907 i= -1; 908 } 909 if (i == wb->left) 910 { 911 wb->left=0; 912 wb->offset+=i; 913 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && 914 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 915 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 916 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 917 return(s->s3->wpend_ret); 918 } 919 else if (i <= 0) { 920 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || 921 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 922 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole 923 point in using a datagram service */ 924 wb->left = 0; 925 } 926 return(i); 927 } 928 wb->offset+=i; 929 wb->left-=i; 930 } 931 } 932 933/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 934 * 'type' is one of the following: 935 * 936 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 937 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 938 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 939 * 940 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 941 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 942 * 943 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 944 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 945 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 946 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 947 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 948 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 949 * Change cipher spec protocol 950 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 951 * Alert protocol 952 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 953 * Handshake protocol 954 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 955 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 956 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 957 * Application data protocol 958 * none of our business 959 */ 960int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 961 { 962 int al,i,j,ret; 963 unsigned int n; 964 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 965 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; 966 967 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 968 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) 969 return(-1); 970 971 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || 972 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) 973 { 974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 975 return -1; 976 } 977 978 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 979 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 980 { 981 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 982 unsigned char *dst = buf; 983 unsigned int k; 984 985 /* peek == 0 */ 986 n = 0; 987 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 988 { 989 *dst++ = *src++; 990 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; 991 n++; 992 } 993 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 994 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 995 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 996 return n; 997 } 998 999 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ 1000 1001 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) 1002 { 1003 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1004 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1005 if (i < 0) return(i); 1006 if (i == 0) 1007 { 1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1009 return(-1); 1010 } 1011 } 1012start: 1013 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1014 1015 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 1016 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 1017 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1018 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ 1019 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 1020 1021 /* get new packet if necessary */ 1022 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) 1023 { 1024 ret=ssl3_get_record(s); 1025 if (ret <= 0) return(ret); 1026 } 1027 1028 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1029 1030 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1031 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1032 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) 1033 { 1034 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1036 goto f_err; 1037 } 1038 1039 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away 1040 * (even in 'peek' mode) */ 1041 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) 1042 { 1043 rr->length=0; 1044 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1045 return(0); 1046 } 1047 1048 1049 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 1050 { 1051 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we 1052 * are doing a handshake for the first time */ 1053 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1054 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) 1055 { 1056 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1058 goto f_err; 1059 } 1060 1061 if (len <= 0) return(len); 1062 1063 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 1064 n = rr->length; 1065 else 1066 n = (unsigned int)len; 1067 1068 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); 1069 if (!peek) 1070 { 1071 rr->length-=n; 1072 rr->off+=n; 1073 if (rr->length == 0) 1074 { 1075 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1076 rr->off=0; 1077 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) 1078 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1079 } 1080 } 1081 return(n); 1082 } 1083 1084 1085 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake 1086 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ 1087 1088 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, 1089 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 1090 */ 1091 { 1092 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; 1093 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 1094 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 1095 1096 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 1097 { 1098 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1099 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 1100 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; 1101 } 1102 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) 1103 { 1104 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; 1105 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; 1106 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; 1107 } 1108#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1109 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) 1110 { 1111 tls1_process_heartbeat(s); 1112 1113 /* Exit and notify application to read again */ 1114 rr->length = 0; 1115 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1116 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1117 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1118 return(-1); 1119 } 1120#endif 1121 1122 if (dest_maxlen > 0) 1123 { 1124 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1125 if (rr->length < n) 1126 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ 1127 1128 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1129 while (n-- > 0) 1130 { 1131 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1132 rr->length--; 1133 } 1134 1135 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1136 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1137 } 1138 } 1139 1140 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1141 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1142 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ 1143 1144 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1145 if ((!s->server) && 1146 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1147 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1148 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) 1149 { 1150 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1151 1152 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1153 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1154 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) 1155 { 1156 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1158 goto f_err; 1159 } 1160 1161 if (s->msg_callback) 1162 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1163 1164 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1165 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1166 !s->s3->renegotiate) 1167 { 1168 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1169 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) 1170 { 1171 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1172 if (i < 0) return(i); 1173 if (i == 0) 1174 { 1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1176 return(-1); 1177 } 1178 1179 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1180 { 1181 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1182 { 1183 BIO *bio; 1184 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1185 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1186 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1187 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1188 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1189 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1190 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1191 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1192 return(-1); 1193 } 1194 } 1195 } 1196 } 1197 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, 1198 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ 1199 goto start; 1200 } 1201 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't 1202 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. 1203 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) 1204 */ 1205 if (s->server && 1206 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1207 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && 1208 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && 1209 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1210 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 1211 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && 1212 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1213 1214 { 1215 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ 1216 rr->length = 0; 1217 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1218 goto start; 1219 } 1220 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) 1221 { 1222 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; 1223 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; 1224 1225 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1226 1227 if (s->msg_callback) 1228 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1229 1230 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1231 cb=s->info_callback; 1232 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1233 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1234 1235 if (cb != NULL) 1236 { 1237 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1238 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1239 } 1240 1241 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ 1242 { 1243 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1244 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) 1245 { 1246 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1247 return(0); 1248 } 1249 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1250 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with 1251 * a fatal alert because if application tried to 1252 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and 1253 * expects it to succeed. 1254 * 1255 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we 1256 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. 1257 */ 1258 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) 1259 { 1260 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1262 goto f_err; 1263 } 1264#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME 1265 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) 1266 return(0); 1267#endif 1268 } 1269 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ 1270 { 1271 char tmp[16]; 1272 1273 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1274 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1276 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); 1277 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); 1278 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1279 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1280 return(0); 1281 } 1282 else 1283 { 1284 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1286 goto f_err; 1287 } 1288 1289 goto start; 1290 } 1291 1292 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ 1293 { 1294 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 1295 rr->length=0; 1296 return(0); 1297 } 1298 1299 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) 1300 { 1301 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know 1302 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ 1303 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || 1304 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) 1305 { 1306 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1308 goto f_err; 1309 } 1310 1311 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 1312 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) 1313 { 1314 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1316 goto f_err; 1317 } 1318 1319 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) 1320 { 1321 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1323 goto f_err; 1324 } 1325 1326 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 1327 1328 rr->length=0; 1329 1330 if (s->msg_callback) 1331 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1332 1333 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; 1334 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1335 goto err; 1336 else 1337 goto start; 1338 } 1339 1340 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ 1341 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) 1342 { 1343 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1344 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) 1345 { 1346#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and 1347 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting 1348 * protocol violations): */ 1349 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) 1350 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT 1351 :SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1352#else 1353 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1354#endif 1355 s->renegotiate=1; 1356 s->new_session=1; 1357 } 1358 i=s->handshake_func(s); 1359 if (i < 0) return(i); 1360 if (i == 0) 1361 { 1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1363 return(-1); 1364 } 1365 1366 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) 1367 { 1368 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ 1369 { 1370 BIO *bio; 1371 /* In the case where we try to read application data, 1372 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1373 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1374 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ 1375 s->rwstate=SSL_READING; 1376 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); 1377 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1378 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1379 return(-1); 1380 } 1381 } 1382 goto start; 1383 } 1384 1385 switch (rr->type) 1386 { 1387 default: 1388#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1389 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: 1390 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert. 1391 */ 1392 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) 1393 { 1394 rr->length = 0; 1395 goto start; 1396 } 1397#endif 1398 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1400 goto f_err; 1401 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1402 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1403 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1404 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception 1405 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that 1406 * should not happen when type != rr->type */ 1407 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1409 goto f_err; 1410 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1411 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, 1412 * but have application data. If the library was 1413 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data 1414 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data 1415 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), 1416 * we will indulge it. 1417 */ 1418 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1419 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1420 (( 1421 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1422 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1423 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1424 ) || ( 1425 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1426 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1427 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1428 ) 1429 )) 1430 { 1431 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; 1432 return(-1); 1433 } 1434 else 1435 { 1436 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1438 goto f_err; 1439 } 1440 } 1441 /* not reached */ 1442 1443f_err: 1444 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1445err: 1446 return(-1); 1447 } 1448 1449int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) 1450 { 1451 int i; 1452 const char *sender; 1453 int slen; 1454 1455 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) 1456 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; 1457 else 1458 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; 1459 1460 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) 1461 { 1462 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) 1463 { 1464 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ 1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1466 return (0); 1467 } 1468 1469 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 1470 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); 1471 } 1472 1473 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) 1474 return(0); 1475 1476 /* we have to record the message digest at 1477 * this point so we can get it before we read 1478 * the finished message */ 1479 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) 1480 { 1481 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 1482 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 1483 } 1484 else 1485 { 1486 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 1487 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 1488 } 1489 1490 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 1491 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); 1492 if (i == 0) 1493 { 1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1495 return 0; 1496 } 1497 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i; 1498 1499 return(1); 1500 } 1501 1502int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) 1503 { 1504 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ 1505 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); 1506 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) 1507 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ 1508 if (desc < 0) return -1; 1509 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ 1510 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) 1511 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); 1512 1513 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1514 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; 1515 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; 1516 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ 1517 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1518 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written 1519 * some time in the future */ 1520 return -1; 1521 } 1522 1523int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1524 { 1525 int i,j; 1526 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 1527 1528 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; 1529 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); 1530 if (i <= 0) 1531 { 1532 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; 1533 } 1534 else 1535 { 1536 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. 1537 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, 1538 * we will not worry too much. */ 1539 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) 1540 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1541 1542 if (s->msg_callback) 1543 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1544 1545 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1546 cb=s->info_callback; 1547 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1548 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 1549 1550 if (cb != NULL) 1551 { 1552 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1553 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); 1554 } 1555 } 1556 return(i); 1557 } 1558