x509_vfy.c revision 284285
1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59#include <stdio.h> 60#include <time.h> 61#include <errno.h> 62 63#include "cryptlib.h" 64#include <openssl/crypto.h> 65#include <openssl/lhash.h> 66#include <openssl/buffer.h> 67#include <openssl/evp.h> 68#include <openssl/asn1.h> 69#include <openssl/x509.h> 70#include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71#include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73/* CRL score values */ 74 75/* No unhandled critical extensions */ 76 77#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 78 79/* certificate is within CRL scope */ 80 81#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 82 83/* CRL times valid */ 84 85#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 86 87/* Issuer name matches certificate */ 88 89#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 90 91/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 92 93#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 94 95/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 96 97#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 98 99/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 100 101#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 102 103/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 104 105#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 106 107/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 108 109#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 110 111static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); 112static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 113static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 114static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 115static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 116static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 117static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 118static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 121static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 122 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 123static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 124 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 125static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, 126 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, 127 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 128static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, 129 int *pcrl_score); 130static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 131 unsigned int *preasons); 132static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 133static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 136 137static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 138const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 139 140static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 141{ 142 return ok; 143} 144 145#if 0 146static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 147{ 148 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); 149} 150#endif 151 152int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 153{ 154 X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; 155 int bad_chain = 0; 156 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 157 int depth, i, ok = 0; 158 int num, j, retry; 159 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 160 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; 161 if (ctx->cert == NULL) { 162 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 163 return -1; 164 } 165 166 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 167 168 /* 169 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that 170 * the first entry is in place 171 */ 172 if (ctx->chain == NULL) { 173 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 174 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { 175 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 176 goto end; 177 } 178 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 179 ctx->last_untrusted = 1; 180 } 181 182 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 183 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 184 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { 185 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 186 goto end; 187 } 188 189 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 190 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 191 depth = param->depth; 192 193 for (;;) { 194 /* If we have enough, we break */ 195 if (depth < num) 196 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 197 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 198 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code 199 * later. */ 200 201 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 202 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 203 break; 204 205 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 206 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { 207 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); 208 if (xtmp != NULL) { 209 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { 210 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 211 goto end; 212 } 213 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 214 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); 215 ctx->last_untrusted++; 216 x = xtmp; 217 num++; 218 /* 219 * reparse the full chain for the next one 220 */ 221 continue; 222 } 223 } 224 break; 225 } 226 227 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ 228 j = num; 229 /* 230 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. 231 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we 232 * complain. 233 */ 234 235 do { 236 /* 237 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. 238 */ 239 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 240 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); 241 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { 242 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 243 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { 244 /* 245 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can 246 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid 247 * possible impersonation. 248 */ 249 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 250 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { 251 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 252 ctx->current_cert = x; 253 ctx->error_depth = i - 1; 254 if (ok == 1) 255 X509_free(xtmp); 256 bad_chain = 1; 257 ok = cb(0, ctx); 258 if (!ok) 259 goto end; 260 } else { 261 /* 262 * We have a match: replace certificate with store 263 * version so we get any trust settings. 264 */ 265 X509_free(x); 266 x = xtmp; 267 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 268 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 269 } 270 } else { 271 /* 272 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use 273 */ 274 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 275 ctx->last_untrusted--; 276 num--; 277 j--; 278 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 279 } 280 } 281 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 282 for (;;) { 283 /* If we have enough, we break */ 284 if (depth < num) 285 break; 286 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 287 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 288 break; 289 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 290 if (ok < 0) 291 return ok; 292 if (ok == 0) 293 break; 294 x = xtmp; 295 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { 296 X509_free(xtmp); 297 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 298 return 0; 299 } 300 num++; 301 } 302 303 /* 304 * If we haven't got a least one certificate from our store then check 305 * if there is an alternative chain that could be used. We only do this 306 * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking 307 */ 308 retry = 0; 309 if (j == ctx->last_untrusted && 310 !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { 311 while (j-- > 1) { 312 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); 313 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); 314 if (ok < 0) 315 goto end; 316 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ 317 if (ok > 0) { 318 /* 319 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later 320 */ 321 X509_free(xtmp); 322 323 /* 324 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an 325 * alternate chain 326 */ 327 while (num > j) { 328 xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 329 X509_free(xtmp); 330 num--; 331 ctx->last_untrusted--; 332 } 333 retry = 1; 334 break; 335 } 336 } 337 } 338 } while (retry); 339 340 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 341 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { 342 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { 343 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 344 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 345 else 346 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 347 ctx->current_cert = x; 348 } else { 349 350 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); 351 num++; 352 ctx->last_untrusted = num; 353 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; 354 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 355 chain_ss = NULL; 356 } 357 358 ctx->error_depth = num - 1; 359 bad_chain = 1; 360 ok = cb(0, ctx); 361 if (!ok) 362 goto end; 363 } 364 365 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 366 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 367 368 if (!ok) 369 goto end; 370 371 /* Check name constraints */ 372 373 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 374 375 if (!ok) 376 goto end; 377 378 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 379 380 if (param->trust > 0) 381 ok = check_trust(ctx); 382 383 if (!ok) 384 goto end; 385 386 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); 388 389 /* 390 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because 391 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 392 */ 393 394 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 395 if (!ok) 396 goto end; 397 398 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 399 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 400 ok = ctx->verify(ctx); 401 else 402 ok = internal_verify(ctx); 403 if (!ok) 404 goto end; 405 406#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 407 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 408 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 409 if (!ok) 410 goto end; 411 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 412 if (!ok) 413 goto end; 414#endif 415 416 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 417 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 418 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 419 if (!ok) 420 goto end; 421 if (0) { 422 end: 423 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); 424 } 425 if (sktmp != NULL) 426 sk_X509_free(sktmp); 427 if (chain_ss != NULL) 428 X509_free(chain_ss); 429 return ok; 430} 431 432/* 433 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 434 */ 435 436static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 437{ 438 int i; 439 X509 *issuer; 440 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 441 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 442 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 443 return issuer; 444 } 445 return NULL; 446} 447 448/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 449 450static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 451{ 452 int ret; 453 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 454 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 455 return 1; 456 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 457 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 458 return 0; 459 460 ctx->error = ret; 461 ctx->current_cert = x; 462 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 463 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 464 return 0; 465} 466 467/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 468 469static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 470{ 471 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 472 if (*issuer) { 473 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 474 return 1; 475 } else 476 return 0; 477} 478 479/* 480 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied 481 * purpose 482 */ 483 484static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 485{ 486#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 487 return 1; 488#else 489 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 490 X509 *x; 491 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 492 int proxy_path_length = 0; 493 int purpose; 494 int allow_proxy_certs; 495 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 496 497 /*- 498 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 499 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 500 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 501 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 502 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 503 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 504 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 505 */ 506 must_be_ca = -1; 507 508 /* CRL path validation */ 509 if (ctx->parent) { 510 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 511 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 512 } else { 513 allow_proxy_certs = 514 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 515 /* 516 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software 517 * happy 518 */ 519 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 520 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 521 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 522 } 523 524 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 525 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { 526 int ret; 527 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 528 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 529 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 530 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 531 ctx->error_depth = i; 532 ctx->current_cert = x; 533 ok = cb(0, ctx); 534 if (!ok) 535 goto end; 536 } 537 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { 538 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 539 ctx->error_depth = i; 540 ctx->current_cert = x; 541 ok = cb(0, ctx); 542 if (!ok) 543 goto end; 544 } 545 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 546 switch (must_be_ca) { 547 case -1: 548 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 549 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { 550 ret = 0; 551 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 552 } else 553 ret = 1; 554 break; 555 case 0: 556 if (ret != 0) { 557 ret = 0; 558 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 559 } else 560 ret = 1; 561 break; 562 default: 563 if ((ret == 0) 564 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 565 && (ret != 1))) { 566 ret = 0; 567 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 568 } else 569 ret = 1; 570 break; 571 } 572 if (ret == 0) { 573 ctx->error_depth = i; 574 ctx->current_cert = x; 575 ok = cb(0, ctx); 576 if (!ok) 577 goto end; 578 } 579 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { 580 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 581 if ((ret == 0) 582 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 583 && (ret != 1))) { 584 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 585 ctx->error_depth = i; 586 ctx->current_cert = x; 587 ok = cb(0, ctx); 588 if (!ok) 589 goto end; 590 } 591 } 592 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 593 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 594 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 595 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { 596 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 597 ctx->error_depth = i; 598 ctx->current_cert = x; 599 ok = cb(0, ctx); 600 if (!ok) 601 goto end; 602 } 603 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 604 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 605 plen++; 606 /* 607 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate 608 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, 609 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. 610 */ 611 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { 612 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { 613 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 614 ctx->error_depth = i; 615 ctx->current_cert = x; 616 ok = cb(0, ctx); 617 if (!ok) 618 goto end; 619 } 620 proxy_path_length++; 621 must_be_ca = 0; 622 } else 623 must_be_ca = 1; 624 } 625 ok = 1; 626 end: 627 return ok; 628#endif 629} 630 631static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 632{ 633 X509 *x; 634 int i, j, rv; 635 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 636 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 637 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 638 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 639 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 640 continue; 641 /* 642 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain 643 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed 644 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them 645 * to be obeyed. 646 */ 647 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { 648 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 649 if (nc) { 650 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 651 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 652 ctx->error = rv; 653 ctx->error_depth = i; 654 ctx->current_cert = x; 655 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 656 return 0; 657 } 658 } 659 } 660 } 661 return 1; 662} 663 664static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 665{ 666#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 667 return 1; 668#else 669 int i, ok; 670 X509 *x; 671 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 672 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 673/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 674 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 675 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 676 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 677 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 678 return 1; 679 ctx->error_depth = i; 680 ctx->current_cert = x; 681 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 682 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 683 else 684 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 685 ok = cb(0, ctx); 686 return ok; 687#endif 688} 689 690static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 691{ 692 int i, last, ok; 693 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 694 return 1; 695 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 696 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 697 else { 698 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 699 if (ctx->parent) 700 return 1; 701 last = 0; 702 } 703 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { 704 ctx->error_depth = i; 705 ok = check_cert(ctx); 706 if (!ok) 707 return ok; 708 } 709 return 1; 710} 711 712static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 713{ 714 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 715 X509 *x; 716 int ok, cnum; 717 unsigned int last_reasons; 718 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 719 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 720 ctx->current_cert = x; 721 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 722 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 723 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 724 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { 725 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 726 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 727 if (ctx->get_crl) 728 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 729 else 730 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 731 /* 732 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback 733 */ 734 if (!ok) { 735 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 736 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 737 goto err; 738 } 739 ctx->current_crl = crl; 740 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 741 if (!ok) 742 goto err; 743 744 if (dcrl) { 745 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 746 if (!ok) 747 goto err; 748 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 749 if (!ok) 750 goto err; 751 } else 752 ok = 1; 753 754 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 755 if (ok != 2) { 756 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 757 if (!ok) 758 goto err; 759 } 760 761 X509_CRL_free(crl); 762 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 763 crl = NULL; 764 dcrl = NULL; 765 /* 766 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, 767 * so exit loop. 768 */ 769 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { 770 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 771 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 772 goto err; 773 } 774 } 775 err: 776 X509_CRL_free(crl); 777 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 778 779 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 780 return ok; 781 782} 783 784/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 785 786static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 787{ 788 time_t *ptime; 789 int i; 790 if (notify) 791 ctx->current_crl = crl; 792 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 793 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 794 else 795 ptime = NULL; 796 797 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 798 if (i == 0) { 799 if (!notify) 800 return 0; 801 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 802 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 803 return 0; 804 } 805 806 if (i > 0) { 807 if (!notify) 808 return 0; 809 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 810 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 811 return 0; 812 } 813 814 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { 815 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 816 817 if (i == 0) { 818 if (!notify) 819 return 0; 820 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 821 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 822 return 0; 823 } 824 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 825 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { 826 if (!notify) 827 return 0; 828 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 829 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 830 return 0; 831 } 832 } 833 834 if (notify) 835 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 836 837 return 1; 838} 839 840static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 841 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 842 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 843{ 844 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 845 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 846 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 847 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 848 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 849 850 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 851 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 852 reasons = *preasons; 853 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 854 855 if (crl_score > best_score) { 856 best_crl = crl; 857 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 858 best_score = crl_score; 859 best_reasons = reasons; 860 } 861 } 862 863 if (best_crl) { 864 if (*pcrl) 865 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 866 *pcrl = best_crl; 867 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 868 *pscore = best_score; 869 *preasons = best_reasons; 870 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 871 if (*pdcrl) { 872 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 873 *pdcrl = NULL; 874 } 875 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 876 } 877 878 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 879 return 1; 880 881 return 0; 882} 883 884/* 885 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 886 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 887 */ 888 889static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 890{ 891 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 892 int i; 893 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 894 if (i >= 0) { 895 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 896 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 897 return 0; 898 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 899 } else 900 exta = NULL; 901 902 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 903 904 if (i >= 0) { 905 906 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 907 return 0; 908 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 909 } else 910 extb = NULL; 911 912 if (!exta && !extb) 913 return 1; 914 915 if (!exta || !extb) 916 return 0; 917 918 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 919 return 0; 920 921 return 1; 922} 923 924/* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 925 926static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 927{ 928 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 929 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 930 return 0; 931 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 932 if (!base->crl_number) 933 return 0; 934 /* Issuer names must match */ 935 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 936 return 0; 937 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 938 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 939 return 0; 940 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 941 return 0; 942 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 943 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 944 return 0; 945 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 946 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 947 return 1; 948 return 0; 949} 950 951/* 952 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or 953 * retrieve a chain of deltas... 954 */ 955 956static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 957 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 958{ 959 X509_CRL *delta; 960 int i; 961 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 962 return; 963 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 964 return; 965 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 966 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 967 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { 968 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 969 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 970 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 971 *dcrl = delta; 972 return; 973 } 974 } 975 *dcrl = NULL; 976} 977 978/* 979 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 980 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not 981 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is 982 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL 983 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 984 */ 985 986static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 987 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 988{ 989 990 int crl_score = 0; 991 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 992 993 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 994 995 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 996 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 997 return 0; 998 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 999 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { 1000 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 1001 return 0; 1002 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { 1003 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1004 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1005 return 0; 1006 } 1007 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 1008 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 1009 return 0; 1010 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 1011 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { 1012 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 1013 return 0; 1014 } else 1015 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 1016 1017 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 1018 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 1019 1020 /* Check expiry */ 1021 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 1022 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 1023 1024 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 1025 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 1026 1027 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 1028 1029 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 1030 return 0; 1031 1032 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1033 1034 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { 1035 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1036 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1037 return 0; 1038 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1039 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1040 } 1041 1042 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1043 1044 return crl_score; 1045 1046} 1047 1048static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1049 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1050{ 1051 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1052 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1053 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1054 int i; 1055 1056 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1057 cidx++; 1058 1059 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1060 1061 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1062 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { 1063 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1064 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1065 return; 1066 } 1067 } 1068 1069 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { 1070 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1071 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1072 continue; 1073 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1074 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1075 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1076 return; 1077 } 1078 } 1079 1080 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1081 1082 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1083 return; 1084 1085 /* 1086 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of 1087 * untrusted certificates. 1088 */ 1089 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { 1090 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1091 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1092 continue; 1093 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1094 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1095 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1096 return; 1097 } 1098 } 1099} 1100 1101/* 1102 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1103 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1104 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will 1105 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. 1106 */ 1107 1108static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1109{ 1110 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1111 int ret; 1112 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1113 if (ctx->parent) 1114 return 0; 1115 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1116 return -1; 1117 1118 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1119 /* Copy verify params across */ 1120 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1121 1122 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1123 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1124 1125 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1126 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1127 1128 if (ret <= 0) 1129 goto err; 1130 1131 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1132 1133 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1134 err: 1135 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1136 return ret; 1137} 1138 1139/* 1140 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and 1141 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could 1142 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more 1143 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, 1144 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the 1145 * RFC5280 version 1146 */ 1147 1148static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1149 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1150 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1151{ 1152 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1153 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1154 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1155 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1156 return 1; 1157 return 0; 1158} 1159 1160/*- 1161 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1162 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1163 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1164 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1165 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1166 */ 1167 1168static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1169{ 1170 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1171 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1172 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1173 int i, j; 1174 if (!a || !b) 1175 return 1; 1176 if (a->type == 1) { 1177 if (!a->dpname) 1178 return 0; 1179 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1180 if (b->type == 1) { 1181 if (!b->dpname) 1182 return 0; 1183 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1184 return 1; 1185 else 1186 return 0; 1187 } 1188 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1189 nm = a->dpname; 1190 gens = b->name.fullname; 1191 } else if (b->type == 1) { 1192 if (!b->dpname) 1193 return 0; 1194 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1195 gens = a->name.fullname; 1196 nm = b->dpname; 1197 } 1198 1199 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1200 if (nm) { 1201 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { 1202 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1203 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1204 continue; 1205 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1206 return 1; 1207 } 1208 return 0; 1209 } 1210 1211 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1212 1213 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { 1214 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1215 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { 1216 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1217 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1218 return 1; 1219 } 1220 } 1221 1222 return 0; 1223 1224} 1225 1226static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1227{ 1228 int i; 1229 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1230 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1231 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1232 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { 1234 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1235 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1236 continue; 1237 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1238 return 1; 1239 } 1240 return 0; 1241} 1242 1243/* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1244 1245static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1246 unsigned int *preasons) 1247{ 1248 int i; 1249 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1250 return 0; 1251 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { 1252 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1253 return 0; 1254 } else { 1255 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1256 return 0; 1257 } 1258 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1259 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { 1260 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1261 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { 1262 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { 1263 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1264 return 1; 1265 } 1266 } 1267 } 1268 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) 1269 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1270 return 1; 1271 return 0; 1272} 1273 1274/* 1275 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try 1276 * to find a delta CRL too 1277 */ 1278 1279static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1280 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1281{ 1282 int ok; 1283 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1284 int crl_score = 0; 1285 unsigned int reasons; 1286 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1287 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1288 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1289 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1290 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1291 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1292 1293 if (ok) 1294 goto done; 1295 1296 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1297 1298 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1299 1300 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1301 if (!skcrl && crl) 1302 goto done; 1303 1304 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1305 1306 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1307 1308 done: 1309 1310 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1311 if (crl) { 1312 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1313 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1314 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1315 *pcrl = crl; 1316 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1317 return 1; 1318 } 1319 1320 return 0; 1321} 1322 1323/* Check CRL validity */ 1324static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1325{ 1326 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1327 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1328 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1329 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1330 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1331 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1332 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1333 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1334 1335 /* 1336 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next 1337 * certificate in chain. 1338 */ 1339 else if (cnum < chnum) 1340 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1341 else { 1342 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1343 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1344 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { 1345 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1346 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1347 if (!ok) 1348 goto err; 1349 } 1350 } 1351 1352 if (issuer) { 1353 /* 1354 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done 1355 */ 1356 if (!crl->base_crl_number) { 1357 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1358 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1359 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { 1360 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1361 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1362 if (!ok) 1363 goto err; 1364 } 1365 1366 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { 1367 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1368 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1369 if (!ok) 1370 goto err; 1371 } 1372 1373 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { 1374 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { 1375 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1376 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1377 if (!ok) 1378 goto err; 1379 } 1380 } 1381 1382 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { 1383 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1384 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1385 if (!ok) 1386 goto err; 1387 } 1388 1389 } 1390 1391 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { 1392 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1393 if (!ok) 1394 goto err; 1395 } 1396 1397 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1398 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1399 1400 if (!ikey) { 1401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1402 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1403 if (!ok) 1404 goto err; 1405 } else { 1406 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1407 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { 1408 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1409 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1410 if (!ok) 1411 goto err; 1412 } 1413 } 1414 } 1415 1416 ok = 1; 1417 1418 err: 1419 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1420 return ok; 1421} 1422 1423/* Check certificate against CRL */ 1424static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1425{ 1426 int ok; 1427 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1428 /* 1429 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled 1430 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate 1431 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can 1432 * change the meaning of CRL entries. 1433 */ 1434 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1435 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 1436 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1437 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1438 if (!ok) 1439 return 0; 1440 } 1441 /* 1442 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason 1443 * is not removeFromCRL. 1444 */ 1445 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { 1446 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1447 return 2; 1448 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1449 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1450 if (!ok) 1451 return 0; 1452 } 1453 1454 return 1; 1455} 1456 1457static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1458{ 1459 int ret; 1460 if (ctx->parent) 1461 return 1; 1462 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1463 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1464 if (ret == 0) { 1465 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1466 return 0; 1467 } 1468 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1469 if (ret == -1) { 1470 /* 1471 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. 1472 */ 1473 X509 *x; 1474 int i; 1475 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { 1476 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1477 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1478 continue; 1479 ctx->current_cert = x; 1480 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1481 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1482 return 0; 1483 } 1484 return 1; 1485 } 1486 if (ret == -2) { 1487 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1488 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1489 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1490 } 1491 1492 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { 1493 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1494 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 1495 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1496 return 0; 1497 } 1498 1499 return 1; 1500} 1501 1502static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1503{ 1504 time_t *ptime; 1505 int i; 1506 1507 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1508 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1509 else 1510 ptime = NULL; 1511 1512 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1513 if (i == 0) { 1514 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1515 ctx->current_cert = x; 1516 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1517 return 0; 1518 } 1519 1520 if (i > 0) { 1521 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1522 ctx->current_cert = x; 1523 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1524 return 0; 1525 } 1526 1527 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1528 if (i == 0) { 1529 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1530 ctx->current_cert = x; 1531 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1532 return 0; 1533 } 1534 1535 if (i < 0) { 1536 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1537 ctx->current_cert = x; 1538 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1539 return 0; 1540 } 1541 1542 return 1; 1543} 1544 1545static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1546{ 1547 int ok = 0, n; 1548 X509 *xs, *xi; 1549 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1550 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1551 1552 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1553 1554 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1555 ctx->error_depth = n - 1; 1556 n--; 1557 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1558 1559 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1560 xs = xi; 1561 else { 1562 if (n <= 0) { 1563 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1564 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1565 ok = cb(0, ctx); 1566 goto end; 1567 } else { 1568 n--; 1569 ctx->error_depth = n; 1570 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1571 } 1572 } 1573 1574/* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1575 while (n >= 0) { 1576 ctx->error_depth = n; 1577 1578 /* 1579 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1580 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes 1581 * time. 1582 */ 1583 if (!xs->valid 1584 && (xs != xi 1585 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { 1586 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { 1587 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1588 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1589 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1590 if (!ok) 1591 goto end; 1592 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { 1593 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1594 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1595 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1596 if (!ok) { 1597 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1598 goto end; 1599 } 1600 } 1601 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1602 pkey = NULL; 1603 } 1604 1605 xs->valid = 1; 1606 1607 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1608 if (!ok) 1609 goto end; 1610 1611 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1612 ctx->current_issuer = xi; 1613 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1614 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); 1615 if (!ok) 1616 goto end; 1617 1618 n--; 1619 if (n >= 0) { 1620 xi = xs; 1621 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1622 } 1623 } 1624 ok = 1; 1625 end: 1626 return ok; 1627} 1628 1629int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1630{ 1631 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1632} 1633 1634int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1635{ 1636 char *str; 1637 ASN1_TIME atm; 1638 long offset; 1639 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; 1640 int i, j, remaining; 1641 1642 p = buff1; 1643 remaining = ctm->length; 1644 str = (char *)ctm->data; 1645 /* 1646 * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the 1647 * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: 1648 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ 1649 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ 1650 */ 1651 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1652 /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */ 1653 int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1654 int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1; 1655 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1656 return 0; 1657 memcpy(p, str, 10); 1658 p += 10; 1659 str += 10; 1660 remaining -= 10; 1661 } else { 1662 /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */ 1663 int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1; 1664 int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1; 1665 if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length) 1666 return 0; 1667 memcpy(p, str, 12); 1668 p += 12; 1669 str += 12; 1670 remaining -= 12; 1671 } 1672 1673 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { 1674 *(p++) = '0'; 1675 *(p++) = '0'; 1676 } else { 1677 /* SS (seconds) */ 1678 if (remaining < 2) 1679 return 0; 1680 *(p++) = *(str++); 1681 *(p++) = *(str++); 1682 remaining -= 2; 1683 /* 1684 * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds... 1685 * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden. 1686 * Can we just kill them altogether? 1687 */ 1688 if (remaining && *str == '.') { 1689 str++; 1690 remaining--; 1691 for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) { 1692 if (*str < '0' || *str > '9') 1693 break; 1694 } 1695 } 1696 1697 } 1698 *(p++) = 'Z'; 1699 *(p++) = '\0'; 1700 1701 /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */ 1702 if (!remaining) 1703 return 0; 1704 if (*str == 'Z') { 1705 if (remaining != 1) 1706 return 0; 1707 offset = 0; 1708 } else { 1709 /* (+-)HHMM */ 1710 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1711 return 0; 1712 /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */ 1713 if (remaining != 5) 1714 return 0; 1715 if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' || 1716 str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9') 1717 return 0; 1718 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; 1719 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); 1720 if (*str == '-') 1721 offset = -offset; 1722 } 1723 atm.type = ctm->type; 1724 atm.flags = 0; 1725 atm.length = sizeof(buff2); 1726 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; 1727 1728 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1729 return 0; 1730 1731 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1732 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); 1733 if (i < 50) 1734 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1735 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); 1736 if (j < 50) 1737 j += 100; 1738 1739 if (i < j) 1740 return -1; 1741 if (i > j) 1742 return 1; 1743 } 1744 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); 1745 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1746 return -1; 1747 else 1748 return i; 1749} 1750 1751ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1752{ 1753 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1754} 1755 1756ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1757{ 1758 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1759} 1760 1761ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1762 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1763{ 1764 time_t t; 1765 1766 if (in_tm) 1767 t = *in_tm; 1768 else 1769 time(&t); 1770 1771 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { 1772 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1773 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1774 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1775 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1776 } 1777 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1778} 1779 1780int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1781{ 1782 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; 1783 int i, j; 1784 1785 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) 1786 return 1; 1787 1788 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 1789 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); 1790 if (ktmp == NULL) { 1791 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, 1792 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1793 return 0; 1794 } 1795 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1796 break; 1797 else { 1798 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1799 ktmp = NULL; 1800 } 1801 } 1802 if (ktmp == NULL) { 1803 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, 1804 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1805 return 0; 1806 } 1807 1808 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1809 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { 1810 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); 1811 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); 1812 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1813 } 1814 1815 if (pkey != NULL) 1816 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); 1817 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1818 return 1; 1819} 1820 1821int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, 1822 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1823 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, 1824 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1825{ 1826 /* 1827 * This function is (usually) called only once, by 1828 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). 1829 */ 1830 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1831 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1832} 1833 1834int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1835{ 1836 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); 1837} 1838 1839void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1840{ 1841 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); 1842} 1843 1844int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1845{ 1846 return ctx->error; 1847} 1848 1849void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1850{ 1851 ctx->error = err; 1852} 1853 1854int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1855{ 1856 return ctx->error_depth; 1857} 1858 1859X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1860{ 1861 return ctx->current_cert; 1862} 1863 1864STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1865{ 1866 return ctx->chain; 1867} 1868 1869STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1870{ 1871 int i; 1872 X509 *x; 1873 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1874 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) 1875 return NULL; 1876 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 1877 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1878 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1879 } 1880 return chain; 1881} 1882 1883X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1884{ 1885 return ctx->current_issuer; 1886} 1887 1888X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1889{ 1890 return ctx->current_crl; 1891} 1892 1893X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1894{ 1895 return ctx->parent; 1896} 1897 1898void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1899{ 1900 ctx->cert = x; 1901} 1902 1903void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1904{ 1905 ctx->untrusted = sk; 1906} 1907 1908void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1909{ 1910 ctx->crls = sk; 1911} 1912 1913int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1914{ 1915 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1916} 1917 1918int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1919{ 1920 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1921} 1922 1923/* 1924 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. 1925 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and 1926 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't 1927 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then 1928 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL 1929 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the 1930 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL 1931 * client/server. 1932 */ 1933 1934int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1935 int purpose, int trust) 1936{ 1937 int idx; 1938 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1939 if (!purpose) 1940 purpose = def_purpose; 1941 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1942 if (purpose) { 1943 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1944 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1945 if (idx == -1) { 1946 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1947 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1948 return 0; 1949 } 1950 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1951 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { 1952 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1953 if (idx == -1) { 1954 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1955 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1956 return 0; 1957 } 1958 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1959 } 1960 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1961 if (!trust) 1962 trust = ptmp->trust; 1963 } 1964 if (trust) { 1965 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1966 if (idx == -1) { 1967 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1968 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1969 return 0; 1970 } 1971 } 1972 1973 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) 1974 ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1975 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) 1976 ctx->param->trust = trust; 1977 return 1; 1978} 1979 1980X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1981{ 1982 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1983 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1984 if (!ctx) { 1985 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1986 return NULL; 1987 } 1988 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1989 return ctx; 1990} 1991 1992void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1993{ 1994 if (!ctx) 1995 return; 1996 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1997 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1998} 1999 2000int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 2001 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 2002{ 2003 int ret = 1; 2004 ctx->ctx = store; 2005 ctx->current_method = 0; 2006 ctx->cert = x509; 2007 ctx->untrusted = chain; 2008 ctx->crls = NULL; 2009 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 2010 ctx->other_ctx = NULL; 2011 ctx->valid = 0; 2012 ctx->chain = NULL; 2013 ctx->error = 0; 2014 ctx->explicit_policy = 0; 2015 ctx->error_depth = 0; 2016 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 2017 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 2018 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 2019 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 2020 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 2021 ctx->tree = NULL; 2022 ctx->parent = NULL; 2023 2024 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 2025 2026 if (!ctx->param) { 2027 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2028 return 0; 2029 } 2030 2031 /* 2032 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. 2033 */ 2034 2035 if (store) 2036 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 2037 else 2038 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 2039 2040 if (store) { 2041 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2042 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 2043 } else 2044 ctx->cleanup = 0; 2045 2046 if (ret) 2047 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 2048 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 2049 2050 if (ret == 0) { 2051 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2052 return 0; 2053 } 2054 2055 if (store && store->check_issued) 2056 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 2057 else 2058 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 2059 2060 if (store && store->get_issuer) 2061 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 2062 else 2063 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 2064 2065 if (store && store->verify_cb) 2066 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 2067 else 2068 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 2069 2070 if (store && store->verify) 2071 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2072 else 2073 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2074 2075 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2076 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2077 else 2078 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2079 2080 if (store && store->get_crl) 2081 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2082 else 2083 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2084 2085 if (store && store->check_crl) 2086 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2087 else 2088 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2089 2090 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2091 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2092 else 2093 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2094 2095 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2096 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2097 else 2098 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2099 2100 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2101 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2102 else 2103 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2104 2105 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2106 2107 /* 2108 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 2109 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 2110 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. 2111 */ 2112 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 2113 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 2114 &(ctx->ex_data))) { 2115 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2116 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2117 return 0; 2118 } 2119 return 1; 2120} 2121 2122/* 2123 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This 2124 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2125 */ 2126 2127void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2128{ 2129 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2130 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2131} 2132 2133void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2134{ 2135 if (ctx->cleanup) 2136 ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2137 if (ctx->param != NULL) { 2138 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2139 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2140 ctx->param = NULL; 2141 } 2142 if (ctx->tree != NULL) { 2143 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2144 ctx->tree = NULL; 2145 } 2146 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 2147 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); 2148 ctx->chain = NULL; 2149 } 2150 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2151 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2152} 2153 2154void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2155{ 2156 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2157} 2158 2159void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2160{ 2161 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2162} 2163 2164void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, 2165 time_t t) 2166{ 2167 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2168} 2169 2170void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2171 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2172{ 2173 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; 2174} 2175 2176X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2177{ 2178 return ctx->tree; 2179} 2180 2181int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2182{ 2183 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2184} 2185 2186int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2187{ 2188 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2189 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2190 if (!param) 2191 return 0; 2192 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2193} 2194 2195X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2196{ 2197 return ctx->param; 2198} 2199 2200void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2201{ 2202 if (ctx->param) 2203 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2204 ctx->param = param; 2205} 2206 2207IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 2208 2209IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2210 2211IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 2212 2213IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2214 2215IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2216