x509_vfy.c revision 280304
1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59#include <stdio.h> 60#include <time.h> 61#include <errno.h> 62 63#include "cryptlib.h" 64#include <openssl/crypto.h> 65#include <openssl/lhash.h> 66#include <openssl/buffer.h> 67#include <openssl/evp.h> 68#include <openssl/asn1.h> 69#include <openssl/x509.h> 70#include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71#include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73/* CRL score values */ 74 75/* No unhandled critical extensions */ 76 77#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 78 79/* certificate is within CRL scope */ 80 81#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 82 83/* CRL times valid */ 84 85#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 86 87/* Issuer name matches certificate */ 88 89#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 90 91/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ 92 93#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) 94 95/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ 96 97#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 98 99/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ 100 101#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 102 103/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ 104 105#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 106 107/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ 108 109#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 110 111static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); 112static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 113static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 114static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 115static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 116static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 117static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 118static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 119static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 120 121static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 122 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); 123static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 124 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); 125static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, 126 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, 127 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); 128static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, 129 int *pcrl_score); 130static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 131 unsigned int *preasons); 132static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); 133static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); 136 137static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 138const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 139 140static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 141{ 142 return ok; 143} 144 145#if 0 146static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 147{ 148 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b); 149} 150#endif 151 152int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 153{ 154 X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL; 155 int bad_chain = 0; 156 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 157 int depth, i, ok = 0; 158 int num; 159 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 160 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; 161 if (ctx->cert == NULL) { 162 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 163 return -1; 164 } 165 166 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 167 168 /* 169 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that 170 * the first entry is in place 171 */ 172 if (ctx->chain == NULL) { 173 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 174 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) { 175 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 176 goto end; 177 } 178 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 179 ctx->last_untrusted = 1; 180 } 181 182 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 183 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 184 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { 185 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 186 goto end; 187 } 188 189 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 190 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 191 depth = param->depth; 192 193 for (;;) { 194 /* If we have enough, we break */ 195 if (depth < num) 196 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 197 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 198 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code 199 * later. */ 200 201 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 202 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 203 break; 204 205 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 206 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) { 207 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); 208 if (xtmp != NULL) { 209 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { 210 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 211 goto end; 212 } 213 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 214 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); 215 ctx->last_untrusted++; 216 x = xtmp; 217 num++; 218 /* 219 * reparse the full chain for the next one 220 */ 221 continue; 222 } 223 } 224 break; 225 } 226 227 /* 228 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. 229 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we 230 * complain. 231 */ 232 233 /* 234 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. 235 */ 236 237 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 238 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); 239 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { 240 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 241 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { 242 /* 243 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find 244 * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible 245 * impersonation. 246 */ 247 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 248 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { 249 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 250 ctx->current_cert = x; 251 ctx->error_depth = i - 1; 252 if (ok == 1) 253 X509_free(xtmp); 254 bad_chain = 1; 255 ok = cb(0, ctx); 256 if (!ok) 257 goto end; 258 } else { 259 /* 260 * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so 261 * we get any trust settings. 262 */ 263 X509_free(x); 264 x = xtmp; 265 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 266 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 267 } 268 } else { 269 /* 270 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use 271 */ 272 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 273 ctx->last_untrusted--; 274 num--; 275 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); 276 } 277 } 278 279 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 280 for (;;) { 281 /* If we have enough, we break */ 282 if (depth < num) 283 break; 284 285 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 286 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 287 break; 288 289 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 290 291 if (ok < 0) 292 return ok; 293 if (ok == 0) 294 break; 295 296 x = xtmp; 297 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { 298 X509_free(xtmp); 299 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 300 return 0; 301 } 302 num++; 303 } 304 305 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 306 307 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 308 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) { 309 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { 310 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 311 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 312 else 313 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 314 ctx->current_cert = x; 315 } else { 316 317 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); 318 num++; 319 ctx->last_untrusted = num; 320 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; 321 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 322 chain_ss = NULL; 323 } 324 325 ctx->error_depth = num - 1; 326 bad_chain = 1; 327 ok = cb(0, ctx); 328 if (!ok) 329 goto end; 330 } 331 332 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 333 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 334 335 if (!ok) 336 goto end; 337 338 /* Check name constraints */ 339 340 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); 341 342 if (!ok) 343 goto end; 344 345 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 346 347 if (param->trust > 0) 348 ok = check_trust(ctx); 349 350 if (!ok) 351 goto end; 352 353 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 354 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); 355 356 /* 357 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because 358 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 359 */ 360 361 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 362 if (!ok) 363 goto end; 364 365 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 366 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 367 ok = ctx->verify(ctx); 368 else 369 ok = internal_verify(ctx); 370 if (!ok) 371 goto end; 372 373#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 374 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 375 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 376 if (!ok) 377 goto end; 378 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 379 if (!ok) 380 goto end; 381#endif 382 383 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 384 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 385 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 386 if (!ok) 387 goto end; 388 if (0) { 389 end: 390 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); 391 } 392 if (sktmp != NULL) 393 sk_X509_free(sktmp); 394 if (chain_ss != NULL) 395 X509_free(chain_ss); 396 return ok; 397} 398 399/* 400 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 401 */ 402 403static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 404{ 405 int i; 406 X509 *issuer; 407 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { 408 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 409 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 410 return issuer; 411 } 412 return NULL; 413} 414 415/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 416 417static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 418{ 419 int ret; 420 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 421 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 422 return 1; 423 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 424 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 425 return 0; 426 427 ctx->error = ret; 428 ctx->current_cert = x; 429 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 430 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 431 return 0; 432} 433 434/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 435 436static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 437{ 438 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 439 if (*issuer) { 440 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 441 return 1; 442 } else 443 return 0; 444} 445 446/* 447 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied 448 * purpose 449 */ 450 451static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 452{ 453#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 454 return 1; 455#else 456 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 457 X509 *x; 458 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 459 int proxy_path_length = 0; 460 int purpose; 461 int allow_proxy_certs; 462 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 463 464 /*- 465 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 466 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 467 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 468 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 469 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 470 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 471 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 472 */ 473 must_be_ca = -1; 474 475 /* CRL path validation */ 476 if (ctx->parent) { 477 allow_proxy_certs = 0; 478 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; 479 } else { 480 allow_proxy_certs = 481 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 482 /* 483 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software 484 * happy 485 */ 486 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 487 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 488 purpose = ctx->param->purpose; 489 } 490 491 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 492 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { 493 int ret; 494 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 495 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 496 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 498 ctx->error_depth = i; 499 ctx->current_cert = x; 500 ok = cb(0, ctx); 501 if (!ok) 502 goto end; 503 } 504 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { 505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 506 ctx->error_depth = i; 507 ctx->current_cert = x; 508 ok = cb(0, ctx); 509 if (!ok) 510 goto end; 511 } 512 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 513 switch (must_be_ca) { 514 case -1: 515 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 516 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { 517 ret = 0; 518 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 519 } else 520 ret = 1; 521 break; 522 case 0: 523 if (ret != 0) { 524 ret = 0; 525 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 526 } else 527 ret = 1; 528 break; 529 default: 530 if ((ret == 0) 531 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 532 && (ret != 1))) { 533 ret = 0; 534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 535 } else 536 ret = 1; 537 break; 538 } 539 if (ret == 0) { 540 ctx->error_depth = i; 541 ctx->current_cert = x; 542 ok = cb(0, ctx); 543 if (!ok) 544 goto end; 545 } 546 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { 547 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0); 548 if ((ret == 0) 549 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 550 && (ret != 1))) { 551 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 552 ctx->error_depth = i; 553 ctx->current_cert = x; 554 ok = cb(0, ctx); 555 if (!ok) 556 goto end; 557 } 558 } 559 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 560 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 561 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 562 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { 563 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 564 ctx->error_depth = i; 565 ctx->current_cert = x; 566 ok = cb(0, ctx); 567 if (!ok) 568 goto end; 569 } 570 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 571 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 572 plen++; 573 /* 574 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate 575 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, 576 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. 577 */ 578 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { 579 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { 580 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 581 ctx->error_depth = i; 582 ctx->current_cert = x; 583 ok = cb(0, ctx); 584 if (!ok) 585 goto end; 586 } 587 proxy_path_length++; 588 must_be_ca = 0; 589 } else 590 must_be_ca = 1; 591 } 592 ok = 1; 593 end: 594 return ok; 595#endif 596} 597 598static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 599{ 600 X509 *x; 601 int i, j, rv; 602 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ 603 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 604 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 605 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ 606 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 607 continue; 608 /* 609 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain 610 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed 611 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them 612 * to be obeyed. 613 */ 614 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { 615 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; 616 if (nc) { 617 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); 618 if (rv != X509_V_OK) { 619 ctx->error = rv; 620 ctx->error_depth = i; 621 ctx->current_cert = x; 622 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 623 return 0; 624 } 625 } 626 } 627 } 628 return 1; 629} 630 631static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 632{ 633#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 634 return 1; 635#else 636 int i, ok; 637 X509 *x; 638 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 639 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 640/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 641 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 642 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 643 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 644 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 645 return 1; 646 ctx->error_depth = i; 647 ctx->current_cert = x; 648 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 649 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 650 else 651 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 652 ok = cb(0, ctx); 653 return ok; 654#endif 655} 656 657static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 658{ 659 int i, last, ok; 660 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 661 return 1; 662 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 663 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 664 else { 665 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ 666 if (ctx->parent) 667 return 1; 668 last = 0; 669 } 670 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { 671 ctx->error_depth = i; 672 ok = check_cert(ctx); 673 if (!ok) 674 return ok; 675 } 676 return 1; 677} 678 679static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 680{ 681 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 682 X509 *x; 683 int ok, cnum; 684 unsigned int last_reasons; 685 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 686 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 687 ctx->current_cert = x; 688 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 689 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 690 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 691 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { 692 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 693 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 694 if (ctx->get_crl) 695 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 696 else 697 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); 698 /* 699 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback 700 */ 701 if (!ok) { 702 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 703 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 704 goto err; 705 } 706 ctx->current_crl = crl; 707 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 708 if (!ok) 709 goto err; 710 711 if (dcrl) { 712 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); 713 if (!ok) 714 goto err; 715 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); 716 if (!ok) 717 goto err; 718 } else 719 ok = 1; 720 721 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ 722 if (ok != 2) { 723 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 724 if (!ok) 725 goto err; 726 } 727 728 X509_CRL_free(crl); 729 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 730 crl = NULL; 731 dcrl = NULL; 732 /* 733 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, 734 * so exit loop. 735 */ 736 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { 737 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 738 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 739 goto err; 740 } 741 } 742 err: 743 X509_CRL_free(crl); 744 X509_CRL_free(dcrl); 745 746 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 747 return ok; 748 749} 750 751/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 752 753static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 754{ 755 time_t *ptime; 756 int i; 757 if (notify) 758 ctx->current_crl = crl; 759 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 760 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 761 else 762 ptime = NULL; 763 764 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 765 if (i == 0) { 766 if (!notify) 767 return 0; 768 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 769 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 770 return 0; 771 } 772 773 if (i > 0) { 774 if (!notify) 775 return 0; 776 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 777 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 778 return 0; 779 } 780 781 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { 782 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 783 784 if (i == 0) { 785 if (!notify) 786 return 0; 787 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 788 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 789 return 0; 790 } 791 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ 792 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { 793 if (!notify) 794 return 0; 795 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 796 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 797 return 0; 798 } 799 } 800 801 if (notify) 802 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 803 804 return 1; 805} 806 807static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, 808 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, 809 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 810{ 811 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; 812 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; 813 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; 814 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 815 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; 816 817 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 818 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 819 reasons = *preasons; 820 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); 821 822 if (crl_score > best_score) { 823 best_crl = crl; 824 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; 825 best_score = crl_score; 826 best_reasons = reasons; 827 } 828 } 829 830 if (best_crl) { 831 if (*pcrl) 832 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); 833 *pcrl = best_crl; 834 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; 835 *pscore = best_score; 836 *preasons = best_reasons; 837 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 838 if (*pdcrl) { 839 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); 840 *pdcrl = NULL; 841 } 842 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); 843 } 844 845 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) 846 return 1; 847 848 return 0; 849} 850 851/* 852 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be 853 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. 854 */ 855 856static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) 857{ 858 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; 859 int i; 860 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); 861 if (i >= 0) { 862 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ 863 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) 864 return 0; 865 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); 866 } else 867 exta = NULL; 868 869 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); 870 871 if (i >= 0) { 872 873 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) 874 return 0; 875 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); 876 } else 877 extb = NULL; 878 879 if (!exta && !extb) 880 return 1; 881 882 if (!exta || !extb) 883 return 0; 884 885 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) 886 return 0; 887 888 return 1; 889} 890 891/* See if a base and delta are compatible */ 892 893static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) 894{ 895 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ 896 if (!delta->base_crl_number) 897 return 0; 898 /* Base must have a CRL number */ 899 if (!base->crl_number) 900 return 0; 901 /* Issuer names must match */ 902 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) 903 return 0; 904 /* AKID and IDP must match */ 905 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) 906 return 0; 907 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) 908 return 0; 909 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ 910 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 911 return 0; 912 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ 913 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) 914 return 1; 915 return 0; 916} 917 918/* 919 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or 920 * retrieve a chain of deltas... 921 */ 922 923static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, 924 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 925{ 926 X509_CRL *delta; 927 int i; 928 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) 929 return; 930 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) 931 return; 932 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { 933 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 934 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { 935 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) 936 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; 937 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 938 *dcrl = delta; 939 return; 940 } 941 } 942 *dcrl = NULL; 943} 944 945/* 946 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 947 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not 948 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is 949 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL 950 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. 951 */ 952 953static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, 954 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 955{ 956 957 int crl_score = 0; 958 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; 959 960 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ 961 962 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ 963 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) 964 return 0; 965 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ 966 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { 967 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) 968 return 0; 969 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { 970 /* If no new reasons reject */ 971 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 972 return 0; 973 } 974 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ 975 else if (crl->base_crl_number) 976 return 0; 977 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ 978 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { 979 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) 980 return 0; 981 } else 982 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; 983 984 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 985 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; 986 987 /* Check expiry */ 988 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 989 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; 990 991 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ 992 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); 993 994 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ 995 996 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) 997 return 0; 998 999 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ 1000 1001 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { 1002 /* If no new reasons reject */ 1003 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) 1004 return 0; 1005 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; 1006 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; 1007 } 1008 1009 *preasons = tmp_reasons; 1010 1011 return crl_score; 1012 1013} 1014 1015static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, 1016 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) 1017{ 1018 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; 1019 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1020 int cidx = ctx->error_depth; 1021 int i; 1022 1023 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) 1024 cidx++; 1025 1026 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1027 1028 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1029 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { 1030 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; 1031 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1032 return; 1033 } 1034 } 1035 1036 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { 1037 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); 1038 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1039 continue; 1040 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1041 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; 1042 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1043 return; 1044 } 1045 } 1046 1047 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ 1048 1049 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) 1050 return; 1051 1052 /* 1053 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of 1054 * untrusted certificates. 1055 */ 1056 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { 1057 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); 1058 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) 1059 continue; 1060 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { 1061 *pissuer = crl_issuer; 1062 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; 1063 return; 1064 } 1065 } 1066} 1067 1068/* 1069 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new 1070 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the 1071 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will 1072 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. 1073 */ 1074 1075static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1076{ 1077 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; 1078 int ret; 1079 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ 1080 if (ctx->parent) 1081 return 0; 1082 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) 1083 return -1; 1084 1085 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; 1086 /* Copy verify params across */ 1087 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); 1088 1089 crl_ctx.parent = ctx; 1090 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1091 1092 /* Verify CRL issuer */ 1093 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); 1094 1095 if (ret <= 0) 1096 goto err; 1097 1098 /* Check chain is acceptable */ 1099 1100 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); 1101 err: 1102 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); 1103 return ret; 1104} 1105 1106/* 1107 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and 1108 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could 1109 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more 1110 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, 1111 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the 1112 * RFC5280 version 1113 */ 1114 1115static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1116 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, 1117 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) 1118{ 1119 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; 1120 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); 1121 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); 1122 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) 1123 return 1; 1124 return 0; 1125} 1126 1127/*- 1128 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1129 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 1130 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 1131 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 1132 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. 1133 */ 1134 1135static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) 1136{ 1137 X509_NAME *nm = NULL; 1138 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; 1139 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; 1140 int i, j; 1141 if (!a || !b) 1142 return 1; 1143 if (a->type == 1) { 1144 if (!a->dpname) 1145 return 0; 1146 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ 1147 if (b->type == 1) { 1148 if (!b->dpname) 1149 return 0; 1150 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) 1151 return 1; 1152 else 1153 return 0; 1154 } 1155 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1156 nm = a->dpname; 1157 gens = b->name.fullname; 1158 } else if (b->type == 1) { 1159 if (!b->dpname) 1160 return 0; 1161 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ 1162 gens = a->name.fullname; 1163 nm = b->dpname; 1164 } 1165 1166 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ 1167 if (nm) { 1168 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { 1169 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); 1170 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1171 continue; 1172 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) 1173 return 1; 1174 } 1175 return 0; 1176 } 1177 1178 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ 1179 1180 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { 1181 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); 1182 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { 1183 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); 1184 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) 1185 return 1; 1186 } 1187 } 1188 1189 return 0; 1190 1191} 1192 1193static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) 1194{ 1195 int i; 1196 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); 1197 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ 1198 if (!dp->CRLissuer) 1199 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); 1200 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { 1201 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); 1202 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) 1203 continue; 1204 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) 1205 return 1; 1206 } 1207 return 0; 1208} 1209 1210/* Check CRLDP and IDP */ 1211 1212static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, 1213 unsigned int *preasons) 1214{ 1215 int i; 1216 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) 1217 return 0; 1218 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { 1219 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) 1220 return 0; 1221 } else { 1222 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) 1223 return 0; 1224 } 1225 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; 1226 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { 1227 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); 1228 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { 1229 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { 1230 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; 1231 return 1; 1232 } 1233 } 1234 } 1235 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) 1236 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) 1237 return 1; 1238 return 0; 1239} 1240 1241/* 1242 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try 1243 * to find a delta CRL too 1244 */ 1245 1246static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1247 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) 1248{ 1249 int ok; 1250 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1251 int crl_score = 0; 1252 unsigned int reasons; 1253 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; 1254 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; 1255 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 1256 reasons = ctx->current_reasons; 1257 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 1258 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); 1259 1260 if (ok) 1261 goto done; 1262 1263 /* Lookup CRLs from store */ 1264 1265 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); 1266 1267 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 1268 if (!skcrl && crl) 1269 goto done; 1270 1271 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); 1272 1273 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); 1274 1275 done: 1276 1277 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ 1278 if (crl) { 1279 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 1280 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; 1281 ctx->current_reasons = reasons; 1282 *pcrl = crl; 1283 *pdcrl = dcrl; 1284 return 1; 1285 } 1286 1287 return 0; 1288} 1289 1290/* Check CRL validity */ 1291static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 1292{ 1293 X509 *issuer = NULL; 1294 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 1295 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 1296 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 1297 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 1298 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ 1299 if (ctx->current_issuer) 1300 issuer = ctx->current_issuer; 1301 1302 /* 1303 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next 1304 * certificate in chain. 1305 */ 1306 else if (cnum < chnum) 1307 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 1308 else { 1309 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 1310 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 1311 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { 1312 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 1313 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1314 if (!ok) 1315 goto err; 1316 } 1317 } 1318 1319 if (issuer) { 1320 /* 1321 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done 1322 */ 1323 if (!crl->base_crl_number) { 1324 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 1325 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 1326 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { 1327 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 1328 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1329 if (!ok) 1330 goto err; 1331 } 1332 1333 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { 1334 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; 1335 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1336 if (!ok) 1337 goto err; 1338 } 1339 1340 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { 1341 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { 1342 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; 1343 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1344 if (!ok) 1345 goto err; 1346 } 1347 } 1348 1349 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { 1350 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; 1351 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1352 if (!ok) 1353 goto err; 1354 } 1355 1356 } 1357 1358 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { 1359 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 1360 if (!ok) 1361 goto err; 1362 } 1363 1364 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 1365 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 1366 1367 if (!ikey) { 1368 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1369 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1370 if (!ok) 1371 goto err; 1372 } else { 1373 /* Verify CRL signature */ 1374 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { 1375 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1376 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1377 if (!ok) 1378 goto err; 1379 } 1380 } 1381 } 1382 1383 ok = 1; 1384 1385 err: 1386 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 1387 return ok; 1388} 1389 1390/* Check certificate against CRL */ 1391static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 1392{ 1393 int ok; 1394 X509_REVOKED *rev; 1395 /* 1396 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled 1397 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate 1398 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can 1399 * change the meaning of CRL entries. 1400 */ 1401 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 1402 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { 1403 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 1404 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1405 if (!ok) 1406 return 0; 1407 } 1408 /* 1409 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason 1410 * is not removeFromCRL. 1411 */ 1412 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { 1413 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) 1414 return 2; 1415 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 1416 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1417 if (!ok) 1418 return 0; 1419 } 1420 1421 return 1; 1422} 1423 1424static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1425{ 1426 int ret; 1427 if (ctx->parent) 1428 return 1; 1429 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 1430 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 1431 if (ret == 0) { 1432 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1433 return 0; 1434 } 1435 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 1436 if (ret == -1) { 1437 /* 1438 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. 1439 */ 1440 X509 *x; 1441 int i; 1442 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { 1443 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 1444 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 1445 continue; 1446 ctx->current_cert = x; 1447 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 1448 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1449 return 0; 1450 } 1451 return 1; 1452 } 1453 if (ret == -2) { 1454 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1455 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 1456 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 1457 } 1458 1459 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { 1460 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1461 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 1462 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 1463 return 0; 1464 } 1465 1466 return 1; 1467} 1468 1469static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1470{ 1471 time_t *ptime; 1472 int i; 1473 1474 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 1475 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 1476 else 1477 ptime = NULL; 1478 1479 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 1480 if (i == 0) { 1481 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 1482 ctx->current_cert = x; 1483 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1484 return 0; 1485 } 1486 1487 if (i > 0) { 1488 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 1489 ctx->current_cert = x; 1490 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1491 return 0; 1492 } 1493 1494 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 1495 if (i == 0) { 1496 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 1497 ctx->current_cert = x; 1498 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1499 return 0; 1500 } 1501 1502 if (i < 0) { 1503 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 1504 ctx->current_cert = x; 1505 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 1506 return 0; 1507 } 1508 1509 return 1; 1510} 1511 1512static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1513{ 1514 int ok = 0, n; 1515 X509 *xs, *xi; 1516 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1517 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 1518 1519 cb = ctx->verify_cb; 1520 1521 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 1522 ctx->error_depth = n - 1; 1523 n--; 1524 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1525 1526 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 1527 xs = xi; 1528 else { 1529 if (n <= 0) { 1530 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 1531 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1532 ok = cb(0, ctx); 1533 goto end; 1534 } else { 1535 n--; 1536 ctx->error_depth = n; 1537 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1538 } 1539 } 1540 1541/* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 1542 while (n >= 0) { 1543 ctx->error_depth = n; 1544 1545 /* 1546 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 1547 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes 1548 * time. 1549 */ 1550 if (!xs->valid 1551 && (xs != xi 1552 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) { 1553 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { 1554 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1555 ctx->current_cert = xi; 1556 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1557 if (!ok) 1558 goto end; 1559 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { 1560 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1561 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1562 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); 1563 if (!ok) { 1564 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1565 goto end; 1566 } 1567 } 1568 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1569 pkey = NULL; 1570 } 1571 1572 xs->valid = 1; 1573 1574 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1575 if (!ok) 1576 goto end; 1577 1578 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1579 ctx->current_issuer = xi; 1580 ctx->current_cert = xs; 1581 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); 1582 if (!ok) 1583 goto end; 1584 1585 n--; 1586 if (n >= 0) { 1587 xi = xs; 1588 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); 1589 } 1590 } 1591 ok = 1; 1592 end: 1593 return ok; 1594} 1595 1596int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1597{ 1598 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1599} 1600 1601int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1602{ 1603 char *str; 1604 ASN1_TIME atm; 1605 long offset; 1606 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p; 1607 int i, j; 1608 1609 p = buff1; 1610 i = ctm->length; 1611 str = (char *)ctm->data; 1612 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1613 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) 1614 return 0; 1615 memcpy(p, str, 10); 1616 p += 10; 1617 str += 10; 1618 } else { 1619 if (i < 13) 1620 return 0; 1621 memcpy(p, str, 12); 1622 p += 12; 1623 str += 12; 1624 } 1625 1626 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) { 1627 *(p++) = '0'; 1628 *(p++) = '0'; 1629 } else { 1630 *(p++) = *(str++); 1631 *(p++) = *(str++); 1632 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1633 if (*str == '.') { 1634 str++; 1635 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) 1636 str++; 1637 } 1638 1639 } 1640 *(p++) = 'Z'; 1641 *(p++) = '\0'; 1642 1643 if (*str == 'Z') 1644 offset = 0; 1645 else { 1646 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1647 return 0; 1648 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60; 1649 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0'); 1650 if (*str == '-') 1651 offset = -offset; 1652 } 1653 atm.type = ctm->type; 1654 atm.flags = 0; 1655 atm.length = sizeof(buff2); 1656 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2; 1657 1658 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1659 return 0; 1660 1661 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) { 1662 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0'); 1663 if (i < 50) 1664 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1665 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0'); 1666 if (j < 50) 1667 j += 100; 1668 1669 if (i < j) 1670 return -1; 1671 if (i > j) 1672 return 1; 1673 } 1674 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2); 1675 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1676 return -1; 1677 else 1678 return i; 1679} 1680 1681ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1682{ 1683 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1684} 1685 1686ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1687{ 1688 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); 1689} 1690 1691ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, 1692 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) 1693{ 1694 time_t t; 1695 1696 if (in_tm) 1697 t = *in_tm; 1698 else 1699 time(&t); 1700 1701 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { 1702 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1703 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1704 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) 1705 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1706 } 1707 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); 1708} 1709 1710int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1711{ 1712 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; 1713 int i, j; 1714 1715 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) 1716 return 1; 1717 1718 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 1719 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); 1720 if (ktmp == NULL) { 1721 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, 1722 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1723 return 0; 1724 } 1725 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1726 break; 1727 else { 1728 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1729 ktmp = NULL; 1730 } 1731 } 1732 if (ktmp == NULL) { 1733 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, 1734 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1735 return 0; 1736 } 1737 1738 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1739 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { 1740 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); 1741 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); 1742 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1743 } 1744 1745 if (pkey != NULL) 1746 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); 1747 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1748 return 1; 1749} 1750 1751int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, 1752 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1753 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, 1754 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1755{ 1756 /* 1757 * This function is (usually) called only once, by 1758 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). 1759 */ 1760 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1761 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1762} 1763 1764int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1765{ 1766 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); 1767} 1768 1769void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1770{ 1771 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); 1772} 1773 1774int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1775{ 1776 return ctx->error; 1777} 1778 1779void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1780{ 1781 ctx->error = err; 1782} 1783 1784int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1785{ 1786 return ctx->error_depth; 1787} 1788 1789X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1790{ 1791 return ctx->current_cert; 1792} 1793 1794STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1795{ 1796 return ctx->chain; 1797} 1798 1799STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1800{ 1801 int i; 1802 X509 *x; 1803 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1804 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) 1805 return NULL; 1806 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 1807 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1808 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1809 } 1810 return chain; 1811} 1812 1813X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1814{ 1815 return ctx->current_issuer; 1816} 1817 1818X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1819{ 1820 return ctx->current_crl; 1821} 1822 1823X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1824{ 1825 return ctx->parent; 1826} 1827 1828void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1829{ 1830 ctx->cert = x; 1831} 1832 1833void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1834{ 1835 ctx->untrusted = sk; 1836} 1837 1838void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1839{ 1840 ctx->crls = sk; 1841} 1842 1843int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1844{ 1845 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1846} 1847 1848int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1849{ 1850 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1851} 1852 1853/* 1854 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. 1855 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and 1856 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't 1857 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then 1858 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL 1859 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the 1860 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL 1861 * client/server. 1862 */ 1863 1864int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1865 int purpose, int trust) 1866{ 1867 int idx; 1868 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1869 if (!purpose) 1870 purpose = def_purpose; 1871 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1872 if (purpose) { 1873 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1874 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1875 if (idx == -1) { 1876 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1877 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1878 return 0; 1879 } 1880 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1881 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { 1882 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1883 if (idx == -1) { 1884 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1885 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1886 return 0; 1887 } 1888 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1889 } 1890 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1891 if (!trust) 1892 trust = ptmp->trust; 1893 } 1894 if (trust) { 1895 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1896 if (idx == -1) { 1897 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1898 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1899 return 0; 1900 } 1901 } 1902 1903 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) 1904 ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1905 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) 1906 ctx->param->trust = trust; 1907 return 1; 1908} 1909 1910X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1911{ 1912 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1913 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1914 if (!ctx) { 1915 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1916 return NULL; 1917 } 1918 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1919 return ctx; 1920} 1921 1922void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1923{ 1924 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1925 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1926} 1927 1928int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 1929 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1930{ 1931 int ret = 1; 1932 ctx->ctx = store; 1933 ctx->current_method = 0; 1934 ctx->cert = x509; 1935 ctx->untrusted = chain; 1936 ctx->crls = NULL; 1937 ctx->last_untrusted = 0; 1938 ctx->other_ctx = NULL; 1939 ctx->valid = 0; 1940 ctx->chain = NULL; 1941 ctx->error = 0; 1942 ctx->explicit_policy = 0; 1943 ctx->error_depth = 0; 1944 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 1945 ctx->current_issuer = NULL; 1946 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 1947 ctx->current_crl_score = 0; 1948 ctx->current_reasons = 0; 1949 ctx->tree = NULL; 1950 ctx->parent = NULL; 1951 1952 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 1953 1954 if (!ctx->param) { 1955 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1956 return 0; 1957 } 1958 1959 /* 1960 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. 1961 */ 1962 1963 if (store) 1964 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 1965 else 1966 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 1967 1968 if (store) { 1969 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1970 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 1971 } else 1972 ctx->cleanup = 0; 1973 1974 if (ret) 1975 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 1976 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 1977 1978 if (ret == 0) { 1979 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1980 return 0; 1981 } 1982 1983 if (store && store->check_issued) 1984 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 1985 else 1986 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 1987 1988 if (store && store->get_issuer) 1989 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 1990 else 1991 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 1992 1993 if (store && store->verify_cb) 1994 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1995 else 1996 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 1997 1998 if (store && store->verify) 1999 ctx->verify = store->verify; 2000 else 2001 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 2002 2003 if (store && store->check_revocation) 2004 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 2005 else 2006 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 2007 2008 if (store && store->get_crl) 2009 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 2010 else 2011 ctx->get_crl = NULL; 2012 2013 if (store && store->check_crl) 2014 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 2015 else 2016 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 2017 2018 if (store && store->cert_crl) 2019 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 2020 else 2021 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 2022 2023 if (store && store->lookup_certs) 2024 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; 2025 else 2026 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; 2027 2028 if (store && store->lookup_crls) 2029 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; 2030 else 2031 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; 2032 2033 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 2034 2035 /* 2036 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 2037 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 2038 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. 2039 */ 2040 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 2041 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 2042 &(ctx->ex_data))) { 2043 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 2044 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2045 return 0; 2046 } 2047 return 1; 2048} 2049 2050/* 2051 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This 2052 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 2053 */ 2054 2055void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 2056{ 2057 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 2058 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 2059} 2060 2061void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2062{ 2063 if (ctx->cleanup) 2064 ctx->cleanup(ctx); 2065 if (ctx->param != NULL) { 2066 if (ctx->parent == NULL) 2067 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2068 ctx->param = NULL; 2069 } 2070 if (ctx->tree != NULL) { 2071 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 2072 ctx->tree = NULL; 2073 } 2074 if (ctx->chain != NULL) { 2075 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); 2076 ctx->chain = NULL; 2077 } 2078 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 2079 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 2080} 2081 2082void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 2083{ 2084 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 2085} 2086 2087void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 2088{ 2089 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 2090} 2091 2092void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, 2093 time_t t) 2094{ 2095 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 2096} 2097 2098void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 2099 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 2100{ 2101 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; 2102} 2103 2104X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2105{ 2106 return ctx->tree; 2107} 2108 2109int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2110{ 2111 return ctx->explicit_policy; 2112} 2113 2114int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 2115{ 2116 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 2117 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 2118 if (!param) 2119 return 0; 2120 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 2121} 2122 2123X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 2124{ 2125 return ctx->param; 2126} 2127 2128void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 2129{ 2130 if (ctx->param) 2131 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 2132 ctx->param = param; 2133} 2134 2135IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 2136 2137IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 2138 2139IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 2140 2141IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2142 2143IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 2144