x509_vfy.c revision 306196
1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59#include <stdio.h> 60#include <time.h> 61#include <errno.h> 62 63#include "cryptlib.h" 64#include <openssl/crypto.h> 65#include <openssl/lhash.h> 66#include <openssl/buffer.h> 67#include <openssl/evp.h> 68#include <openssl/asn1.h> 69#include <openssl/x509.h> 70#include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71#include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73/* CRL score values */ 74 75/* No unhandled critical extensions */ 76 77#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 78 79/* certificate is within CRL scope */ 80 81#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 82 83/* CRL times valid */ 84 85#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 86 87/* Issuer name matches certificate */ 88 89#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 90 91/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 92 93#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 94 95/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 96 97#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 98 99/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 100 101#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 102 103/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 104 105#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 106 107/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 108 109#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 110 111static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); 112static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 113static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 114static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 115static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 116static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 117static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 118static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 121static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 122 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 123static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 124 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 125static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, 126 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, 127 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 128static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, 129 int *pcrl_score); 130static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 131 unsigned int *preasons); 132static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 133static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 136 137static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 138const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 139 140static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 141{ 142 return ok; 143} 144 145#if 0 146static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 147{ 148 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); 149} 150#endif 151 152int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 153{ 154 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; 155 int bad_chain = 0; 156 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 157 int depth, i, ok = 0; 158 int num, j, retry; 159 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 160 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; 161 if (ctx->cert == NULL) { 162 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 163 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; 164 return -1; 165 } 166 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 167 /* 168 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We 169 * cannot do another one. 170 */ 171 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); 172 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; 173 return -1; 174 } 175 176 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 177 178 /* 179 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that 180 * the first entry is in place 181 */ 182 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 183 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { 184 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 185 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 186 ok = -1; 187 goto end; 188 } 189 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 190 ctx->last_untrusted = 1; 191 192 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 193 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 194 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { 195 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 196 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 197 ok = -1; 198 goto end; 199 } 200 201 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 202 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 203 depth = param->depth; 204 205 for (;;) { 206 /* If we have enough, we break */ 207 if (depth < num) 208 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 209 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 210 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code 211 * later. */ 212 213 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 214 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 215 break; 216 217 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 218 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { 219 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); 220 if (xtmp != NULL) { 221 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { 222 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 223 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 224 ok = -1; 225 goto end; 226 } 227 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 228 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); 229 ctx->last_untrusted++; 230 x = xtmp; 231 num++; 232 /* 233 * reparse the full chain for the next one 234 */ 235 continue; 236 } 237 } 238 break; 239 } 240 241 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ 242 j = num; 243 /* 244 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. 245 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we 246 * complain. 247 */ 248 249 do { 250 /* 251 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. 252 */ 253 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 254 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); 255 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { 256 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 257 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { 258 /* 259 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can 260 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid 261 * possible impersonation. 262 */ 263 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 264 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { 265 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 266 ctx->current_cert = x; 267 ctx->error_depth = i - 1; 268 if (ok == 1) 269 X509_free(xtmp); 270 bad_chain = 1; 271 ok = cb(0, ctx); 272 if (!ok) 273 goto end; 274 } else { 275 /* 276 * We have a match: replace certificate with store 277 * version so we get any trust settings. 278 */ 279 X509_free(x); 280 x = xtmp; 281 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 282 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 283 } 284 } else { 285 /* 286 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use 287 */ 288 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 289 ctx->last_untrusted--; 290 num--; 291 j--; 292 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 293 } 294 } 295 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 296 for (;;) { 297 /* If we have enough, we break */ 298 if (depth < num) 299 break; 300 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 301 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 302 break; 303 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 304 if (ok < 0) { 305 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; 306 goto end; 307 } 308 if (ok == 0) 309 break; 310 x = xtmp; 311 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { 312 X509_free(xtmp); 313 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 314 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 315 ok = -1; 316 goto end; 317 } 318 num++; 319 } 320 321 /* 322 * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check 323 * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this 324 * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking 325 */ 326 retry = 0; 327 if (num == ctx->last_untrusted && 328 !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { 329 while (j-- > 1) { 330 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); 331 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); 332 if (ok < 0) { 333 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; 334 goto end; 335 } 336 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ 337 if (ok > 0) { 338 /* 339 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later 340 */ 341 X509_free(xtmp); 342 343 /* 344 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an 345 * alternate chain 346 */ 347 while (num > j) { 348 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 349 X509_free(xtmp); 350 num--; 351 } 352 ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 353 retry = 1; 354 break; 355 } 356 } 357 } 358 } while (retry); 359 360 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 361 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { 362 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { 363 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 364 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 365 else 366 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 367 ctx->current_cert = x; 368 } else { 369 370 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); 371 num++; 372 ctx->last_untrusted = num; 373 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; 374 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 375 chain_ss = NULL; 376 } 377 378 ctx->error_depth = num - 1; 379 bad_chain = 1; 380 ok = cb(0, ctx); 381 if (!ok) 382 goto end; 383 } 384 385 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 386 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 387 388 if (!ok) 389 goto end; 390 391 /* Check name constraints */ 392 393 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 394 395 if (!ok) 396 goto end; 397 398 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 399 400 if (param->trust > 0) 401 ok = check_trust(ctx); 402 403 if (!ok) 404 goto end; 405 406 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 407 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); 408 409 /* 410 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because 411 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 412 */ 413 414 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 415 if (!ok) 416 goto end; 417 418 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 419 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 420 ok = ctx->verify(ctx); 421 else 422 ok = internal_verify(ctx); 423 if (!ok) 424 goto end; 425 426#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 427 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 428 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 429 if (!ok) 430 goto end; 431 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 432 if (!ok) 433 goto end; 434#endif 435 436 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 437 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 438 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 439 if (!ok) 440 goto end; 441 if (0) { 442 end: 443 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); 444 } 445 if (sktmp != NULL) 446 sk_X509_free(sktmp); 447 if (chain_ss != NULL) 448 X509_free(chain_ss); 449 450 /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ 451 if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) 452 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; 453 return ok; 454} 455 456/* 457 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 458 */ 459 460static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 461{ 462 int i; 463 X509 *issuer; 464 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 465 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 466 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 467 return issuer; 468 } 469 return NULL; 470} 471 472/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 473 474static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 475{ 476 int ret; 477 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 478 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 479 return 1; 480 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 481 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 482 return 0; 483 484 ctx->error = ret; 485 ctx->current_cert = x; 486 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 487 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 488 return 0; 489} 490 491/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 492 493static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 494{ 495 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 496 if (*issuer) { 497 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 498 return 1; 499 } else 500 return 0; 501} 502 503/* 504 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied 505 * purpose 506 */ 507 508static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 509{ 510#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 511 return 1; 512#else 513 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 514 X509 *x; 515 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 516 int proxy_path_length = 0; 517 int purpose; 518 int allow_proxy_certs; 519 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 520 521 /*- 522 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 523 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 524 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 525 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 526 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 527 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 528 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 529 */ 530 must_be_ca = -1; 531 532 /* CRL path validation */ 533 if (ctx->parent) { 534 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 535 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 536 } else { 537 allow_proxy_certs = 538 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 539 /* 540 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software 541 * happy 542 */ 543 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 544 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 545 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 546 } 547 548 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 549 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { 550 int ret; 551 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 552 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 553 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 555 ctx->error_depth = i; 556 ctx->current_cert = x; 557 ok = cb(0, ctx); 558 if (!ok) 559 goto end; 560 } 561 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { 562 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 563 ctx->error_depth = i; 564 ctx->current_cert = x; 565 ok = cb(0, ctx); 566 if (!ok) 567 goto end; 568 } 569 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 570 switch (must_be_ca) { 571 case -1: 572 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 573 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { 574 ret = 0; 575 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 576 } else 577 ret = 1; 578 break; 579 case 0: 580 if (ret != 0) { 581 ret = 0; 582 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 583 } else 584 ret = 1; 585 break; 586 default: 587 if ((ret == 0) 588 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 589 && (ret != 1))) { 590 ret = 0; 591 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 592 } else 593 ret = 1; 594 break; 595 } 596 if (ret == 0) { 597 ctx->error_depth = i; 598 ctx->current_cert = x; 599 ok = cb(0, ctx); 600 if (!ok) 601 goto end; 602 } 603 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { 604 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 605 if ((ret == 0) 606 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 607 && (ret != 1))) { 608 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 609 ctx->error_depth = i; 610 ctx->current_cert = x; 611 ok = cb(0, ctx); 612 if (!ok) 613 goto end; 614 } 615 } 616 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 617 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 618 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 619 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { 620 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 621 ctx->error_depth = i; 622 ctx->current_cert = x; 623 ok = cb(0, ctx); 624 if (!ok) 625 goto end; 626 } 627 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 628 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 629 plen++; 630 /* 631 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate 632 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, 633 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. 634 */ 635 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { 636 /* 637 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint 638 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to 639 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length 640 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. 641 * 642 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start 643 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, 644 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, 645 * increment proxy_path_length. 646 */ 647 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { 648 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { 649 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 650 ctx->error_depth = i; 651 ctx->current_cert = x; 652 ok = cb(0, ctx); 653 if (!ok) 654 goto end; 655 } 656 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; 657 } 658 proxy_path_length++; 659 must_be_ca = 0; 660 } else 661 must_be_ca = 1; 662 } 663 ok = 1; 664 end: 665 return ok; 666#endif 667} 668 669static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 670{ 671 X509 *x; 672 int i, j, rv; 673 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 674 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 675 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 676 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 677 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 678 continue; 679 680 /* 681 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the 682 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry 683 * added. 684 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) 685 */ 686 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { 687 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); 688 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 689 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; 690 int last_object_nid = 0; 691 int err = X509_V_OK; 692 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; 693 694 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ 695 if (last_object_loc < 1) { 696 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; 697 goto proxy_name_done; 698 } 699 700 /* 701 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as 702 * there is in issuer. 703 */ 704 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) 705 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { 706 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; 707 goto proxy_name_done; 708 } 709 710 /* 711 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a 712 * multivalued RDN 713 */ 714 if (X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)->set 715 == X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1)->set) { 716 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; 717 goto proxy_name_done; 718 } 719 720 /* 721 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that 722 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly 723 */ 724 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); 725 if (tmpsubject == NULL) { 726 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 727 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 728 return 0; 729 } 730 731 tmpentry = 732 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); 733 last_object_nid = 734 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); 735 736 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName 737 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { 738 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; 739 } 740 741 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); 742 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); 743 744 proxy_name_done: 745 if (err != X509_V_OK) { 746 ctx->error = err; 747 ctx->error_depth = i; 748 ctx->current_cert = x; 749 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 750 return 0; 751 } 752 } 753 754 /* 755 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain 756 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed 757 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them 758 * to be obeyed. 759 */ 760 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { 761 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 762 if (nc) { 763 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 764 switch (rv) { 765 case X509_V_OK: 766 continue; 767 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: 768 ctx->error = rv; 769 return 0; 770 default: 771 ctx->error = rv; 772 ctx->error_depth = i; 773 ctx->current_cert = x; 774 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 775 return 0; 776 break; 777 } 778 } 779 } 780 } 781 return 1; 782} 783 784static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 785{ 786#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 787 return 1; 788#else 789 int i, ok; 790 X509 *x; 791 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 792 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 793/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 794 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 795 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 796 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 797 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 798 return 1; 799 ctx->error_depth = i; 800 ctx->current_cert = x; 801 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 802 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 803 else 804 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 805 ok = cb(0, ctx); 806 return ok; 807#endif 808} 809 810static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 811{ 812 int i, last, ok; 813 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 814 return 1; 815 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 816 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 817 else { 818 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 819 if (ctx->parent) 820 return 1; 821 last = 0; 822 } 823 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { 824 ctx->error_depth = i; 825 ok = check_cert(ctx); 826 if (!ok) 827 return ok; 828 } 829 return 1; 830} 831 832static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 833{ 834 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 835 X509 *x; 836 int ok, cnum; 837 unsigned int last_reasons; 838 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 839 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 840 ctx->current_cert = x; 841 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 842 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 843 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 844 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { 845 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 846 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 847 if (ctx->get_crl) 848 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 849 else 850 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 851 /* 852 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback 853 */ 854 if (!ok) { 855 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 856 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 857 goto err; 858 } 859 ctx->current_crl = crl; 860 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 861 if (!ok) 862 goto err; 863 864 if (dcrl) { 865 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 866 if (!ok) 867 goto err; 868 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 869 if (!ok) 870 goto err; 871 } else 872 ok = 1; 873 874 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 875 if (ok != 2) { 876 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 877 if (!ok) 878 goto err; 879 } 880 881 X509_CRL_free(crl); 882 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 883 crl = NULL; 884 dcrl = NULL; 885 /* 886 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, 887 * so exit loop. 888 */ 889 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { 890 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 891 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 892 goto err; 893 } 894 } 895 err: 896 X509_CRL_free(crl); 897 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 898 899 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 900 return ok; 901 902} 903 904/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 905 906static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 907{ 908 time_t *ptime; 909 int i; 910 if (notify) 911 ctx->current_crl = crl; 912 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 913 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 914 else 915 ptime = NULL; 916 917 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 918 if (i == 0) { 919 if (!notify) 920 return 0; 921 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 922 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 923 return 0; 924 } 925 926 if (i > 0) { 927 if (!notify) 928 return 0; 929 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 930 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 931 return 0; 932 } 933 934 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { 935 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 936 937 if (i == 0) { 938 if (!notify) 939 return 0; 940 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 941 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 942 return 0; 943 } 944 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 945 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { 946 if (!notify) 947 return 0; 948 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 949 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 950 return 0; 951 } 952 } 953 954 if (notify) 955 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 956 957 return 1; 958} 959 960static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 961 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 962 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 963{ 964 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 965 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 966 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 967 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 968 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 969 970 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 971 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 972 reasons = *preasons; 973 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 974 975 if (crl_score > best_score) { 976 best_crl = crl; 977 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 978 best_score = crl_score; 979 best_reasons = reasons; 980 } 981 } 982 983 if (best_crl) { 984 if (*pcrl) 985 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 986 *pcrl = best_crl; 987 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 988 *pscore = best_score; 989 *preasons = best_reasons; 990 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 991 if (*pdcrl) { 992 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 993 *pdcrl = NULL; 994 } 995 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 996 } 997 998 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 999 return 1; 1000 1001 return 0; 1002} 1003 1004/* 1005 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 1006 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 1007 */ 1008 1009static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 1010{ 1011 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 1012 int i; 1013 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 1014 if (i >= 0) { 1015 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 1016 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 1017 return 0; 1018 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 1019 } else 1020 exta = NULL; 1021 1022 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 1023 1024 if (i >= 0) { 1025 1026 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 1027 return 0; 1028 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 1029 } else 1030 extb = NULL; 1031 1032 if (!exta && !extb) 1033 return 1; 1034 1035 if (!exta || !extb) 1036 return 0; 1037 1038 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 1039 return 0; 1040 1041 return 1; 1042} 1043 1044/* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 1045 1046static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 1047{ 1048 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 1049 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 1050 return 0; 1051 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 1052 if (!base->crl_number) 1053 return 0; 1054 /* Issuer names must match */ 1055 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 1056 return 0; 1057 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 1058 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 1059 return 0; 1060 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 1061 return 0; 1062 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 1063 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1064 return 0; 1065 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 1066 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 1067 return 1; 1068 return 0; 1069} 1070 1071/* 1072 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or 1073 * retrieve a chain of deltas... 1074 */ 1075 1076static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 1077 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 1078{ 1079 X509_CRL *delta; 1080 int i; 1081 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 1082 return; 1083 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 1084 return; 1085 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 1086 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 1087 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { 1088 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 1089 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 1090 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 1091 *dcrl = delta; 1092 return; 1093 } 1094 } 1095 *dcrl = NULL; 1096} 1097 1098/* 1099 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 1100 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not 1101 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is 1102 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL 1103 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 1104 */ 1105 1106static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 1107 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1108{ 1109 1110 int crl_score = 0; 1111 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 1112 1113 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 1114 1115 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 1116 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 1117 return 0; 1118 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 1119 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { 1120 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 1121 return 0; 1122 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { 1123 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1124 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1125 return 0; 1126 } 1127 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1128 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1129 return 0; 1130 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1131 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { 1132 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1133 return 0; 1134 } else 1135 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1136 1137 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1138 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1139 1140 /* Check expiry */ 1141 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1142 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1143 1144 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1145 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1146 1147 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1148 1149 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1150 return 0; 1151 1152 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1153 1154 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { 1155 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1156 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1157 return 0; 1158 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1159 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1160 } 1161 1162 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1163 1164 return crl_score; 1165 1166} 1167 1168static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1169 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1170{ 1171 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1172 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1173 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1174 int i; 1175 1176 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1177 cidx++; 1178 1179 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1180 1181 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1182 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { 1183 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1184 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1185 return; 1186 } 1187 } 1188 1189 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { 1190 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1191 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1192 continue; 1193 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1194 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1195 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1196 return; 1197 } 1198 } 1199 1200 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1201 1202 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1203 return; 1204 1205 /* 1206 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of 1207 * untrusted certificates. 1208 */ 1209 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { 1210 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1211 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1212 continue; 1213 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1214 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1215 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1216 return; 1217 } 1218 } 1219} 1220 1221/* 1222 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1223 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1224 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will 1225 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. 1226 */ 1227 1228static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1229{ 1230 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1231 int ret; 1232 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1233 if (ctx->parent) 1234 return 0; 1235 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1236 return -1; 1237 1238 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1239 /* Copy verify params across */ 1240 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1241 1242 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1243 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1244 1245 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1246 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1247 1248 if (ret <= 0) 1249 goto err; 1250 1251 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1252 1253 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1254 err: 1255 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1256 return ret; 1257} 1258 1259/* 1260 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and 1261 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could 1262 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more 1263 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, 1264 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the 1265 * RFC5280 version 1266 */ 1267 1268static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1269 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1270 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1271{ 1272 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1273 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1274 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1275 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1276 return 1; 1277 return 0; 1278} 1279 1280/*- 1281 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1282 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1283 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1284 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1285 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1286 */ 1287 1288static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1289{ 1290 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1291 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1292 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1293 int i, j; 1294 if (!a || !b) 1295 return 1; 1296 if (a->type == 1) { 1297 if (!a->dpname) 1298 return 0; 1299 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1300 if (b->type == 1) { 1301 if (!b->dpname) 1302 return 0; 1303 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1304 return 1; 1305 else 1306 return 0; 1307 } 1308 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1309 nm = a->dpname; 1310 gens = b->name.fullname; 1311 } else if (b->type == 1) { 1312 if (!b->dpname) 1313 return 0; 1314 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1315 gens = a->name.fullname; 1316 nm = b->dpname; 1317 } 1318 1319 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1320 if (nm) { 1321 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { 1322 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1323 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1324 continue; 1325 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1326 return 1; 1327 } 1328 return 0; 1329 } 1330 1331 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1332 1333 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { 1334 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1335 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { 1336 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1337 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1338 return 1; 1339 } 1340 } 1341 1342 return 0; 1343 1344} 1345 1346static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1347{ 1348 int i; 1349 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1350 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1351 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1352 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1353 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { 1354 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1355 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1356 continue; 1357 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1358 return 1; 1359 } 1360 return 0; 1361} 1362 1363/* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1364 1365static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1366 unsigned int *preasons) 1367{ 1368 int i; 1369 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1370 return 0; 1371 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { 1372 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1373 return 0; 1374 } else { 1375 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1376 return 0; 1377 } 1378 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1379 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { 1380 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1381 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { 1382 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { 1383 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1384 return 1; 1385 } 1386 } 1387 } 1388 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) 1389 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1390 return 1; 1391 return 0; 1392} 1393 1394/* 1395 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try 1396 * to find a delta CRL too 1397 */ 1398 1399static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1400 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1401{ 1402 int ok; 1403 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1404 int crl_score = 0; 1405 unsigned int reasons; 1406 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1407 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1408 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1409 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1410 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1411 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1412 1413 if (ok) 1414 goto done; 1415 1416 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1417 1418 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1419 1420 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1421 if (!skcrl && crl) 1422 goto done; 1423 1424 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1425 1426 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1427 1428 done: 1429 1430 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1431 if (crl) { 1432 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1433 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1434 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1435 *pcrl = crl; 1436 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1437 return 1; 1438 } 1439 1440 return 0; 1441} 1442 1443/* Check CRL validity */ 1444static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1445{ 1446 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1447 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1448 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1449 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1450 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1451 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1452 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1453 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1454 1455 /* 1456 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next 1457 * certificate in chain. 1458 */ 1459 else if (cnum < chnum) 1460 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1461 else { 1462 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1463 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1464 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { 1465 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1466 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1467 if (!ok) 1468 goto err; 1469 } 1470 } 1471 1472 if (issuer) { 1473 /* 1474 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done 1475 */ 1476 if (!crl->base_crl_number) { 1477 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1478 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1479 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { 1480 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1481 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1482 if (!ok) 1483 goto err; 1484 } 1485 1486 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { 1487 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1488 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1489 if (!ok) 1490 goto err; 1491 } 1492 1493 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { 1494 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { 1495 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1496 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1497 if (!ok) 1498 goto err; 1499 } 1500 } 1501 1502 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { 1503 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1504 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1505 if (!ok) 1506 goto err; 1507 } 1508 1509 } 1510 1511 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { 1512 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1513 if (!ok) 1514 goto err; 1515 } 1516 1517 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1518 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1519 1520 if (!ikey) { 1521 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1522 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1523 if (!ok) 1524 goto err; 1525 } else { 1526 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1527 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { 1528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1529 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1530 if (!ok) 1531 goto err; 1532 } 1533 } 1534 } 1535 1536 ok = 1; 1537 1538 err: 1539 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1540 return ok; 1541} 1542 1543/* Check certificate against CRL */ 1544static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1545{ 1546 int ok; 1547 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1548 /* 1549 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled 1550 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate 1551 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can 1552 * change the meaning of CRL entries. 1553 */ 1554 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1555 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 1556 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1557 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1558 if (!ok) 1559 return 0; 1560 } 1561 /* 1562 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason 1563 * is not removeFromCRL. 1564 */ 1565 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { 1566 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1567 return 2; 1568 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1569 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1570 if (!ok) 1571 return 0; 1572 } 1573 1574 return 1; 1575} 1576 1577static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1578{ 1579 int ret; 1580 if (ctx->parent) 1581 return 1; 1582 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1583 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1584 if (ret == 0) { 1585 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1586 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; 1587 return 0; 1588 } 1589 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1590 if (ret == -1) { 1591 /* 1592 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. 1593 */ 1594 X509 *x; 1595 int i; 1596 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { 1597 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1598 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1599 continue; 1600 ctx->current_cert = x; 1601 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1602 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1603 return 0; 1604 } 1605 return 1; 1606 } 1607 if (ret == -2) { 1608 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1609 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1610 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1611 } 1612 1613 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { 1614 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1615 /* 1616 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed 1617 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then 1618 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier 1619 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. 1620 */ 1621 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1622 return 0; 1623 } 1624 1625 return 1; 1626} 1627 1628static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1629{ 1630 time_t *ptime; 1631 int i; 1632 1633 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1634 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1635 else 1636 ptime = NULL; 1637 1638 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1639 if (i == 0) { 1640 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1641 ctx->current_cert = x; 1642 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1643 return 0; 1644 } 1645 1646 if (i > 0) { 1647 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1648 ctx->current_cert = x; 1649 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1650 return 0; 1651 } 1652 1653 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1654 if (i == 0) { 1655 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1656 ctx->current_cert = x; 1657 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1658 return 0; 1659 } 1660 1661 if (i < 0) { 1662 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1663 ctx->current_cert = x; 1664 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1665 return 0; 1666 } 1667 1668 return 1; 1669} 1670 1671static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1672{ 1673 int ok = 0, n; 1674 X509 *xs, *xi; 1675 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1676 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1677 1678 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1679 1680 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1681 ctx->error_depth = n - 1; 1682 n--; 1683 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1684 1685 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1686 xs = xi; 1687 else { 1688 if (n <= 0) { 1689 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1690 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1691 ok = cb(0, ctx); 1692 goto end; 1693 } else { 1694 n--; 1695 ctx->error_depth = n; 1696 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1697 } 1698 } 1699 1700/* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1701 while (n >= 0) { 1702 ctx->error_depth = n; 1703 1704 /* 1705 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1706 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes 1707 * time. 1708 */ 1709 if (!xs->valid 1710 && (xs != xi 1711 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { 1712 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { 1713 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1714 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1715 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1716 if (!ok) 1717 goto end; 1718 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { 1719 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1720 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1721 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1722 if (!ok) { 1723 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1724 goto end; 1725 } 1726 } 1727 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1728 pkey = NULL; 1729 } 1730 1731 xs->valid = 1; 1732 1733 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1734 if (!ok) 1735 goto end; 1736 1737 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1738 ctx->current_issuer = xi; 1739 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1740 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); 1741 if (!ok) 1742 goto end; 1743 1744 n--; 1745 if (n >= 0) { 1746 xi = xs; 1747 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1748 } 1749 } 1750 ok = 1; 1751 end: 1752 return ok; 1753} 1754 1755int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1756{ 1757 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1758} 1759 1760int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1761{ 1762 char *str; 1763 ASN1_TIME atm; 1764 long offset; 1765 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; 1766 int i, j, remaining; 1767 1768 p = buff1; 1769 remaining = ctm->length; 1770 str = (char *)ctm->data; 1771 /* 1772 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the 1773 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: 1774 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ 1775 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ 1776 */ 1777 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1778 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ 1779 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1780 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; 1781 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1782 return 0; 1783 memcpy(p, str, 10); 1784 p += 10; 1785 str += 10; 1786 remaining -= 10; 1787 } else { 1788 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ 1789 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1790 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; 1791 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1792 return 0; 1793 memcpy(p, str, 12); 1794 p += 12; 1795 str += 12; 1796 remaining -= 12; 1797 } 1798 1799 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { 1800 *(p++) = '0'; 1801 *(p++) = '0'; 1802 } else { 1803 /* SS (seconds) */ 1804 if (remaining < 2) 1805 return 0; 1806 *(p++) = *(str++); 1807 *(p++) = *(str++); 1808 remaining -= 2; 1809 /* 1810 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... 1811 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. 1812 * Can we just kill them altogether? 1813 */ 1814 if (remaining && *str == '.') { 1815 str++; 1816 remaining--; 1817 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { 1818 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') 1819 break; 1820 } 1821 } 1822 1823 } 1824 *(p++) = 'Z'; 1825 *(p++) = '\0'; 1826 1827 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ 1828 if (!remaining) 1829 return 0; 1830 if (*str == 'Z') { 1831 if (remaining != 1) 1832 return 0; 1833 offset = 0; 1834 } else { 1835 /* (+-)HHMM */ 1836 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1837 return 0; 1838 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ 1839 if (remaining != 5) 1840 return 0; 1841 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || 1842 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') 1843 return 0; 1844 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; 1845 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); 1846 if (*str == '-') 1847 offset = -offset; 1848 } 1849 atm.type = ctm->type; 1850 atm.flags = 0; 1851 atm.length = sizeof(buff2); 1852 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; 1853 1854 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1855 return 0; 1856 1857 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1858 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); 1859 if (i < 50) 1860 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1861 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); 1862 if (j < 50) 1863 j += 100; 1864 1865 if (i < j) 1866 return -1; 1867 if (i > j) 1868 return 1; 1869 } 1870 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); 1871 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1872 return -1; 1873 else 1874 return i; 1875} 1876 1877ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1878{ 1879 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1880} 1881 1882ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1883{ 1884 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1885} 1886 1887ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1888 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1889{ 1890 time_t t; 1891 1892 if (in_tm) 1893 t = *in_tm; 1894 else 1895 time(&t); 1896 1897 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { 1898 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1899 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1900 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1901 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1902 } 1903 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1904} 1905 1906int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1907{ 1908 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; 1909 int i, j; 1910 1911 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) 1912 return 1; 1913 1914 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 1915 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); 1916 if (ktmp == NULL) { 1917 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, 1918 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1919 return 0; 1920 } 1921 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1922 break; 1923 else { 1924 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1925 ktmp = NULL; 1926 } 1927 } 1928 if (ktmp == NULL) { 1929 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, 1930 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1931 return 0; 1932 } 1933 1934 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1935 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { 1936 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); 1937 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); 1938 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1939 } 1940 1941 if (pkey != NULL) 1942 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); 1943 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1944 return 1; 1945} 1946 1947int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, 1948 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1949 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, 1950 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1951{ 1952 /* 1953 * This function is (usually) called only once, by 1954 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). 1955 */ 1956 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1957 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1958} 1959 1960int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1961{ 1962 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); 1963} 1964 1965void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1966{ 1967 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); 1968} 1969 1970int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1971{ 1972 return ctx->error; 1973} 1974 1975void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1976{ 1977 ctx->error = err; 1978} 1979 1980int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1981{ 1982 return ctx->error_depth; 1983} 1984 1985X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1986{ 1987 return ctx->current_cert; 1988} 1989 1990STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1991{ 1992 return ctx->chain; 1993} 1994 1995STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1996{ 1997 int i; 1998 X509 *x; 1999 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 2000 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) 2001 return NULL; 2002 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 2003 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 2004 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 2005 } 2006 return chain; 2007} 2008 2009X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2010{ 2011 return ctx->current_issuer; 2012} 2013 2014X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2015{ 2016 return ctx->current_crl; 2017} 2018 2019X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2020{ 2021 return ctx->parent; 2022} 2023 2024void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 2025{ 2026 ctx->cert = x; 2027} 2028 2029void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2030{ 2031 ctx->untrusted = sk; 2032} 2033 2034void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 2035{ 2036 ctx->crls = sk; 2037} 2038 2039int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 2040{ 2041 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 2042} 2043 2044int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 2045{ 2046 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 2047} 2048 2049/* 2050 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. 2051 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and 2052 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't 2053 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then 2054 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL 2055 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the 2056 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL 2057 * client/server. 2058 */ 2059 2060int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 2061 int purpose, int trust) 2062{ 2063 int idx; 2064 /* If purpose not set use default */ 2065 if (!purpose) 2066 purpose = def_purpose; 2067 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 2068 if (purpose) { 2069 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 2070 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 2071 if (idx == -1) { 2072 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 2073 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2074 return 0; 2075 } 2076 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2077 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { 2078 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 2079 if (idx == -1) { 2080 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 2081 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 2082 return 0; 2083 } 2084 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 2085 } 2086 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 2087 if (!trust) 2088 trust = ptmp->trust; 2089 } 2090 if (trust) { 2091 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 2092 if (idx == -1) { 2093 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 2094 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 2095 return 0; 2096 } 2097 } 2098 2099 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) 2100 ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 2101 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) 2102 ctx->param->trust = trust; 2103 return 1; 2104} 2105 2106X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 2107{ 2108 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 2109 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2110 if (!ctx) { 2111 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2112 return NULL; 2113 } 2114 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 2115 return ctx; 2116} 2117 2118void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2119{ 2120 if (!ctx) 2121 return; 2122 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 2123 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2124} 2125 2126int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2127 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2128{ 2129 int ret = 1; 2130 ctx->ctx = store; 2131 ctx->current_method = 0; 2132 ctx->cert = x509; 2133 ctx->untrusted = chain; 2134 ctx->crls = NULL; 2135 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 2136 ctx->other_ctx = NULL; 2137 ctx->valid = 0; 2138 ctx->chain = NULL; 2139 ctx->error = 0; 2140 ctx->explicit_policy = 0; 2141 ctx->error_depth = 0; 2142 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 2143 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 2144 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 2145 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 2146 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 2147 ctx->tree = NULL; 2148 ctx->parent = NULL; 2149 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ 2150 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); 2151 2152 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2153 if (!ctx->param) { 2154 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2155 return 0; 2156 } 2157 2158 /* 2159 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. 2160 */ 2161 if (store) 2162 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2163 else 2164 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2165 2166 if (store) { 2167 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2168 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */ 2169 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2170 } else 2171 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2172 2173 if (ret) 2174 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2175 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2176 2177 if (ret == 0) { 2178 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2179 goto err; 2180 } 2181 2182 if (store && store->check_issued) 2183 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2184 else 2185 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2186 2187 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2188 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2189 else 2190 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2191 2192 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2193 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2194 else 2195 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2196 2197 if (store && store->verify) 2198 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2199 else 2200 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2201 2202 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2203 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2204 else 2205 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2206 2207 if (store && store->get_crl) 2208 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2209 else 2210 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2211 2212 if (store && store->check_crl) 2213 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2214 else 2215 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2216 2217 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2218 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2219 else 2220 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2221 2222 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2223 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2224 else 2225 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2226 2227 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2228 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2229 else 2230 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2231 2232 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2233 2234 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 2235 &ctx->ex_data)) 2236 return 1; 2237 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2238 2239 err: 2240 /* 2241 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not 2242 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. 2243 */ 2244 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 2245 return 0; 2246} 2247 2248/* 2249 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This 2250 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2251 */ 2252 2253void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2254{ 2255 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2256 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2257} 2258 2259void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2260{ 2261 /* 2262 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls 2263 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() 2264 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the 2265 * pointers below after they're freed! 2266 */ 2267 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ 2268 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { 2269 ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2270 ctx->cleanup = NULL; 2271 } 2272 if (ctx->param != NULL) { 2273 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2274 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2275 ctx->param = NULL; 2276 } 2277 if (ctx->tree != NULL) { 2278 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2279 ctx->tree = NULL; 2280 } 2281 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 2282 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); 2283 ctx->chain = NULL; 2284 } 2285 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2286 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2287} 2288 2289void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2290{ 2291 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2292} 2293 2294void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2295{ 2296 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2297} 2298 2299void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, 2300 time_t t) 2301{ 2302 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2303} 2304 2305void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2306 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2307{ 2308 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; 2309} 2310 2311X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2312{ 2313 return ctx->tree; 2314} 2315 2316int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2317{ 2318 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2319} 2320 2321int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2322{ 2323 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2324 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2325 if (!param) 2326 return 0; 2327 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2328} 2329 2330X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2331{ 2332 return ctx->param; 2333} 2334 2335void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2336{ 2337 if (ctx->param) 2338 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2339 ctx->param = param; 2340} 2341 2342IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 2343 2344IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2345 2346IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 2347 2348IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2349 2350IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2351