monitor.c revision 295367
1/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.150 2015/06/22 23:42:16 djm Exp $ */
2/*
3 * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4 * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5 * All rights reserved.
6 *
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15 *
16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26 */
27
28#include "includes.h"
29
30#include <sys/types.h>
31#include <sys/socket.h>
32#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
33#include <sys/wait.h>
34
35#include <errno.h>
36#include <fcntl.h>
37#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
38#include <paths.h>
39#endif
40#include <pwd.h>
41#include <signal.h>
42#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
43#include <stdint.h>
44#endif
45#include <stdlib.h>
46#include <string.h>
47#include <stdarg.h>
48#include <stdio.h>
49#include <unistd.h>
50#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
51#include <poll.h>
52#else
53# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
54#  include <sys/poll.h>
55# endif
56#endif
57
58#ifdef SKEY
59#include <skey.h>
60#endif
61
62#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
63#include <openssl/dh.h>
64#endif
65
66#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
67#include "atomicio.h"
68#include "xmalloc.h"
69#include "ssh.h"
70#include "key.h"
71#include "buffer.h"
72#include "hostfile.h"
73#include "auth.h"
74#include "cipher.h"
75#include "kex.h"
76#include "dh.h"
77#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC	/* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
78#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
79#include "zlib.h"
80#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
81#else
82#include "zlib.h"
83#endif
84#include "packet.h"
85#include "auth-options.h"
86#include "sshpty.h"
87#include "channels.h"
88#include "session.h"
89#include "sshlogin.h"
90#include "canohost.h"
91#include "log.h"
92#include "misc.h"
93#include "servconf.h"
94#include "monitor.h"
95#include "monitor_mm.h"
96#ifdef GSSAPI
97#include "ssh-gss.h"
98#endif
99#include "monitor_wrap.h"
100#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
101#include "compat.h"
102#include "ssh2.h"
103#include "roaming.h"
104#include "authfd.h"
105#include "match.h"
106#include "ssherr.h"
107
108#ifdef GSSAPI
109static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
110#endif
111
112/* Imports */
113extern ServerOptions options;
114extern u_int utmp_len;
115extern u_char session_id[];
116extern Buffer auth_debug;
117extern int auth_debug_init;
118extern Buffer loginmsg;
119
120/* State exported from the child */
121static struct sshbuf *child_state;
122
123/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
124
125int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
126int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
127int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
128int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
129int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
130int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
131int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
132int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
133int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
134int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
135int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
136int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
137int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
138int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
139int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
140int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
141int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
142int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
143int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
144int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
145
146#ifdef USE_PAM
147int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
148int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
149int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
151int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
152int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
153#endif
154
155#ifdef GSSAPI
156int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
157int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
158int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
159int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
160#endif
161
162#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
163int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
164int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
165#endif
166
167static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
168
169static Authctxt *authctxt;
170
171#ifdef WITH_SSH1
172static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
173#endif
174
175/* local state for key verify */
176static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
177static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
178static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
179static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
180static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
181static char *auth_method = "unknown";
182static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
183static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
184static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
185static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
186
187struct mon_table {
188	enum monitor_reqtype type;
189	int flags;
190	int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
191};
192
193#define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
194#define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
195#define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
196#define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
197
198#define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
199
200#define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
201
202struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
203#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
204    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
205#endif
206    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
207    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
208    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
209    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
210    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
211#ifdef USE_PAM
212    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
213    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
214    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
215    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
216    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
217    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
218#endif
219#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
220    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
221#endif
222#ifdef BSD_AUTH
223    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
224    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
225#endif
226#ifdef SKEY
227    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
228    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
229#endif
230    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
231    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
232#ifdef GSSAPI
233    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
234    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
235    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
236    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
237#endif
238    {0, 0, NULL}
239};
240
241struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
242#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
243    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
244#endif
245    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
246    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
247    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
248    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
249#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
250    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
251    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
252#endif
253    {0, 0, NULL}
254};
255
256struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
257#ifdef WITH_SSH1
258    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
259    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
260    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
261    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
262    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
263    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
264    {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
265    {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
266#ifdef BSD_AUTH
267    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
268    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
269#endif
270#ifdef SKEY
271    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
272    {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
273#endif
274#ifdef USE_PAM
275    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
276    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
277    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
278    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
279    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
280    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
281#endif
282#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
283    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
284#endif
285#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
286    {0, 0, NULL}
287};
288
289struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
290#ifdef WITH_SSH1
291    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
292    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
293    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
294#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
295    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
296    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
297#endif
298#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
299    {0, 0, NULL}
300};
301
302struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
303
304/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
305
306static void
307monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
308{
309	while (ent->f != NULL) {
310		if (ent->type == type) {
311			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
312			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
313			return;
314		}
315		ent++;
316	}
317}
318
319static void
320monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
321{
322	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
323
324	while (ent->f != NULL) {
325		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
326			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
327			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
328		}
329		ent++;
330	}
331}
332
333void
334monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
335{
336	struct mon_table *ent;
337	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
338
339	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
340
341	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
342	close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
343	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
344
345	authctxt = _authctxt;
346	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
347
348	authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
349
350	if (compat20) {
351		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
352
353		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
354		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
355		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
356	} else {
357		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
358
359		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
360	}
361
362	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
363	while (!authenticated) {
364		partial = 0;
365		auth_method = "unknown";
366		auth_submethod = NULL;
367		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
368
369		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
370		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
371			if (!compat20)
372				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
373				    "with SSH protocol 1");
374			if (authenticated &&
375			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
376			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
377				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
378				    auth_method);
379				authenticated = 0;
380				partial = 1;
381			}
382		}
383
384		if (authenticated) {
385			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
386				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
387				    __func__, ent->type);
388			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
389			    !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
390				authenticated = 0;
391#ifdef USE_PAM
392			/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
393			if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
394				Buffer m;
395
396				buffer_init(&m);
397				mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
398				    MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
399				authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
400				buffer_free(&m);
401			}
402#endif
403		}
404		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
405			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
406			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
407			if (!partial && !authenticated)
408				authctxt->failures++;
409		}
410	}
411
412	if (!authctxt->valid)
413		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
414	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
415		fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
416
417	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
418	    __func__, authctxt->user);
419
420	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
421
422	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
423	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
424		;
425
426	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
427	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
428	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
429}
430
431static void
432monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
433{
434	monitor_child_pid = pid;
435}
436
437static void
438monitor_child_handler(int sig)
439{
440	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
441}
442
443void
444monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
445{
446	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
447	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
448
449	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
450	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
451	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
452	signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
453#ifdef SIGXFSZ
454	signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
455#endif
456
457	if (compat20) {
458		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
459
460		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
461		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
462		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
463		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
464	} else {
465		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
466		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
467	}
468	if (!no_pty_flag) {
469		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
470		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
471	}
472
473	for (;;)
474		monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
475}
476
477void
478monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
479{
480	if (options.compression) {
481		/* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
482		mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
483	}
484}
485
486/* Allocation functions for zlib */
487static void *
488mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
489{
490	size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
491	void *address;
492
493	if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
494		fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
495
496	address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
497
498	return (address);
499}
500
501static void
502mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
503{
504	mm_free(mm, address);
505}
506
507static int
508monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
509{
510	Buffer logmsg;
511	u_int len, level;
512	char *msg;
513
514	buffer_init(&logmsg);
515
516	/* Read length */
517	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
518	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
519	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
520		if (errno == EPIPE) {
521			buffer_free(&logmsg);
522			debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
523			close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
524			pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
525			return -1;
526		}
527		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
528	}
529	len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
530	if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
531		fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
532
533	/* Read severity, message */
534	buffer_clear(&logmsg);
535	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
536	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
537	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
538		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
539
540	/* Log it */
541	level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
542	msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
543	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
544		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
545		    __func__, level);
546	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
547
548	buffer_free(&logmsg);
549	free(msg);
550
551	return 0;
552}
553
554int
555monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
556    struct mon_table **pent)
557{
558	Buffer m;
559	int ret;
560	u_char type;
561	struct pollfd pfd[2];
562
563	for (;;) {
564		memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
565		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
566		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
567		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
568		pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
569		if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
570			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
571				continue;
572			fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
573		}
574		if (pfd[1].revents) {
575			/*
576			 * Drain all log messages before processing next
577			 * monitor request.
578			 */
579			monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
580			continue;
581		}
582		if (pfd[0].revents)
583			break;  /* Continues below */
584	}
585
586	buffer_init(&m);
587
588	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
589	type = buffer_get_char(&m);
590
591	debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
592
593	while (ent->f != NULL) {
594		if (ent->type == type)
595			break;
596		ent++;
597	}
598
599	if (ent->f != NULL) {
600		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
601			fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
602			    type);
603		ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
604		buffer_free(&m);
605
606		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
607		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
608			debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
609			    type);
610			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
611		}
612
613		if (pent != NULL)
614			*pent = ent;
615
616		return ret;
617	}
618
619	fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
620
621	/* NOTREACHED */
622	return (-1);
623}
624
625/* allowed key state */
626static int
627monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
628{
629	/* make sure key is allowed */
630	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
631	    timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
632		return (0);
633	return (1);
634}
635
636static void
637monitor_reset_key_state(void)
638{
639	/* reset state */
640	free(key_blob);
641	free(hostbased_cuser);
642	free(hostbased_chost);
643	key_blob = NULL;
644	key_bloblen = 0;
645	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
646	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
647	hostbased_chost = NULL;
648}
649
650#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
651int
652mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
653{
654	DH *dh;
655	int min, want, max;
656
657	min = buffer_get_int(m);
658	want = buffer_get_int(m);
659	max = buffer_get_int(m);
660
661	debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
662	    __func__, min, want, max);
663	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
664	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
665		fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
666		    __func__, min, want, max);
667
668	buffer_clear(m);
669
670	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
671	if (dh == NULL) {
672		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
673		return (0);
674	} else {
675		/* Send first bignum */
676		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
677		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
678		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
679
680		DH_free(dh);
681	}
682	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
683	return (0);
684}
685#endif
686
687int
688mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
689{
690	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; 	/* XXX */
691	extern int auth_sock;			/* XXX move to state struct? */
692	struct sshkey *key;
693	struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
694	u_char *p;
695	u_char *signature;
696	size_t datlen, siglen;
697	int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
698	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
699
700	debug3("%s", __func__);
701
702	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
703	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
704		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
705
706	/*
707	 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
708	 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
709	 *
710	 * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
711	 * proof.
712	 *
713	 * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
714	 * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
715	 * than the full kex structure...
716	 */
717	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
718		/*
719		 * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
720		 * the client sent us.
721		 */
722		if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
723			fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
724		if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
725			fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
726		if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
727			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
728		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
729		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
730		    session_id2_len) != 0) ||
731		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
732			fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
733			    "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
734		if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
735		    memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
736			fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
737			    __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
738		sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
739		is_proof = 1;
740	}
741
742	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
743	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
744		session_id2_len = datlen;
745		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
746		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
747	}
748
749	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
750		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
751		    datafellows)) != 0)
752			fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
753			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
754	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
755	    auth_sock > 0) {
756		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
757		    p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
758			fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
759			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
760		}
761	} else
762		fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
763
764	debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
765	    is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
766
767	sshbuf_reset(m);
768	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
769		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
770
771	free(p);
772	free(signature);
773
774	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
775
776	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
777	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
778
779	return (0);
780}
781
782/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
783
784int
785mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
786{
787	char *username;
788	struct passwd *pwent;
789	int allowed = 0;
790	u_int i;
791
792	debug3("%s", __func__);
793
794	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
795		fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
796
797	username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
798
799	pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
800
801	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
802	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
803	free(username);
804
805	buffer_clear(m);
806
807	if (pwent == NULL) {
808		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
809		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
810		goto out;
811	}
812
813	allowed = 1;
814	authctxt->pw = pwent;
815	authctxt->valid = 1;
816
817	buffer_put_char(m, 1);
818	buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
819	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
820	buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
821#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
822	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
823#endif
824#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
825	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
826#endif
827	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
828	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
829
830 out:
831	buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
832
833#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
834		if (options.x != NULL) \
835			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
836	} while (0)
837#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
838		for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
839			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
840	} while (0)
841	/* See comment in servconf.h */
842	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
843#undef M_CP_STROPT
844#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
845
846	/* Create valid auth method lists */
847	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
848		/*
849		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
850		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
851		 * authentication to succeed.
852		 */
853		debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
854	}
855
856	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
857	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
858
859	/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
860	if (!compat20)
861		monitor_permit_authentications(1);
862	else {
863		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
864		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
865		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
866	}
867#ifdef USE_PAM
868	if (options.use_pam)
869		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
870#endif
871
872	return (0);
873}
874
875int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
876{
877	char *banner;
878
879	buffer_clear(m);
880	banner = auth2_read_banner();
881	buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
882	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
883	free(banner);
884
885	return (0);
886}
887
888int
889mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
890{
891	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
892
893	authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
894	authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
895	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
896	    __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
897
898	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
899		free(authctxt->style);
900		authctxt->style = NULL;
901	}
902
903	return (0);
904}
905
906int
907mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
908{
909	static int call_count;
910	char *passwd;
911	int authenticated;
912	u_int plen;
913
914	passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
915	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
916	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
917	    auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
918	explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
919	free(passwd);
920
921	buffer_clear(m);
922	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
923
924	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
925	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
926
927	call_count++;
928	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
929		auth_method = "none";
930	else
931		auth_method = "password";
932
933	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
934	return (authenticated);
935}
936
937#ifdef BSD_AUTH
938int
939mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
940{
941	char *name, *infotxt;
942	u_int numprompts;
943	u_int *echo_on;
944	char **prompts;
945	u_int success;
946
947	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
948	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
949
950	buffer_clear(m);
951	buffer_put_int(m, success);
952	if (success)
953		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
954
955	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
956	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
957
958	if (success) {
959		free(name);
960		free(infotxt);
961		free(prompts);
962		free(echo_on);
963	}
964
965	return (0);
966}
967
968int
969mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
970{
971	char *response;
972	int authok;
973
974	if (authctxt->as == 0)
975		fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
976
977	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
978	authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
979	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
980	authctxt->as = NULL;
981	debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
982	free(response);
983
984	buffer_clear(m);
985	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
986
987	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
988	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
989
990	if (compat20) {
991		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
992		auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
993	} else
994		auth_method = "bsdauth";
995
996	return (authok != 0);
997}
998#endif
999
1000#ifdef SKEY
1001int
1002mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1003{
1004	struct skey skey;
1005	char challenge[1024];
1006	u_int success;
1007
1008	success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
1009	    sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1010
1011	buffer_clear(m);
1012	buffer_put_int(m, success);
1013	if (success)
1014		buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
1015
1016	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1017	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
1018
1019	return (0);
1020}
1021
1022int
1023mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1024{
1025	char *response;
1026	int authok;
1027
1028	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1029
1030	authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
1031	    authctxt->valid &&
1032	    skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
1033	    skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
1034
1035	free(response);
1036
1037	buffer_clear(m);
1038	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
1039
1040	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1041	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
1042
1043	auth_method = "skey";
1044
1045	return (authok != 0);
1046}
1047#endif
1048
1049#ifdef USE_PAM
1050int
1051mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
1052{
1053	if (!options.use_pam)
1054		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
1055
1056	start_pam(authctxt);
1057
1058	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
1059
1060	return (0);
1061}
1062
1063int
1064mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
1065{
1066	u_int ret;
1067
1068	if (!options.use_pam)
1069		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
1070
1071	ret = do_pam_account();
1072
1073	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1074	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1075
1076	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
1077
1078	return (ret);
1079}
1080
1081static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
1082extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
1083
1084int
1085mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1086{
1087	debug3("%s", __func__);
1088	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
1089	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1090	buffer_clear(m);
1091	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
1092		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
1093		buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1094	} else {
1095		buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1096	}
1097	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
1098	return (0);
1099}
1100
1101int
1102mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
1103{
1104	char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
1105	u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
1106	int ret;
1107
1108	debug3("%s", __func__);
1109	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1110	ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
1111	if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
1112		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1113	if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
1114		ret = -1;
1115	buffer_clear(m);
1116	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1117	buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
1118	free(name);
1119	buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
1120	free(info);
1121	buffer_put_int(m, num);
1122	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
1123		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
1124		free(prompts[i]);
1125		buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
1126	}
1127	free(prompts);
1128	free(echo_on);
1129	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1130	auth_submethod = "pam";
1131	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
1132	return (0);
1133}
1134
1135int
1136mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1137{
1138	char **resp;
1139	u_int i, num;
1140	int ret;
1141
1142	debug3("%s", __func__);
1143	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1144	num = buffer_get_int(m);
1145	if (num > 0) {
1146		resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
1147		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
1148			resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1149		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
1150		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
1151			free(resp[i]);
1152		free(resp);
1153	} else {
1154		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
1155	}
1156	buffer_clear(m);
1157	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1158	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
1159	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1160	auth_submethod = "pam";
1161	if (ret == 0)
1162		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1163	return (0);
1164}
1165
1166int
1167mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1168{
1169	int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
1170
1171	debug3("%s", __func__);
1172	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
1173	sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
1174	buffer_clear(m);
1175	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
1176	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1177	auth_submethod = "pam";
1178	return r;
1179}
1180#endif
1181
1182int
1183mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1184{
1185	Key *key;
1186	char *cuser, *chost;
1187	u_char *blob;
1188	u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
1189	enum mm_keytype type = 0;
1190	int allowed = 0;
1191
1192	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1193
1194	type = buffer_get_int(m);
1195	cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1196	chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1197	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1198	pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
1199
1200	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1201
1202	if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
1203	    (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1204		fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1205
1206	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1207
1208	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1209		/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
1210		if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
1211		    (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
1212			fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
1213
1214		switch (type) {
1215		case MM_USERKEY:
1216			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1217			    !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1218			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1219			    options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1220			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
1221			    pubkey_auth_attempt);
1222			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1223			auth_method = "publickey";
1224			if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
1225			    (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
1226				auth_clear_options();
1227			break;
1228		case MM_HOSTKEY:
1229			allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1230			    match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1231			    options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1232			    hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1233			    cuser, chost, key);
1234			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
1235			    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
1236			    cuser, chost);
1237			auth_method = "hostbased";
1238			break;
1239#ifdef WITH_SSH1
1240		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
1241			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1242			allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
1243			    auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1244			    cuser, chost, key);
1245			if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
1246				auth_clear_options();
1247			auth_method = "rsa";
1248			break;
1249#endif
1250		default:
1251			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1252			break;
1253		}
1254	}
1255	if (key != NULL)
1256		key_free(key);
1257
1258	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
1259	monitor_reset_key_state();
1260
1261	if (allowed) {
1262		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1263		key_blob = blob;
1264		key_bloblen = bloblen;
1265		key_blobtype = type;
1266		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
1267		hostbased_chost = chost;
1268	} else {
1269		/* Log failed attempt */
1270		auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1271		free(blob);
1272		free(cuser);
1273		free(chost);
1274	}
1275
1276	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1277	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1278
1279	buffer_clear(m);
1280	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1281	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1282
1283	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1284
1285	if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1286		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1287
1288	return (0);
1289}
1290
1291static int
1292monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1293{
1294	Buffer b;
1295	char *p, *userstyle;
1296	u_int len;
1297	int fail = 0;
1298
1299	buffer_init(&b);
1300	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1301
1302	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1303		p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1304		len = buffer_len(&b);
1305		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1306		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
1307		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1308			fail++;
1309		buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1310	} else {
1311		p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1312		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1313		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1314		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1315			fail++;
1316		free(p);
1317	}
1318	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1319		fail++;
1320	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1321	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1322	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1323	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1324	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1325		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1326		    userstyle, p);
1327		fail++;
1328	}
1329	free(userstyle);
1330	free(p);
1331	buffer_skip_string(&b);
1332	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1333		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1334			fail++;
1335	} else {
1336		p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1337		if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1338			fail++;
1339		free(p);
1340		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1341			fail++;
1342		buffer_skip_string(&b);
1343	}
1344	buffer_skip_string(&b);
1345	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1346		fail++;
1347	buffer_free(&b);
1348	return (fail == 0);
1349}
1350
1351static int
1352monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1353    char *chost)
1354{
1355	Buffer b;
1356	char *p, *userstyle;
1357	u_int len;
1358	int fail = 0;
1359
1360	buffer_init(&b);
1361	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1362
1363	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1364	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1365	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1366	    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1367		fail++;
1368	free(p);
1369
1370	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1371		fail++;
1372	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1373	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1374	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1375	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1376	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1377		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1378		    userstyle, p);
1379		fail++;
1380	}
1381	free(userstyle);
1382	free(p);
1383	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* service */
1384	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1385	if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1386		fail++;
1387	free(p);
1388	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkalg */
1389	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkblob */
1390
1391	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1392	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1393	if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1394		p[len - 1] = '\0';
1395	if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1396		fail++;
1397	free(p);
1398
1399	/* verify client user */
1400	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1401	if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1402		fail++;
1403	free(p);
1404
1405	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1406		fail++;
1407	buffer_free(&b);
1408	return (fail == 0);
1409}
1410
1411int
1412mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1413{
1414	Key *key;
1415	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1416	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1417	int verified = 0;
1418	int valid_data = 0;
1419
1420	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1421	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1422	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1423
1424	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1425	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1426		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1427
1428	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1429	if (key == NULL)
1430		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1431
1432	switch (key_blobtype) {
1433	case MM_USERKEY:
1434		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1435		break;
1436	case MM_HOSTKEY:
1437		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1438		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1439		break;
1440	default:
1441		valid_data = 0;
1442		break;
1443	}
1444	if (!valid_data)
1445		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1446
1447	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1448	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1449	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1450
1451	/* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1452	if (verified == 1)
1453		auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1454	else
1455		key_free(key);
1456
1457	free(blob);
1458	free(signature);
1459	free(data);
1460
1461	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1462
1463	monitor_reset_key_state();
1464
1465	buffer_clear(m);
1466	buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1467	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1468
1469	return (verified == 1);
1470}
1471
1472static void
1473mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1474{
1475	socklen_t fromlen;
1476	struct sockaddr_storage from;
1477
1478	if (options.use_login)
1479		return;
1480
1481	/*
1482	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1483	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1484	 */
1485	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1486	fromlen = sizeof(from);
1487	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1488		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1489		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1490			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1491			cleanup_exit(255);
1492		}
1493	}
1494	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1495	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1496	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1497	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1498}
1499
1500static void
1501mm_session_close(Session *s)
1502{
1503	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1504	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1505		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1506		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1507	}
1508	session_unused(s->self);
1509}
1510
1511int
1512mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1513{
1514	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1515	Session *s;
1516	int res, fd0;
1517
1518	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1519
1520	buffer_clear(m);
1521	s = session_new();
1522	if (s == NULL)
1523		goto error;
1524	s->authctxt = authctxt;
1525	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1526	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1527	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1528	if (res == 0)
1529		goto error;
1530	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1531
1532	buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1533	buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1534
1535	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
1536	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1537		fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1538
1539	mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1540
1541	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1542	close(0);
1543
1544	/* send messages generated by record_login */
1545	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1546	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1547
1548	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1549
1550	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1551	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1552		fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1553
1554	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1555	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1556		fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1557	if (fd0 != 0)
1558		error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1559
1560	/* slave is not needed */
1561	close(s->ttyfd);
1562	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1563	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1564	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1565
1566	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1567
1568	return (0);
1569
1570 error:
1571	if (s != NULL)
1572		mm_session_close(s);
1573	buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1574	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1575	return (0);
1576}
1577
1578int
1579mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1580{
1581	Session *s;
1582	char *tty;
1583
1584	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1585
1586	tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1587	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1588		mm_session_close(s);
1589	buffer_clear(m);
1590	free(tty);
1591	return (0);
1592}
1593
1594#ifdef WITH_SSH1
1595int
1596mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1597{
1598	BIGNUM *p;
1599	int rsafail;
1600
1601	/* Turn off permissions */
1602	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1603
1604	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1605		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1606
1607	buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1608
1609	rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1610
1611	buffer_clear(m);
1612	buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1613	buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1614
1615	BN_clear_free(p);
1616
1617	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1618
1619	/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1620	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1621
1622	return (0);
1623}
1624
1625int
1626mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1627{
1628	int i;
1629
1630	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1631
1632	if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1633		fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1634	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1635		session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1636
1637	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1638	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1639
1640	return (0);
1641}
1642
1643int
1644mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1645{
1646	BIGNUM *client_n;
1647	Key *key = NULL;
1648	u_char *blob = NULL;
1649	u_int blen = 0;
1650	int allowed = 0;
1651
1652	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1653
1654	auth_method = "rsa";
1655	if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1656		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1657			fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1658		buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1659		allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1660		BN_clear_free(client_n);
1661	}
1662	buffer_clear(m);
1663	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1664	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1665
1666	/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1667	monitor_reset_key_state();
1668
1669	if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1670		key->type = KEY_RSA;	/* cheat for key_to_blob */
1671		if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1672			fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1673		buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1674
1675		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1676		key_blob = blob;
1677		key_bloblen = blen;
1678		key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1679	}
1680	if (key != NULL)
1681		key_free(key);
1682
1683	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1684
1685	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1686	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1687	return (0);
1688}
1689
1690int
1691mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1692{
1693	Key *key = NULL;
1694	u_char *blob;
1695	u_int blen;
1696
1697	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1698
1699	if (!authctxt->valid)
1700		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1701	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1702	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1703		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1704	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1705		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1706	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1707		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1708	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1709		fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1710	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1711	if (ssh1_challenge)
1712		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1713	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1714
1715	buffer_clear(m);
1716	buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1717
1718	debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1719	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1720
1721	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1722
1723	free(blob);
1724	key_free(key);
1725	return (0);
1726}
1727
1728int
1729mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1730{
1731	Key *key = NULL;
1732	u_char *blob, *response;
1733	u_int blen, len;
1734	int success;
1735
1736	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1737
1738	if (!authctxt->valid)
1739		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1740	if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1741		fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1742
1743	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1744	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1745		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1746	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1747		fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1748	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1749		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1750	response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1751	if (len != 16)
1752		fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1753	success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1754
1755	free(blob);
1756	key_free(key);
1757	free(response);
1758
1759	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1760
1761	/* reset state */
1762	BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1763	ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1764	monitor_reset_key_state();
1765
1766	buffer_clear(m);
1767	buffer_put_int(m, success);
1768	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1769
1770	return (success);
1771}
1772#endif
1773
1774int
1775mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1776{
1777	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1778	int res, status;
1779
1780	debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1781
1782	/* The child is terminating */
1783	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1784
1785#ifdef USE_PAM
1786	if (options.use_pam)
1787		sshpam_cleanup();
1788#endif
1789
1790	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1791		if (errno != EINTR)
1792			exit(1);
1793
1794	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1795
1796	/* Terminate process */
1797	exit(res);
1798}
1799
1800#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1801/* Report that an audit event occurred */
1802int
1803mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
1804{
1805	ssh_audit_event_t event;
1806
1807	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1808
1809	event = buffer_get_int(m);
1810	switch(event) {
1811	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
1812	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
1813	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
1814	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
1815	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
1816	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
1817	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
1818		audit_event(event);
1819		break;
1820	default:
1821		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
1822	}
1823
1824	return (0);
1825}
1826
1827int
1828mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
1829{
1830	u_int len;
1831	char *cmd;
1832
1833	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1834	cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1835	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
1836	audit_run_command(cmd);
1837	free(cmd);
1838	return (0);
1839}
1840#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
1841
1842void
1843monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1844{
1845	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;	/* XXX */
1846	struct kex *kex;
1847	int r;
1848
1849	debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1850	if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1851                fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1852	sshbuf_free(child_state);
1853	child_state = NULL;
1854
1855	if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
1856		/* XXX set callbacks */
1857#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1858		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1859		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1860		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1861		kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1862# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
1863		kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1864# endif
1865#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
1866		kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1867		kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1868		kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1869		kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1870		kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1871	}
1872
1873	/* Update with new address */
1874	if (options.compression) {
1875		ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1876		    (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1877		    (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1878	}
1879}
1880
1881/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1882
1883void
1884mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1885{
1886	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1887
1888	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1889		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1890	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1891	    child_state);
1892	debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1893}
1894
1895
1896/* XXX */
1897
1898#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1899	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1900		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1901} while (0)
1902
1903static void
1904monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1905{
1906	int pair[2];
1907
1908	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1909		fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1910	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1911	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1912	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1913	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1914
1915	if (do_logfds) {
1916		if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1917			fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1918		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1919		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1920		mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1921		mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1922	} else
1923		mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1924}
1925
1926#define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
1927
1928struct monitor *
1929monitor_init(void)
1930{
1931	struct ssh *ssh = active_state;			/* XXX */
1932	struct monitor *mon;
1933
1934	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1935
1936	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1937
1938	/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1939	if (options.compression) {
1940		mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1941		mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1942
1943		/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1944		ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1945		    (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1946		    (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1947	}
1948
1949	return mon;
1950}
1951
1952void
1953monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1954{
1955	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1956}
1957
1958#ifdef GSSAPI
1959int
1960mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1961{
1962	gss_OID_desc goid;
1963	OM_uint32 major;
1964	u_int len;
1965
1966	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1967	goid.length = len;
1968
1969	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1970
1971	free(goid.elements);
1972
1973	buffer_clear(m);
1974	buffer_put_int(m, major);
1975
1976	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1977
1978	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1979	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1980
1981	return (0);
1982}
1983
1984int
1985mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1986{
1987	gss_buffer_desc in;
1988	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1989	OM_uint32 major, minor;
1990	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1991	u_int len;
1992
1993	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1994	in.length = len;
1995	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1996	free(in.value);
1997
1998	buffer_clear(m);
1999	buffer_put_int(m, major);
2000	buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
2001	buffer_put_int(m, flags);
2002	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
2003
2004	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
2005
2006	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
2007		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
2008		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2009		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
2010	}
2011	return (0);
2012}
2013
2014int
2015mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
2016{
2017	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
2018	OM_uint32 ret;
2019	u_int len;
2020
2021	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2022	gssbuf.length = len;
2023	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
2024	mic.length = len;
2025
2026	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
2027
2028	free(gssbuf.value);
2029	free(mic.value);
2030
2031	buffer_clear(m);
2032	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
2033
2034	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
2035
2036	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
2037		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
2038
2039	return (0);
2040}
2041
2042int
2043mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
2044{
2045	int authenticated;
2046
2047	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
2048
2049	buffer_clear(m);
2050	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2051
2052	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2053	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
2054
2055	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
2056
2057	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
2058	return (authenticated);
2059}
2060#endif /* GSSAPI */
2061
2062